Our Philosophical Heritage

425 Pages·2003·19.498 MB·English

by  Andrew B. Schoedinger

Third Edition
Andrew Schoe#igfe
B.
Our
Coverphoto by: JimTalbot
Copyright© 1997, 1999, 2000byAndrew B. Schoedinger
SecondRevised Printing 2003
ISBN 0-7575-0276-8
All rights reserved. Nopart ofthis publication may be reproduced,
stored in aretrieval system,ortransmitted, in any formorby any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, orotherwise, without
the priorwritten permission ofthe copyrightowner.
Print9ed8in7the6Un5it4ed3States ofAmerica
10
^CONTENTS^
Preface to the Third Edition v
1 The Philosophical Act; Josef Pieper 1
2 What Is Philosophy? 11
3 The Value of Philosophy; Bertrand Russell 19
Part Ethics
I:
4 Problems of Ethics 27
5 Self-Actualization; Aristotle 37
6 Hedonism; Epicurus 57
7 The Categorical Imperative; Immanuel Kant 77
8 Classical Utilitarianism; Jeremy Bentham 99
Part Political Theory
II:
9 Problems of Political Theory 119
10 Authoritarianism; Thomas Hobbes 127
11 Liberalism; John Locke 149
12 Conservatism; Edmund Burke 173
13 Communism; Karl Marx 193
Part Philosophy of Religion
III:
14 Problems of the Philosophy of Religion 217
^15 The Ontological Argument; St. Anselm 227
^16
The Cosmological Argument;
Thomas Aquinas 245
St.
17 The Teleological Argument; William Paley 261
18 The Problem of Evil; David Hume 279
Part IV: Epistemology
19 Problems of Epistemology 295
^^^2 Rationalism; Rene Descartes 307
21 Empiricism; John Locke 325
22 Idealism; George Berkeley 351
111
23 Adverbial Theory; Roderick Chisholm 377
Part V: Metaphysics
24 Problems of Metaphysics 395
25 Realism; Plato 411
2 6 Conceptualism; John Locke 441
27 Nominalism; George Berkeley 455
2 8 Ordinary Language Analysis;
Ludwig Wittgenstein 475
IV
^Preface
The Philosophical
/
Act; Josef Pieper
^BlOGRAPHY^
^^
tt^(\<^ (\.ijs "-/^
JosefPieperwasbom in 1904 in Elte, Germany. He studiedatthe {^Voj^
University ofBerlin and University ofMuensterfrom 1923 to 1928, \(XJ^"^ • \
when he receivedhis Ph.D. inphilosophyfrom Muenster Hisdisserta-
tion was on the ethicaltheory ofSt. '%omasAquinas. Piepertaughtat
Muensterfrom 1928 to 1931 after which he worked as a free-lance
writerforsevenyears. Subsequenttoserving in the GermanArmydur-
ing World War 11, he taught for a brieftime at Teachers College in
Essen. In 1946 he returned to the University ofMuenster, where he
remaineduntilhis retirementfrom teaching in 1972. During his tenure
at Muenster, he came to the United States to be a visiting professor at
the University ofNotre Dame (1950) and Stanford University (1956,
1962). Pieperhas been awardedhonorarydegreesfrom the University
ofMunich (1964), the University ofMuenster (1974), and the Univer-
sityofEichstaett (1985).
Pieper has been a prolific writer His books include Leisure, the
Basis of Culture (1948), Reality and the Good (1949), Guide to Tho-
mas Aquinas (1958), The Four Cardinal Virtues (1964), About Love
(1972), The End of Time: A Meditation on the Philosophy of History
(1980), andIn Search ofthe Sacred (1988).
Originally published as Was Heisst Philosophieren? Copyright (c)
1948 by Kbsel-Verlag, Munich. English edition: Copyright (c) 1998 by
St. Augustine's Press. Reprinted by permission.
When the physicist poses the question,—"What does it mean to do
physics?" or "What is research in physics?" his question is a prelimi-
nary question. Clearly, when you ask a question like that, and try to I "i
answer it, you are not "doing physics." Or, rather, you are no longerdoing loso/l7
physics. But when you ask yourself, "What does it mean to do philoso- If
phy?" then you actually are "doing philosophy"—this is not at all a "pre-
liminary" question but a truly philosophical one; you are right at the heart
of the business. To go further: I can say nothing about the existence of
philosophy and philosophizing without also saying something about the
human being, and to do that is to enter one ofthe most central regions of
philosophy. Our question, "What is the philosophical act?" belongs, in
fact, to the field ofphilosophical anthropology.
b
2 Our Philosophical Heritage
II IjpWj^ ecause it is a philosophical question, that means it cannot be
D^y /)
'ic.A i*i<- answered in a permanent or conclusive way. It pertains to the very nature
.
"'' 1 1 /io-t of a philosophical question that its answer will not be a "perfectly
^"^ "^ rounded truth" (as Parmenides said it), grasped in the hand like an applp
_kr_£:£±!::i:^f:^_-- plucked froma tree'....
