One, None and One Hundred Thousand Margins of Appreciations:The Lautsi Case

22 Pages·2013·0.19 MB·English

HumanRightsLawReview13:2(cid:2)TheAuthor[2013].PublishedbyOxfordUniversityPress.
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doi:10.1093/hrlr/ngs038 AdvanceAccesspublication31January2013
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One, None and One Hundred
Thousand Margins of
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Appreciations:The Lautsi Case nlo
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Giulio Itzcovich* h
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Abstract jou
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The second decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the rg
Lautsi case on crucifixes in Italian state-school classrooms is almost at C/
entirely grounded on the margin of appreciation doctrine.This article o
describes the doctrine as developed by the European Court of Human rte In
Rights and, on the basis of the distinction between ‘hard cases’and te
ra
‘easycases’,attemptstoshowonecounter-intuitiveconsequenceofthe m
e
doctrine. Taken seriously, the doctrine seems to imply that the ric
a
European Court of Human Rights is the exemplar of a court that n
a
enjoys no discretion.This constructioncannot be accepted.Two other de
reconstructions are more plausible: the margin of appreciation can be D
e
consideredasacanonofinterpretationor,alternatively,asaproportion- rec
h
ality test. The present article argues that both reconstructions entail os
H
certain normative consequences for the way in which the European u
m
CourtshouldhavereasonedintheLautsicase. a
n
o
Keywords: margin of appreciation doctrine ^ proportionality test ^ s o
methods of interpretation ^ EuropeanCourtof Human Rights ^ Lautsi n F
e
vItaly b
ru
a
ry
1
8
, 2
0
1
5
* Researcher inJurisprudence, Universityof Brescia. Comments are welcomed ([email protected]
nibs.it). A first draft of this article was discussed at the workshop ‘European Court of
Human Rights and Margin of Appreciation: A dialogue with Andra¤s Sajo¤ and Giulio
Itzcovich’,attheUniversita' CommercialeLuigiBocconi,Milano.IwouldliketothankOreste
Pollicino,Andra¤sSajo¤,theotherparticipantsintheworkshopandtwoanonymouspeerre-
viewersofthisarticlefortheirhelpfulcomments.
...........................................................................
HumanRightsLawReview13:2(2013),287^308
288 HRLR13(2013),287^308
1. The Lautsi Case
The two Lautsi judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
raised and addressed two distinct issues.1Firstly, a substantive issue.Whether
the obligation to display the crucifix in state-school classrooms is compatible
with freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 9 of the European
Conventionon HumanRights (ECHR)2);andwhetheritis compatiblewiththe D
o
rightofparentstoensuretheirchildren’seducationandteachinginconformity w
n
with their own religious and philosophical convictions (Article 2 Protocol No loa
d
e
1of the ECHR). In short, whether the ECHR imposes an obligation upon the d
Contracting Parties to uphold confessional neutrality in educationand teach- from
ingand,ifso,whatconsequencesfollowfromthatobligation. http
Secondly, a legitimacy issue.Who should have interpretative authority on ://h
the substantive issue? Which institution should be assigned the taskof decid- rlr.o
ing on the content and scope of freedom of religion, the right to education xfo
andthestate’sdutyofimpartialityandneutrality?Shoulditbethedemocratic- rdjo
u
allyelected legislator or should it be the judiciary? If the lattercase, should it rn
a
bethedomesticcourtsortheECtHR? ls.o
As is well known, on 3 November 2009 a Chamber of the Second arg/
SectionoftheECtHRansweredthesubstantivequestionbyunanimouslyhold- t C
o
ing that there had beenaviolation of the right to education of the applicants rte
(‘LautsiI’).3 Accordingtothejudgment, the ECHR requiresthe statetorefrain Inte
from imposing‘beliefs, even indirectly, inplaces where persons are dependent ram
on it or in places where they are particularly vulnerable’.4 ‘The State has a eric
a
duty to uphold confessional neutrality in public education, where school at- na
d
tendance is compulsory.’5 The crucifix has aprevalent religious meaning; it is e D
a symbolof thepredominant religionof the countryand canbe consideredas ere
c
a‘powerful external symbol’of the same kind as the Islamic headscarves in ho
s
H
u
m
a
n
1 Foradetailedaccountofthecaseandanoverviewonthedebateinlegaldoctrineandpublic o
s
opinion, see McGoldrick,‘Religion in the European Public Square and in European Public o
n
Life^CrucifixesintheClassroom?’(2011)11HumanRightsLawReview451;seealsoZucca, F
e
‘Lautsi: A Commentary of the Grand Chamber Decision’ (2012) International Journal of b
ConstitutionalLaw(forthcoming);Panara,‘LautsyvItaly:TheDisplayofReligiousSymbolsby rua
the State’ (2011) 17 European Public Law 139; Witte and Arold,‘Lifting High the Cross? ry
1
Contrasting the New Europeanand AmericanCases on Religious Symbols onGovernment 8
Property’ (2011) 25 Emory International Law Review 5; Pin, ‘Public Schools, the Italian , 2
0
Crucifix, and the European Court of Human Rights:The Italian Separationof Churchand 15
State’ (2011) 25 Emory International Law Review 95; Chiassoni, Diritti Umani, Sentenze
Elusive,ClausoleIneffabili(Rome:Aracne,2011)at30^44;Weiler,‘Editorial.Lautsi:Crucifixin
the Classroom Redux’ (2010) 21EuropeanJournal of International Law1; and Mancini,‘The
Crucifix Rage: Supranational Constitutionalism Bumps Against the Counter-Majoritarian
Difficulty’(2010)6EuropeanConstitutionalLawReview6.
