Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism

160 Pages·2009·14.72 MB·English

by  Cihan Tugal

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2009
Passive Revolution
ABSORBING THE ISLAMIC CHALLENGE TO CAPITALISM
Cihan Tugal
Stanford University Press
Stanford. California
To Deniz
Stanford University Press
Stanford, California
© 2009 by the Board ofTrustees of the Leland Stanford 1unior University.
All rights reserved.
No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic or mechanical. including photocopying and recording, or in any information
storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press.
Printed in the United States of America on acid-free, archival-quality paper
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
ThgaJ, Cihan.
Passive revolution; absorbing the Islamic challenge to capitalism I Cihan TugaL
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-8047-6144-4 (cloth: alk. paper)-lsBN 978-0-8047-6145-1 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Islam and politics-Thrkey. 2. Islamic fundamentalism-Turkey. 3. Islamic
modernism-Thrkey. 4. Capitalism-Religious aspects-Islam. 1. Title.
BPI73·7.T822009
322'.109561-dc22 1,008046633
Typeset by Westchester Book Group in 10/!4 Minion
CONTENTS

Acknowledgments
ix
Abbreviations
xi
Introduction 1
PART:1. CONCEPTUALIZING ISLAMIC MOBILIZATION
1 Toward a Theory of Hegemonic Politics 19
2 Islamization in Turkey as Constitution of Hegemony 36
PART 2 POLITICAL SOCIETY AND CIVIL SOCIETY UNCOUPLED
3 Vicissitudes of Integral Political Society 59
4 The Making and Unmaking of Integral Civil Society 102
PART 3 POLITICAL SOCIETY AND CIVIL SOCIETY RECOUPLED
5 The Emergence of Modern Islamic Political Society 147
6 Modern Islamic Civil Society Triumphant 192
Conclusion: Islamic Hegemony in Comparative
Perspective 235
Notes
267
References
283
Index
301
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
THIS BOOK IS BASED on research in Sultanbeyli, an urban district once under
Islamist control. I first of all thank this district's residents for suffering the
presence ofan ethnographer among them for several years. I acknowledge, on
top ofall, my great debt to friends among the district's teachers and municipal
employees who led me through the maze of religion and politics at the local
level, opened their homes to me, and taught me the subtleties ofIslamic mobi­
lization and demobilization.
Michael Burawoy contributed to the structure and arguments ofthis book,
read several versions, and thoroughly commented on them. The revisit of my
ethnographic site that he suggested proved crucial to the book, leading to the
two-phase design: the observation ofthe same district in two different histori­
cal contexts. Esra Ozyiirek also commented on several versions. Mike Hout
enriched the book with his helpful comments. The analyses benefited from
discussions with Ann Swidler, Dylan Riley, Peter Evans, Victoria Bonnell, Raka
Ray, Laura Enriquez, Loic Wacquant, Martin Sanchez-Jankowski, and Philip
Gorski, as well as from their feedback on previous work related to this project.
I discussed with Aynur Sadet my observations on a daily basis during both
phases of the project, and the sociological and political insights we have devel­
oped together over the years has shaped the analyses in this book. I also im­
mensely benefited from the input ofmy editor, Kate Wahl, and the two anony­
mous reviewers Stanford University Press provided.
During the first phase of the project, Patma Milge GOyek helped me de­
velop a more complete sense of Islamic schools of thought. She not only en­
couraged me to live in an unfamiliar setting but acted as my initial guide in
Ix
x ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
interpreting this complex locality with a historical perspective. Howard
Kimeldorfwas an engaged, patient, and untiring reader. He made sure that I
ABBREVIATIONS

did not lose direction. George Steinmetz pushed me to develop the theoretical
implications of my arguments. Fernando Coronil, Arthur Stinchcombe, Gary
Fine, Georgi Derlugian, Charles Kurzman, ElifKale, Asena Gunal, Berna Turam,
Burc;:ak Keskin, Dicle KogaclOglu, Ash Giir, Miicahit Bilid, Ban~ Biiyiikoku­
tan, Yiiksel Ta~km, Nick Jorgensen, Devra Coren, Irfan Nouriddin, and Darcy
Leach read and provided detailed comments on my earlier analyses.
Niikhet Sirman both indirectly influenced this book by cultivating myeth­
nographic sensibility and discussed my observations and ideas throughout the
research project. C;:aglar Keyder, Ay~e Oncii, Nuray Mert, Zafer Yenal, Ye~im
Arat, Koray C;:ah~kan, Murat Yiiksel, Oguz I~lk, Wendy Espeland, Bruce Carru­
thers, and Ann Orloff also contributed their recommendations and criticisms.
The Committee on Research at the University of California at Berkeley Parties
funded the second phase of this project. The first phase was funded by the
Center Right
Social Science Research Council, the Population Council, and the Lebanese
Policy Center, along with the Rackham School of Graduate Studies and the DP: Democrat Party (1946-1960)

