Operation PBHISTORY: The Aftermath of SUCCESS

35 Pages·2004·0.26 MB·English

InternationalJournalofIntelligenceandCounterIntelligence,17:300–332,2004
Copyright#Taylor&FrancisInc.
ISSN:0885-0607print/1521-0561online
DOI:10.1080/08850600490274935
MAX HOLLAND
Operation PBHISTORY: The Aftermath of
SUCCESS
Save for the efforts to overthrow Fidel Castro in the early 1960s, no single
covert action undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during
the Cold War has been more widely written about than Operation
PBSUCCESS. The CIA-supported overthrow of Guatemalan President
Jacobo Arbenz Guzma´ n in June 1954 is a staple in all histories of the
Agency, in biographies and memoirs of former officers, and in the
academic literature on post-war United States relations with Guatemala
specifically, and Latin America in general.1
While deserved, this fascination with PBSUCCESS has left the covert
operation that followed on its heels all but neglected. There is, to be sure,
an oft-told anecdote derived from PBHISTORY, the cryptonym for the
project dedicated to gathering and exploiting Guatemalan Communist
documents. As a direct consequence of PBHISTORY, the CIA opened a
file on a young Argentinian physician named Ernesto Guevara. Apart
from this episode though, the covert operation that followed PBSUCCESS
has been relegated to a paragraph here and there or described in few pages
at most, when not reduced to a footnote.2 PBHISTORY merits closer
attention, and now that documents about the operation have been
declassified, it is finally possible to give the operation its due.3
The organic sequel to PBSUCCESS yields many insights. Above all,
PBHISTORY represents Washington’s covert effort to justify a covert
action ex post facto because of the adverse international reaction to
Arbenz’s overthrow. The operation also reveals some of the inner workings
MaxHollandwasaResearchFellowattheMillerCenterofPublicAffairsatthe
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia. His articles on international
events have appeared in a wide range of newspapers, magazines, and scholarly
journals. Mr. Holland’s book, A Need to Know: Inside the Warren
Commission,isforthcomingfromAlfredA.Knopf,NewYork.
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OPERATIONPBHISTORY:THE AFTERMATHOFSUCCESS 301
of the (then) Plans Directorate, techniques of ‘‘white,’’ ‘‘gray,’’ and ‘‘black’’
psychological warfare as practiced by U.S. government agencies in the mid-
to-late1950s,andtheinteragencynatureofwhatwaspredominantly,though
notexclusively,aCIAoperation.PBHISTORYalsoilluminatestheAgency’s
collaborative relationship with then-sympathetic congressional committees,
and the dangers (such as ‘‘blowback,’’ and exposure of intelligence sources
and methods) inherent in congressional inquiries striving for publicity.
Finally, and despite limitations recognized at the time, PBHISTORY
constitutes one of the Agency’s most notable counterintelligence efforts
and windfalls in the first decade of the Cold War against Communism.
GENESIS
Ontheeveningof27June1954,JacoboArbenzGuzma´nannouncedoverthe
radio his abrupt resignation from the Guatemalan presidency that had been
his since 1950. Although it would take eleven more days to install Colonel
Carlos Castillo Armas, the successor favored by Washington, with
Arbenz’s removal Operation PBSUCCESS had culminated in the desired
result. Accordingly, on 30 June, Frank Wisner, the Deputy Director for
Plans (DD=P), sent what became known as the ‘‘shift of gears cable.’’ The
‘‘time had come for the surgeons [CIA officers] to step back and [let] the
nurses [U.S. diplomats]... . take over the patient,’’ instructed Wisner.4
Within a matter of hours CIA officers in the field started to melt away and
the PBSUCCESS infrastructure began to disappear. La Voz de la
Liberacio´n (the Voice of Liberation), the clandestine radio station of the
insurrectionists, stopped broadcasting just as mysteriously as it had started.
YetWisnerwasthefirsttorecognizethattheAgency’sjobwasnotentirely
over. The covert triumph opened up several opportunities that the CIA
would be utterly foolish to ignore. The time was ripe to recruit agents in
both camps: from among Communists (not just Guatemalans but other
Latin nationals) now willing to defect, and from ‘‘untainted’’ Guatemalans
who might soon play a role in the new government. Recruiting assets from
among those who might work in any new or revamped internal security
apparatus would be particularly important.
