Table Of Content

P e r s i a n D r e a m s Related titles fRom Potomac Books The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terror—Paul murphy The Wars of Edvard Shevardnadze, Second Edition, Revised and Updated—melvin Goodman and Carolyn m. ekedahl Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin’s Russia and the End of Revolution, Updated Edition—Peter Baker and susan Glasser P e r s i a n Moscow and Tehran D r e a m s Since the Fall of the Shah J o h n W. Pa r k e r Potomac Books, Inc. WashIngton, D.c. Copyright © 2009 by John W. Parker Published in the United States by Potomac Books, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission from the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. The views expressed in this book are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of State or the U.S. government. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Parker, John W., 1945– Persian dreams : Moscow and Tehran since the fall of the Shah / John W. Parker. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-59797-236-9 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Soviet Union—Foreign relations—Iran. 2. Iran--Foreign relations—Soviet Union. 3. Russia (Federation)—Foreign relations—Iran. 4. Iran—Foreign relations—Russia (Federation) I. Title. DK68.7.I7P36 2009 327.47055—dc22 2008033716 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper that meets the American National Standards Institute Z39-48 Standard. Potomac Books, Inc. 22841 Quicksilver Drive Dulles, Virginia 20166 First Edition 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 For susan Contents Preface ix 1 From the Shahs to the Ayatollah 1 2 Gorbachev and Khomeini: Perestroika Pen Pals 23 3 Soviet Collapse: Revanche or Accommodation? 39 4 Tajikistan: “Greater Iran” or “Near Abroad”? 57 5 The Bait of “Strategic Partnership” 83 6 Kilo Subs, Bushehr, and Shahab 103 7 The Putin Factor 129 8 Caspian Tempests 147 9 Taliban Threats, Tajik Accords, and U.S.-Iran Talks 169 10 9/11 and Afghanistan 183 11 No “Strategic Partnership” 207 12 Operation Iraqi Freedom 223 13 The Ahmadinejad Shock Wave 247 14 Beyond Turkmanchai? 273 Postscript: The Road to Tehran 301 Notes 311 Selected Bibliography 393 Index 405 About the Author 417 Preface moscow’s ties with the new Islamic Republic of Iran underwent dramatic fluc- tuations in the quarter-century following Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s triumphant return to Tehran in early 1979. After a prolonged implosion, they fitfully expanded. By summer 2006, as Iran forged ahead with its nuclear program and Iranian- backed Shia and Sunni forces flexed their muscles across the Middle East, Russian- Iranian relations again appeared to be on the threshold of an entirely new dynamic. This book looks at Moscow’s motives and approaches to dealing with Tehran, shaped not only by the rush of events in the period examined but by centuries of ingrained practices, prejudices, fears, and hopes. It weaves into the public record the recollections and analyses of Russian politicians, diplomats, and experts who dealt directly with Iran, both under the Pahlavi monarchy and after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In both capitals, a variety of imperatives combined to override what was otherwise a mutual aversion going far back in history. Russians in fact were particularly repulsed by the fanaticism of the Khomeini-inspired theocratic regime. By 1996–97, however, the relationship had grown fairly solid—if still filled with wariness on both sides—and was even described as “strategic” by some. Even at their low point, however, when there were no nuclear power plants or conventional weapons contracts to protect, the dominant approach in Moscow was the same as when ties were at their peak. Iran was a big neighbor, went the Russian refrain, with whom close contacts had always to be maintained lest Tehran behave badly towards Moscow’s interests in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East. This outlook in part reflected Moscow’s sense of vulnerability to Iranian proselytizing inside the Soviet Union and then, after 1991, in Russia proper and in those newly independent post-Soviet nations with extensive Muslim populations. However, Moscow’s concerns were probably needlessly exaggerated given the historical animosities toward Shia Iran throughout the predominantly Sunni peoples of these territories. Shaping this Russian stance was also Moscow’s historically founded wariness of spontaneous as well as inspired mob violence against Russian interests inside Iran and ix