Department of Sociology at the University of Michigan. An Andrew W. Mel­ DYP: True Path Party (1983-2007)

lon Postdoctoral Fellowship at Northwestern University has been helpful in
ANAP: Motherland Party (1983-present)

rethinking aspects ofthe first phase of my research.
My partner, parents, brothers-in-law, and parents-in-law made this book Center Left and Right-Wing Kemalist
possible by generously sharing my enthusiasm, joy, and troubles during both
CHP: Republican People's Party (Kemalist to center left to right-wing Ke­
phases of the project. The book would not have seen the light of day if it were
malist, 1923-1981, 1992-present)
not for them. I dedicate this book to my son Deniz, whose birth and first
SODEP: Social Democracy Party (center left, 1983-1985)
months accompanied its writing.
SHP: Social Democratic Populist Party (center left, 1985-1995) (descendent of
SODEP)
DSP: Democratic Left Party (center-left to nationalist, 1985-present)
Islamist and EX-/slamist
MNP: Milli Order Party (Islamist, 1970-1971)
MSP: Milli Salvation Party (Islamist, 1972-1980)
RP: Welfare Party (Islamist, 1983-1998)
FP: Virtue Party (Islamist, 1997-2001)
SP: Felicity Party (Islamist, 200l-present)
AKP: Justice and Development Party (ex-Islamist, 200l-present; also AK Party)
xl
xII ABBREVIATIONS
Nationalist Right
MHP: Nationalist Action Party (1969-1981, 1993-present)
MGP: Nationalist Work Party (1985-1993; descendent ofMHP)
BBP: Great Unity Party (religious nationalist right, 1993-present)
Socialist Left
Tip: Labor Party ofTurkey (1961-1971, 1975-1981)
Nationalist Left
HADEP: People's Democracy Party (Kurdish, 1994-zo03) Passive Revolution
DTP: Democratic Society Party (zoos-present; descendent ofHADEP)
Armed Political Groups
Dev-Sol: Revolutionary Left
iBDA-C: Islamic Great East Raiders Front
PKK: Kurdistan Worker's Party
Associations, Foundations, and Other Institutions
DiSK: Confederation ofRevolutionary Worker Unions
Hak-I~: Confederation of Real Worker Unions
iHL: High Schools for Imams and Preachers
MGV: Milli Youth Foundation
MTTB: Milli Turkish Student Association
MOsiAD: Association ofIndependent Industrialists and Businessmen
Turk-i~: Confederation of Worker Unions ofThrkey
T0S1AD: Association ofIndustrialists and Businessmen ofTurkey
INTRODUCTION

