PERPETUAL PEACE *For I dipt into thef uture, far as hamnn eye could TCC, Saw the Vision of the world, and all thcw ondert hr: waxld Le; Snw theh eavens fill with commerce, argosies of magics ails, Pi!o!s of thop urplet wilight, dropping d>wnw ith eosrj? bales: Heardt heh eavens fill withn lmlting,a ndt here rsin'd a ghastly dew From the nations' airyn avies grappling in thec entm! b!uo; Far dong the world.widc whisper of the south-wind rushing warm, With the standards of the peoplesp lungingt hro' tkc thunder.storm: Till thew ar-drum throbb'd no longer, and the bntt.e.flags were fuurl'd In tho Parliament of man, the Federation of the world. Thew the common sense of mmt shall hold a f3etf::l realm in awe, And the kindly earth ahall dumbor, lapt in universal hw." -' ' TSNNYSOLNcrR: slry HER PERPETUAL PEACE A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY Tr7.rlSSLATED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY 31. CAMPBELLS MITH, M.A. :67?'il .4 PREFACE BY I'I<CFl:'.SSOR LATTA LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD. RUSKIN HOUSE 40 MUSEUSMT R EET, W.C. NEW YORK : THE IvIAChlILLAN COMPANY PREFACE THISt ranslation of Kant’es ssay on PerptuaP Peace was undertaken by Miss Mary Campbell Smith at the suggestion of thlea te Professor Ritchie of St. Andrews, who had promised to write for it a prefacei, n dicating the value of Kant’s work in relation to recent discussions regarding the possibility of making wars to cease.” In view ‘I of the general interest which these discussions have arouseda nd of thev ague thinking and aspiration which have too often characterised them, it seemed to Professor Ritchie that at ranslation of this wise and sagaciouse ssay would be both opportunea nd * valuable. His untimely deathh asp reventedt he fulfilment of his promise, and I have been asked, in his stead,t o introduce thet ranslator’s work. This is, I think, the only completet r anslation into English of Kant’s essay, including all the notes as well as thet ext,a ndt he translatorh as added a full historicalI ntroduction, along with numerous notes of her own, so as (in Professor Ritchie’s words) ‘I to meet the needs (I) of the student of Political vi Preface Sciencew ho wishes to understandt her elation of Kant’s theories to those of Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, Kousseau etc.,a nd (2) of theg eneralr eaderw ho wishes tuo n derstantd h e significance of Kant’s proposals in connection with the ideals of Peace Congresses, and with the developmento f International Law from the end of the Middle Ages to the Hague Conference.” Although it is moret han 100 years since Kant‘s essay was written, its substantial va!ue is practically unimpairedA. nyone who is acquainted with the generalc haracter of the mind of Kant will expect to find in him soundc ommon-sense, clearr ecogni- tion of the essential facts of the case and a remark- able power of analytically exhibiting the conditions on which the facnt se cessarily dependT .h ese characteristics are manifest iu the essay on Perpetual A,ore. Kant is not pessimist enough to believe that a perpetualp eace is an unrealisable dreamo r a consummationd evoutlyt ob e feared, nor is he optimiste nought o fancy thati t is an ideal which could easily be realised if men would butt u rn their hearts too nea notherF. orK antp erpetual peace is an ideal, nomt erelay s a speculative Utopian idea, with which in fancy we mayp lay, but as am oralp rinciple,w hich oughtt ob e,a nd therefore can be, realised. Yet he makes it perfectly clear that we cannot hope to approach ther ealisation Preface vii of itu nless we honestly face political facts and get a firmg rasp of thei ndispensablec onditions of a lasting peace. To strive after the ideal in contempt or in ignorance of these conditions is a labour that must inevitablyb ee ither fruitless ord estructive of itso wne nds, Thus Kantd emonstratest he hope- lessness of anya ttemptt os ecurep erpetualp eace betweein n dependennt a tionsS. ucnh a tionms ay maket reaties;b utt hesea reb indingo nly for so longa si t is nott ot hei nterest of eitherp arty to denouncteh em. To enforcteh em is impossible while then ationsr emaini ndependent.