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Origins of Containment A P E sychological xplanation By Deborah Welch Larson PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY Copyright © 1985 by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540 In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, Guildford, Surrey All Rights Reserved Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data will be found on the last printed page of this book ISBN 0-691*07691-X Publication of this book has been aided by a grant from the Whitney Darrow Fund of Princeton University Press This book has been composed in Linotron Galiiard Clothbound editions of Princeton University Press books arc printed on acid-free paper, and binding materials are chosen for strength and durability Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press Princeton, New Jersey To David i \ i r CONTENTS PREFACE ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Xİİİ ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE FOOTNOTES XV INTRODUCTION 3 .ONE. Social Psychological Theories of Attitude Change 24 tw o. Taming the Bear 66 th re e . Truman as World Leader 126 fo u r. Keeping Agreements 150 five. Power Politics „ 213 six. Drift and Indecision 250 seven. “This Terrible Decision” 302 co n clu sio n s 324 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 357 INDEX 375 PREFACE The Cold War has been the commanding reality of international politics since World War II. Although a fragile U.S.-Soviet detente was patched together in 1955, 1959, 1963, and 1971-1972, the Cold War periodically reemerged, temporarily quiescent but not resolved. In part because of the Cold War’s influence on nearly all international political phenomena—alliances, international organizations, aspira tions of the third world—a vast body of scholarly literature on its origins has accumulated. Still, after a quarter of a century, there is no scholarly consensus on why the United States adopted Cold War pol icies in the postwar period. This book analyzes the historical origins of the containment policy from a radically different perspective: cognitive social psychology. Since U.S.-Soviet conflict has been waged largely with words and sym bols aimed at the “minds of men,” it seems appropriate to focus on events in the human psyche—the development of the American Cold War belief system. Although it may be difficult for us to imagine to day, during and immediately after the war the Soviet Union was widely perceived to be a valiant, benevolent, and trustworthy ally. Gen eralissimo Stalin was affectionately known as “Uncle Joe.” This book uses various theories of attitude change in social psychology to explain why American policymakers’ perceptions of the Soviet Union changed radically within a short period of time. The narrative centers on four men who were arguably the most influential in reorienting U.S. for eign policy from 1944 to 1947: W. Averell Harriman, Harry S Tru man, James F. Byrnes, and Dean Acheson. Reworking well-plowed historical ground with new concepts and ideas is risky but potentially productive. Conceptual tools and gener alizations developed by practitioners in a different discipline—particu larly the experimental laboratory—may not fit the disorder and noise of real-world foreign policy cables and memoranda. On the other hand, the use of psychological theories may sensitize the scholar to previously overlooked or discarded evidence, as well as imbue bits of information with new meaning by integrating them within a different unifying’-framework of understanding. Applied to the origins of the U.S. containment policy, cognitive social psychology has illuminated previously perplexing incongruities and inconsistencies in American policy, while casting doubt on some received wisdom. x — Preface Some political scientists and historians have argued that the Cold War was bound to occur once Germany was defeated, given the rise of two superpowers and the accompanying bipolar distribution of ca pabilities in the world. But the tragedy is that the United States and the Soviet Union could have defined their relationship altogether dif ferently, even under the burden of ideological suspicion and the ob jective threat that each country’s military power posed to the other. Further, had Henry A. Wallace or Franklin D. Roosevelt been presi dent, the Cold War might not have occurred or assumed the bitter, intense ideological tone that it did. Had Dean Acheson been president, the United States would have launched the containment policy much sooner. In other words, though they confronted the same “objective” circumstances and received similar information and analyses of the world situation, the subjects of this study arrived at Cold War beliefs at different times, by separate paths. Although President Harry S Truman is popularly known as the doughty World War I captain who told the Soviets just where to get off, he wavered and vacillated for nearly two years before he finally gave up trying to preserve world peace by cooperating with the Soviet Union. One reason why Truman was reluctant to relinquish the chance to develop a working partnership with Joseph Stalin was that he viewed the Russian dictator as another Boss Tom Pendergast, the machine politician who gave Truman his start in politics. Truman rea soned that Stalin, like any smart political boss, would at least have enough sense to go through the motions of holding elections in East ern Europe for the benefit of American public opinion; the president knew from his personal experience with “ghost votes” in Jackson County that the machine in power—Soviet occupying forces—would determine the outcome. Truman also firmly believed that Stalin, like Boss Pendergast, could be trusted to keep his agreements—the ethical code of a machine politician. Reputed to be a simple man of strong convictions, Truman had a Machiavellian streak. Truman believed in whatever the situation de manded, and he felt no discomfort at maintaining contradictory con victions simultaneously. Pragmatic politicians such as Truman and Byrnes create difficulties for cognitive dissonance theory, which builds on the proposition that people have an overwhelming drive to main tain consistency in their beliefs and opinions. Ultimately, it was the need for decision that finally led Truman and other U.S. officials to change their image of the Soviet Union, not any positive act by the Soviets. In other words, the circumstances sur rounding the Truman Doctrine speech forced Truman to reach cog- Preface — xi nitive closure, although the Soviets had initiated no aggressive or sub versive actions against the West. President Truman did not adopt hard-line beliefs about the Soviet Union until several months after making the Truman Doctrine speech in March 1947. It has often been said that U.S. policymakers exaggerated the dangers of Soviet expan sion into Western Europe because they viewed the conservative, cautious Stalin through the distorting prism of their image of Hitler. But although the experience of Munich was still fresh and vivid, U.S. leaders did not invoke the appeasement analogy or compare Stalin to .Hitler. So much solid research has gone into explaining the origins of the Cold War that one feels obliged to answer die question, why consider psychological factors at all? The introduction reviews Cold War his toriography to show why existing intrepretations should be supple mented with systematic psychological analysis. Readers who are not historians, however, might find this analysis to be a digression from the bverall argument, and their understanding of the rest of the book would not be impaired by avoiding it. When using social psychological theories, one must avoid the temp tation to find evidence of psychological bias where there is none, to distort the intentions and motives of historical characters in order to satisfy the requirements of a rigid theoretical scheme. To avoid falling into this well-known trap, I self-consciously tested alternative theories against archival evidence and tried to articulate the logic of causal in ference so that other analysts can replicate or challenge my conclu sions. Chapter One compares and contrasts different psychological theories of attitude change and provides a detailed description of how they were applied to documentary evidence. Those who have less in terest in psychology than in understanding the development of Amer ican Cold War policies may wish to skip over this chapter and jump directly into the story. Chapters Two through Seven trace U.S. policymakers5 interpreta tion of Soviet actions from 1944 to 1947 and the impact of certain critical events on their beliefs and perceptions of the Soviet Union. Where applicable, I have drawn on psychological theories to explain why American leaders derived different conclusions about Soviet in tentions and the prospects for U.S.-Soviet cooperation. But one must also consider the situational pressures and constraints under which these men were acting: insufficient time, a glut of raw information, inexperience in foreign policy, America’s woeful lack of preparation for world leadership, and the absence of a clear-cut, historical policy. xii — Preface American leaders confronted the ruins of world order, without the legacy of a balance-of-power tradition, amid the noise and spotlight of modem mass communications. Together, members of the Truman administration fashioned the Cold War consensus that continues to guide American foreign policy.