OVER THE LAST DECADES, pious Muslims all over the world have been going
through deep and contradictory transformations. Public attention has focused
on some Muslims' turn to violence and their cry for military jihad, ignoring
more widely shared changes among the population. A personal story oftrans­
formation exemplifies another experience. When I met Yasin in 2000, he was
a forty-year-old radical Islamist shopkeeper. He had been one ofthe leaders of
Islamist1 street action in his poor urban district in the 1990S. This district,
Sultanbeyli, was at the forefront of Islamization in Istanbul during that de­
cade. Yasin frequently went to unregistered, radical mosques for Friday ser­
mons. Visitors took off their shoes in front of his office (to keep the environ­
ment clean and ready for ritual observance). He performed daily prayers
regularly, together with partners and customers. Yasin, along with his part­
ners and friends, did not support the (mainstream Islamist) Virtue Party (FP),
which he found too submissive, cowardly, somewhat nationalistic, and obedi­
ent to the state. He was deeply committed to global Islamic unity and saw the
Turkish nation-state as an artificial impediment .
. When I was a newcomer in his district, I told Yasin I had heard that there
were many Nur students (or Nurcus)2 in the district. He heartily laughed
at this suggestion and said, "How can there be Nur students in a district where
the Islamists are so strong?" Only an outsider lil<e me could believe that there
could be any followers of this pro-state, Turkish nationalist, pro-Western, and
capitalist Islamic group in Sultanbeyli. My ignorance deeply embarrassed me.
When I visited Yasin again in 2006, he had started to attend the seminars
of the Nurcus. He argued that this was the only Islamic movement that had a
:L
2 INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION 3
"systematic" way of working and therefore would survive in the long run. In­
deed, various Nurcu groups had become the most active circles in Sultanbeyli. MODERATE ISLAM: SPONTANEOUS RATIONALIZATION
Moreover, Yasin no longer went to radical, unregistered mosques, and he now OR HEGEMONIC STRATEGY?
said, "Confrontational environments are not good. We have to think with Especially after the attacks of 9/11, public opinion in the West identified Is­
sound reason [akl-t selim olmamtz laztm]. This is better for every sector of so­ lamic politics with radical challenges against the world system. Analysts
ciety." Shoes were no longer removed outside his office and he had started to pOinted out a long history of revolutionary mobilization within national bor­
perform his daily prayers in the mosque across the street rather than in his ders, which after the 1990S globalized into a world movement (Kepel 2002).
workplace. He upheld the Turkish nation-state and said it served Islam better This history was characterized by authoritarianism, social protectionism, and
than any other state in the Middle East. He deeply regretted the past decade of at least a rhetorical anticapitalism (Abrahamian 1991; Burke 1998; Fischer
activism and said: 1982; Zubaida 1989). However, in many parts of the Muslim world, Islamic
politics started with such radicalism but evolved in a market-oriented, at least
Back then, there was a movement against the system, but it had no real con­
partially democratic, and sometimes even pro-Western direction. Scholars
tent. Itwas not based on science and knowledge. Now [Pious] Muslims think
and policy makers have taken note of this alternative trend and labeled it
much more systematically. They have a broader horizon. They also learned
"moderate Islam." While some have taken this as a completely distinct phe­
how to respect other people's rights. Imposing Islam is not right anyway.
nomenon, others have recognized that market-oriented Islamic politics in
They have learned all of these and they are in a better position to rule the
most cases have their roots in radical Islamism. Scholars have tended to
country.
treat this transformation of radical movements into prosystem movements as
He supported a recently established conservative party, the Justice and Devel­ a healthy evolution, a learning process, adaptation, rationalization, coopera­
opment Party (AKP), an organization on much more favorable terms with the tion, secularization. and democratization (<;avdar 2006; <;mar 2006; Esposito
state than the FP. The AKP, which had come to power after the 2002 general and Voll 1996; Moaddel 2004; Nasr 2005; Robinson 1997; Turam 2007). In­
elections, represented for him the emergent science-oriented, systematic, and stead, I treat this process as the constitution ofhegemony and the absorption of
tolerant Muslims. He also praised the AKP's economic policies, thanks to radicalism.
which his once humble business was booming. Yasin was still strictly obser­ There are certainly traditions ofliberal and modernist religion in the Mus­
vant. He did not miss his prayers. He still wore the loose pants that allowed lim world, especially starting from the nineteenth century on (Kurzman 1998;
him to pray during working hours. His clothes did not reveal the contours of Moaddel 2005). However, the contemporary wave of moderate Islam cannot
his body, a sign of Islamic humility. He still had his rounded beard modeled be taken as just another step toward this religion's ultimate liberalization. It is
after that of the Prophet Muhammad. Yet, he had spatially separated ritual not continuity with these traditions that has empowered moderate Islam in
observance and work. He spoke in a less excited tone, more calmly, especially countries such as Turkey.4 It is rather the mobilization ofbroad sectors under
about politics and religion. He emphasized political calculation over political the banner of radicalizing Islam, the subsequent defeat ofradicalism, and the
correctness. l;'adicals' strategic (yet internalized) change of track after the defeat. These