In addition, the success of PBSUCCESS promised a paper bonanza, a
chance to perhaps expose, as never before, Soviet machinations throughout
the Western Hemisphere. It was thought that the coup’s rapidity—it had
taken but ten days to crack open the regime—meant that Arbenz and his
followers had not had time to destroy incriminating materials that would
document the extent of Moscow’s penetration and the workings of
international Communism, especially its tactics of infiltration. These could
be exploited for all manner of propaganda operations throughout the
hemisphere; utilized to ensure the root-and-branch eradication of
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Communism in Guatemala; shared selectively with friendly and neighboring
anticommunist governments for their use; and finally, provided to the
Agency’s own experts, keeping them busy for months if not years.
The last of these considerations was not a small one. Although the
Communist movement in Latin America had been in existence since at
least 1919, because of its clandestine nature it was not easy for CIA to
come by such rudimentary information as the ‘‘order of battle’’ of a local
Communist Party like the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT). But it
appeared extremely likely that PGT records left behind in haste would
enable the Agency’s International Communism Division to reconstruct the
PGT’s ‘‘collective leadership’’ and organizational structure, and perhaps do
the same for Moscow-oriented movements throughout the hemisphere.5
Identifying individuals who were secret Communists would also enable the
Agency to monitor or possibly recruit, and if not recruit then neutralize
and perhaps manipulate, persons sympathetic to Moscow. And PGT
records were only one of several promising possibilities. Besides party
headquarters, Wisner envisioned searching the private offices and homes of
Communist leaders (and of their friends and relatives) from Arbenz on
down; government offices dominated or strongly influenced by
Communists; offices of labor and peasant unions, Communist fronts and
affiliated organizations; the Foreign Ministry; and the regime’s internal
security agencies.6
NegativeWorld Response
These reasons alone were more than sufficient to launch what was dubbed
PBHISTORY. Yet by 1 July, the operation acquired another acute
justification when it became apparent that Western and non-aligned
nations’ reaction to Arbenz’s overthrow was continuing to be adverse.7
Arbenz’s secret purchase of weapons from Czechoslovakia, and their
arrival in Guatemala in mid-May, had given Washington a propaganda
windfall in the weeks leading up to PBSUCCESS. Once Colonel Castillo
Armas’s forces crossed into Guatemala on 18 June, however, the tenor of
international media coverage changed swiftly and dramatically—influenced
to a considerable degree by the Communist media’s saturation coverage.8
Suddenly, Jacobo Arbenz’s only sin seemed to be that he was a courageous
‘‘agrarian reformer’’ willing to challenge the United Fruit Company’s grip
over the local economy; simultaneously, Castillo Armas was portrayed as a
mercenary leading an aggression against a democratically elected
government not to Washington’s liking.
ReadingtheseallegationsinCommunistandCommunist-controlledmedia
was one thing. When criticisms of this kind were leveled by such normally
pro-American voices as Britain’s Labour Party and Sweden’s Social
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OPERATIONPBHISTORY:THE AFTERMATHOFSUCCESS 303
Democratic Party, the CIA took notice. Nowhere, of course, was this
problem more acute than in deeply nationalistic Latin America. ‘‘No one
could recall so intense and universal a wave of anti-U.S. sentiment in the
entire history of Latin America,’’ wrote one keen observer in the wake of
the coup.9 Mexican students laid a black-draped wreath at the door of the
U.S. embassy ‘‘in memory of the Good Neighbor policy,’’ while in
Havana, hundreds of young men lined up at the Guatemalan embassy to
enlist in the Guatemalan army. As the Agency’s Current Intelligence
Weekly for 9 July noted,
The Castillo Armas revolution in Guatemala has been almost
unanimously attributed by the rest of Latin America to the
intervention of Washington acting through the governments of
Honduras and Nicaragua... . ‘[A]nti-intervention’ demonstrations and
editorials have been widespread and in some cases violent. Many
government officials have hinted that Washington either suffers from
excessive anti-Communist zeal or is unduly influenced by the interests
of the United Fruit Company.10
Worldreactionwassounfavorable,andevensharplyhostiletotheUnited
States, that Moscow’s propaganda barrage had to be answered by the CIA’s
own ‘‘mighty Wurlitzer,’’ the term Frank Wisner used for the Agency’s
formidable array of informational assets, of which the media were a most
important part.11 A problem, in other words, that had been created by the
CIA’s triumph needed amelioration by further CIA action before
PBSUCCESS could produce undesirable and long-lasting effects upon non-
Communist governments and public opinion alike. ‘‘Counteracting
unfavorable world reaction is a matter of highest priority,’’ observed a
PsychologicalnParamilitary Operations Staff memo from early July, ‘‘and it
is therefore necessary to undertake with all means at our disposal a world-
wide campaign presenting the true facts as quickly and effectively as
possible.’’12 Consequently, just as the Agency was doing everything to
scrub all traces of PBSUCCESS out of existence, it simultaneously
launched a new initiative.
