Pawnship, Slavery, and Colonialism in Africa

482 Pages·2003·30.95 MB·English

by  Paul E. Lovejoy

PAWN:S,HIP,
S~LAVERY,
AND
·C·OLO·N.IALISM IN AFRICA
a.v
EDITED
PAUL E. .. LO·VE]OY
Afri1ca Worlld Pr·ess, Inc.
P.O.B~109l
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• P.O.Bo•48
l'renlon, Nl 08607 A~mara, ERITREA
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Africa World Pr,ess, Inc.
P.O. Bo. '89> P.O. Bo<"
1
Trenton, NJ 08&07 . Asmara, ERITRIEA
Copyrigh~©2003 Paul E. Lovejoy and Toyin Faiola
First Printing 2003
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechani
cal, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission of
the publisher.
Book design: Getahun Seyoum Alemayehu
Cover design: Roger Dormann
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Pawnship, slavery, and colonialism in Afdca/ Paul E. Lovejoy and Toyin
Faiola, eds ..
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1-59221-039-2--ISBN 1-59221-040-6 (pbk.)
] . Peonage--Africa--History. 2. Slavery--Africa--History. 3.
Africa--Colonization--History. I. Lovejoy, Paul E. H. Faiola, Toyin.
HD4275.A3 P392003
306. 3'62'096--dc21
2002152038
;-.·~~ '! ...
. I ( . (. ..· :;
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
T
his volume includes the chapters origin. ally published in Toy in
Faiola and Paul Lovejoy, eds., Pawnship in Africa: Debt Bondage in
Historical Perspective (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, African
Modernization and Development Series, Paul E. Lovejoy, Series Editor),
which includes two chapters previously published, viz.: ''Pawns, Porters,
and Petty Traders: Women in the Transition to Cash-Crop Agriculture in
Colonial Ghana, ... by Beverly Grier, in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture
and Society, 17, 2 ( 1992), 304-28 (reprinted with the pennission of the
University of Chicago Press). The chapter by Martin A. Klein and Richard
Roberts, "The Resurgence of Pawning in French West Africa during the
Depression of the 1930s," is a revised version of an article originaUy
published in Aji-ican Economic History, 16 (l987), 23-37 (reprinted with
the permission of the editors).
The following essays have been added to this expanded edition: E. A.
Oroge, "lwofa: An Historical Survey of the Yoruba Institution of
Indenture," published posthumously in African Economic History, 14
( 1985), 75-106 (reprinted with pennission of the editors). Paul Lovejoy and
David Richardson, "Pawns Will Live When Slaves Is Apt to Dyen: Credit,
Risk and Trust at Old Calabar in the Era of the Slave Trade," first published
in The American Historical Review, 104:2 (1999), 332-55, is reprinted here
with the permission of the American Historical Society. Lovejoy and
Richardson, 'The Busmess of Slaving: Pawnship in Western Africa, c.
1600-181 0," initiaHy pubhshed the Journal ofA frican History, 42:1 (200 1) ,
is reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press. Toyin
Faiola, "Slavery and Pawnship in the Yoruba Economy of the Nineteenth
Century," previously published in Slave1y and Abolition, 15, 2 (1994), 221-
45, is reprinted with the pennission of Frank Cass, Ltd.
