Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Community in Bangladesh

45 Pages·2005·0.3 MB·English

Human Rights Watch June 2005 Vol. 17, No. 6(C)
Breach of Faith
Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Community in Bangladesh

Glossary..........................................................................................................................................1
I. Summary.....................................................................................................................................2
Note on methodology..............................................................................................................6
II. History of the Ahmadiyya Community................................................................................7
III. Persecution of the Ahmadiyya: The Pakistani Model.....................................................14
IV. Human Rights Abuses Against the Ahmadiyya...............................................................17
Discrimination and violence against the Ahmadiyya in late 2003 and early 2004.........17
Killing of an imam, assault, and damage to a mosque in Jessore................................17
Discrimination, denial of education, and ill-treatment in Kushtia District...............20
Anti-Ahmadiyya violence, hate speech and agitation: November 2003 to January
2004.......................................................................................................................................25
The government ban on Ahmadi publications...................................................................29
The government’s response..............................................................................................32
Discrimination and violence against the Ahmadiyya since March 2004........................34
Incitement to anti-Ahmadiyya violence in Barguna District........................................34
Incitement to anti-Ahmadiyya violence and destruction of religious property in
Dhaka...................................................................................................................................36
The Bogra incident.............................................................................................................38
Satkhira attack.....................................................................................................................39
V. Conclusion..............................................................................................................................41
VI. Recommendations................................................................................................................42
To the government of Bangladesh.......................................................................................42
To foreign governments:.......................................................................................................43
To international donors and lending institutions:..............................................................43
Acknowledgements.....................................................................................................................44
Glossary

A.L. Awami League: Opposition party led by Sheikh Hasina Wajed

BNP Bangladesh National Party: Ruling party led by Prime Minister Khaleda Zia

IOJ Islamic Okye Jyote:
Junior partner in ruling coalition; Islamist party

K.N. Khatme Nabuwat:
International umbrella organization of Islamists dedicated to the “preservation of the
finality of Mohammad’s prophethood.”

J.I. Jama’at-e-Islami: International Wahabi Islamist political movement and name of
a political party in Bangladesh.

J.P. Jatiyo Party: Minor political party headed by General Ershad, former military
ruler.
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I. Summary

An unprecedented climate of fear now pervades Bangladesh’s minority Ahmadiyya
community, a heterodox religious group that considers itself part of the larger Muslim
world. Ahmadis have been the target of deadly violence and organized and widespread
intimidation. Extremist Muslim groups have organized mass political rallies calling for an
official declaration that Ahmadis are not Muslims and for a ban on their publications
and missionary activities. Ahmadiyya mosques have been attacked, individuals have been
beaten up or killed, and others have been denied access to schools and sources of
livelihood. While the police have generally provided protection to Ahmadis against mob
violence, the current Bangladeshi government has aligned itself politically with groups
and individuals inciting violence against Ahmadis.

Throughout 2004 and into 2005, the Khatme Nabuwat (K.N.), an umbrella organization
of Islamist groups dedicated to the preservation of “the finality of the prophethood” of
Mohammad, has threatened the Ahmadiyya community with attacks on their mosques
and campaigned for Ahmadis to be declared non-Muslim. The K.N. enjoys links to the
governing Bangladesh National Party (BNP) through the BNP’s coalition partners, the
Jama’at-e-Islami (J.I.) and the Islami Okye Jote (IOJ).

One of the worst attacks on Ahmadis took place on April 17, 2005 when a mob led by
the K.N. attacked members of the Ahmadiyya community, injuring at least twenty-five
people. The attack took place in Joytidrianagar, a remote village in the southwestern
Satkhira district. Witnesses reported that thousands of K.N. members brandishing sticks,
machetes, and darts started marching towards the Sundarban Bazar. The K.N. activists
sought to place a signboard on the Ahmadi mosque in the area which stated: “This is a
place of worship for Kadianis; no Muslim should mistake it for a mosque.” As the K.N.
activists reached the Ahmadiyya mosque at Sundarban Bazar, the Ahmadis, led by their
chief missionary in Bangladesh, tried to prevent the incident from taking place. Incensed
at the resistance, K.N. activists started throwing stones at them and injured dozens of
people, some seriously, including six women. The police, instead of preventing the
incident from occurring, sought to contain the situation by taking possession of the sign-
board and hanging it themselves on the Ahmadi mosque.