Becoming Assertive
The‘‘snatchjobondocumentswhilethemelonwasfreshlyburstopen’’began
on4July,withthearrivalinGuatemalaCityoftwoCIAofficersandtwofrom
the State Department’s Office of Intelligence Research (OIR).13 One officer,
Lothar Metzl, was from the CIA’s Counterintelligence Staff. An Austrian
lawyer who had emigrated to the United States after the Anschluss, Metzl
seemed at first glance an unlikely person to be the Agency’s leading expert
on international Communism. He had written fourteen musicals for the
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Viennesemusicaltheater,andalsoworkedasaplaywrightandsongwriteron
Broadway after immigrating. Metzl was equally fascinated by Communist
machinations though, dating back to the tumultuous 1930s in Central
Europe. Eventually, his study of the Comintern and various national
Communist Party organizations turned into his life’s work. Indeed, Metzl’s
ability to detect every nuance in Communist Party policy or doctrine was
unmatched in and outside the government.14
The initial survey was made in a situation of great confusion, even chaos,
and flux over who was in genuine authority, Colonel Castillo Armas having
arrived in Guatemala City only the day before. The initial targets were PGT
headquarters, Jacobo Arbenz’s personal effects and papers (and those of his
briefsuccessor,armedforceschiefColonelCarlosEnriqueDı´az),tradeunion
offices, known front organizations, and police agencies. The four-man team
was quickly disappointed by what it found. Because no guards had been
posted at PGT headquarters, the ‘‘obvious hub of the [Communist]
conspiracy,’’ offices had already been plundered systematically by the
Guatemalan army and unsystematically by looters.15 Other sensitive party
and government offices were in little better shape; what official documents
remained were strewn about in heaps, and secret police documents could
be purchased from street urchins. One particular disappointment was the
team’s inability, despite days of searching, to find any documents
pertaining to the Czech arms shipment that had arrived in mid-May. Nor
could any documents evincing Soviet control of the Communist movement
in Guatemala be found. Stung by accusations that it had acted merely to
protect the dividends of the United Fruit Company, Washington wanted
proof of an operational link between Guatemala City and Moscow, and
not merely evidence of a casual ideological or intellectual affinity. But the
Communists seemingly had sufficient time to destroy or remove any
especially sensitive documents.16
Notwithstandingtheearlydisappointment,alargenumberofrecords—up
to an estimated 150,000, and that figure did not include government files—
were judged ripe for exploitation, making it, in quantitative terms, the
‘‘greatest catch of documents ever left behind by a Communist Party and
its auxiliaries.’’17 Explicit instructions from Moscow might be missing, but
the remaining records would document a strong Communist influence over
and infiltration of the Arbenz regime, and depict in considerable detail the
structure and personalities of the country’s Communist apparatus,
including ‘‘transmission belts’’ like labor unions, peasant organizations,
student unions, and youth groups. The cache also promised to yield more
information than was already known about overt international
connections. In sum, there was every reason to believe that the documents
would provide sufficient information about Guatemala’s Communist
complex to accomplish its complete ‘‘exposure and destruction.’’18
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OPERATIONPBHISTORY:THE AFTERMATHOFSUCCESS 305
After two weeks in Guatemala, the CIA’s two-man team presented its
preliminary inventory and recommendations in Washington on 20 July.
