Operation Herrick : an unofficial history of British military operations in Afghanistan 2001-2014

890 Pages·2015·4.28 MB·English

by  Sallust

OPERATION HERRICK
An unofficial history of
British military operations
in Afghanistan 2001-2014

By
‘Sallust’
Copyright © ‘Sallust’ 2015
This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, resold, hired out, or
otherwise circulated without the publisher’s prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is
published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent publisher.
The moral right of ‘Sallust’ has been asserted.
ISBN-13: 978-1519225511
ISBN-10: 1519225512
Dedicated to wonderful nieces Teresa, Sophia, and Isabel.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Afghanistan War generated an impressive corpus of books and studies. By the
second half of the war, the Afghanistan Conflict Analyst Bibliography had already
extended to some 250 pages. It would be impractical to acknowledge all the authors that
have helped shape this author’s understanding of what was plainly an obdurately complex
conflict. It is hoped the footnotes illustrate that they were many. Special mention should
be made of some of the outstanding authors in the field. The output of Anthony
Cordesman, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategic Studies at the Center for Strategic and
International Relations, was prodigious. Over the course of the war he generated close to
one hundred reports, dense with trenchant, honest criticism. Antonio Giustozzi has good
claim to be the Afghan expert. His books and studies provided indispensable
understanding of Afghan society and recent history. Michael Martin’s intimate study of the
war from the perspective of Helmandis was frankly outstanding. James Fergusson wrote
the first of the reflective works on the war. Frank Ledwidge, a Naval Reservist, wrote the
key work challenging British counter-insurgency practice. Emile Simpson, a Gurkha
officer, published a brilliant academic study on the nature of modern counter-insurgencies.
Retired Generals Christopher Elliott and Andrew MacKay wrote intelligent works that
questioned the workings of the MOD. Ambassador Sherard Cowper-Coles, a colourful and
controversial personality, courageously challenged the prosecution of the war. Rory
Stewart and Gerald Knaus offered the incisive book examining the viability of western
interventions. David Mansfield was the well informed voice on the opium trade. Jack
Fairweather capped his already impressive account of the Iraq War with an equally
comprehensive survey of the Afghanistan War. Two organizations stood out: the
Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) and the US Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). Both offered honesty in a war unfortunately
characterized by dishonesty. The author is especially grateful to the many soldiers who
wrote of their experiences in regimental blogs. These were commonly the most honest and
insightful accounts of the war.
Special thanks must go to Frank de Planta, an old school friend and former army officer
who loyally read through the text and pointed out many errors. This would have been a far
poorer book but for this effort. When he was young he used to say: ‘You are lucky in life
if you can count on one or two good friends’. He certainly proved the case.
The author would also like to acknowledge and thank Yanina and Alexander
Goldenberg at Gold Wind Limited who expertly prepared and arranged the e-publication
of this book.
To the author’s best knowledge, this is the first book to include the Afghanistan War
roll of honour and unit lists. This book was written for those names. It is hoped the
manuscript honestly recognizes their sacrifice.
Manui Dat Cognitio Vires
CONTENTS
FOREWORD
CHAPTER 1. THE PLANES OPERATION
CHAPTER 2. INTERNATIONAL RESCUE AFGHANISTAN 2001 - 2005
CHAPTER 3. A PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT OPERATION
CHAPTER 4. UNFIX THE FORCE
CHAPTER 5. TAKE THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY
CHAPTER 6. THE PRIZE IS THE POPULATION
CHAPTER 7. FIXED AGAIN
CHAPTER 8. SERVING IN HELL-LAND
CHAPTER 9. THE COMMANDOS RETURN
CHAPTER 10. CRISIS YEAR
CHAPTER 11. ALL CHANGE
CHAPTER 12. DOING THE HARD-YARDS (SUCCESSFULLY)
CHAPTER 13. THE RUSH FOR THE EXIT DOOR
ANNEX A. ROLL OF HONOUR
ANNEX B. BRITISH ARMY STRENGTH IN AFGHANISTAN 2001- 2014
FOREWORD
Robert McNamara’s
11 Lessons from Vietnam

The Afghanistan War was an American war, not a British war. It would have been an
omission, then, not to preface this book with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara’s 11
Lessons from Vietnam.[1] These are paraphrased below. Reading them, it will be obvious
to the reader why.
1. We failed to understand our opponents and exaggerated the threat to the United

States.
2. We failed to understand South Vietnam and viewed the country through the lens of

our own values.
3. We failed to reckon on the power of nationalism and how it drives people to fight

and die for their cause.
4. We were deeply ignorant of the history, culture, and society of Indochina.

5. We failed to acknowledge the limitations of modern, high-technology war and

failed to win the hearts and minds of people from a different culture.
6. We failed to involve Congress and the American people in an open and honest

debate before committing to war.
7. When the war unraveled, we did not credibly explain our strategy or actions.

8. We failed to recognize that we are not all-wise and we do not hold a universal

mandate to impose our values on other nations.
9. We failed to get allies to fully support the US-led war, except in cosmetic ways.

10. We failed to recognize that not every problem in international affairs has a

solution.
11. We failed to organize our own government machinery to effectively deal with the

intractably complex nature of the war.
Twenty-six years after the American withdrawal from Saigon, these lessons had been
entirely forgotten. Robert McNamara, of course, passed away in 2009, and thus lived long
enough to witness the same follies repeated again in Iraq and Afghanistan.
CHAPTER 1
THE PLANES OPERATION

On 14 September 2001, Secretary of State for Defence, Geoffrey William Hoon, rose to
address a packed House of Commons.[2] The most shocking public event in recent memory
had taken place just three days earlier in the United States. The moment deserved the
gravitas of Churchill but a four page speech delivered to the expectant House, in the event,
fell flat. Hostile journalists perceived Hoon as a Blair acolyte and had already labelled the
minister ‘Geoff Who?’. The minister himself would later reveal his Blairite credentials in
rather unattractive ways. Entrapped in a media sting, Hoon boasted to an undercover
reporter that what he was really looking forward to was ‘translating my knowledge and
contacts about the international scene into something that frankly makes money’.[3] After
leaving office he fulfilled this lubricious ambition, taking a senior post in a defence firm,
in the customary fashion. From humble origins (the son of a railway worker), Hoon
perfectly fitted the mould of the archetypal New Labour politician: the unembarrassed
covetous socialist, keen on self-advancement. After leaving school he read law at
Cambridge, and subsequently worked as a university lecturer before being called to the
Bar. This legal background was evident when he spoke to the House. The performance
was measured and he gave the impression that he was rather more concerned with
protecting the government from opposition criticism, than in rising to the historical
occasion. Rather than reassuring his listeners, he reinforced a growing reputation which
the government had acquired for spin over substance.
After expressing condolences to the American people, Hoon informed the House that
following the recent terrorist attacks in the United States, his government was prepared
and ready to protect the British people. A raft of melodramatic emergency measures was
then announced inflated by some hollow boasts. Britain, he stated, had some of the best
anti-terrorist capabilities in the world. Robust contingency plans were in place to ensure
the safety of Britons. Military units were being placed at immediate notice to move. Anti-
aircraft missiles were being readied to protect key sites. The RAF, which was ‘constantly
at a high state of readiness’, was prepared to intercept all enemies.
No defence secretary had spoken like this since the outbreak of the Second World War