We gratefully acknowledge the support of the Social Sciences and
Hwnanities Research Council of Canada,. and we would especially like to
thank J.J. Shafer and Anita Thakurdeen for their editorial assistance.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgments ............................................................................. iii
Table Of Contents ............................................................................... v
1. Pawn ship In Historical Perspective .............................................. 1
by Toyin Faiola and Paul E. Lovejoy
2. The Business Of Slaving: Pawnship In Western Africa,
C. 1600-1810* .......................................................................... 27
by Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson
3. On Pawning And Enslavement For Debt In The Precolonial
Slave Coast ................................................................................. 55
by Robin Law
4. "Pawns WiH Live When Slaves Is Apt To Dye": Credit,
Risk And Trust At Old Calabar In The Era Of
The Slave Trade* ........................................................................ 71
by Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson
5. Pawnship In Nembe, Niger Delta ................................................. 97
by Ebiegberi J. Alagoa and Atei M. Okorobia
6. Slavery And Pawnship In The Yoruba Economy Of
The Nineteenth Century ............................................................ 10 9
by Toyin Faiola
7. Pawning In The Emirate Of Ilorin ............................................. 13 7
by Ann O'Hear
8. Pawnship In lgbo Society ......................................................... 165
by Felix Ekechi
9. Human Pawning In Asante, 1820-1950: Markets And
Coercion, Gender And Cocoa ................................................... 187
by Gareth Austin
10. Pawnship ln Edo Society: From Benin Kingdom To Benin
Province Under Colonial Rule .................................................. 225
by Uyilawa Usuanlele
11. Pawning And Slavery On The Kenya Coast:
The Miji Kenda Case ................................................................ 239
by Fred Morton
12. Pawning, Politics And Matriliny Jn Northeastern Tanzania ....... 255
by James Giblin
13. Pawning In Coastal Northwest Sierra Leone, 1870-1910 ........... 267
by Allen M. Howard
vi
14. Indirect Rule And The Brief Apogee OfPawnship In
Nimba, Liberia, 1918-30 ........................................................... 283
by Martin Ford
15. Pawns, Porters, And Petty Traders: Women In The Transition
To Cash-Crop Agriculture In Colonial Ghana ........................... 299
by Beverly Grier
16. lwofa: An Historical Survey Of The Yoruba Institution
Of Indenture* ........................................................................... 325
by E. Adeniyi Oroge
17. Pawns And Politics: The Pawnship Debate In Western Nigeria. 357
by Judith Byfield
18. Pawnship In Colonial Southwestern Nigeria ............................. 387
by Toyin Faiola
19. The Resurgence Of Pawning In French West Africa During The
Depression OfThe 1930s ............................................................... 409
by Martin Klein and Richard Roberts
20. "What Is And What Is Not The Law:" Imprisonrnen~ For Debt
And The Institution Of Pawnship In The Gold Coast, .............. 42 7
by Kwabena Akurang-Pany
Bibliograp,hy ................................................................................... 449
Notes On Contributors .................................................................... 467
Index .............................................................................................. 471
P AW NSHIP IN HISTORICAL
PERSPE·CTIVE
TOYIN FALOLA and PAUL E. LOVEJOY
Studies in African labor and social history have emphasized,. with
some justification, slavery, peasantries, and wage labor. Pawnship,
a system in which individuals are held in debt bondage as collateral
for' loans, has been largely' neglected, and until this volume, information
on pawnship in Africa has been so scarce as to make generalization
difficult 1 Yet pawns were more prevalent than hitherto recognized, and
it is possible to suggest a broad historical framework to explain the
political and economic conditions that accounted for the range of
contexts in which pawnship was important. The institution is centuries
old, at least along the Atlantic seaboard, where it appears to have
developed in tandem with the growth of the trans-Atlantic slave trade,
the expansion of slavery within Africa, and the greater
commercialization of African economies. Because of its importance in
the provision of credit, pawnship seems to have become more common
in those states and societies that were most fully involved in external
trade. Although at this stage of research, we cannot detennine the
frequency of pawning in the distant past,. it flourished in the late
nineteenth century when slavery was stiH widespread and when demand
for primary products (palm oil and kemds, witd rubber, ivory, peanuts,
2 Faiola & LoveJo.F
among others) had pulled African producers more fully into the
international market than ever before. Under colonialism, pawnship
continued to be a common mechanism for mobilizing labor and
guaranteeing credit, although the demise of slavery and legal restrictions
- -
on various forms of servility, including pawnship, gradually altered the
political and economic setting. Pawns held in debt bondage became less
important in regulating the extension of credit as other forms of collateral
became more common.
The study of pawnship is related to questions of indebtedness, labor
control, gender, and capital flows in societies that were only imperfectly
connected to world markets. Hence there are a variety of themes that have
to be considered in assessing the importance of this institution and how it
changed over the past several centuries in the different parts of Africa that
are examined in this volume. First, the prevalence of pawnship at any point
in time appears to have had some correlation with poverty and the inability
2
of families and individuals to secure the necessities of life. Famine,
disease, political insecurity, and econorruc miscakulation were frequent
causes of poverty and the need to borrow. It should be noted, however, that
poverty was not always the cause of indebtedness. Sometimes merchants
borrowed to promote their trade. Their expectation was to repay the loan
sooner or later out of profits. People also borrowed to meet funeral
expenses, ritual obligations, and court fines. In these cases, however, failure
to repay debts quickly was often a sign of deteriorating economic
circumstances and hence was ultimately related to poverty. Second,
pawnship involved the control over the labor of the individual held in pawn.