Immediately afterwards, K.N. activists went on a rampage, looting nearby Ahmadi
homes and injuring many Ahmadis in the process, who were beaten with sticks and
sustained serious injuries. During the attack and for three days afterwards, alleged K.N.
activists looted at least ten Ahmadi houses at Sundarban Bazar in the village.

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Similarly, on October 29, 2004, when a mob of at least three hundred linked to the K.N.
launched an attack on an Ahmadi mosque in Brahmanbaria, seventy-five kilometers
northeast of Dhaka. The axe-wielding mob pelted Ahmadi worshippers with stones as
they congregated to offer Friday prayers. Subsequently, the mob broke down the doors
of the mosque with axes and attacked the worshippers with the same weapons. Eleven
Ahmadis were seriously injured in the attack. Underlining the government’s hostility to
Ahmadis, no prosecutions of these high profile attacks have taken place.

While Ahmadis, followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, a 19th century religious leader who
claimed to be a prophet and sought the renewal of Islam, have faced persecution and
ostracism in many countries since the group’s founding in 1889, it is only recently that
the government of Bangladesh has taken a direct part in curbing the religious freedom of
members of the Ahmadiyya community. The most tangible expression of governmental
hostility towards Ahmadis came on January 8, 2004, when the Bangladeshi government
banned all Ahmadiyya publications.

The ban on publications was enacted in response to an upsurge in anti-Ahmadi protests
and violence in late 2003 incited by Islamist groups. These groups, including at least one
of the partners in the government’s ruling coalition, the Islamic Okye Jote, demanded
that the Bangladeshi government declare the Ahmadis to be non-Muslim. Such a
declaration would have a profoundly detrimental effect on Ahmadis in Bangladesh, as it
has in Pakistan, as also described in this report. Ahmadis would have reasonable fears
that institutionalized discrimination and violence would become the norm. The ongoing
legal and extra-legal persecution of Ahmadis in Pakistan provides a chilling precedent.

Since the government ban on Ahmadiyya publications was introduced, anti-Ahmadi
activities have continued and intensified across Bangladesh. These incidents have
included massive anti-Ahmadi rallies, threats against members of the group, attacks on
mosques, the refusal to allow Ahmadi children to go to school, and the confiscation of
Ahmadiyya publications.

At worst, Bangladeshi officials have themselves supported discrimination against
Ahmadis, or stood by idly while Ahmadi mosques were attacked. Most often, the official
response has been based not on human rights principles (including the equality of all
citizens and freedom of all to profess the religion of their choice), but on political
calculations of risk and benefit, a sliding scale that, depending on the circumstances, has
included everything from denunciations of anti-Ahmadi discrimination to adoptions of
policies that are themselves discriminatory, to acquiescence in acts of violence.

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On December 21, 2004, Bangladesh's High Court temporarily suspended the January 8
order banning Ahmadiyya publications in response to a legal challenge launched by
human rights groups in the country. While the stay remained in effect at this writing, the
ultimate disposition of the case remained unclear.

Ahmadis fear that the literature ban will be followed by a ban on the practice and
expression of their religion, and other assaults on their identity. The gradual shift of
Bangladesh away from its secular roots, including the increasing Islamization of
Bangladeshi politics and society, gives some credence to these fears.

Given the alarmingly high levels of communal violence in Bangladesh directed against
other minorities, including Hindus and indigenous peoples, further government
concessions to extremist religious demands would set a particularly dangerous precedent.
In the overheated, sectarian atmosphere of contemporary Bangladesh, with the ruling
government more religiously intolerant than any government since the country’s
founding, Ahmadis fear that even a tiny spark could unleash a serious and perhaps
uncontrollable wave of violence against members of their community.

Why are Ahmadis facing such persecution? The Ahmadiyya are a relatively small
religious group that considers itself to be part of the larger Muslim community.
However, for doctrinal reasons, particularly their heterodox beliefs (see background
section below), many Muslims consider Ahmadis to be non-Muslims. Ahmadis are seen
by many of their detractors in the Muslim world, and especially in South Asia, as a
British creation of 19th century colonial India, dedicated to subverting one of tenets of
Islam—the “finality of the prophethood of Mohammed.” They make easy targets in
times of religious and political insecurity. For those pursuing populist political goals,
such as Islamist and conservative parties in Bangladesh, raising the bogey of Ahmadi
subversion and persecuting them, ostensibly in order to preserve the faith, provides a
fast track to political power.

