Outsmarting the state : a comparative case study of the learning capacity of Colombian drug trafficking organizations and government drug enforcement agencies

348 Pages·2002·13.9 MB·English

by  Kenney, Michael C

OUTSMARTINGTHESTATE:
ACOMPARATIVECASESTUDYOFTHELEARNINGCAPACITY
OFCOLOMBIANDRUGTRAFFICKINGORGANIZATIONSAND
GOVERNMENTDRUGENFORCEMENTAGENCIES
ADISSERTATIONPRESENTEDTOTHEGRADUATESCHOOLOFTHE
UNIVERSITYOFFLORIDAINPARTIALFULFILLMENTOFTHE
REQUIREMENTFORTHEDEGREEOFDOCTOROFPHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITYOFFLORIDA
2002
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Aswiththeproduction,transportation,anddistributionofpsychoactive
substances,writingadissertationisacollectiveendeavor. Thisstudywascompleted
withthesupportofmanyindividualsandinstitutions. FellowshipsfromtheNational
ScienceFoundation,theTinkerFoundation,andtheDivisionofSponsoredResearchat
theUniversityofFloridasupportedfieldworkinBogotaandvariouslocationsinthe
UnitedStates. AresidentialfellowshipattheCenterforInternationalSecurityand
CooperationatStanfordUniversitysupporteddataanalysisandwriting.
WhileconductingresearchinBogota,IbenefittedenormouslyfromtheInstitute
ofPoliticalStudiesandInternationalRelations(IEPRI)attheNationalUniversityof
Colombia. ThedirectoroftheInstitute,WilliamRamirez,providedaplacetohangmy
hatbetweeninterviews,andnumerousIEPRIscholarsofferedconstructivecriticismand
friendship. Fortheirassistanceduringthisperiod,IthankAlvaroCamacho,Nathanial
Christie,FernandoCubides,FranciscoGutierrez,AndresLopez,GregorioPerez,Alvaro
Valencia,andCarlosVelasquez. DuringresearchtripstoWashington,D.C.andMiami,
FionaWrightandJuanCarlosValenciaprovidedgreaterhospitalitythanIdeserved.
DozensofU.S.andColombianofficialsgavegenerouslyoftheirtimeduring
interviews. Withouttheirwillingnesstosharetheirknowledge,thisstudycouldnothave
beenwritten. Ioweasimilardebtofgratitudetotheformertraffickersthatspokewith
me. Forreasonsofdiscretion,manyofmyrespondentsmustremainanonymous. They
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knowwhotheyareandIthankthem. IalsothankGabrielaRovillonAcosta,Maxine
Downs,andEmiliaGiorevafortheirprofessionaltranscriptionsofdozensofinterviews.
TheCenterforInternationalSecurityandCooperation(CISAC)andStanford
Universityprovidedastimulatingandsupportiveenvironmenttowritemostofthis
dissertation. FortheirsupportandfriendshipduringmystayinPaloAlto,IthankHerb
Abrams,ChrisChyba,NishaFazal,KarenGuttieri,CaroleHyde,JacquesHymans,Wu
Jun,JamesMarch,DinshawMistry,BarryO'Neill,BarbaraPiatt,WoodyPowell,Scott
Sagan,SteveStedman,andJeremiSuri. SpecialthanksgotoLynnEden,whoservedas
mymentoratStanford. LynnscrutinizedallofthechaptersIwroteatCISAC,always
tenderingherenthusiasticsupportinsightfulcriticism. RobertAxelrod,MarthaFeldman,
andRichardValcourtwerekindenoughtosharetheirperceptivecommentsonseparate
chapters.
AttheUniversityofFloridaIhavebeneffitedenormouslyfrommyassociation
withprofessorsandfellowstudentsoverthepastseveralyears. Mydissertation
committeechair,PhilipWilliams,andco-chair,TerryMcCoy,guidedmethrough
graduateschoolandthisstudy. Iamenormouslygratefulfortheirfriendshipandsupport.
Theothermembersofmycommittee,LeannBrown,JosephSpillane,andLarryDodd,
providedassistancethroughouttheproject. ForadditionalsupportattheUniversityof
Florida,IthankLeslieAnderson,RalphDiMuccio,ErrolHenderson,LalithaHenderson,
PeterHildebrand,GoranHyden,MichaelMartinez,GeraldineNichols,RichardNolan,
HazelPhillips,SandraRusso,SteveSanderson,MartySwilley,LesThiele,andDebbie
Wallen. FortheirfriendshipduringmyyearsinGainesville,IthankShawnBird,Parakh
Hoon,AjentShriar,JuanCarlosValencia,EricCooper,FabianoToni,ScottRichards,
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VilmaFuentes,JoshGordon,EdGreaves,BrianGridley,TomNisley,LizOldmixon,Jim
Conley,LeeWalker,andFionaWright.
