Perception and Knowledge

260 Pages·2011·1 MB·English

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PERCEPTION AND KNOWLEDGE
Thisbookoffersaprovocative,clear,andrigorouslyarguedaccountof
thenatureofperceptionanditsroleintheproductionofknowledge.
WalterHopparguesthatperceptualexperiencesdonothaveconcep-
tual content, and that what makes them play a distinctive epistemic
roleisnotsomethingthattheysharewithbeliefs,butsomethingthat
sets them radically apart. He explains that the reason-giving relation
between experiences and beliefs is what Edmund Husserl called
“fulfillment” – in which we find something to be as we think it to
be. His book covers a wide range of central topics in contemporary
philosophy of mind, epistemology, and traditional phenomenology.
It is essential reading for contemporary philosophers of mind and
phenomenologistsalike.
walter hopp is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Boston
University.Hehaspublishedarticlesinnumerousjournalsincluding
theCanadianJournalofPhilosophy,theEuropeanJournalofPhilosophy,
andHusserlStudies.

PERCEPTION AND
KNOWLEDGE
A Phenomenological Account
WALTER HOPP
BostonUniversity
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Contents
Acknowledgments page ix
ListofHusserl’sworks x
Introduction 1
1 Content 7
1.1 Contemporaryusesof‘content’ 8
1.2 Twoargumentsformentalcontent 12
1.3 AHusserlianaccount 27
1.4 Conclusion 36
2 Experientialconceptualism 37
2.1 Motivatingexperientialconceptualism 40
2.2 Theargumentfromconditionsofsatisfaction 43
2.3 Theargumentfromperceiving-as 47
2.4 Theargumentfromtheperceptionofcategorially
60
structuredobjects
2.5 Theargumentfromperceptualidentification 73
2.6 Theargumentfromhorizons 76
2.7 Conclusion 80
3 Conceptualismandknowledge 81
3.1 McDowell’sposition 82
3.2 Brewer’saccount 92
3.3 Conclusion 101
4 Againstexperientialconceptualism 103
4.1 Detachablecontents 103
4.2 Theargumentfromknowledge 106
4.3 Theargumentfromintentionality 115
4.4 Thedemonstrativetheory 118
4.5 Someargumentsagainstthedemonstrativetheory 119
4.6 Conclusion 129
5 Conceptualandnonconceptualcontent 130
5.1 Nonconceptualcontent 130
5.2 Conceptualcontent 141
vii
viii Contents
5.3 Theargumentfromhorizonsrevisited 146
5.4 Conclusion 148
6 Thecontentsofperception 149
6.1 Therelationalview 149
6.2 Therelationalviewandhallucination 152
6.3 Furtherconsiderationsagainsttherelationalview 161
6.4 Adefenseofmoderatedisjunctivism 172
6.5 Conclusion 189
7 Tothethingsthemselves 190
7.1 Epistemicfulfillment 191
7.2 Otherkindsoffulfillment 201
7.3 DeparturesfromHusserl 206
7.4 Epistemicfulfillmentandknowledge 210
7.5 Conclusion 224
Bibliography 226
Index 242