Cornelia-Adriana Baciu · John Doyle Editors Peace, Security and Defence Cooperation in Post-Brexit Europe Risks and Opportunities Peace, Security and Defence Cooperation in Post-Brexit Europe (cid:129) Cornelia-Adriana Baciu John Doyle Editors Peace, Security and Defence Cooperation in Post-Brexit Europe Risks and Opportunities Editors Cornelia-AdrianaBaciu JohnDoyle SchoolofLawandGovernment SchoolofLawandGovernment DublinCityUniversity DublinCityUniversity Dublin,Ireland Dublin,Ireland ISBN978-3-030-12417-5 ISBN978-3-030-12418-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12418-2 LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2019934707 ©SpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG2019 Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.AllrightsarereservedbythePublisher,whetherthewholeorpart of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation,broadcasting,reproductiononmicrofilmsorinanyotherphysicalway,andtransmissionor informationstorageandretrieval,electronicadaptation,computersoftware,orbysimilarordissimilar methodologynowknownorhereafterdeveloped. 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Theregisteredcompanyaddressis:Gewerbestrasse11,6330Cham,Switzerland Foreword If the EU and the UK do not manage to create a strategic partnership in foreign policyanddefence—a‘specialrelationship’,asitwere—bothsideswilllose.There is no point therefore in debating who needs the other more. Both Brussels and Londonstandtogainfromapragmaticpartnership. SuchanEU–UKpartnershipwillhavetobeclearlydefined.Firstofall,aEuro- British ‘special relationship’ must be just that: special. It cannot be seen as a precedentforsimilararrangementswithanyotherstate(which,formostEUmember states, means: with Turkey). That is easy to justify, if necessary: after Brexit, only onenon-EUEuropeanstatewillhaveapermanentseatintheUNSecurityCouncil, soonlythatonestatequalifiesforthisparticulartypeofstrategicpartnership. AstheUKhasalwaysstronglyopposedfreeriding,itcannotnowdosoitself.One far-reachingwayofinstitutionalisingaspecialrelationship,forexample,wouldbeto maintainaBritishseatintheForeignAffairsCouncil(FAC).Butsuchaseat,even withoutvotingrights,cannotcomeforfree.TheCFSPremainsanintergovernmental area of EU policy: decisions require unanimity. In practice, member states hardly evervoteintheFACoritspreparatorybodies,buteithertakedecisionsbyconsensus ordonotdecideatall.Aseatwithoutavotethusactuallycomesveryclosetohaving anormalseat.Therefore,itwouldbebutlogicalthatinthisscenariotheUKwould continuetoabidebyallTreatystipulationsontheCFSPandcontinuetopayintothe CFSP budget. An ‘opt-in’ into the CFSP cannot be partial: it would have a very negative impact on decision-making if the UK subscribed to one EU common positionandnottoanother.HavingaseatimpliessubscribingtoallCFSPdecisions, anddefendingtheminallotherforums,justliketheEUmemberstates. This would senda strongsignalto theother powers,such asRussia and China, thatindiplomacyevenafterBrexittherewillstillbeoneEurope,whichwouldbein theinterestofallEuropeanstates.TheUKwouldalsobenefitbecauseitwouldretain an important asset in its relationship with the USA. And the EU member states wouldbenefitbecauseiftheUKremainsfullyinvolvedintheCFSP,theyneednot fear the emergence of new parallel circuits that would bypass the EU. Smaller member states especially would not be keen on the UK trying to influence foreign v vi Foreword policy from the outside through bilateral relations with the other big European players,FranceandGermany.Atthesametime,itwouldbeclearthatifoneleaves theUnion,onecannotcomebackinonthecheap. Thebiggestobstacle tosuchapartnership,however, aretheBritish themselves. TheBritishgovernment,initspaperon“ForeignPolicy,DefenceandDevelopment: A Future Partnership Paper” (September 2017), expressed a very positive view of CFSP andCSDP.One almost wonders whyit wouldwishtoleave.Unfortunately, and contrary to the British reputation for pragmatism, in the debate on the EU and Brexit ideology and emotions prevail. That has rendered it very difficult for the Britishpoliticalleadershiptoadoptanuancedandrealisticstance.Britishdomestic politics have become extremely volatile. This has certainly not made the Brexit negotiationsanyeasier. Not just in foreign and defence policy, but in many other policy areas there are very good reasons to maintain practical cooperation between the UK and the EU even after Brexit. Cooperation betweenpoliceand intelligence servicesand justice departmentsinthefightagainstterrorismisanobviousexample.Theproblemisthat wheneveryBritishministrydrawsupthelistofwhatitwouldstillbedesirabletodo together with the EU after Brexit, and London then assembles all those