Iextendmydeepestgratitudetomyfamilyfortheirloveandsupportduringthe
yearsthatIhavebeenworkingonthisstudy. Myparents,Peter,Chris,andMargaret
Kenney,providedunwaveringaffectioninlifeandgraduateschool. Mybiggestdebtof
gratitudegoestomywife,Emilia,whosacrificedasmuchasI,ifnotmore,toseethis
projectthroughtoitscompletion.
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TABLEOFCONTENTS
page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii
LISTOFTABLES ix
LISTOFFIGURES x
KEYTOABBREVIATIONS xi
ABSTRACT xiii
CHAPTER
1 INTRODUCTION 1
PersistenceofIllicitDrugProductioninColombia 2
ExplainingtheColombianDrugDilemma 6
TowardanAlternativeExplanation:OrganizationalLearningbyTrafficking
Enterprises 8
SignificanceofResearch 10
ResearchDesign 12
OverviewofStudy 15
2 HISTORICALOVERVIEWOFTHEILLICITDRUGINDUSTRYIN
COLOMBIA 17
Colombian—SmugglingTradition 18
PhaseOne 1930s:ColombiaasTransitPoint 20
Gove—rnmentDrugEnforcementEffortsDuringPhaseOne 21
PhaseTwo Late1930stoearly1960s:FromTransitPointtoProducer 22
HerranOlazagaBrothersEnterprise 24
OtherPhaseTwoTraffickingGroups 25
Gover—nmentDrugEnforcementEffortsDuringPhaseTwo 26
PhaseThree Mid-1960stolate1970s:ExpansionofColombianDrugIndustry.... 27
HerreraEnterprise 29
BravoEnterprise 31
GovernmentDrugEnforcementEffortsDuringPhaseThree 32
PhaseFour—1980stomid1990s:RiseandFallofthe"Cartels" 36
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EmergenceoftheCoreOrganizations 38
SmugglingMethodsofCoreOrganizations 40
DiversifyingtoHeroin 43
GovernmentDrugEnforcementEffortsDuringPhaseFour 44
PhaseFive—Mid-1990sto2000:AtomizationofColombianNarcoticsIndustry.... 49
GovernmentDrugEnforcementEffortsDuringPhaseFive 52
Conclusion ^4
3 TOWARDATHEORETICALUNDERSTANDINGOFORGANIZATIONS
ANDORGANIZATIONALLEARNING 58
Organizations 60
OrganizationalTasks 60
Environments 61
Hostileenvironments 63
OrganizationalStructure 63
Routines 64
ParticipantsinOrganizations 67
Technology 68
DefiningOrganizationalLearning 69
AcquiringInformation 70
InterpretingInformation 71
ApplyingInformation 73
ResearchPropositions 75
AlternativeExplanationsforOrganizational Change 75
LearningEcologies 78
"Productive"Learning 80
LevelsofLearning:Tacticalvs.StrategicAdaptation 81
LearningunderAmbiguity 85
PropertiesofOrganizationalLearning 90
EnvironmentalHostilityvs.Benevolence 90
OrganizationSizeandDecision-MakingHierarchies 91
Conclusion 93
4 ORGANIZATIONALANALYSISOFTHEILLICITDRUGINDUSTRYIN
COLOMBIA 95
TasksofColombianTraffickingEnterprises 96
UnderstandingTasksinColombianTraffickingEnterprises 100
EnvironmentsofColombianTraffickingEnterprises 101
TraffickingEnterprisesandLawEnforcementAgencies 101
OtherOrganizationsintheTaskEnvironment 105
StructureofColombianTraffickingEnterprises 106
CentralizedDecision-makingHierarchies 107
"Flat"Decision-makingHierarchies 109
RoleSpecialization 112
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H4
Compartmentalization
RoutinesinTraffickingEnterprises 115
RoutineFailure 118
ParticipantsinColombianTraffickingEnterprises 120
ParticipantsasaSourceofRiskinTraffickingEnterprises 122
TurnoverinTraffickingEnterprises 124
PromotioninTraffickingEnterprises 127
TechnologiesinColombianTraffickingEnterprises 130
Practicalvs.ScientificKnowledge 133
Conclusion 136
ORGANIZATIONALLEARNINGBYCOLOMBIANTRAFFICKING
ENTERPRISES 138
Re-StatementofOrganizationalLearningProposition 139
AFirstCut:QuantifyingInterviewResults 139
AcquiringKnowledgeandExperience 143
Counter-SurveillanceActivities 145
IntelligenceCapabilitiesofRodriguezOrejuelaOrganization 147
InformalExchangeofInformation 148
DrugSmugglingU:AcquiringTraffickingKnowledgeinPrison 150
RecordingandStoringInformationthroughOrganizationalMemories 152