The decision to accelerate exploitation of captured Guatemalan documents
was made that same day. DD=P Frank Wisner also asked Tracy Barnes,
chief of the Agency’s Political=Psychological Staff, to prepare a publication
that Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Allen W. Dulles could pass
around at an upcoming National Security Council briefing on Guatemala
for President Dwight D. Eisenhower. With the assistance of CIA’s printing
shop, Barnes quickly pulled together a booklet from the preliminary
inventory.19 The twenty-three documents reproduced included photographs
of Arbenz’s library of Marxist literature; Communist Chinese materials on
agrarian reform; pages from Mrs. Arbenz’s copy of Stalin’s biography;
documents revealing that Arbenz had tried to purchase arms from Italy;
and miscellaneous letters and cables revealing the former president’s strong
pro-Communist bias. The booklet also contained documents about the last
throes of the Arbenz government, including some communications that
showed Arbenz rejecting offers in early June to rid his government of
Communists in return for the Guatemalan armed forces’ putting up a
staunch fight against Castillo Armas. The publication, insofar as President
Eisenhower was concerned, buttressed Ambassador John Peurifoy’s
famous judgment, initially uttered in a State Department cable after his
first long meeting with Arbenz, and soon to be repeated in public
testimony before Congress. After a six-hour dinner with Arbenz in
December 1953, Peurifoy had reported ‘‘that if [the] President is not a
Communist he will certainly do until one comes along.’’20
THE TWO-MONTH PUSH
On 4 August, after a series of conferences, it was agreed that the new
PBHISTORY team would consist of twelve officers, including three from
the State Department, one from the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), and
eight from the CIA. The leader of the CIA delegation, and therefore chief
of the PBSUCCESS team, was an Agency officer with the pseudonym
‘‘Francis T. Mylkes,’’ who operated under State Department cover.21 The
deputy to ‘‘Mylkes’’ would be an enterprising 32-year-old American who
normally worked as a newspaper editor in Chile. At one time an aspiring
actor, David Atlee Phillips was fluent in Spanish and fresh from working
under contract to the CIA during PBSUCCESS. Under the pseudonym
‘‘Paul D. Langevin,’’ Phillips had been the Agency’s chief liaison and
advisor to La Voz de la Liberacio´n, one of the most effective tools in the
psychological war waged against Arbenz.22
The PBHISTORY task force adopted as its cover name the ‘‘Social
Research Group’’ (Grupo de Estudios Sociales). As had been the case with
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PBSUCCESS, CIA wanted to retain some semblance of deniability in its
dealings with Castillo Armas. The PBHISTORY team consisted of private
businessmen and experts from universities, or so Castillo Armas was
told.23 At the same time, the Agency was anxious to obtain the new
leader’s unstinting support, lest PBHISTORY ‘‘be faced with long
‘man˜ ana’ type of delays.’’24 Ransacking the Foreign Ministry and other
sensitive government offices for documents was bound to raise nationalist
hackles at some point, so there never was any question but that the
Guatemalans would retain ownership of all records. It was hoped,
however, that ‘‘through demonstration of the services which the task force
can perform for the Guatemalans... fullest [sic] cooperation will be
obtained.’’25 One of these services—if not the key one—was to instruct
Guatemalans on how to establish a records and filing system that would
enable a new, thoroughly professional intelligence service to identify and
keep tabs on known Communist subversives. As part of its bequest to the
new Guatemala, the CIA was intent on leaving such an organization
behind.26
Under prodding (and with funding) from the CIA, on 20 July Castillo
Armas had signed a decree creating such an executive agency, responsible
only to the governing junta, that would investigate and dismantle the
country’s Communist complex.27 The National Committee for Defense
against Communism (Comite´ de Defensa Nacional Contra el Comunismo)
was not a police force but a nascent intelligence service with certain police
prerogatives and functions. In theory, it had power over all military and
police authorities and could order the arrest of anyone suspected of being
a Communist. The PBHISTORY team would initially assist this nucleus of
a new internal security service by helping it create a central repository of
information on PGT members, fronts, and sympathizers.28 PBHISTORY