O^^'/ fcKrt c^'ofyj^ But, for a first approach, we can venture the following: a philosophi-
I ' cal act is an act in which the work-a-day world is transcended. We must
^ ^^ ' ' first explain what we mean by "work-a-day world," and second, what we
mean by "transcending" it. i
The work-a-day world is the world of the working day, the world of
usefulness, ofpurposeful action, of accomplishment, ofthe exercising of
functions; it is the world of supply and demand, the world of hunger and
the satisfaction ofhunger. It is a world dominated by one goal: the realiza-
tion of the "common utility"; it is the world of work, to the extent that
work is synonymous with "useful activity" (a characteristic both ofactiv-
ity and effort). The process of working is the process of realizing the
"common utility"; this concept is not equivalent to that of the "common
good" {bonum commune): the "common utility" is an essential compo-
nent of the "common good," but the concept of the bonum commune is
much more comprehensive. For example, as Thomas puts it^, there are
people who devote themselves to the "un-useful" life ofcontemplation; to
philosophize belongs to the common good, whereas one could not say
that contemplation, vision, or philosophizing serve the "common utility."
Ofcourse, in the present day bonum commune and the "common util-
ity" seem to be growing more identical every day; ofcours—e (it comes to
the sam—e thing) the world of work begins to become threatens to
become our only world, to the exclusion ofall else. The demands ofthe
working world grow ever more total, grasping ever more completely the
whole ofhuman existence.
Ifit is correct to say that the philosophical act is one which transcends
the wor—king world, then our question, "What does—it mean to philoso-
phize?" our so very theoretical, abstract question becomes suddenly,
and unexpectedly, a question ofutmost relevance. We need only to take a
single step, in our thoughts or in physical space, to find ourselves in a
world in which the working process, the process of realizing the "com-
mon utility," determines the whole realm of human existence. Inwardly
and outwardly, there is a boundary, very near and easy tojump across, in
order to win entry into the work-a-day world, in which—there is no such
thing as genuine philosophy and genuine philosophizing all this presup-
poses, of course, that it is correct to say that "philosophy transcends the
working world" and that it pertains to the very essence ofthe philosophi-
cal act not to belong to this world of uses and efficiencies, of needs and
satisfactions, this world of "useful good" {bonum utile), of the "common
utility," but is, rather, to be incommensurable to it in principle. Indeed, the
more acute the incommensurability, the more obvious the "not-belong-
ing." It could even be said, perhaps, that this very opposition, this threat
from the world oftotal work, is what characterizes the situation ofphilos-
ophy t—oday more than its own—particular content. Philosophy increasingly
adopts necessarily, it seems the character of the alien, of mere intel-
lectual luxury, of that which seems ever more intolerable and unjustifi-
' Parmenides, fragment 1. Paimenides (born 515 B.C.) was a Greek philosopher [edi-
tor'snote].
^ ThomasAquinas, Commentaryon theSentences, iv,d. 26, 1.2. Aquinas (1224- 1274)
wasan influentialphilosopher/theologianofthe MiddleAges[editor'snote].
The Philosophical Act; Josef Pieper 3
able, the more exclusively the demands of the daily world of work take
overthe world ofman.
And yet, we have something more to say, something very concrete,
about the incommensurability of the philosophical act, of this transcend-
ing the world ofwork, that takes place in the philosophical act.
Let's recall the things that dominate the contemporary working day;
no special effort ofthe imagination is needed, for we all stand right in the
middle of it. There is, first of all, the daily running back and forth to
secure our bare physical existence, food, clothing, shelter, heat; then, the
anxieties that affect, and absorb, each individual . . . Struggles for power
forthe exploitation ofearth's commodities, conflicts o—finterest in matters
great and small. Everywhere, tensions and burdens only superficially
eased by hastily arranged pauses and diversions: newspapers, movies, cig-
arettes. I do not need to paint it in any fullerdetail; we all know what this
world looks like. And we need not only direct ourattention to the extreme
dinasytawnocreskionfgcrwiosrilsdt,hawthsehroewwtehemmussetlvgeos taobdoauyt: oIumrebaunsisniesmsp,lywhtheereevveeryr-y ,^^^^ J^ -f- c c>^^-e-^,
concrete goals are advanced and realized; goals that must be sighted with ^^f n<^o c^-^rz*^ T-^.