2 1950,ETS5.
3 LautsivItalyApplicationNo30814/06,Merits,3November2009.
4 Ibid.atpara48.
5 Ibid.atpara56.
TheLautsiCase 289
the DahlabvSwitzerlandand KaradumanvTurkeycases.6 The obligationto dis-
play it in state-school classrooms violates the negative freedom of religion of
the pupils, as ‘[t]he presence of the crucifix may easily be interpreted by
pupils of all ages as a religious sign, and they will feel that they have been
brought up in a school environment marked by a particular religion’.7
Moreover, the obligation can enter into conflict with‘sufficiently serious and
consistent’ convictions of the parents, and the disrespect for their beliefs D
o
w
cannot be justified, as it is incompatible with the state’s duty of impartiality n
lo
and neutrality.8 ad
e
LautsiIwas reportedtohave causedthe most widespreadopposition inthe d fro
history of the ECtHR: ‘The political response to the Chamber’s judgment in m
h
Lautsi is without precedent in European human rights terms. It caused a ttp
storm of political controversy in Italy and elsewhere in Europe.’9 In Italy, ://h
except on the far left, the ruling met the almost unanimous condemnation rlr.o
x
bothof the Governmentand of the centre-leftist opposition.The Lautsi family fo
was allegedlysubjected toverbalabuse;10 during the televisionprogramme La rdjo
u
Vita in Diretta, the Minister of the Defence La Russa shouted ‘death to those rn
a
people [the secularists] and to those fake international institutions [the ls.o
rg
ECtHR] that don’t count for anything!’ (and the interviewing journalist a/
agreed).11Inthe EuropeanUnion, the Parliamentcame closetoadoptingreso- t C
o
lutionsdirectlyontheissue. rte
The Italian Government asked for the case to be referred to the Grand Inte
Chamber of the ECtHR for a rehearing. Several governments (Armenia, ram
e
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Russian, Greece, Lithuania, Malta, Monaco, Romania and ric
a
San Marino), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), members of the na
d
European Parliamentand the distinguished Law ProfessorJoseph H. H.Weiler e D
intervened in the proceeding.12 They argued that the Convention had not ere
c
been violated. No coercive process of indoctrination was taking place in ho
s
Italian state-schools.The crucifixcould be interpretedas a symbolof cultural H
u
m
identity,aswellasareligioussymbol.Thestate’sdutyofconfessionalneutrality a
n
shouldnotbeconfusedwiththeendorsementofsecularism.Liberalneutrality os
o
is impossible, or it is not desirable: it is in itself the expression of a particular n F
e
political ideology, a distinct‘conceptionof the good’. Inanycase, theyargued, b
ru
individual rights should be balanced with collective identities and the ECtHR ary
1
8
6 Ibid.atpara54. , 2
0
7 Ibid.atpara55. 15
8 Ibid.atpara53.
9 SeeMcGoldrick,supran1at470.
10 OpenletterbyMassimoAlbertinandSoileLautsi,PDFversionofdocumentdownloaded27
September2012.
11 Viaicrocifissidascuola-IgnazioLaRussascatenato,4November2009,http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v¼goWDmbvNGr0#t¼5m0s[lastaccessed27September2012].
12 Weiler,actingonaprobonobasis,presentedthecollectiveviewsofeightgovernmentsduring
the oral hearing before the Grand Chamber. The webcast of the hearing is available at:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼ioyIyxM-gnM[lastaccessed27September2012].
290 HRLR13(2013),287^308
is not inthe positionof striking that balance inaway that is bindingand ap-
propriate forall the Contracting Parties.Therefore, Italianauthorities had not
oversteppedtheboundsoftheirlegitimatediscretionininterpretingtheECHR.