“ There is,” as Professor Ritchie put it (Sttrdies in Political and Social Ethics, p. 169), lionly one way inw hich war betweeni ndependent“ ’nationsc anb ep revented ; andt hat is byt hen ationsc easingt ob ei ndepen- dent.B” uth t ids o ens o n te cessarilmy eatnh e establishment of da espotismw, hethear u tocratic ord emocratic.O nt heo therh and,K antm aintains that just aps eaceb etweeni n dividuals within a statce a on n lby pe e rmanentlsy e curebd ty h e institution of a“ republican ” (that is to say, a representative) government, so the onlyr eal guarantee of pa e rmanenp te acbe e tweenn a tions is the establishment of a federation of free“ republican” states.S uch a federation her egards as practically possible. “For if Fortune ordains that a powerful 11 ande nlightenedp eoples houldf orm a republic- viii Preface which by its veryn ature is inclined top erpetual peace-thwi os uld serve a centre of federal unionf oro thers tatesw ishingt o join, andt hus secure.’conditionso ff reedoma mongt hes tatesi n accordancew itht hei dea of thel aw of nations. Graduallyt, h rough different unions of thisk ind, thef ederationw oulde xtendf urthera ndf urther.” Readers who area cquaintedw itht h eg eneral philosophy of Kant will find manyt races of its influence int hee ssayo n Perpetual Peace. Those who haven ok nowledge of hisp hilosophym ay find some of his forms of statement rather difficult to understand,a ndi tm ayt hereforen otb eo ut of place for met oi ndicatev ery briefly them eaning of some terms which hef requently uses, especially int heS upplementsa ndA ppendices.T husa tt he beginning of theF irstS upplement,K antd raws a distinctionb etweent hem echanicala ndt het eleo- logical view of things, between “nature and Provi- ” “ dence ”, which depends upon his main philosophical position.A ccordingt oK ant,p urer eason has two aspectst h, eoreticaal n pd r actical. Acs o ncerning knowledge, strictly so called, the a priori principles ofr eason (e.g, substancea nda ttribute,c ausea nd effect etc.a) r e valid only within thre e alm of possible sense-experience. Such ideas, fori nstance, cannobt ee xtendedt o G ods, ince He is not a possible object of sense-experience, They are limited Frefare ix t to the world of phenomena. This world of pheno- mena nature or the world of sense-experience) (‘1 ” is pa urely mechanical system. But in order to understand fully thep henomenal world, thep ure theoretical reasonm ust postulate certain ideas( the ideas of the soul, the world and God), theo bjects of which transcends ense-experience. Thesei d eas are nott h eoreticallp valid, butt h eir validity is practicallye stablished by the pure practicalr eason, which doesn ot yields p eculative truthb, upt re- scribes its principlesd ogmatically ” in the form of. imperatives to the will. The will is itself practical’ ‘\ reason, andt husi t imposesi t s imperativesu pon. itself. The fundamental imperative of the practical’ reason is stated by Kant in Appendix I. (p. 175) :- Act so that thou canst will that thy maxim should (I be a universal law, be the end of thy actionw hat it will.” If thee nd of perpetualp eace is a duty, it must be necessarily deduced from this general law. AndK ant does regard it as da u ty. We mustd esire perpetual peacen ot only as a material good, but also as a state of things resulting from our recognition of the precepts of duty ” (loc. lit.). This is further expressed in the maxim (p. 177):- “Seek ye first the kingdom of pure practical reason and its righteousness, antdh oe b ject of your endeavour, the blessing of perpetual peace, will be addeud n to you.” The distinction between the Preyme X moral politician and the political moralist, which is developed in Appendix I., is an application of the gcneral distinction between dutya nde xpediency, which is a prominent feature of the Kantian ethics. Methods of.e xpediency, omitting all reference to the purpe racticarl e asonc, a no nly bringa bout re-arrangements of circumstances in the mechanical course of nature. Theyc an never guaranteet he attainment of theire nd:t hey can never make it more than a speculative ideal, which may or may notb e practicable. But if thee nd can be shown to be a duty, we have, from Kant’s point of view, the onlyr easonableg round for a conviction that it is realisable. We cannoti, n deedt, h eoretically know that it is realisable. “Reason is not suffi- cieutly enlightened to survey the series of predeter- mining causes which would make it possible for us to predict with certainty the good or bad results of human action, ast hey follow from the mechanical laws of nature; although we mayh ope that things will turno uta s we should desire” (p. 163). On the other hand, since the idea of perpetual peace is a moral ideal,a ni dea of duty ”, we are entitled to believe that it is practicable. Nature ,. I( guarantees the coming of perpetual peace, through the natural course of human propensities ; not indeed with sufficient certainty toe nable us to prophesy She future of this ideal theoretically, but yet clearly
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