Perception in Indian Philosophy

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■Article■
Perception in Indian Philosophy
―
Is Nirvikalpakain Pratyaksam Possible?
●
Junzo Tanizawa
Perception (pratyaksa) is one of the main subjects in Indian
philosophy as it is in Western philosophy. In this paper, I shall
consider three schools of Indian philosophy and analyse their theo-
ries of perception. The three schools are Nyaya
, Mimamsa, and
the Buddhist school of logic.
A distinctive characteristic of these theories is that they divide
the process of perceptual cognition into two stages: conception-
free (nirvikalpaka) and conception-loaded (savikalpaka) .1) Bud-
dhist logicians, however, regard the former alone as perception
,
while Nyaya and Mimamsa regard both stages as perception . I
shall clarify several problems relating to the two-stage theory of
perception and then show that the Buddhist theory of perception is
entirely untenable.
The theory that perception has two phases is rather naive and
easy to understand. But it should be noted that the kind of percep-
tion with which we are concerned is that of everyday experience
and is regarded as the most fundamental way to arrive at knowl-
edge by Indian philosophers. Thus the question is whether per-
谷沢淳三 Junzo Tanizawa, Shinshu University, Indian Philosophy.
Main Publications:
"Dravyas as Referents of Prono
uns", Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu 41-2, pp. 1149-
1145, 1993; "Advaitins' Theory of Laksand and Paninian Grammar" Indogaku
Bukkyogaku Kenkyu 42-2, pp. 1066-1062, 1994 .
2 Journal of the Japanese Association for South Asian Studies, 7, 1995
ception in normal life is really divided into two stages, or whether,
even if it is, the first stage can be called perception in its own right.
Firstly the Nyayasfitra, the basic book of the Nyaya school,
states as follows:
Perception is the cognition resulting from the contact of a
sense organ with its object, and it is ineffable, non-deviating,
and determinate in itself.2)
The four characteristics of perception mentioned here are: (1) that
it is caused by the contact of a sense organ with its object
(indriyarthasannikarsotpanna), (2) that it is ineffable (avyapadesya),
(3) that it is non-deviating (avyabhicarin) and (4) that it is determi-
nate in itself (vyavasayatmaka). The central issues in the following
discussion will be closely connected with these four points. To be
brief, if we attach too much importance to (1), we might confuse
perception with sensation; (2) leads us to the problem of the rela-
tion between language and perception; (3) reminds us of the prob-
lem of certainty as the foundation of knowledge; (4), which has to
do with (2), accords the status of knowledge to perception.
Here the two stages of perception are not explicitly expressed
but implied. In his Nyayabhasya, Vatsyayana comments on the
term' avyapadesya' (ineffable) as follows:
The cognition of an object, if the relation between the object
and the word which denotes it has not yet been compre-
hended, is not expressed by the object's name. Even after the
relation between the object and the word which denotes it is
comprehended in the form of the understanding that this
word is the name of the object, the cognition of the object
does not differ from the former cognition.3)
From this remark, it is not difficult to see that Vatsyayana looks
upon (2) as the stage in which we, without the help of verbal
expressions, grasp an object as it is. What, however, is "as it is"
(yathartha)? Does it mean the state in which we grasp an object as
if it were a picture or a photograph? This point also is crucial to the
Perception in Indian Philosophy(cid:129)\Is Nirvikalpakam Pratyaksam Possible? 3
following discussion.
In later writings Nyaya definitely describes the two-stage theory
of perception. In his Tarkabhasa, Kesavamisra remarks as follows:
Perception is an immediate means of knowing(cid:129)c And it is
of two kinds: conception-loaded and conception-free.4)
Conception-free perception, which occurs prior to any association
of the object with its name (nama) , its essential property as a whole
(jati) , etc., is concerned with the object as it is (vastumatrava-
gahin).5) It is exactly the state in which, as mentioned above, we
grasp an object as if it were a picture or a photograph. It can be
referred to by a pronoun such as "this" or "that". In other words,
the perceiver is conscious of the object; his mental state has inten-
tionality6) toward it; nevertheless he does not attribute any proper-
ties to it. The point is that, in spite of the fact that he is conscious
of it, a determinate cognition such as "This is so and so", they
claim, does not arise in this case. We might think of an instance in
which we, for the first time, encounter an unknown object, al-
though, even here, the question of whether a determinate cogni-
tion as mentioned above really arises or not still remains7) How-
ever, Nyaya keeps our more usual cases of perception in mind, as is
shown when Kesavamisra cites "This is Ditta" and "This is a
Brahmana" as examples of judgements that immediately succeed
conception-free perceptions.
