Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy. Empty Persons

239 Pages·2003·82.41 MB·English

by  Mark Siderits

PERSONAL IDENTITY
AND BUDDIDST PIDLOSOPHY
What does it mean to be a person? The philosophical problem ofp ersonal identity has
been the subject ofm uch debate in both Western philosophy and Buddhist philosophy.
This book initiates a conversation between the two traditions showing how concepts
and tools drawn from one philosophical tradition can help solve problems arising in
another, particularly as regards the philosophical investigation of persons.
The recent controversy over personal identity has concerned reductionism, the view
that persons are mere useful fictions. Mark Siderits explores the most important
objections that have been raised to reductionism, and shows how some key arguments
and semantic tools from early Buddhism can be used to answer those objections.
Buddhist resources are used to examine the important ethical consequences of this
view of persons. The second halfo ft he book explores a new objection to reductionism
about persons that originates in Mahayana Buddhist philosophy.
Contents
Preface ix
Introduction xi
1 Situating Reductionism I
Ontological reductionism about persons, and the alternative views
2 Refuting the Self 17
Reductionist arguments against the view that the continued existence
of a person involves the existence of a self
3 Getting Impersonal 35
Replying to various objections to Reductionism and its impersonal
description thesis using Buddhist resources
4 Wholes, Parts and Supervenience 75
Might persons and other wholes have an ontological status more
exalted than that of mere conceptual fiction?
s Ironic Engagement 99
The ethical consequences of Buddhist Reductionism
6 Establishing Emptiness 113
A new objection to Reductionism: the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness
as a distinctive form of global anti-realism, and the anti-realist
challenge to Reductionism
7 Empty Knowledge 139
The epistemological consequences of the doctrine of emptiness
8 The Turn of the True 157
The semantic consequences of the doctrine of emptiness
vii
viii Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy
9 Empty Persons 197
The ethical consequences of the doctrine of emptiness
Appendix: A Buddhist Nominalist Semantics 211
Bibliography 219
Index
229
Preface
Analytic philosophy and Buddhist philosophy share a fundamental commitment to
trying to attain complete clarity about the matters they investigate. One such matter is
what it means to be a person. Both traditions contain long and complex debates over
questions concerning their mode of existence and the properties that attach to them. In
this work I have tried to bring the two traditions into dialogue with one another over
some key issues in the philosophical investigation of persons. While I know that the
results fall short of complete clarity, I hope I have made some progress toward that
goal. If so, there are many people I must thank.
David Anderson and Kenton Machina have proven invaluable conversational
partners over the years.l consider myselft ruly fortunate in having two such colleagues
- analytic philosophers who are willing (sometimes even eager) to discover how a
non-Western philosophical tradition might contribute to a current debate. Not only did
I learn much from my interactions with them, but without their examples I might have
despaired of the possibility of finding an audience for 'fusion' philosophy.
I have gained much from my many long philosophical conversations with Arindam
Chakrabarti over the years, and I hope he will not be chagrined by the fruit these have
borne here. Roy Perrett provided many valuable comments on earlier drafts of the
first part of this book, as well as a great deal of extremely helpful bibliographic
information. Chakraborti Ram-Prasad had useful things to say about some of the
material in the second half. And special thanks must go to Amita Chatterji, who
introduced me to some of the exciting work being done at Jadavpur University.
As this work developed, portions of it were presented to a number of philosophy
departments, and I must thank them all for useful comments and general
encouragement. Portions of Chapter 3 were the basis of talks at Otago University
(Dunedin), at Massey University (Palmerston North), and at Rabindra Bharati
University (Calcutta). Parts of Chapter 4 were presented at Canterbury University
(Christchurch), Jadavpur University (Calcutta), and to the Philosophy of Religions
program at University of Chicago. Parts of Chapter 5 were presented to the Friday
Seminar, Calcutta, where Kalipada Bakshi, Tara Chatterjea and Shefali Moitra all
raised important points. Finally, my colleagues and friends in the joint philosophy
colloquium series of Illinois State University and Illinois Wesleyan University heard
earlier versions of some of the material in Chapters 1, 3 and 7; I especially wish to
thank Carl Gillett and Michael Gorr for useful discussion and feedback.
I should also like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to my many
students who over the years have demanded clarity in the presentation of
philosophical ideas.
If persons are ultimately empty, then there is no person who is ultimately to blame
for any mistakes in these pages. Mistakes were made nonetheless - despite all the
helpful advice, comments and criticism made by those mentioned here and by others.
The ultimate responsibility for those mistakes must rest with me alone.
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