Operation Z

183 Pages·2022·2.05 MB·English

by  Jacques Baud

4th cover
Why did Putin launch Operation Z in Ukraine? Do Ukrainian forces use neo-Nazi volunteers? What
are the forces present and the reality of the military conflict for six months? What do we know about
war crimes like Boutcha? Have Western economic sanctions worked? Does the massive shipment of
weapons by Westerners have an effect on the conflict?
After the bestseller Putin: master of the game?, whose analytical work has been hailed around the
world, Jacques Baud returns in this book to the root causes of the war in Ukraine and the reasons which
led Vladimir Putin to intervene on February 24, 2022. Based on information from intelligence services
and official reports, it analyzes the course of military actions and the way in which they were interpreted
in the West. It explains the upheaval of the world order politically and economically, as well as the long-
term consequences of Western sanctions on our daily lives. It reveals how the conflict could have been
avoided and which tracks were voluntarily abandoned by the United States and Europe.
Jacques Baud was a member of Swiss strategic intelligence. A specialist in Eastern European
countries and head of United Nations peace operations doctrine, he was involved in negotiations with
the highest officials of the Russian army and intelligence just after the fall of the USSR. Within NATO,
he followed the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 and then took part in assistance programs for Ukraine. He is
the author of several books on intelligence, war and terrorism, in particular Governing by fake news,
The Navalny Affair and Poutine: master of the game? published by Max Milo.
Copyright
© Max Milo, Paris, 2022
www.maxmilo.com
ISBN: 978-2-31501-047-9
Introduction
On May 18, 2022, George W. Bush sparked hilarity in the world by castigating
the one man decision to launch a totally unwarranted and brutal invasion of Iraq… I mean,
Ukraine.
This Freudian slip illustrates and underlines the absurdity of the Western attitude towards Russia. On
the one hand, it accepts and supports the crimes of the Western powers and, on the other, it applies to
Russia a shower of sanctions which border on the absurd.
Three months earlier, on February 24, 2022, Vladimir Putin, speaking on Russian television,
announced his decision to intervene militarily in Ukraine at the request of the republics of Donetsk and
Lugansk, whose independence he recognized three days later. early. The Western world, in shock,
begins to rain down sanctions on Russia and Belarus. Ukraine is neither a member of the European
Union nor of NATO; however, since 2014, his regime has been under Western protection. Resolving
crises by force is rarely the right solution. The Russians know it as we do. Was Vladimir Putin's decision
relevant? In unison, Westerners respond in the negative, but their unanimity stems from a reading of
events that conveniently combines a form of Holocaust denial and revisionism aimed at taking into
consideration only what reinforces their prejudices. Added to the political lies is the media illusion, as
our news organizations have contributed to the confusion by painting a reality that is quite far removed
from the facts.
However, from the way we understand the crisis, follows our strategy to get out of it.
The objective of this book is to provide precise, factual, nuanced information, conducive to facilitating
a more peaceful look at this crisis. All is not black; not everything is white. The truth lies in the shades
of gray. Biased and extremist rhetoric tends to make any discordant information appear favorable to
Russia. It is time to remember what popular wisdom has been saying since the dawn of time: there are
always two relevant points of view in a conflict.
Readers with an exclusively Western perspective will judge this book to be “Putinian” or even
“Poutinolâtre”. On the contrary, those who are looking for a way to better understand the crisis in order
to find a path to dialogue will consider that this book is favorable to peace and therefore, ultimately, to
Ukraine.
To understand the inconsistent way in which the West has responded to the Ukraine crisis, one only
has to ask why this conflict – and Russia in particular – is more damnable than those we have initiated
before.
The invasions – illegal and illegitimate – of Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya or Syria by Western countries
have given rise to neither sanctions nor condemnations. Disabled American or Polish athletes were not
deprived of the Paralympic Games; British cats were not excluded from cat shows; Polish, German,
American, British, French or Lithuanian weightlifters were not convicted for crimes they did not
personally commit; British , American or Swiss tennis players were not forced to condemn their