This rationalization and partial secularization is emblematic of the ex-radicals might be the heirs of the liberal Islam of the nineteenth century,
change Islamists in TUrkey are going through. By analyzing the transfor­ but it is their previous radicalism and past experience with populist mobili­
mation of Islamists in a previously radical district and the relationship of zation that allows them to naturalize modernized Islam among the masses.
this change to the AKP, I will demonstrate how this rationalization of Without this defeated mobilization, moderate Islam would neither have its
religion was not simply the end result of an inevitable world-historical loyal followers nor its ardent leaders today.
trend (as a Weberian might think)3 but an outcome of contingent political In this book, I use the Gramscian concept of "passive revolution" to study
struggles. this process of absorption. Passive revolution is one of the convoluted, and
4 INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION 5
sometimes unintended, ways by which the dominant sectors establish willing the approval of both the West and Muslims worldwide. U.S. newspapers such
consent ("hegemony") for their rule. Different from classic revolutions (as in as The New York Times and The Washington Post, prominent German newspa­
the French, Russian, and Chinese cases) where an emergent dominant class pers such as die Welt, and officials ofthe European Union point it out to other
attempts to sweep away the old dominant classes and their institutions through Islamic movements as a democratic example to follow? At the same time,
mass mobilization, in a passive revolution popular sectors are mobilized with while the party's Islamic acceptance is not universal (<;avdar 2006), Malaysia's
revolutionary discourses and strategies only to reinforce existing patterns of most remarkable Islamic activist Anwar Ibrahim, as well as the Palestinian
domination.s I contend that moderate Islam is the culmination of a long pro­ movement Hamas, declare that they take the AKP as their model. However,
cess of passive revolution as a result ofwhich erstwhile radicals and their fol­ what is at stake in the AKP experience is not simply a marriage of Islam and
lowers are brought into the fold of neoliberalism, secularism, and Western secularism, of religion and democracy, of East and West, but the absorption
domination. Today, the effective leaders of moderate Islam are not those who of a radical challenge against the system, which we can only understand in
have always been liberal Muslims, but they are those who have fought against the context of Turkish Islamism's development over the last century.
neoliberalism, secularism, and U.S. hegemony for decades, only to deliver their The last decades of the Ottoman Empire witnessed an Islamic movement
experiences to the service oftheir past enemies in the end. organized in political parties, newspapers, magazines, and associations. After
The analysis of moderate Islam also contributes to our understanding of Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk established the Turkish Republic in 1923, all Islamic
transition to market economies. Critics of neoliberalism draw attention to circles were disbanded. Let alone permitting any activism, the state sup­
the social sectors that it inevitably excludes. It follows that neoliberalization pressed basic Islamic education by unofficial actors in the 1930S and 1940S. In
will lead to major clashes between the haves and have-nots, except when so­ the 1950S and 1960s, Islamic activists started to organize again in communi­
cial conflict is violently repressed. As the regulation mechanisms of the twen­ ties, informal networks, magazines, publication houses, and fringe political
tieth century (such as the welfare state) are now discarded, what on earth can parties. It was at the end of the 1960s that they decisively came together under
appease the wrath of the excluded? Some might pose identity politics as a the roof of an Islamist mass party.
way out (Harvey 2005). But what ifwhole populations were mobilized against After Necmettin Erbakan's election to the parliament as an independent
neoliberalization only to be brought back under its spell? What if control­ candidate, Islamists established the Milli Order Party (MNP). Even the title of
led popular initiative became the main political engine of neoliberaliza­ the party, along with the name of its ideology (Milli Outlook), expressed a
tion? Passive revolution is indeed a viable, even if unstable, route to a market deep ambivalence. In early Islamic usage, millet (the noun for milli), a Kur'anic
economy. term, deSignated Muslim and non-Muslim religiOUS groups. It referred in the
The goal of this book is not simply to analyze Islamic politics but to de­ Ottoman social system to religious communities with distinct administrative
velop our understanding of sociopolitical radicalism in generaL While the structures and legal systems (Lewis 1988). As there was nothing in local lan­
empirical material of this book is about a religious challenge against the sys­ guage to refer to "the nation," nationalists appropriated the term milli in the
tem,6 my more general interest is in how radical attacks against the reigning nineteenth century and started to use it as an equivalent ofthe word national.
order come into being, how activists organize them in the process ofchanging Th.e Milli Outlook movement, born in the late 1960s, utilized the ambivalence
their own and others' lives, and how the system survives after sustained chal­ of this term to appeal to the religious feelings of its audience in a country
lenges. In this regard, this is not a book solely about Islamism but about how where the only officially legitimate collective identity had become Turkish
revolutionary movements are mobilized and ultimately absorbed. nationality. Were the Islamists reproducing the already hegemonic national­
ist ideology, or were they making use of the multivalance of the word milli to