The current national government has taken an increasingly populist stance on religion,
pandering to groups that want to change Bangladesh from an officially secular state to an
Islamic republic. A four-party coalition led by the Bangladesh National Party (BNP)
holds a slender majority of the popular vote over its bitter secular opponent, the Awami
League.

Both junior coalition partners, the J.I. and the IOJ, have been linked to violent attacks
connected to religious issues. In February 2001, two top leaders of the IOJ, Maulana
Azizul Haq and Maulana Fazlul Haq Amini, were arrested in connection with the
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lynching of a policeman in violence that followed a ruling by the Bangladesh High Court
banning the use of fatwas (religious edicts). The IOJ leaders allegedly also threatened the
two judges who banned the issuance of fatwas. In October 2003, a J.I. leader in Jessore,
Maulana Aminur Rahman, led a mob attack in which local Ahmadiyyah leader
Mohammed Shah Alam was killed.

The J.I. maintains that Ahmadis are non-Muslim, though it has been silent on the
literature ban, apparently in order to present itself as a moderate religious force to the
West (in Pakistan the J.I. is part of the Islamist Muttahida Majlis-eAmal (MMA) coalition
that holds power in the country’s strategically important North West Frontier Province
bordering Afghanistan). Openly anti-Ahmadiyya actors have found a more vocal
platform in the IOJ, which is using the Ahmadiyya issue as a vehicle through which to
attract public attention and win more votes and power in the government.

The J.I.-IOJ alliance is essential to the BNP’s continued hold on power. As a result, the
J.I. has been given two key ministries in the Bangladeshi government, the Ministry of
Social Welfare and the Ministry of Industries. The Social Welfare Ministry governs
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Not surprisingly, the J.I. has been vocal against
NGOs because they are seen to empower women and raise awareness of women’s rights
and human rights more generally. Further, NGOs are viewed as a powerful secular force
in Bangladesh, as the international community has over the years funneled enormous
sums of aid through NGOs to deliver key services and sidestep government corruption.

The BNP at times has sought to please its coalition partners J.I. and IOJ and some of its
own members by implementing discriminatory policies—such as the ban on Ahmadiyya
publications—and by turning a blind eye to acts of violence and intimidation against
minorities such as Ahmadis, Hindus, Christians, and others. While the BNP claims it is
not a communal party and that it is not leading or instigating attacks on minorities, it has
failed to take any serious action against those who carry out attacks or incite violence.
The government’s capitulation to certain anti-Ahmadi demands, moreover, belies its
assertions that if there are any religious fundamentalist groups in Bangladesh they have
little power.

This report details acts of intimidation, harassment, and violence against Ahmadis since
October 2003. The government ban on Ahmadiyya publications and the failure of
officials to respond adequately to the attacks constitute violations of the fundamental
rights of members of the Ahmadiyya community. Such acts and omissions violate their
right to freedom of religion under the Bangladeshi Constitution, and their rights to
freedom of religion and expression as well as their right to be free from religious
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discrimination under international human rights law, notably the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, to which Bangladesh is party. The government further has
an obligation under international law to investigate effectively abuses against Ahmadis
and to prosecute those responsible. Victims of such abuses must be ensured an effective
remedy.

The government of Bangladesh must act decisively to respect the rights and dignity of
members of the Ahmadiyya Community. Human Rights Watch calls upon the
government of Bangladesh to:
• Immediately rescind the ban on all Ahmadiyya publications.
• Investigate thoroughly and impartially attacks on members of the Ahmadiyya
community, as well as other religious minorities, and prosecute the perpetrators
and sponsors of such attacks.
• Ensure that the police register and investigate all cases of communal violence
regardless of the religious background of the victim.
• Ensure that these investigations address the conduct of the local leadership and
members of all political parties and party leaders who may have incited, took
part in, or were complicit in the planning or execution of religion-motivated
attacks.
• Allow unfettered access to the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion
in order that she may visit Bangladesh on terms consistent with her mandate
with specific reference to the persecution of members of the Ahmadiyya
community. Immediately provide the Rapporteur with specific dates when she
may undertake the visit.
• Take appropriate measures to combat religious discrimination and intolerance in
public schools and madrassas.

