Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal

471 Pages·1995·32.88 MB·English

by  Diego Cordovez

OUT OF AFGHANISTAN
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OUT OF
A
F G H A N I S T AN
The Inside Story of the
Soviet Withdrawal
DIEGO CORDOVEZ
SELIG S. HARRISON
New York Oxford
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
1995
Oxford University Press
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Copyright © 1995 by Oxford University Press, Inc.
Published by Oxford University Press, Inc.
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All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,
without the prior permission of Oxford University Press.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Cordovez, Diego.
Out of Afghanistan : the inside story of the Soviet withdrawal /
Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-19-506294-9
1. Afghanistan—History—Soviet occupation,
1979-1989—Personal narratives.
2. United Nations—Afghanistan.
I. Harrison, Selig S.
II. Title.
DS371.2.C67 1995 958.104'5—dc20 94-22301
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 21
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
PREFACE
This book is the product of an unusual intellectual partnership between an
insider and an outsider. One of the authors is a diplomatic practitioner, the
former Undersecretary General of the United Nations who negotiated the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan. The other is a longtime foreign correspondent
and South Asia specialist who closely monitored the six-year U.N. mediation
effort, analyzing and often criticizing what the U.N. and the governments con-
cerned were doing in Op Ed articles and in journals. On more than forty occa-
sions between 1982 and 1988, we met to exchange views and compare notes on
the progress of the war, the latest political developments in Moscow, Washing-
ton, Kabul, and Islamabad, and the tortuous twists and turns of the U.N.
negotiations.
The format we have chosen is deliberately designed to emphasize our differ-
ing roles and the multifaceted character of the story that we tell. For each period
of the narrative, we have written separate and independent companion chapters
in which a personal memoir of the U.N. diplomatic effort is preceded by an
account of the war and of the policy struggles in the concerned capitals that
surrounded the U.N. process.
We would like to express our deep gratitude to the many colleagues and
friends who encouraged us to write this book and helped us in our effort to
establish an unimpeachable historical record. Most of this account is based on
our firsthand experience and observation. In many cases, we have attributed
information and quotations to specific individuals and sources. However, we
have also relied heavily on the confidential help of numerous present and former
officials of the governments concerned whose identities cannot be disclosed.
We would like to express our deep appreciation to the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace for sponsoring a Study Group on "War and Peace in
Afghanistan" under our chairmanship that brought together many of the key
actors in our story. The four meetings of the Study Group on June 9 and 12 and
November 14, 1989, and February 6, 1990, stimulated and enriched the early
stages of our research.
Most of the translation of Russian-language materials was done by Soviet
specialist Paul Saunders.
Vi PREFACE
Among the many scholars and journalists in Washington, Moscow, London,
Paris, and Islamabad who shared their insights and information, we would like
to mention Don Oberdorfer, former diplomatic correspondent of the Washington
Post, who suggested the title of this book, and Raymond L. Garthoff of the
Brookings Institution. Finally, we would like to thank the Afghans of all politi-
cal persuasions to whom we owe our understanding of the historical, cultural
and social context of the events discussed in these pages.
Quito D. C.
Washington, D.C. S. S. H.
February 1995
CONTENTS
Map of Afghanistan, x
Overview
Afghanistan and the End of the Cold War, 3
Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison
I 1973-1979
The Road to Intervention
1. How The Soviet Union Stumbled into Afghanistan, 13
Selig S. Harrison
Exit the King, Enter the Superpowers, 14
The KGB, the GRU, and the Afghan Communists, 17
Ending the Soviet Tilt, 19
On the Eve of the Communist Coup, 22
An Afghan Coup, Afghan Style, 25
The Emergence of Amin, 28
Vance versus Brzezinski, 32
Moscow Rejects Intervention, 35
Showdown in Kabul: The Murder of Taraki, 39
Did Amin Signal Washington? 42
The Decision to Intervene, 44
II 1980-1981
The Last Days of Brezhnev
2. Soviet Occupation, Afghan Resistance, and the American Response, 53
Selig S. Harrison
A Stillborn U.S. Peace Initiative, 54
Zia's Great Expectations, 56
Viii Contents
The Red Army Under Fire, 58
Islamabad and the Resistance: Divide and Rule, 60
An Opening for the United Nations, 63
Pakistan Becomes a Frontline State, 65
Upgrading Afghan Aid, 67
The New Soviet Offensive Strategy, 70
3. My Mission Begins, 73
Diego Cordovez
III 1982-1983
Andropov: The Lost Opportunity
4. Making the Russians Bleed, 91
Selig S. Harrison
"A Capacity for Realism," 92
Pakistan Reverses Course, 96
The Andropov Legacy, 100
Casey and the U.N. Negotiations, 102
Hawks and Doves in Islamabad, 105
5. From Breakthrough to Breakdown, 109
Diego Cordovez
IV 1984
The Chernenko Interregnum
6. The War Escalates, 147
Selig S. Harrison
The Resistance on the Offensive, 148
A Visit to Kabul, 151
Representative Wilson Settles a Score, 155
Pakistan, the Fundamentalists, and the King, 160
7. The Long Winter, 165
Diego Cordovez
V 1985-1986
Gorbachev: Preparing the Ground for Disengagement
8. "Bleeders," "Dealers," and Perestroika, 187
Selig S. Harrison
A Victory for the "Dealers," 189
The Stinger Decision, 194
Did the Stingers Matter? 198
Confrontation with Karmal, 201
Contents IX
Building a Shadow Government, 205
Moscow Gives Kabul a Deadline, 207
9. The Slow Thaw, 211
Diego Cordovez
VI 1987-1988
The End Game
10. Realpolitik Vindicated, 245
Selig S. Harrison
Can "Our Boys" Survive?: The Soviet Debate, 247
Can the Resistance Govern?: American Illusions, 253
Zia and "Strategic Realignment," 256
The United States Moves the Goalposts, 260
To Sign or Not to Sign, 266
11. The Final Hurdles: "Linkage" and the Time Frame, 271
Diego Cordovez
12. Climax and Anticlimax: The Geneva Accords, 313
Diego Cordovez
Epilogue
The Withdrawal and After, 365
Diego Cordovez
Appendix: The Geneva Accords, 389
Notes, 399
Index, 427