InterpretingKnowledgeandExperience 156
DiscoveryProcess 157
ApplyingKnowledgeandExperience 159
AdaptationsinDrugProcessingRoutines 160
AdaptationsinTransportationRoutines 162
AdaptationsinDistributionCells 167
StrategicLearninginColombianTraffickingOrganizations 170
DiversifyingintoNewProductsandMarkets 171
ChangingOrganizationalStructures:"SmallerisBetter" 173
ObstaclestoLearningbyColombianTraffickingOrganizations 175
RestrictedInformationFlows 175
OrganizationalMemoriesandParticipantTurnover 177
AdditionalBarrierstoLearning 180
Conclusion 182
ORGANIZATIONALLEARNINGBYDRUGENFORCEMENTAGENCIES... 184
AFirstCutII:QuantifyingInterviewResults 185
DrugEnforcementIntelligenceActivities 187
DEA'sRoleinDrugEnforcementIntelligence 192
CNPDrugEnforcementIntelligence 194
GatheringIntelligencethroughCriminalInvestigations 195
CriminalInformants 196
SurveillanceandUndercoverOperations 197
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ManufacturingDrugEnforcementIntelligence 198
FromIntelligencetoOperations 200
ChangesinU.S.DrugEnforcement 201
StructuralAdaptationCase#1:TowardanAdministrativeMergerofthe
DEAandFBI 202
OtherDEAStructuralAdaptations 205
ReformingtheColombianNationalPolice 206
StructuralAdaptationCase#2:CulturalTransformationoftheCNP 207
AdaptationsinDrugEnforcementOperations 211
BansheeorBuy-Bust? 211
InnovationsinConspiracyInvestigations 213
InnovationsinUndercoverOperations 215
CompetitiveLearningGames 217
FactorsthatAffectOutcomesinAfarco-NarcLearningGames 222
PlayingCatchUp 223
TheSurvivalImperative 224
TheEnforcementDilemma 226
SmallerinSize,FlatterinStructure 228
TheRedTapeTrap 232
Conclusion 236
7 CONCLUSION 238
WhatHaveWeLearned? 239
AlternativeExplanationsofRoutineChange 244
ImplicationsforCounter-DrugPolicy:OrHowILearnedtoStopWorrying
andLovetheDrugTrade 248
DiffusionofTraffickingTechnologies 251
WhatistobeDone? 252
LegalizationandHarmReduction 253
AModestProposal 255
Conclusion 260
APPENDIX
ARESPONDENTDATA 262
B QUESTIONNAIRE 266
BIBLIOGRAPHY 269
BIOGRAPHICALSKETCH 332
viii
LISTOFTABLES
Table Page
2-1 ColombianDrugEnforcementIndicators,1974-1979 33
2-2 ColombianDrugEnforcementIndicators,1980-1995 49
2-3 ColombianDrugEnforcementIndicators,1996-1999 54
2-4 EvolutionofIllicitDrugIndustryinColombia 56
4-1 NationalGovernmentAgenciesInvolvedinDrugEnforcement 104
4-2 RoleSpecializationinColombianTraffickingEnterprise 113
4-3 RiskReductionRoutinesinColombianTraffickingEnterprises 117
4-4 NumberofDrug-RelatedArrestsbyColombianNationalPolice,1974-
1998(evenyears) 125
5-1 ProfessionalAffiliationandNationalityofRespondents 140
5-2 DoColombianTraffickingOrganizationsLearn?ResultsfromInterviews 142
5-3 TransportationInnovationsinDrugSmugglingOperations 166
6-1 DoestheStateLearn?ResultsfromInterviews 186
6-2 U.S.DrugEnforcementIntelligenceAgencies,TypesofIntelligence
andScopeofActivities 191
6-3 DEADomesticArrestsbyClassLevel,FiscalYears1979and1982 213
6-4 NumberofDEAElectronicSurveillanceOrdersConductedandFacilities
Covered,FY1990-1998 215
6-5 AuthorizedDEAPersonnel,FiscalYear2000 229
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LISTOFFIGURES
mm
Figure
3-1 SimpleProcessModelofOrganizationalLearning 70
3-2 AlternativeSourcesofChangeinOrganizationalRoutines 77
3-3 ComplexProcessModelofOrganizationalLearning 85
4-1 "Wheel"StructureofIllicitDrugNetwork 99
4-2 ManagementLevelswithinLargeTraffickingEnterprise Ill
4-3 StashHouseInventoryRoutine 119
6-1 OrganizationofDEAIntelligenceDivision,circa1996 193
6-2 PHVAManagementCycle 208
6-3 ExampleofDEAManagementLevels 231
7-1 SourcesofChangeinOrganizationalRoutines,Amended 245
7-2 PhasedEvolutionofIllicitDrugIndustry 248
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