The Bhatta sect of the Mimamsa school approximately follows
the same line of thought. The Miinameyodaya states as follows:
The cognition that results from the contact of a sense-organ
[with its object] is of two kinds: conception-free and concep-
tion-loaded. Immediately after the sense-organ has made con-
tact, there arises a cognition which, indistinct (sammugdha)
and devoid of verbal expression, merely assumes the form of
the individual and so on (dravyadisvarupamatravagahin). This
is called conception-free perception, because it lacks any de-
terminate conceptions. Yet cognition with verbal expression
4 Journal of the Japanese Association for South Asian Studies, 7, 1995
immediately succeeds it. It has as its content something deter-
mined by an essential property as a whole (jati) and the like,
and takes the form of "This is red", "This is a pot" and so on.
It is called conception-loaded.8)
Here we should note the term "indistinct". This expression means
that we do not know what the object is in the stage of conception-
free perception. Since, however, the state is non-attributive, it
might, in fact, be impossible even to determine whether it is dis-
tinct or indistinct.9) Does it deserve the name "perception"?
Thus we can describe the two stages as follows: the first in
which we genuinely grasp an object as it is as if it were a picture or
a photograph, and the second in which we, immediately after the
first, make a judgement by means of verbal expressions. And they
give the name "perception" to both stages. Here we might be
reminded of the sense-datum theory of Western philosophers. Ac-
cording to this theory there are two elements of perception: sense-
datum and perceptual judgement. We directly perceive not physi-
cal objects but sense-data.10) A great difference between the sense-
datum theory and the Indian two-stage theory of perception is that
sense-data, that which is given, is the object of perception, while
conception-free awareness itself is, Indian philosophers say, per-
ception. Hence we could say that conception-free perception cor-
responds to the stage of awareness of sense-data. However, it is to
be noted that one of the main grounds on which several philoso-
phers resort to the sense-datum theory is what is called the argu-
ment from illusion.11) A stick, for example, which is really straight
looks bent in water. Or the oasis which the perceiver thinks is
present might be only a mirage. From these instances sense-datum
theorists proceed as follows: since there is no essential difference
between these cases of illusion and normal cases of perception, we
directly perceive not physical, or material, objects but sense-data,
on which we make judgements. These perceptual judgements cor-
respond to the second stage of the Indian theory of perception, i.e.,
conception-loaded perception. Nydya and the Bhatta sect of
Perception in Indian Philosophy(cid:129)\Is Nirvikalpakam Pratyaksam Possible? 5
Mimamsa, on the other hand, think of the first stage, conception-
free awareness, as the perception of physical objects. Therefore,
according to them, the objects of the conception-free perception
are physical objects themselves. In other words, we directly per-
ceive them. They also seem to think that the objects of the second
stage of perception, concept-loaded perception, are physical ob-
jects. Therefore their standpoint is, as Matilal points out, 12) one of
direct realism, whereas sense-datum theorists are generally repre-
sentationalists or phenomenalists.
In spite of these important differences, Indian thinkers and
sense-datum theorists have one point in common: there are two
phases of perception, one in which sense-organs receive physical
objects and the other in which we attach judgements to it. Is this
thought the case?
In the west, various objections have been raised against the
sense-datum theory. And here I shall consider those which bear
most directly upon the Indian two-stage theory of perception.
The first question is whether or not, when we perceive or see
something in our ordinary life, we first receive an impression of
physical objects and subsequently attach judgements or interpreta-
tions to that impression.13) When we see, say, a book in front of us,
does such a process really occur? Is it not the case that we see it,
from the first, as a book? This seeing an object as something is not
seeing it according to an interpretation.14) Or it might be said that
such a process occurs unconsciously. Indeed, in the case of visual
sensation, light radiation from some object impinges on our retina
and its form is reflected in our visual field. But we should notice
that we necessarily have intentionality toward an object when we
perceive or see it. If we disregard the intentionality which is neces-
sarily present in the subject of perception, we can, from outside the
act of perception, claim that there is a conception-free stage in the
causal chain of the perceptual process. However, when we perceive
something in ordinary life, from the subject's point of view, we can
make no claim for the existence of such a stage.15) In other words,
6 Journal of the Japanese Association for South Asian Studies, 7, 1995
the fact that there is a conception-free stage in the causal chain of
the perceptual process does not mean that we perceive something
without conception.
