Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics PDF
Preview Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 5 EDITED BY MARK TIMMONS 1 3 GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship, andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries ©theseveralcontributors2015 Themoralrightsoftheauthorshavebeenasserted FirstEditionpublishedin2015 Impression:1 Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted bylaw,bylicenceorundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe addressabove Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyOxfordUniversityPress 198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NY10016,UnitedStatesofAmerica BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData Dataavailable LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2015932779 ISBN 978–0–19–874466–5(hbk.) ISBN 978–0–19–874467–2(pbk.) Printedandboundby CPIGroup(UK)Ltd,Croydon,CR04YY LinkstothirdpartywebsitesareprovidedbyOxfordingoodfaithand forinformationonly.Oxforddisclaimsanyresponsibilityforthematerials containedinanythirdpartywebsitereferencedinthiswork. Contents Acknowledgments vii List of Contributors viii Introduction 1 MARKTIMMONS 1. The Asymmetry of Good and Evil 15 PHILIPPETTIT 2. A Particularist but Codifiable Virtue Ethics 38 CHRISTINESWANTON 3. My Welfare and Yours 64 MARKLEBAR 4. Moral Worth and Normative Ethics 86 NOMYARPALY 5. Ideas of the Good in Moral and Political Philosophy 106 T.M.SCANLON 6. Scrupulous Judgments 129 JESSES.SUMMERSANDWALTERSINNOTT-ARMSTRONG 7. Obligations of Gratitude and Correlative Rights 151 TONYMANELA 8. Moral Anxiety and Moral Agency 171 CHARLIEKURTH 9. The Narrative Calculus 196 ANTTIKAUPPINEN 10. Morality Within the Realm of the Morally Permissible 221 ELIZABETHHARMAN 11. Fairness, Participation, and the Real Problem of Collective Harm 245 JULIANEFSKY vi Contents 12. The Virtue of Authenticity 272 ERNESTOV.GARCIA 13. What Normative Terms Mean and Why It Matters for Ethical Theory 296 ALEXSILK Index 327 OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,17/7/2015,SPi Acknowledgments Versions of the articles in this collection were presented at the fifth annual Arizona Workshop in Normative Ethics that took place in Tucson, Arizona on January 9–11, 2014. I would like to thank the Center for the Philosophy ofFreedom and the Department ofPhiloso- phyattheUniversityofArizonafortheircontinuinggenerousfinancial support of the workshop. Thanks to Sameer Bajaj who assisted me in running the workshop, to Chris Howard for preparing the volume’s index, and to Betsy Timmons for her gracious help with workshop details. I would also like to express my sincere thanks to the following philosophersforservingasdefactoprogramreferees:DaleDorsey,Brad Hooker, Tom Hurka, Eleanor Mason, Doug Portmore, and Sarah Stroud. Two anonymous referees for Oxford University Press offered very helpful, constructive advice to our authors. Thanks finally (and again)toPeterMomtchiloff,myOUPeditor,forhissupport. MarkTimmons Tucson,AZ List of Contributors NomyArpalyisProfessorofPhilosophyatBrownUniversity ErnestoV.GarciaisAssistantProfessorofPhilosophyatUMassAmherst ElizabethHarmanisAssociateProfessorofPhilosophyandHumanValues atPrincetonUniversity AnttiKauppinenisResearchFellowattheAcademyofFinland CharlieKurthisAssistantProfessorofPhilosophyatWashington UniversityinSt.Louis MarkLeBarisProfessorofPhilosophyatFloridaStateUniversity TonyManelaisAdjunctLectureratGeorgetownUniversity JuliaNefskyisAssistantProfessorofPhilosophyatUniversityofToronto PhilipPettitisLaurenceRockefellerUniversityProfessorofPoliticsand HumanValuesatPrincetonUniversityandUniversityDistinguished ProfessorofPhilosophyattheAustralianNationalUniversity T.M.ScanlonisAlfordProfessorofNaturalReligion,MoralPhilosophy, andCivilPolityintheDepartmentofPhilosophyatHarvardUniversity AlexSilkisLecturerintheDepartmentofPhilosophyatUniversityof Birmingham WalterSinnott-ArmstrongisChaunceyStillmanProfessorofProfessional EthicsintheDepartmentofPhilosophyatDukeUniversity JesseS.SummersisPost-DoctoralFellow,KenanInstituteforEthics ChristineSwantonisHonoraryResearchFellowintheDepartmentof PhilosophyattheUniversityofAuckland Introduction MARK TIMMONS ThisfifthvolumeofOxfordStudiesinNormativeEthicsfeaturessomeof thebestcontemporaryworkinthefieldofnormativeethicaltheory.This volume includes thirteen essays, covering a broad range of topics: the asymmetry of good and evil, particularism and virtue ethics, personal welfare, moral worth and normative theory, ideas of the good in moralandpoliticalphilosophy,moralscrupulosity,gratitudeandrights, moralanxietyandmoralagency,prudentialvalueinanindividual’slife, moral theory and the category of the morally permissible, fairness and the problem of collective harm, the virtue of authenticity, and the significanceofthemeaningsofmoraltermsfornormativetheory. In “The Asymmetry of Good and Evil” Philip Pettit explains the asymmetry in terms of the so-called robustness of doing good that is lackingindoingevil.Inexplainingtheideaofrobustness,Pettitusesthe term ‘action’ to refer to a sufficiently rich sense of one’s doings that includesone’sintentionsormotivesanddistinguishestwokindsofeffects of actions: disposition-dependent effects, which they have essentially in virtueofone’sintentionsormotives(one’sdispositions),anddisposition- independenteffectsincluding,forexample,whatone’sactionsbringabout causally.Actionsarecontrastedwithactsordeeds—thelatterbeingone’s behaviorconsideredindependentlyofone’sdispositions.Thus,myactof benefitting you will count as a genuinely kind action depending on my motive.WhenIamsodisposedthatinbenefittingyouInotonlyconfera benefit in the actual circumstances, but I am disposed to do so across a range of non-actual circumstances, including those which involve some levelofself-sacrifice,thenIamcontrollingbenevolentlyforpositiveeffects on your well-being and thereby realize a kind of good (e.g., kindness). Suchgoodsarethusproperlydescribedasrobustlydemanding,andinclude respect,attachmentstobefoundinloveandfriendship,aswellinactions thatexpresssuchvirtuesashonesty,justice,fidelity,andkindness.Ifdoing
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