Note on methodology
This report is based on Human Rights Watch research in Bangladesh in August 2004
and interviews conducted and an earlier text written by HLS Advocates for Human
Rights/Harvard Human Rights Program in March 2004. The HLS Advocates for
Human Rights/Harvard Human Rights Program text has been reviewed and
authenticated by Human Rights Watch, including through follow-up interviews in
Bangladesh. This report covers the period from October 2003 to April 2005. Due to
limitations described below, this report does not purport to provide a comprehensive list
of cases of anti-Ahmadi violence that occurred during this period. Indeed, it could not
be, given the routine intimidation and harassment that takes place at the village level,
which goes unaddressed by the authorities, and which leads many victims to remain
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silent for fear of retaliation. In addition, much of Bangladesh is inaccessible to outside
researchers and Human Rights Watch was not able to visit all areas where incidents are
believed to have taken place.

II. History of the Ahmadiyya Community

The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community (the official name of the community) is a
contemporary messianic movement founded in 1889 by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1839–
1908), who was born in the small village of Qadian in Punjab, India.1 The Ahmadiyya
community is also referred to derogatorily by some as the “Qadiani” (or “Kadiyani”)
community, a term derived from the birthplace of the founder of the movement. In
1889, Ahmad declared that he had received divine revelation authorizing him to accept
the baya’ah, or allegiance of the faithful.2 In 1891, he claimed to be the expected mahdi or
messiah of the latter days, the “Awaited One” of the monotheist community of religions,
and the messiah foretold by the Prophet Mohammed.3 Ahmad described his teachings,
incorporating both Sufic and orthodox Islamic, Hindu, and Christian elements, as an
attempt to revitalize Islam in the face of the British Raj, proselytizing Protestant
Christianity, and resurgent Hinduism.4 Thus, the Ahmadiyya community believes that
Ahmad conceived the community as a revivalist movement within Islam and not as a
new religion.

Members of the Ahmadiyya community (“Ahmadis”) profess to be Muslims. They
contend that Ahmad meant to revive the true spirit and message of Islam that the
Prophet Mohammed introduced and preached.5 Virtually all mainstream Muslim sects
believe that Ahmad proclaimed himself as a prophet, thereby rejecting a fundamental
tenet of Islam: Khatme Nabuwat (literally, the belief in the “finality of prophethood”—
that the Prophet Mohammed was the last of the line of prophets leading back through
Jesus, Moses, and Abraham). Ahmadis respond that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a non-
law-bearing prophet subordinate in status to Prophet Mohammed; he came to illuminate
and reform Islam, as predicted by Prophet Mohammed. For Ahmad and his followers,
the Arabic Khatme Nabuwat does not refer to the finality of prophethood in a literal

1 “Ahmadiyya,” The Columbia Encyclopedia, 2003 [online], http://www.bartleby.com/65/ah/Ahmadiyy.html
(retrieved May 25, 2005).
2 Ibid.
3 “The Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam: An Overview,” Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, 1995-2005 [online],
http://alislam.org/introduction (retrieved May 25, 2005).
4 “Ahmadiyya,” The Columbia Encyclopedia, 2003 [online], http://www.bartleby.com/65/ah/Ahmadiyy.html
(retrieved May 25, 2005).
5M. Nadeem Ahmad Siddiq, Enforced Apostasy: Zaheerudin v. State and the Official Persecution of the
Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan, (14 Law and Inequality: 1995), P. 275-79.
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sense—that is, to prophethood’s chronological cessation—but rather to its culmination
and exemplification in the Prophet Mohammed. Ahmadis believe that “finality” in a
chronological sense is a worldly concept, whereas “finality” in a metaphoric sense carries
much more spiritual significance.