Bhartrhari, a grammarian and philosopher of the Paninian
school, asserts that language penetrates into all knowledge.16) The
Bhatta sect of A/I-imams-a objects to this as follows:
It is not right. If we did not see an object in advance [of
judgement], there would be no cause for our invoking words
appropriate to it.17)
Here we find the mistake mentioned above: it is supposed that the
perceiver himself can identify a link in the causal chain of the
perceptual process. In fact, Bhartrhari also considers, as a matter
of course, that there is a genuine sensation. He does not, however,
regard it as knowledge.18)
Thus the notion that perception, in the context in which knowl-
edge is relevant, has two stages and that both of them can be
regarded as means of knowing (pramana) is grossly misleading.
Even if the fact that we see something presupposes that it is neces-
sarily reflected in our visual field, this process, by itself, can never
be labelled perception.19) Our seeing assumes our past experiences.
We see, as Hanson says,20) what we know.
Therefore the two-stage theory of perception advocated by In-
dian thinkers is untenable. It also follows that the Buddhist logi-
cians' theory that conception-free perception alone should be
called perception21) is entirely untenable. Why did they use the
term "pratyaksa" (perception) in such an unusual way?22) The an-
swer has something to do with their ontology.
Buddhist logicians, as is well known, divide beings into two
kinds: particulars (svalaksanas) and universals (samanyalaksanas).
According to them, all things change at every moment. By particu-
lars they refer to things of one moment and regard them alone as
real. On the other hand they regard universals as mental construc-
tions, which are unreal. Universals are useful only in everyday life.
Perception in Indian Philosophy―Is Nirvikalpakam Pratyaksam Possible? 7
The important point is that they admit just two means of knowing:
perception and reasoning, which correlate with the two beings: we
have cognizance of particulars exclusively by perception and uni-
versals exclusively by reasoning.23) From the fact that, according to
them, the only real entities are particulars, it follows that we can
know real entities exclusively by perception. If universals inhab-
ited the realm of perception, they would not regard perception as
the most fundamental way to arrive at knowledge, because univer-
sals are not real. The mistake of Buddhist logicians stems origi-
nally from this dichotomy. Real existence, as they call it, has no
significance in ordinary life. Buddhist logicians themselves, in fact,
attached importance to the pragmatic aspect of everyday activity,
which they explained by the term "arthakriya" (effective action).24)
They developed their theory of truth from the point of view of
arthakriya and asserted that particulars alone are capable of
arthakriyas:25) it is a particular we conventionally refer to as, say,
water, and not the concept "water", that has the capacity to quench
one's thirst. However, can the perception of Buddhist logicians
bring about arthakriya in this way? The answer is evidently no. In
so far as we do not see something in front of us as water, i.e., as a
particular associated with the concept "water", we cannot enjoy its
arthakriyas. It is only because we see it as water that the seeing is
qualified as knowledge.26) The notion that perception is devoid of
concepts contradicts their theory of knowledge. In fact, Akalanka,
a philosopher of the Jaina school, who severely criticized
Dharmakirti, pointed out this contradiction as one of the grounds
for his argument against him.27) Or suppose that the Buddhist logi-
cians' argument runs as follows: since particulars, which are real
entities, have arthakriyets, perception which genuinely grasps them
must be a means of knowing. This argument is not right because
they confuse an argument about cognition with an argument about
existence. In order for a perceiver to experience an arthakriya in a
particular, he needs linguistic functions or concepts. It is of great
interest that Dharmakirti, explaining conception-free perception,
8 Journal of the Japanese Association for South Asian Studies, 7, 1995
remarks as follows: 28)
Even a man who pays attention to something other than the
thing [toward which his eyes look], sees the latter's color with
his eyes. Then clearly we do not understand the conventional
relation [between the color and a word]. And conceptualiza-
tion is derived from understanding. [Therefore, it does not
arise in the realm of sight.]29)
Indeed, when one's eyes look toward something, there is, even if
one does not pay attention to it, an optical appearance of color in
the visual field. But can we say that this appearance is an example
of conception-free perception?30) What kind of arthakriya does
such an appearance bring about?31) The fact is that the appearance
is an example of genuine sensations devoid of intentionality. It
cannot be qualified as knowledge.32) Even sense-datum theorists do
not regard such an appearance as perception.33) The invalidity of
the Buddhist logicians' theory of perception is shown by the fact
that they cannot but cite an example like this, which is, in fact,
inappropriate to perception.
Some Buddhist logicians, however, seem to have noticed this
difficulty. Indian thinkers generally regard the traditional theory of
their own school as almost absolute. What solution can Buddhist
logicians offer without abandoning their traditional theory of per-
ception?