officers would instruct Comite´ personnel in the screening, classifying,
indexing, and carding of the confiscated documents. Subsequently, and so
that it could incorporate new information as it became available, the
Comite´ would be taught the rudiments of mail control, logging,
abstracting, and cryptic reference.29 Only after all these lessons had been
absorbed could CIA depend upon the Comite´ (or a successor service) to
conduct the ‘‘back-track’’ investigations necessary to obtain the complete
picture of Communism in Guatemala, and ensure that the country was
purged of ‘‘all commie influence.’’30 In the meantime, PBHISTORY
chairman ‘‘Mylkes,’’ along with the CIA chief of station and Comite´
members, would develop the full framework for a new countersubversive
service.31 Although this effort initially depended on CIA funding, Castillo
Armas, as well as the Agency, recognized that such financing could prove
‘‘very embarrassing’’ if it became known. The new Guatemalan
government would have to supply the operating funds as soon as possible.32
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OPERATIONPBHISTORY:THE AFTERMATHOFSUCCESS 307
The work of sorting through hundreds of thousands of documents was
arduous, of course, though made much easier with the assistance of
twenty-five Comite´ officials and clerical personnel.33 The North Americans
had a private entrance=exit to the offices where the documents were hauled
and sorted, so as to preserve the appearance of an all-Guatemalan affair,
as the ‘‘Social Research Group’’ operated overtly but without publicity.
All documents had to be indexed, a monumental but necessary task if they
were going to be useful for name-checks. (By late September, the central
index would consist of 15,800 cards).34 Documents from the PGT,
Guatemala’s official Communist Party, received the highest priority.
Everything handwritten and in typescript was preserved; generally, three or
four copies of printed materials were retained. This procedure meant that
about fifty percent of the volume of paper gathered was incinerated.35 One
aspect which slowed processing, of course, was the need to reproduce
documents, since all originals were to remain in Guatemala. The categories
of documents that interested U.S. agencies were numerous, and became
even longer once the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) heard about
the project.36 Accordingly, the Agency arranged for state-of-the-art
microfilm and three photostat machines to be delivered to the premises, all
of which were driven to their limits.
The CIA’s initial disappointment over the quality of the documents was
not cured by further hard work. By early September, after much sorting
and screening, the percentage of genuinely ‘‘top secret’’ documents was
confirmed as extremely low. Retrieved government files made it fairly clear
that Arbenz government officials and top Communist leaders had either
destroyed or taken with them the most sensitive material. And amid the
jockeying for power that persisted for weeks after Arbenz’s departure, one
member of the ruling junta had refused to allow the Comite´ to make
arrests and search the homes of private citizens, where such materials may
have been secreted.37 When he finally emerged as the junta’s undisputed
president, Carlos Castillo Armas told the PBHISTORY chief that he
‘‘personally knew that [Guatemalan] Army G-2 [intelligence] files had been
burned in their entirety.’’38
By the time the document processing terminated on 28 September 1954,
conservative estimates indicated that the ‘‘Social Research Group’’ had
plowed through more than 500,000 documents (not including duplicates), a
considerably higher number than initially expected. Of this amount, 2,095
documents were considered of sufficient importance to warrant
photostating; 50,000 documents of secondary importance were
microfilmed; 750 positive photographs were made for immediate
exploitation by local and international media; and a small number of
original documents were set aside for technical study.39 Duplicates of these
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documents,inturn,wereparceledouttotheagenciesparticipatingdirectlyin
PBHISTORY, as well as to the FBI.40
EXPLOITATION
Even before the processing began, the captured documents were expected to
become subject to competing urges. The primary tension would be between
exploiting the documents for operational intelligence, and using the
information for informational and propaganda purposes. To some degree
this tension was replicated in the agencies participating in PBSUCCESS.