governments to participate in a tournament, Chopin's "Polonaises" did not become "Iraqis", and the
atrocities of the Polish military were not condemned , etc.
With the Russian operation, it seems that, suddenly, the West has created a consciousness, but which
functions – as we will see – in a very selective and variable geometry way…
Methodology
In order to counterbalance the radical, simplistic and under-informed speeches which restrict the
understanding of the conflict and privilege the recitation of an anti-Russian vulgate to the detriment of
informational objectivity, my approach is different from that of the media which respect neither the
Charter of Munich nor the most elementary journalistic ethics – among which the Swiss Radio-
Television, France 5 or LCI. It also stands out from those who fight the propaganda of one party by
using that of the other (and often of the extreme right), such as heidi.news. My purpose is to fight the
propaganda of each party by examining its own information and therefore its own contradictions.
Therefore, I will use exclusively Western and Ukrainian sources (on the government side), as well as
those coming from the Russian opposition.
The lack of diversity in the French-speaking media landscape has led me to take most of my sources
from the Anglo-Saxon mainstream media, which are often more honest than their French-speaking
counterparts, even if they remain fiercely opposed to Russia.
Contents
Cover
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Copyright
Introduction
Methodology
1. Fundamentals and perceptions
1.1. The emotional and cultural level
1.2. The strategic level
1.2.1. The Russian point of view
1.2.2. The American point of view
1.3. The operational level
2. The historical context
2.1. Post-Cold War
2.2. The expansion of NATO
2.3. The indivisibility of security
2.4. The nuclear issue
2.5. The 2007 Munich Speech
2.6. The role of minorities
2.7. The Ukrainian question
2.7.1. The rapprochement between Ukraine and Europe
2.7.2. Euromaidan and the militarization of the conflict
2.7.3. The rise of right-wing extremism in Ukraine
2.7.4. The armed confrontation
2.7.5. Crimea
2.7.6. The Donbas crisis
2.8. The Minsk Accords
3. The forces involved
3.1. Ukrainian Armed Forces
3.1.1. Unrest in the Ukrainian Armed Forces
3.1.2. The use of paramilitaries
3.1.3. The role of volunteers
3.1.4. The national resistance
3.2. Paramilitary volunteer forces
3.2.1. Ukrainian National Assembly – Ukrainian National Self-Defense (UNA-UNSO)
3.2.2. Freedom (Свобода – Svoboda)
3.2.3. Patriot of Ukraine (Патріо ́т Украї ́ ни – Patriot Ukraine)
3.2.4. Black Body (Чорний Корпус)
3.2.5. Trident (Тризуб – Trizub)
3.2.6. Right Sector (Пра ́ вий се ́ ктор – Praviy Sektor)
3.2.7. Ukrainian Volunteer Army (Українська добровольча армія) (UDA)
3.2.8. The AZOV Movement
3.2.9. White Hammer (Білий Молот – Biliy Molot)
3.2.10. Sich of the Carpathians (Карпатська Січ – Karpatska Sich)
3.2.11. S14 (C14)
3.2.12. Misanthropic Division
3.2.13. Tradition and Order (Традиція і порядок)
3.2.14. International Legion for the Territorial Defense of Ukraine
3.2.15. Territorial defense battalions
4. Rising tensions
5. Operation Z
5.1. Challenges
5.1.1. Ukrainian issues
5.1.2. Russian issues
5.2. Planning
5.3. The situation in the Donbass
5.4. The Ukrainian system
5.4.1. The political context
5.4.2. Respect for human rights
6. Conduct of operations
6.1. Russia's goals
6.2. Two ways of waging war
6.3. Russian driving
6.3.1. Russian military doctrine
6.3.2. The Russian operational concept in Ukraine
6.3.3. The final state
6.4. Ukrainian driving
6.4.1. popular resistance
6.4.2. The conduct of operations
6.4.3. The “ Durchhaltebefehl »
6.4.4. A different perception of the battlefield
7. Information warfare
7.1. Communication
7.2. cyber warfare
7.3. Misinformation
7.3.1. The nuclear threat
7.3.2. War crimes
7.3.3. Biological laboratories
7.3.4. Rape as a weapon of war
7.3.5. Snake Island
8. Western reactions
8.1. Punishments
8.1.1. A foolish strategy, decided by fools
8.1.2. strategic materials
8.1.3. The blockade of grain exports
8.1.4. The “blockade” of Kaliningrad
8.2. weapon supplies
8.2.1. Well-adapted contracts and poorly adapted weapons
8.2.2. Weapons of uncertain fate
8.2.3. Deficient Western capabilities
8.2.4. Low operating profit
8.3. natural gas
8.3.1. The problem
8.3.2. The alternatives
8.3.3. The Turbine Case
8.3.4. An economic suicide
8.3.5. The sale of natural gas in rubles
8.4. The embargo on Russian oil
8.5. Ukraine in the EU
8.6. Sweden and Finland joining NATO
9. Ridicule does not kill
9.1. Vladimir Putin's illnesses
9.2. The fate of Marina Ovsyannikova
9.3. Letter Z ban
9.4. Banned Russian trees and cats
9.5. Art
10. Conclusions
10.1. What happened ?
10.2. The Absence of Western Intelligence
10.3. Western unity strengthened?
10.4. Foresight