an eye fixed on the things nearest and closest at hand. Now it is not our a , ^ ^_^^ ^ ^ t^/vj*.^
r-^ .pwduoarrvpk-o-wsoaer-ldhdaey"reowfotroplhcdiolinossdovepemhrnyy.fmtNhuioschwwoowrrildtdh,s ufnsre,oetmdhaBttheeiwnsatistatntedhdpeooifnnotunsodafaytisinoogmntsehao'tf^tohhui^rs c+^,^^^.^ -"«us"-rU-.J^o^
physical existence are secured, without which nobody can philosophize at^-^.'^' ^^ ^„a ^^XV/j,^
all! Nevertheless, let us also recall, that among the voices which fill the /
workplace and the markets ("How do you get this or that item of daily
existence?" "Where do you get that?" etc.)—in the midst of all these
voices suddenly one—calls outabove the rest: "Why is there anything at all,
and not nothing?" asking that age-old question, which Heidegger
called the basic question ofall metaphysics!' Must weexplicitly state how
unfathomable this Philosopher's question is, in comparison with that
everyday world of needs and purposefulness? If such a question as this
were asked, without introduction or interpretation, in the company of
those people ofefficiency and success, wouldn't the questionerbe consid-
ered rather mad? Through such extremely formulated contrasts, how-
ever, the rea.l,. .underlying distinction comes to the fore: it becomes clear
that even to ask that question constitutes taking a step toward transcend-
ing, toward leaving behind, the work-a-day world. Tjie genuine philo-
sophical question strikes disturbingly againstthe canopy that encloses the
work-dayf^"^^"""™^"""^^^^^
world ofthe citizen's
But the philosophical act is not the only way to take this "step
beyond." No less incommensurable with the working-world than the
philosophical question is the sound oftrue poetry:
In middle andending everstands the tree,
The birdsare singing; on God's breast
The round Creation takes its holy rest . . .''
Such a voice sounds utterly strange in the realm of actively realized pur-
' MartinHeidegger,Was1stMetaphysik(Frankfurt,Germany: Klostermann, 1943),p.22.
" Konrad Weiss, In Exitu (first verses)—which first appeared in the volume Die
cumaische Sibylle (Munich, 1921), more readily accessible now in the collected edi-
tion: Konrad Weiss, Gedichte. 1914-1939 (Munich: Kosel-Verlag, 1961). Translator's
note.
T
4 Our Philosophical Heritage
pose. And no differently sounds the voice of one who prays: "We praise
you, we glorify you, we give you thanks for your great glory ." How
. .
can that ever be understood in the categories of rational usefulness and
efficiency? The lover, too, stands outside the tight chain of efficiency of
this working world, and whoever else approaches the margin ofexistence
through some deep, existential disturbance (which always brings a "shat-
1
f-lov^ i/p x/oo \ fcrr,<^f^aI taring" of one's environment as well), or through, say, the proximity of
\JLt t^o-'l^ '^ ^«^Y "^ dpath. In such a disturbance (for the philosophica—l act, genuine poetry,
t^ ,^rj msuosmiecaklinedxpoefrdiiesntcuerbianncgee)neirnals,ucahnadnperxapyeerrieanscew,elmlanasllentsheessethdeenpoenn-udltoin-
.
yJ^^^,J(a c^*'^^''^^ mate natiu^e of this daily, worrisome world: hg transcends it, he takes a
y/^c^, Step outside it.
For Plato, the laughter of the Thracian maiden, who saw Thales of
Miletus fall into a well while he was staring at the skies, is the typical
response of feet-on-the-ground, work-a-day reasoning to philosophy.'
And this anecdote of the Thracian maid stands at the very beginning of
Western Philosophy. "And always," as Plato says in the Theaetetus, the
philosopher is the butt ofhumor,'' "not only forThracian maidens, butTor
most people, because one who is a stranger to the world falls into wells,
ml
and into many otherembarrassments too."^
I i
And yet the incommensurability of this situation is not merely nega-
tive, for there is another side as well, known as . . . freedom. For—philoso-
phy is "useless" in the sense of immediate profit and application that is
^ne thing. Another thing is, that philosophy cannot allow itselfto be used,
it is not at the disposal ofpurposes beyond itself, forit is itselfa goal. Phi-
VvC Af losophy is not functional-knowing, but rather, as John Henry Newman put
T/'^^cXc/vN '*'* '^ gentleman's knowledge, not "useful," but "free" knowing. But this
^ freedom means that philosophical knowing does not acquire its legiti-
Wc iVtV rf'-H' macy from its utilitarian applications, not from its social function, not
from its relationship with the "common utility." Freedom in exactly this
f/ sense is the freedom ofthe "liberal arts," as opposed to the "servile arts,"
which, according to Thomas "are ordered to a use, to be attained through
activity."' And philosophy has long been understood as the most free
among the free arts (the medieval "Arts Faculty" is the forerunner of the
"Philosophical Faculty" oftoday's university).
Now, this freedom of philosophy, this quality of not-being-subservi-
ent-to some purpose is intimately connected with something else (a con-
nection which seems extremely important to point out); the theoretical
character of philosophy. Philosophy is the purest form of theorein, or
speculari (to observe, behold, contemplate), consisting in a purely recep-
tive gaze on reality, whereby things alone are determinative, and the soul
is completely receptive of determination. Whenever some existent is
taken up into view in a philosophical way, the questions are asked in a
"purely theoretical" manner, and that means a manneruntouched by any-
'' This isareferenceby Piepertothe legend (relatedby Plato)thatoncewhentheGreek
philosopherThales (about 625-547 B.C.) was lookinguptostudy thestars, he fell into
acistern and was laughed at by a maid fromThrace for being so impractical [editor's
note].
' Plato,Theaetetus. Stephanusp. 174. [J.R]
' Ibid.[J.R]
* JohnHenryNewman,TheIdeaofa University,Part I,DiscourseV,section6. [J.P.]
' ThomasAquinas, Commentaryon theMetaphysics, I, 3. [J.P.]