Patterns of Legislative Politics: Roll-Call Voting in Latin America and the United States

240 Pages·2003·1.676 MB·English

by  Scott Morgenstern

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PatternsofLegislativePolitics
UsingtheUnitedStatesasabasisofcomparison,thisbookmakesex-
tensiveuseofroll-calldatatoexplorepatternsoflegislativepoliticsin
Argentina,Brazil,Chile,andUruguay.Thepatternsaredefinedbythe
extent to which parties, factions, delegations, or alliances – what the
authorcollectivelyterms“legislativeagents”–areunifiedintheirvot-
ingandhencearecollectivelyidentifiabletovotersasbeingresponsible
forpolicydecisions.Then,todevelopanindicatorofthesecondcentral
pattern, the book examines the propensity of the legislative agents to
form policy coalitions with one another. It shows that agents in Chile
and to some extent Uruguay are more coalitional than in Argentina
and Brazil, but there is evidence that the agents work with one an-
other in these latter countries as well. The U.S. parties have exhibited
animportantshift,movingfromlowlevelsofunityandfrequentbipar-
tisanshiptowardconsiderablyhigherlevelsofunityandmorefrequent
polarization.Inexplainingthepatterns,thebookconsiderstheeffects
oftheelectoralsystem,legislators’ideology,cabinetmembership,and
othervariables.
Scott Morgenstern is assistant professor of Political Science at Duke
University and has been a visiting scholar at CIDE in Mexico, the
UniversidaddelaRepublicainUruguay,andtheInstitutoInteruniversi-
tariodeEstudiosdeIberoame´ricayPortugalinSpain.Heiscoeditorof
LegislativePoliticsinLatinAmerica,andhisarticleshaveappearedin
theJournalofPolitics,PartyPolitics,ComparativePolitics,andLegisla-
tiveStudiesQuarterly.Hisworkhasalsoappearedinseveralcollected
volumesandinjournalsinArgentina,Spain,Mexico,andUruguay.
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Patterns of Legislative Politics
Roll-Call Voting in Latin America and
the United States
SCOTT MORGENSTERN
DukeUniversity
iii
cambridge university press
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo
Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge cb2 2ru, UK
Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521820561
© Scott Morgenstern 2004
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of
relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place
without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published in print format 2004
isbn-13 978-0-511-16451-4 eBook (EBL)
isbn-10 0-511-16451-3
eBook (EBL)
isbn-13 978-0-521-82056-1 hardback
isbn-10 0-521-82056-1 hardback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls
for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not
guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
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Contents
TablesandFigures page vi
PrefaceandAcknowledgments ix
Party,Faction,andCoalitionNamesandAbbreviations xiii
1 PatternsofLegislativePolitics:IdentifiabilityandFlexibility 1
2 RepresentationandtheAgentSystem 26
3 IdentifyingAgents 41
4 InfluencesonAgentUnity:DisciplineandCohesion 85
5 ExplainingVotingUnity 115
6 PolicyCoalitionsandAgentFlexibility 139
7 Conclusion 188
Bibliography 203
SubjectIndex 215
AuthorIndex 222
v
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Tables and Figures
tables
1.1 VetoesinArgentina,1983–1995 page 13
1.2 AgentTypes 18
1.3 NumberofRoll-CallVotes 22
3.1 AverageAgentWeightedUnityScores 46
3.2 AreU.S.PartiesAgents? 47
3.3 PercentageofSeatsHeldintheArgentineChamber
ofDeputies,1983–2001 52
3.4 ArgentinePartyUnity 53
3.5 BrazilianPartyUnity,1991–1998 56
3.6 ContentiousVotesinBrazilYieldingHighPartyUnity,
1991–1998 58
3.7 StateDelegationUnityinBrazil,1995–1998 59
3.8 PMDBAWUScores,byState,1995–1998 60
3.9a ChileanPresidentialElections,1989–1999 64
3.9b PartisanandCoalitionRepresentationofElectedLegislators
inChile,1989–2001 65
3.10 ChileanAgentUnity 68
3.11 ChileanUnityandIssues 69
3.12 UruguayanPartyUnity,1985–1989 75
3.13 UruguayanPartyUnity,1990–1994 76
3.14 UruguayanFactionalUnity,1990–1994 77
4.1 UruguayanPresidentialVoting,1994 96
4.2 Effects of Intraagent Competition and Requirements for
AgentEndorsementsonStrengthofLeaders(LowerHouse
ElectoralSystems) 99
5.1 NominationControlandAWUScores 118
5.2 ComponentsofVarianceAnalysis 122
5.3 GeographicConcentrationofLegislators 125
vi
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TablesandFigures vii
5.4 Extremism,Cohesion,andUnity 127
5.5 CyclesofPartyUnity,1985–1995 132
A5.1 Agents’Left–RightPlacement 138
6.1 FrequencyofAgentVotingwiththeMajority 145
6.2 LikelihoodofVotingwiththeLegislativeMajority,Brazil 152
6.3 VotingwithandagainsttheLegislativeMajority,
HighlyUnifiedBrazilianParties 154
6.4 Two-PartyPolicyCoalitions 155
6.5a UnifiedTwo-PartyPolicyCoalitions,Brazil 156
6.5b UnifiedTwo-PartyConflict,Brazil 156
6.6a LogitEstimatesofBrazilianPolicyCoalitionFormation 160
6.6b SubstantiveImpacts 160
6.7 LikelihoodofVotingwiththeLegislativeMajority,Chile 164
6.8 VotingwithandagainsttheLegislativeMajority,
HighlyUnifiedChileanAgents 164
6.9 PolicyCoalitionsandMajorityofAgents,Chile 169
6.10a UnifiedTwo-AgentPolicyCoalitions,Chile 170
6.10b UnifiedTwo-AgentConflict,Chile 171
6.11 TheElectoralCycleandPolicyCoalitionsin
theChileanHouse 174
6.12 FlexibilityofHighlyUnifiedAgents,Uruguay 180
6.13a UnifiedTwo-AgentPolicyCoalitions,Uruguay 181
6.13b UnifiedTwo-AgentPolicyOpposition,Uruguay 182
6.14 FlexibilityofHighlyUnifiedParties,UnitedStates 185
7.1 IdeologicalPlacementofAgentsinBrazilandChile 197
figures
A3.1 SchematicviewofArgentineLowerHouseballot 79
A3.2 SchematicviewofBrazilianLowerHouseballot 80
A3.3 SchematicviewofChileanLowerHouseballot 81
A3.4 SchematicviewofUruguayanballot 81
5.1 Polarization,cohesion,andunityintheUnitedStates 130
6.1a W-NOMINATEscoresfortheBrazilianHouse,1991–1994 158
6.1b W-NOMINATEscoresfortheBrazilianHouse,1995–1998 158
6.2a W-NOMINATEscoresfortheChileanHouse,1997–1998 172
6.2b W-NOMINATEscoresfortheChileanHouse,1998–1999 172
6.2c W-NOMINATEscoresfortheChileanSenate,1992–1998 172
7.1 Acomparisonofagenttypes 194
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