lists, the resultwilllookverymuchlikemembership.Thatwillbepoliticallyunfeasible,even though every individual item on every list will be perfectly logical. This demon- stratesthesheerabsurdityofBrexit:afteryearsofnegotiatingonhowtoleave,the UKwillthenhavetostartanotherroundofnegotiationsonhowtolinkbackupwith theEUinawholerangeofareas. Perhaps,ifofferedthechancetovoteagain,Britishcitizenswouldprefertostay in the EU after all. Meanwhile, however, the EU itself will (hopefully!) have advanced and made new steps towards more integration. Even if the UK was to remain, which personally I strongly hope, something, sadly, has been broken betweentheUKandtherestoftheEU. Egmont—RoyalInstitutefor SvenBiscop InternationalRelations,Brussels, Belgium GhentUniversity,Ghent,Belgium Acknowledgements The editors of this volume would like to thank Professor Ulrich Krotz, Director of Europe in the World Programme at the European University Institute, Florence; Jeremy Stöhs, Research Analyst at the Institute for Security Policy, University of Kiel; Dr Heiko Borchert, Security Analyst and Managing Director, Borchert Con- sulting &Research AG; DrThomasWithington, ResearcherandDefenceAnalyst, MönchPublishingGroup,fortheircommentsinrelationtothiswork.Wewouldalso liketothank ProfessorRobert Elgie, School ofLawandGovernment, Dublin City University; Dr Azra Naseem, Research Fellow at the Institute for International Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction, Dublin City University; Dr Sebastian Bruns, Director of the Center for Maritime Strategy and Security, University of Kiel; and Daniel Pust, DAAD Lecturer at the Department of Germanic Studies, Trinity College Dublin, for their assistance and support. Finally, we thank all contributors for their commitment and professionalism during various stages of processingthisbook,whichweareverypleasedtopresent. vii Contents PartI TurningtheTables:TheCollaborativePotentialofFuture EU-UKRelationsinPeace,SecurityandDefence 1 UK-EUMilitaryCooperationandBrexitfromaNeoclassical RealistPerspective:NoBigDeal?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 LeeDavidTurpin 2 ChannelTrouble?ChallengestoUK-EUSecurityCollaboration AfterBrexit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 MonikaSusandBenjaminMartill PartII BeyondBrexit:RethinkingtheFutureofEurope 3 TheFrench-GermanMilitaryCooperationandtheRevival ofEuropeanDefenceAfterBrexit:BetweenReality andPoliticalMyth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 DelphineDeschaux-Dutard 4 TheEffectsofBrexitontheGoodFridayAgreement andtheNorthernIrelandPeaceProcess. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 JohnDoyleandEileenConnolly 5 AlliancePersistence,MilitarySecurityandthe2016Brexit Referendum:TheCaseofEstoniaandtheUnitedKingdom. . . . . 97 JonasJ.Driedger PartIII NewSourcesofLegitimationandPowerinEuropeanPeace andSecurity 6 TheEU’sTechnologicalPower:HarnessingFutureandEmerging TechnologiesforEuropeanSecurity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 RalucaCsernatoni ix x Contents 7 CollaborativeNavalProcurementandGrandStrategy Post-Brexit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 MichaelFriederichKluth 8 EuropeanNuclearDeterrenceandSecurityCooperation: Post-BrexitRelationsandChallenges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 AdéritoVicente PartIV Post-BrexitStrategy:TowardsNewParadigmsofEuropean Resilience,StabilityandSecurity 9 ConceptualisingEuropeanSecurityPost-Brexit:Turbulence, ComplexityandInterdependence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 EffieCharalampaki 10 Conclusion:TheFutureofEurope—TowardsaNewParadigm ofEuropeanSecurityandResilience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 Cornelia-AdrianaBaciuandJohnDoyle List of Contributors Cornelia-AdrianaBaciu SchoolofLawandGovernment,DublinCityUniversity, Dublin,Ireland Effie Charalampaki Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies, Institute of International Relations,Athens,Greece EileenConnolly SchoolofLawandGovernment,DublinCityUniversity,Dublin, Ireland RalucaCsernatoni CharlesUniversityPrague,Prague,CzechRepublic VrijeUniversiteitBrussels,Brussels,Belgium DelphineDeschaux-Dutard UniversitéGrenobleAlpes,Grenoble,France John Doyle School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland JonasJ.Driedger EuropeanUniversityInstitute,Florence,Italy HigherSchoolofEconomics,Moscow,Russia Michael Friederich Kluth Department of Social Science and Business, Roskilde University,Roskilde,Denmark BenjaminMartill LondonSchoolofEconomics,London,UK MonikaSus HertieSchoolofGovernance,Berlin,Germany LeeDavidTurpin LancasterUniversity,Lancaster,UK AdéritoVicente EuropeanUniversityInstitute,Florence,Italy xi