Perceptual Coding

428 Pages·1978·28.148 MB·English

by  Edward C. Carterette, Morton P. Friedman

ADVISORY EDITORIAL BOARD
G. EKMAN*, STOCKHOLM D. B. LINDSLEY, Los ANGELES
C. W. ERIKSEN, CHAMPAIGN B. F. LOMOV, Moscow
W. K. ESTES, NEW YORK R. D. LUCE, CAMBRIDGE (U.S.)
P. FRAISSE, PARIS M. TREISMAN, OXFORD
W. R. GARNER, NEW HAVEN W. A. ROSENBLITH, CAMBRIDGE (U.S.)
D. M. GREEN, CAMBRIDGE (U.S.) H. A. SIMON, PITTSBURGH
R. L. GREGORY, BRISTOL P. SUPPES, STANFORD
T. INDOW, TOKYO N. S. SUTHERLAND, SUSSEX
I. KOHLER, INNSBRUCK M. TODA, SAPPORO
* Until his death.
This is Volume VIII of
HANDBOOK OF PERCEPTION
EDITORS: Edward C. Carterette and Morton P. Friedman
Contents of the other books in this series appear at the end of this volume.
HANDBOOK
OF PERCEPTION
VOLUME VIII
Perceptual Coding
EDITED BY
Edward C. Carterette and Morton P. Friedman
Department of Psychology
University of California, Los Angeles
Los Angeles, California
ACADEMIC PRESS New York San Francisco London 1978
A Subsidiary of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers
COPYRIGHT © 1978, BY ACADEMIC PRESS, INC.
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
NO PART OF THIS PUBLICATION MAY BE REPRODUCED OR
TRANSMITTED IN ANY FORM OR BY ANY MEANS, ELECTRONIC
OR MECHANICAL, INCLUDING PHOTOCOPY, RECORDING, OR ANY
INFORMATION STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL SYSTEM, WITHOUT
PERMISSION IN WRITING FROM THE PUBLISHER.
ACADEMIC PRESS, INC.
Ill Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10003
United Kingdom Edition published by
ACADEMIC PRESS, INC. (LONDON) LTD.
24/28 Oval Road, London NW1 7DX
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Main entry under title:
Perceptual coding.
(Handbook of perception ; v. 8)
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Perception. 2. Coding theory. 3. Human
information processing. I. Carterette, Edward C.
II. Friedman, Morton P.
BF311.P362 153.7 78-16753
ISBN 0-12-161908-7 ( v. 8 )
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Numbers in parentheses indicate the pages on which the authors' contributions begin.
T. G. R. BOWER (83), Department of Psychology, University of
Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland
ROBERT M. BOYNTON (173), Department of Psychology, University of
California, San Diego, La Jolla, California 92093
MYRON L. BRAUNSTEIN (147), School of Social Sciences, University of
California, Irvine, Irvine, California 92717
LYNN A. COOPER (105), Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14850
ROBERT G. CROWDER (343), Department of Psychology, Yale University,
New Haven, Connecticut 06519
PAUL FRAISSE (203), Laboratoire de Psychologie Experimentale, Uni-
versité René Descartes, Paris, France
G. ADRIAN HORRIDGE (3), Department of Neurobiology, Research
School of Biological Sciences, The Australian National University,
Canberra, Australia
MARI RIESS JONES (255), Department of Psychology, Ohio State Univer-
sity, Columbus, Ohio 43210
JOHN M. KENNEDY (289), Scarborough College, University of Toronto,
West Hill, Ontario, Canada
LAWRENCE E. MARKS (321), John B. Pierce Foundation Laboratory and
Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06519
IX
X LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
ALLAN PAIVIO (375), Department of Psychology, University of Western
Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 5C2
ROGER N. SHEPARD (105), Department of Psychology, Stanford Univer-
sity, Stanford, California 94305
FOREWORD
The problem of perception is one of understanding the way in which the
organism transforms, organizes, and structures information arising from
the world in sense data or memory. With this definition of perception in
mind, the aims of this treatise are to bring together essential aspects of the
very large, diverse, and widely scattered literature on human perception
and to give a précis of the state of knowledge in every area of perception.
It is aimed at the psychologist in particular and at the natural scientist in
general. A given topic is covered in a comprehensive survey in which
fundamental facts and concepts are presented and important leads to
journals and monographs of the specialized literature are provided. Per-
ception is considered in its broadest sense. Therefore, the work will treat
a wide range of experimental and theoretical work.
This ten-volume treatise is divided into two sections. Section One deals
with the fundamentals of perceptual systems. It is comprised of six
volumes covering (1) historical and philosophical roots of perception, (2)
psychophysical judgment and measurement, (3) the biology of perceptual
systems, (4) hearing, (5) seeing, and (6) which is divided into two books
(A) tasting and smelling and (B) feeling and hurting.