ABSORPTION OF AN ANTISECULAR CHALLENGE establish a radical Islamist line? Was this a system party or a revolutionary
Today, many in the Western as well as the Islamic world enthusiastically em­ one? In the following decades, these questions plagued not only the guardians
brace the AKP. This party seems to be the only Islamic political actor that gets ofthe secular state but also Islamic activists who had doubts about the party's
6 INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION 7
ideological sincerity. The secularist courts dosed the party down in 1971 and Islamic activists believed, just like the rigid secularists, that there was conti­
the party resurfaced under a new name, a pattern that was to be repeated sev­ nuity between the Wamist party and the AKP rather than a break; but they also
eral times in the next thirty-five years (see Table 2.1 for the Islamist parties' gave up the demand ofan Islamic state. Combining the power ofthe new secular
changing names and positions over the years). supporters and the old Islamist supporters resulted in a major election victory in
In the 1980s and 1990S, the party again ambivalently and implicitly al­ 2002 and a one-party government, which Thrkey had not seen since 1991.
luded to both Islamic traditions and modern social justice struggles with its The economy boomed under the AKP government, and the party turned
new name, the Refah Party (RP). (Refah means prosperity or welfare.) Those out to be the most successful privatizer of public companies. Unemployment
who wanted to see Islam in the party read this word as a part of traditional and poverty peaked, but the informal workers remained unshakable sup­
Islamic vocabulary. Those who wanted to see in the party the promise of a porters. Many scholars and journalists have interpreted this process as one of
new world-an exploding class ofinformal workers8 and many converts from rationalization. However, the ambivalences in Turkish Islamism's history, the
the Left-saw an insinuation of the welfare state in this new name. While for indecisive mobilizations, and the still persisting contradictions lead me to
some the party's new platform (the Just Order, see Chapter 2) signified radical read this transition as a passive revolution. Islamism had mobilized activists
redistribution, for others it was a metaphor for Islamic law. While the party and workers, and the AKP appropriated this mobilization to reinforce neolib­
said it would develop a market economy, it also promised market regulation, eralization in Turkey.
redistribution, unionization, and the eradication ofpoverty. During five years of AKP rule, Islamist street action came to an end. The
Ambivalence had its misfortunes. Already in the early 1990S, pious entre­ ratio of people who said they want an Islamic state decreased from around 20
preneurs (represented by MOslAD, the Association of Independent Industri­ percent throughout the 1990S to 9 percent in 2006 (<;arkoglu and Toprak 2006).
alists and Businessmen) raised eyebrows over what they saw to be impractical At the same time, practicing Muslim men who had not been allowed to oc­
economic promises in the party's program, while some radical Islamist groups cupy high offices before became a part of the ruling elite. Such a thorough
stayed away from the party, accusing it of a lack of clarity in its Islamic and change in such a short period of time requires explanation. Why would street
egalitarian demands. Despite all this, the party appealed to broad masses dur­ action stop just when it could be most effective by making use of the emer­
ing these decades. It had millions of members in the mid-1990s. Islamic life­ gence of sympathetic elites? Why would Islamists abandon the demand of an
styles gained force with the party's ascent, as symbolized most ofall with the Islamic state? This book will reveal the dynamiCS ofthis massive social change
increasing number of women who donned the veil. by studying how the AKP changed people's everyday lives and their relations
After election victories in 1994 and 1995, the Islamist party had a chance to to politics.
apply its program in the municipalities and a coalition government. The party's The AKP government poses yet more conundrums for scholarly analysis.
municipal efficiency increased its popularity. Although it is still questionable The first three years ofAKP rule were a liberal's dream. The party passed many
whether the party really constituted a challenge to the secular system, the secu­ democratic reforms, recognized the existence of minorities hitherto rejected
larist military interpreted its policies as a major threat and intervened to remove by official discourse, and liberalized the political system. Consequently, the lib­
the RP at the end ofthe 1990S. After this intervention, the Islamist party under­ eraJ intelligentsia remained enthusiastic supporters ofthe party well into 2005.
went a few tumultuous years, at the end of which a new generation of leaders The indecision of the intellectuals after that point is more readily interpreta­
split the party to establish the AKP, while the old leaders founded the Felicity ble, but the position of informal workers is confusing at first Sight. While the
Party. The AKP leaders attempted to remove any ambivalence and market the AKP slowed down democratic reforms by mid-2005. until the last days of its
party as a secular, pro-state, pro-Western, and pro capitalist organization. first mandate it maintained market reforms. Despite increasing unemploy­
While the staunch secularists were still not convinced, liberal business­ ment and poverty, there was no massive popular resistance to the govern­
men, intellectuals, and academics in Turkey-and many liberals in the West­ ment-street action remained restricted to leftist unions, which were already
became enthusiastic supporters. Interestingly, many informal workers and mobilized in the previous decades. The puzzle of this book is: Why did the