The exact size of the Ahmadiyya community worldwide is unclear, though there are
concentrations of Ahmadis in India, Pakistan, Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Gambia.6

Ahmadis have lived in what is present-day Bangladesh since the early 1900s.7 Roughly
100,000 Ahmadis live in Bangladesh today. Violence towards the Ahmadiyya community
in Bangladesh has occurred for almost two decades. The recent upsurge in the
persecution of the Ahmadis can be understood as part of a gradual trend in Bangladesh
away from the country’s secular roots toward more blending of religion and politics.
This Islamization of government can be explained partially by examining the history of
Bangladesh.

In 1971, Bangladesh, then East Pakistan, fought a liberation war to secede from its
union with Pakistan, in order to protect its own Bengali language and culture. After a
brutal nine-month war, the newly independent Bangladeshis created a constitution
founded upon four guiding principles: nationalism, socialism, democracy, and
secularism.

Starting with Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman in 1972, however, the role of Islam slowly
began to increase in Bangladesh’s civil society and state apparatus. In 1977, the
government replaced Article 12 of the founding constitution, which provided that the
principle of secularism should be realized by the elimination of communalism in all its
forms, with the assertion that the Muslim faith would be one of the nation’s guiding
principles. In 1988, Bangladesh moved a step further away from its secular heritage
when Islam officially became the state religion through an amendment to the
constitution, Article 2-A, which reads: “The state religion of the Republic is Islam, but
other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in the Republic.”

6 Figures for the total membership of the Ahmadiyya Community vary greatly between sources. While it is
difficult to provide an exact figure of the Ahmadiyya population, estimates of around 20 million would be
appropriate
7 Human Rights Watch interview with Abdul Awwal Khan Chowdury, Central Missionary, Amadiyya Muslim
Jama’at, Dhaka, August 23, 2004.
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While these constitutional amendments have set the tone for Bangladeshi society, the
reversal of the constitutional prohibition on religious parties allowed for the
reemergence of the Jama’at-e-Islami and for the formation of extreme religious parties,
such as the Islamic Okye Jyote (IOJ). The religious parties were able to return to power
despite arguing that nationalism is un-Islamic and the secession from Pakistan was
unwarranted.

Sporadic attacks and threats against Ahmadis became more systematic in the early 1990s
as Bangladesh returned to parliamentary government. The attacks began in earnest
during the BNP government (1991-96), continued through the period of Awami League
rule (1996-2001), and acquired renewed vigor as the BNP returned to power in 2001,
this time in coalition with the J.I. and OJI.

Between December 27-29, 1991, the Khatme Nabuwat (K.N.), an Islamist organization
dedicated to safeguarding the sanctity of the finality of the Prophet Mohammed, held a
conference to organize activities aimed at banning Ahmadi religious practice and identity
in Bangladesh.8 As one Bangladeshi Ahmadi explained to Human Rights Watch, “the
K.N. want the Ahmadis to leave Bangladesh. They have threatened that they would
attack us if we do not surrender, if we continued to be Ahmadis.”9 On February 5, 1992,
Mahfuzur Rahman, the president of the Khilafat (“Caliphate”) Student Movement – an
Islamist student group—led a public protest in the Noakhali district demanding that the
Ahmadi community be declared non-Muslim.10

The anti-Ahmadi conferences held by Khatme Nabuwwat and the Khilafat Student
Movement sparked fresh attacks on Ahmadis. On February 29, 1992, several hundred
people under the leadership of the Imam Council, a group of Imams from the Helatala
and Niral mosques in Khulna, attacked an Ahmadi mosque and mission house on the
Nirala Housing Estate in the city. 11 The group attempted to set fire to the buildings,
stole and destroyed Ahmadi books, including Ahmadi copies of the Qur’an, and inflicted
property damage on a charitable medical dispensary nearby.12 The police near Khulna
arrested eight of the group’s members, who had also planned to disrupt an Ahmadi

8 “Appeal to Government For Banning All Activities of Qadianis,” Weekly Ittesal (Narayangan), January 3, 1992.
9 HLS Advocates for Human Rights/ Harvard Human Rights Program interview with Kamal Ahmed, Amadiyya
Muslim Jama’at, Khakdan, March 29, 2004.
10 “Demand for the Declaration of the Qadianis as non-Muslims,” The Daily Inqilab, February 5, 1992.
11 “Attack on the Qadianis in Kulna,” Daining Sangbad (National Daily), March 1, 1992.
12 Ibid.
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