Section Two, comprising four volumes, covers the perceiving or-
ganism, taking up the wider view and generally ignoring specialty bound-
aries. The major areas include (7) language and speech, (8) perceptual
coding of space, time, and objects, including sensory memory systems
and the relations between verbal and perceptual codes, (9) perceptual
processing mechanisms, such as attention, search, selection, pattern rec-
ognition, and perceptual learning, (10) perceptual ecology, which consid-
ers the perceiving organism in cultural context, and so includes aes-
thetics, art, music, architecture, cinema, gastronomy, perfumery, and the
special perceptual worlds of the blind and of the deaf.
The "Handbook of Perception" should serve as a basic source and
reference work for all in the arts or sciences, indeed for all who are
interested in human perception.
EDWARD C. CARTE RETTE
MORTON P. FRIEDMAN
XI
PREFACE
Any theory is built from what has excited the experimenter, but the
nervous system works on what excites the neurons of the next higher
order, says G. Adrian Horridge in Chapter 1 where he systematically lays
out the details of the compound eye, a different kind of vision.
Insects do avoid objects; take off and land successfully; find flowers,
prey, and mates; and chase each other. But even the idea that insects see
is derived from our knowledge of our own introspective world. And "to
think of a mosaic vision with each ommatidium conveying one coarse
grain to a picture of the visual world made up of dots of overlapping fuzzy
patches is a complete misrepresentation of the situation [p. 51]." What
has been learned about the seeing of insects from pattern perception,
receptor output and projections to higher levels (e.g., lamina ganglion
cells) is that the main signal is the moving contrast. "If relative movement
across the eye is essential, it follows that the essential pattern of excita-
tion is in the timing, as well as in the spatial projection across the optic
lobe."
Horridge had particularly wanted his synthesis of the insect visual
system to appear in The Handbook for two reasons. One was that stu-
dents of human perception would profit from knowledge of the anatomi-
cal, physiological, and behavioral features of the insect visual system and
from the analysis of the insect visual mechanisms. The summary of this
knowledge is admirably and critically presented. Another reason was to
document his belief that it no longer suffices to frame an explanatory
theory of the mechanisms of insect vision on the class of data that gave
rise to it. A theory must be based on the (four) classes of data arising from
the basic methods: inferences from anatomy, electrophysiology of single
neurons, accounts of whole-animal behavior, and mathematical analysis
of models. Furthermore, Horridge believes that there has been successful
analysis only where the system has been cut down to an extremely simple
form, and only the direct attack will allow us to see neurons in action or to
discover their relevant interactions. What is the direct attack? "It is the
multichannel analysis, step by step through the causative chain of named
Xlll
XIV PREFACE
neurons while the relevant behavior is going on [p. 78]." If there is a
question of whether this method is a practical possibility for analyzing
how the bee sees (p. 79), what of analyzing how we see?
The two original, opponent, classic theories of perceptual development
are nativism and empiricism. As Bower reminds us in his Chapter 2,
Perceptual Development: Object and Space, the first theory in its extreme
form gives to a perceptually naïve organism all the perceptual capacities
of a mature, experienced organism. And again in extreme form empiri-
cism gives to a perceptually naïve organism none of the perceptual
capacities of a mature experienced organism. It is easy to test these two
theories. 'They are still influential and indeed, despite their patent absur-
dity, have adherents even today."
Bower's aim is to select out, from the great variety of problems that
have been studied on neonates, the problems of the perceptual constan-
cies and of intersensory coordination in perceptual development. In these
problems the oppositions and methods of the two theories are seen. By
drawing on recent work on constancies, Bower shows that neither theory
is consistent with the data. Just where nativism and empiricism differ
most sharply, in intersensory coordination, the available research vali-
dates neither. As a third alternative, Bower proposes the differentiation
theory of perceptual development, "that in development the output of
perceptual structures becomes more and more precise, more and more
detailed, more and more specific [p. 91]." Bower discusses tests of the
differentiation theory and looks to some findings of molecular biology for
support.
A significant perceptual interpretation of a stimulus sometimes emerges
only after the active completion of additional, optional mental operations
of transformations or comparison, or both. This is the position taken by
Cooper and Shepard in Chapter 3, Transformations on Representations of
Objects in Space. Although the notion of such mental transformations
goes at least as far back as the British empiricists, such eminences as
Helmholtz and Mach discussed these notions, and Galton tackled them
empirically but introspectively. The renaissance of Chronometrie methods
in 1960 in cognitive psychology affected the study of mental operations on
spatial objects only in the 1970s. The most central theoretical issues are,
first, the nature of these transformations, and next, the nature of the
internal representations which undergo transformation.
The basic Chronometrie paradigms and major findings are set out in
Section II on rotational transformations while Section III deals with other
spatial transformations—of size, translation, sequential rigid motions and
structure. Essential recent findings are that "such spatial transformations
as expansion or contraction, translation, reflection, rotation, folding, and
joining of parts into wholes have been discovered to take times, when
PREFACE XV
carried out purely mentally, that strongly suggest an internal simulation of
the corresponding physical processes in the external world [p. 142]." For
Cooper and Shepard these mental processes have a central role not only
in problem solving but in mundane perceptual acts of discriminating and
identifying.