As a mechanism for obtaining access to labor, pawnship has to be
considered in the context of other mechanisms of labor supply, including
slavery, communal activities, corvee, and wages. Pawnship was only one
form of labor mobilization. Third, gender issues are paramount in
understanding the context for pawnship because much of the labor that was
mobilized through this institution was performed by women. 3 Furthennore,
women and their children were often ilie ones to suffer the most from
famine and political instability, and hence gender and indebtedness were
often associated. Because of this vulnerability, women were exposed to
sexual ,exploitation and other abuse that sometimes resulted in their
reduction to slavery. Fourth, pawning was only one mechanism for
obtaining credit, and hence an examination of its economic role must take
into consideration other institutions and practices and how these changed in
different historical contexts.4 As Gareth Austin has argued,. pawnship was
characterized by "interlocking factor markets," in which the tenns of
exchange in different markets (labor and credit) were contractually and
5
simultaneously tied together. Because of the primacy of women as a
Pawnship in Historical Perspective 3
source of pawns, moreover, the flow of credit and the control of labor were
closely linked with the institution of marriage.
Until this volume, pawnship in Africa has usually been
discussed in the context of slavery; pawns have been
perceived as an important supplement to slaves during
the precolonial period and as substitutes for slaves
during the present century when slavery was declining
into insignjficance. Indeed pawnship existed alongside
slavery, experiencing levels of resurgence and intensity
that initially depended upon the economic conditions of
precapitalist social fonnations and then under
colonialism on the imperfect penetration of capitalism.
When slavery was dominant, pawnship fed individuals
into servitude. After slavery subsided, pawnship briefly
surfaced as an alternative to slavery, its appearance
fluctuating with the vicissitudes of the market
economy.
Pawnsbip,: C.haracteristics of the Institution
Pawnship, by definition, is a legal category of social and economic
6
dependency. The institution, in various fonns, was common in many
preindustrial societies,. not on1y in Africa, but in southern and southeastern
Asia and parts of Latin America as well, where it is usuaUy referred to as
7
deb~ bondage. The pawn was a person held as collateral fur a loan, and as
in the case of trees and fanns that were pledged under a similar system of
credit, the pawning of individuals constituted the transfe,r of productive
assets for the duration of the debt as security, unlike a ~Ortgage, in which
assets are transferred only in case of default. 8
The labor of the pawn constituted interest on the debt and covered the
costs of subsistence, but did not contribute to the principal. The principal
usually had a fixed value at the time of the contract and had to be paid off in
full before the pawn was free from service.9 As Morton,s study of the Miji
Kenda demonstrates, however, there could be disputes over the amount of
the principal; if the loan had been originally calculated in tenns of a
commodity whose value subsequently increased during the period of
servitude, the creditor might insist that repayment be made on the basis of
the inflated value, thereby adding an often substantial increment to the debt.
H was also possible for the original debt to include a monemry component
for interest, in which case the pawn did not usually live with the creditor.
However the principal and interest were calculated, the pawn continued in
bondage until the fuU debt had been repaid or otherwise cancelled. While
4 Faiola & Lovejoy ·,
the period for repayment was usually indefimte before the twentieth
century, colonial laws in some parts of Africa attempted to fix a terminal
date for repaym.ent, thereby establishing the that the labor
p~rinciple
p~erfonned by the pawn itncluded both interest and capitaL
The contmct that controUed the labor of the pawn represented an
]nv·estment that was realized thfough the laborRpower of the p~awn. That
contract was property and henc·e was owned and could be transferred,
1
although as Byfield demonstrates in her study of Yoruba pawning in this
volume, the p·ell1rission of the debtor was required before a pawn could be
transferred. Pawns thems~elves were not property and were not owned,.
although various authors sometimes refer to "masters" who "owned''
pawns, as if they were slaves (see below). In most instances, it would be 1
more ac·curate to refer to 11Creditors" who "'contro11ed11 pawns. This
confusion over the loan and the labor of the p·awn highlights the
interconnection between property and indebtedness,. on the one hand, and '
m
various methods for controlling ]abor in economies whi·ch wage labor
was marginal or nonexistent, on the other hand. A debt that resulted in
pawning involved the imp~Hcit recognition by the debtor and the creditor
that a specific amount of was owed,, and that the loan arose from
~cap~ital
property rights enjoyed by the creditor. Food, money, shelter, ttade items or
some c~ombination of these goods and s~ervices were extended to the debtor
in Heu of fuU repayment. In short the transaction was based on the
con1moditization of these goods and servic·es.