The CIA, for its part, was most interested in data that would allow it to
act against Communism, not only in Guatemala but throughout the
hemisphere; it would also have a singular interest in controlling and=or
exploiting persons, based on information contained in the documents. The
State Department’s greatest interest lay in using the records to reconstruct
the pattern and growth of Communist influence and subversion in the
years since the 1944 revolution, which had overthrown the 14-year
dictatorshipofJorgeUbicoyCasten˜eda.TheequityoftheU.S.Information
Agency (USIA) in the documents, meanwhile, was nearly identical to that of
the State Department, except for the USIA’s emphasis on information that
could be released to inform international opinion.
Timing, of course, was everything. The U.S. government was engagedin a
global,seeminglyendless,struggleinwhichsuchawealthofinformationwas
hardtocomeby.Thedesiretoimmediatelyextractmaximumadvantagewas
powerful; yet with respect to counterintelligence, patience often paid
dividends. The expectation was that ‘‘Francis Mylkes’’ would favor neither
operational needs nor propaganda, but strike an appropriate balance
between the two. In any case, in return for inviting State and USIA to
participate, the CIA retained two important veto powers. It insisted on
exclusive control over relations with the Guatemalan government with
respect to the captured documents, and if there were any records that
could be used most effectively for clandestine operations, then the CIA
reserved the right to deny their public use by either State or USIA.41
Linked Ventures
Two preexisting covert operations would be nourished directly by the
captured documents: KUFIRE and KUGOWN. Both had been
instrumental parts of PBSUCCESS, and they also happened to coincide
with the primary tension inherent in the PBHISTORY operation.
KUFIRE was the code-name for the program to identify, irrespective of
nationality, all Communist party members, front members, and
sympathizers who had flocked to Arbenz’s Guatemala. These activists were
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OPERATIONPBHISTORY:THE AFTERMATHOFSUCCESS 309
expected to return to their country of origin, or to countries known for their
liberal asylum policies, like Mexico. Once safe, presumably these activists
would resume fomenting ‘‘trouble and agitation.’’ Via KUFIRE, the CIA
was intent on charting their movements and monitoring or frustrating their
machinations.42
DavidAtleePhillips’s assignedtaskwasto reviewthecaptureddocuments
for KUGOWN purposes. But given the smallness of the PBHISTORY staff
and informality of the setting, everyone pitched in as needed. Thus, it fell
accidentally to Phillips to order the opening of what would in time become
a most important file. In the midst of the sorting operation, another CIA
analyst approached Phillips carrying a single piece of paper. ‘‘Should we
open a file on this one?’’ she asked, as she handed him the document. It
contained biographical information on a 25-year-old physician named
Ernesto Guevara who had sought asylum in the Argentine embassy. ‘‘I
guess we’d better have a file on him,’’ said Phillips casually, though there
was nothing especially alarming or sinister about the physician. In a
shorter time than anyone could imagine, however, the ‘‘Che’’ Guevara file
would become one of the Agency’s thickest dossiers on a single person.43
Elsewhere in his memoir The Night Watch, Philips recounts generally that
the ‘‘The CI-nicks—counterintelligence officers—who worked with me [on
PBHISTORY] were ecstatic. These [documents] were pearls which could be
fondled for years.’’44 Yet the language in contemporary reports from the
PBHISTORY team was far more restrained. Exploitation of the captured
documents for KUFIRE purposes resulted in few operational leads for the
CIA, and none were fully developed.45 The captured documents, from an
operational perspective, were of primary value to the Comite´ and=or its
successor. With some Communists still in the government and used to
operating clandestinely, the pressing need was to exploit the records for the
purpose of exposing them. Reports also indicated that known Communists
who initially sought asylum in foreign embassies were already resuming
their activities under assumed names.46
KUGOWN’sValue
The relationship between PBHISTORY and the Agency’s operation
KUGOWN proved far more profitable. KUGOWN was the cryptonym for
the propaganda component in the broad program of psychological warfare
that had been initiated in the run-up to the coup. During PBSUCCESS,
KUGOWN’s targets had been the Arbenz regime, followed by Guatemala
as a whole, its Central American neighbors, the rest of the hemisphere,
nonaligned countries, and the Western alliance in roughly that order. That
list of priorities would remain the same under PBHISTORY (save for the
regime) because the pressure to disseminate derogatory information about
Arbenz was as intense after the coup as before.
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