The everyday perception of motion in three dimensions is almost al-
ways combinations of the four categories of rigid motions which Braun-
stein reviews in Chapter 4, Perception of Motion. These are (a) rotations in
depth, where the axis of rotation is perpendicular to the line of sight, as in
a Ferris wheel seen from the front; (b) translations in depth, as when an
automobile approaches or recedes; (c) rotations in the plane, about the
line of sight, as in a Ferris wheel seen from the side; (d) translations in the
plane. The first category is the least familiar but obviously in both (c) and
(d) translation may be in many different planes at once since most objects
are three dimensional. Section VI deals with a relatively new area of
research, elastic or nonrigid motions such as the bending and stretching of
a person walking.
This chapter will serve as an introduction to Braunstein's 1976 mono-
graph, Depth Perception through Motion. For a discussion of the egocen-
tric coordinate system and the physical and physiological cues to spatial
localization, see Whitman Richards (Chapter 10, Volume 5, this Hand-
book).
Where is color? In the object, in the light, or in the observer? Color
perception must be explained in terms of relations among these three
domains, says Boynton in his unorthodox Chapter 5, Color in Contour
and Object Perception. At times provocative, but always clear and scien-
tifically impeccable, Boynton reviews the complexities of surface proper-
ties and the paradox of being able to judge the character of the illuminant
even though "we usually do not, in fact, see light." We see objects and
surfaces that have been rendered visible by the presence of light. It is
good to have color vision owing to the importance of surface color in
providing information about an absolute property of a surface, a fact
exploited by nature and man (Section VI). Contour perception is critical
for object perception and though chromatic vision is not usually necessary
for perceiving contour, purely chromatic differences can affect contour
(Section VII). Boynton's important final topic, color constancy (Section
IX), is complex and depends "upon very many physiological mechanisms
and psychological cues." An intriguing summary of the ideas of the
chapter, the Epilog, consists of direct quotes from leading visual scientists
of every age.
Part II of this volume takes up the representation of temporal, auditory,
and hap tic perception.
For Paul Fraisse (Chapter 6, Time and Rhythm Perception) the psy-
XVI PREFACE
chological present is nothing more than the temporal field in which a
series of events is rendered present and integrated into a unique percep-
tion. The temporal field is a set of stimulations, like the spatial field. "We
do not perceive duration or space as such, but only the duration or space
of perceptual data, which thus enables us to define the extent of these
fields." A temporal field is involved in apprehending as a unit an uninter-
rupted series of letters or digits, a rhythm, a melody, or a sentence. Of
course, the temporal field is limited to about 7 ± 2 perceptible elements or
chunks and can be distinguished from memory. The perceived present
endures maximally for about 5 sec.
Thus armed, Fraisse proceeds to a thorough survey of the evidence
from all the senses on the perception of succession (Section II), of dura-
tion (Section III), and of rhythm (Section IV). Fraisse provides a great
wealth of experimental detail together with explanatory systems and
critiques thereof.
Outstanding examples of Fraisse's temporal field are taken up by Mari
Riess Jones in Chapter 9, Auditory Patterns: Studies in the Perception of
Structure. " Patte rnness" is central to the problem of structure in tem-
poral sequences such as rhythms. Musical or not, an auditory pattern
moves inexorably past. There is no hope of a second look as in vision.
Whether a serial structure unfolds quickly or slowly, rhythmic groupings
aid the listener: "Rhythmic structures reflect a fundamental and pervasive
organizing process that is largely temporal in nature." Riess Jones re-
views a variety of ways in which patterns are specified as relations in
serial structure, for example, ordered sets, alphabets (a musical scale is an
auditory alphabet), and speech.
A quarter of a century ago Lashley's intrigue with serial ordering
"suggested to him the existence of an active central mechanism flexibly
moving amidst preplanned schemes." Modern theories of central pre-
planning are laid out by Riess Jones, in three categories, according to
whether the listener associates, structures, or detects structure. Auditory
pattern perception has recently become more directed by theory with
some coherence of topics of research, major ones being evaluation of
pattern structure, rate of presentation, and relative timing.
Hap tics (Chapter 8) is not passive, cutaneous touch, does not take the
skin to be studded within points, dots, or spots. In haptics, the skin,
muscles, and joints play as an ensemble in touching, contracting, and
exploring in the act of obtaining information. As Kennedy emphasizes,
haptic touch is a hypothetical sensory system frankly opposed to the
hypothetical sensory system of passive, cutaneous touch. The sensory
ensemble of haptics embraces the use of tools and cognizing. The envi-
ronment for haptics may be physical (e.g., surfaces, streams, films) or