Because interest continued in the fonn of labor unti1 the debt was
repaid in full, pawnship had some similarities to slavery. In both cases, the
creditor/master had :relatively full control over the output oftbe pawn/slave;
the labor-power of the pawn/slave belonged to the cr,editor/master.
Nonetheless,, there ]s an important distinction between pawnship and
slav,ery., From a theoretical perspective, the pawning contract, not the pawn,
was the p~rop~erty of the creditor, while under slavery,, the slav·e was the
direct property of the master. Pawns, or more often their relatives who had
placed them in pawn, had legal rec·our;se in the case of abuse or dispute on
1
the basis of the contract, and the contract could be tenninated on the
repayment of the original debt. Slaves had no such legal recourse, although
m
they could achieve emancip.ation a vari.ety of ways if a master was so
disposed. This proprietacy diffefence between the pawning contract and the
sJave as property had important ramifications in different. historical
contexts, ahhou,gh it should be recognized that the fine theoretical
distinction that is drawn here often broke down in pract]c,e. Pawns could
end up as slave:s, and slaves we11e pawned.
som~etimes
P'awns were gener:aJly drawn from within the society in which they
were in bondage;. ,either pawns were freeborn members of society, or they ,
--------------.......
- -----·--··- ---------------
Pawnship in Historical Perspective 5
were slaves of long standing whom masters to redeem and to
~expected
reincorporate into their households. In order for an individual to have use as
collateral, it was essential that the debtor want to redeem the person. This
commitment to paying off the debt was clearly established in the cas~e of
self-pawning, whereby a person agre~ed to pledge him or herself as
coUateral. Whether or not a person was always able to pay off the debt is
another matter. The commitment to redemption was also operative in the
case of close kin, where the debtors usually intended to pay off the debt.
Chronic financial difficulties might prevent redemption, and therefore there
was considerable risk that the transaction might involve the total alienation
of the pawn. A domestic slave had value to his or her owner because slaves
were an moreover over time, the relationship might well evolve
inv~estment;
so that the personal attachment might become almost as strong as that based
on kinship. Nonetheless, the potential alienation for slaves was certainly
more extreme than in instances of self-pawning or the pawning of close
relatives.
Pawns had to be individuals who, were recognized as constituent
members of society, even if they were subordinates or peopl~e of low status.
Unless they were fuU members,, they had little chance of being protected
from sale into slav~ery or otherwise abused. Individuals had to have value
deriving from their social relationship to the debtor in order for them to
have value to the as collateral. Self-pawning intrinsicany
~cr,editor
emphasiz,ed this value, even though those who pawned themselves were
often in the worst position to honor a debt They were preoccupied with
servioe to the creditor,. and were usually only able to cover the costs
henc~e
of subsistence and to pay the interest on the debt. Time had to be allowed
for additional work if ther-e was any hope of the principal, or
liecov~ering
relatives had to be willing to repay the original debt. Those individuals who
were the most effective pawns were close tdatives of the debtor, because
the debtor was stiU free to conc,entrate on acquiring the resources to repay
the debt. Sodal pressures and affection between debtor and pawn were
effective instruments that promoted redemption.
m
This identification with the sodety which individuals experienced
their subordination distinguished pawnship from slavery as an institution.
Newly acquired slaves were foreigners or otherwise defmed as outsiders,.
unlike individuals being reduced to the status of pawn. As already noted,.
slaves could be pawned, but when masters arranged to slaves as
us~e
collateral, they were acting on the basis of their investment in slaves as
prop~erty. UsuaUy, slaves could serve this function only if they were
a~ccuUurated and therefore members of society as well, albeit of servile
status. In a sense, pawned slaves were being treated like quasi-kin.
Otherwise, a master would be more likely to sell the slave in order to p~ay a