Dharmottara, in his commentary on the Nyayabindu 1-12, di-
vided the objects of perceptual cognition into two kinds: objects to
be grasped (grahyas) and objects to be obtained (prapaniyas). The
objects we recognize by means of perception belong to the latter
category and have, according to him, a series of moments. Here he
clearly admits a connection between perception and universals.34)
It is not until we identify the object that perception becomes
a means of knowing.35)
In his Tarkabhasa, Moksakaragupta also remarks as follows:
And this perception is a means of knowing only when it
Perception in Indian Philosophy―Is Nirvikalpakam Pratyaksam Possible? 9
brings about a subsequent conceptualization; for we can grant
it the status of perception only if it leads to actions in ordinary
life.")
These remarks mean that conception-free perception, by itself,
cannot be a means of knowing, that is to say, that what is acquired
by conception-free perception alone is not knowledge. This evi-
dently contradicts the Buddhist logicians' traditional theory of per-
ception, even though Dharmottara or Moksakaragupta labours not
to deny it but to improve upon it.
The Buddhist logicians' theory of perception leads, after all, to
an inquiry into certainty. In their view the foundation of human
knowledge must be infallible. Particulars alone are real; therefore
infallible knowledge must have as its objects these particulars,
which conception-free perception alone can grasp; the state in
which sense-organs receive their objects as they are is infallible,
because judgements that may give rise to mistakes") are not
present.38) In this context we can say that the Buddhist position is
a kind of direct realism because they claim that the direct objects of
perception are real things, i.e., particulars. But we can ask this: is
something like a picture or a photograph really a reflection of a
state as it is?39) We can see something through a microscope. It
looks to us quite differently from when we see it with unaided
eyes. In which case do we see the object as it is?40) Or, even if a
round coin looks elliptical to us, we normally think that it is
round.41) Can we say that its shape as it is is elliptic? Does the
judgement that it is round not correspond to reality? Dharmakirti
cites as one of the illusions the visual experience that, when we are
placed on any moving thing, we see something unmoving as if it
were moving. In this case also, in fact, we do not normally judge it
to be moving; we think that what is unmoving looks as if it were
moving. Is there an essential difference between this appearance of
moving and the elliptical appearance of the coin? All we can say is
that an object appears in a certain form and that we cannot call the
appearance or the reflection in our visual field 'the thing as it is'.42)
10 Journal of the Japanese Association for South Asian Studies, 7, 1995
Dharmakirti gives clear instances of cases when the deficiencies
of sense organs are a cause of fallacious cognition and, in order
to exclude both these examples and those mentioned above from
the realm of perception, adds the expression "free from error"
(abhranta) to the definition of 'perception'. Why, however, must it
be added? In fact, it need not be added, if its aim is only to exclude
cases of illusion; for they would have to add the expression "free
from error" to the definition of reasoning (anumana) also, because
we may wrongly reason.43) Thus Dharmakirti's definition of per-
ception is incoherent. If the expression "free from error" is to be
significant, it must mean that perception is, unlike reasoning, essen-
tially or unconditionally infallible.44)
The fact that Dharmakirti, in order to exclude perception based
on the deficiencies of the sense organs from normal perception
,
added the expression "free from error" to the definition of percep-
tion, in spite of the incoherency mentioned above, shows that he
accorded a fundamental status to perception and that he laid em-
phasis on its certainty because, he believed, it grasps its object as it
is.45) Thus Buddhist logicians believed that the two means of
knowing should respectively be correlated with each of the two
aspects of being and, inquiring into the nature of certainty as the
foundation of human knowledge, advanced a theory of perception
,
which is, though very interesting, untenable.
Notes
1) "conception-free" and "conception-loaded" are Matilal's terms [Matilal 1986: 313] .
2) indriyarthasannikarsotpannam jnanam avyapadesyam avyabhicari vyavasayatmakam
pratyaksam (Nyayasutra 1-1-4)
3) yad idam anupayukte sabdarthasambandhe 'rthajnanam, na tat namadheyasabdena
vyapadisyate/grhite 'pi ca sabdarthasambandhe 'syarthasyayam sabdah namadhe-
yam iti/yada so 'rtho grhyate, tada tat purvasmad arthajnanan na
visisyate…
4) saksatkaripramakaranam pratyaksam sa ca dvidha savikalpakanirvikalpaka-
/…/
bhedat/[Tarkabhasa (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series): 33]
5) tato 'rthasamnikrstenendriyena nirvikalpakam namajatyadiyojanahinam vastuma-
travagahi kincid idam iti jnanam janyate/[Tarkabhasa: 33]
6) "intentionality" means "the directedness or 'aboutness' of many , if not all, concious
states". (S. Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy , Oxford: Oxford Uni-