On18March2011,theGrandChamberheld,by15votesto2,thattherehad
been no violation of the Convention (‘Lautsi II’).13 According to the Court,
Italy had acted ‘within the limits of the margin of appreciation’ left to the
stateinensuringtherightofparentsineducationandteaching. D
o
w
It comes as no surprise that the Lautsi judgments of the ECtHR have at- n
lo
tracted great scholarlyattentionas wellas the attentionof the public and the ad
e
d
mrealisgsiomusedsiyam, absoltshienytahreeppuabrlticofdaonmaininc.r1e4aSstianrgtliynginftreonmsethdeeb1a9t8e0os,ntthheeqpuleascteioonf from
h
of whether crucifixes should be present in state-school classrooms has been ttp
thesubjectofgreatcontroversyinEuropeandhasbeenbroughtbeforethesu- ://h
preme courts of several states. Different authoritiesçthe legislators, the rlr.o
x
courts,theschooladministratorsçhavedecidedthematterindifferentways.15 fo
rd
The attention of the public has mainly focused on the substantive issue of jo
u
the case: does freedomof religion imply the state’s neutrality in religious mat- rn
a
ls
ters and, if so, what consequences for the presence of religious symbols inthe .o
rg
classroom should be inferred from the duty of denominational neutrality? Is a/
the content of freedom of religionand the right to education fixed, rigidly es- t C
o
tablishedanduniversallybinding,orshoulditbesensitivetothecontext,vary- rte
In
ing from time to time and from country to country? As it is oftenthe case in te
ra
human rights adjudication, the discussion on the substantive issue has m
e
involved the legitimacy issue: should the ECtHR be entrusted with the taskof ric
a
n
evaluating the relations between state and church in each member state of a
d
the Councilof Europe? If the contentand scope of freedomof religionand the e D
e
right to education is sensitive to the context, who is better placed to evaluate re
c
h
whatthecontextrequires? o
s
OnemightsaythatinLautsiItheECtHRhasgivenarulingonthesubstan- H
u
m
tive issueçthe duty to exhibit the crucifix in state-schoolclassrooms is prima a
n
o
facie incompatible with the rights of parents in educationand teaching taken s o
n
F
e
13 LautsiandOthersvItalyApplicationNo30814/06,Merits,18March2011. b
14 SeeRorive,‘ReligiousSymbolsinthePublicSpace:InSearchofaEuropeanAnswer’(2009) rua
30CardozoLawReview2669. ry
1
15 AsreportedinLautsiII,supran13,whileinthemajorityofthememberstatesoftheCouncil 8
ofEuropethequestionisnotgovernedbyanyspecificregulations,insometheexhibitionof , 2
0
the crucifix is expressly forbidden (Macedonia, France and Georgia) and inothers it is ex- 15
presslyallowed orevenprescribed (Italy, Austria, certain German La«nder, Switzerland and
Poland).The duty to display the crucifix, however, is quite uncommon. It has been struck
downbytheSwissFederalCourtin1990andbytheGermanConstitutionalCourtin1995;
in1993,thePolishConstitutionalCourtruledthatthepossibilityofdisplayingcrucifixesin
state school classrooms is compatible with the Constitution given that such display is not
compulsory;in2008,theRomanianSupremeCourtheldthatthedecisiontodisplayreligious
symbolsshouldbeamatterforthecommunityformedbyteachers,pupilsandpupils’parents;
and in 2009, the Spanish High Court of Justice of Castile and Leon held that the schools
shouldremovethecrucifixesiftheyreceivedanexplicitrequestfromtheparentsofapupil.
TheLautsiCase 291
togetherwithfreedomof thought, conscienceand religionçandthatLautsiII
has givena ruling onthe legitimacy issue: it is not for the Court to definitely
ascertain such incompatibility, as national authorities are better placed to
evaluate, all things considered, whether crucifixes should be present in
state-schoolclassrooms.
InwhatfollowsIwillnotapproachthesubstantiveissueofthecase,norwill
D
Iaddress the legitimacy issue (not from a normative viewpoint, at least). Iam o
w
not interested here in the question of what the Court should have decided, n
lo
nor inthe questionof whether it was for the Courttorule on matters suchas ad
e
d
this. Iwillapproachthe Lautsicasefromadifferent perspectiveçtheperspec- fro
tiveof theanalysisof legalreasoning. m
h
Iwilltry toreflectontheway inwhichthe ECtHRjustifieditsdecisionson ttp
the substantive and the legitimacy issues. Seen from the perspective of the ://h
analysis of legal reasoning, it seems that Lautsi II is quite remarkable.While rlr.o
x
Lautsi I is maybe a questionable but carefully argued judgment, Lautsi II is fo
rd
based almost exclusively on the margin of appreciation doctrine. Apart from jo
u
two supporting arguments for justifying its decision (no indoctrination policy rna
ls
is occurring in Italy and the crucifix is essentially a‘passive symbol’16), the .o
rg
Court relied entirely on the notion that the Contracting Parties have a wide a/
t C
margin of appreciation (with regard to compliance with the duty to‘respect’ o
the convictionsof thepupils’parents,17 withregardtothe decisiontoperpetu- rte In
ate a tradition,18 with regard to the place of religion in education and teach- te
ra
ing,19 with regard to the cultural meaning of the crucifix20). The phrase m
e
ric
a
n
a
16 Thecrucifixisan‘essentiallypassive[religious]symbol’astheobligationtohangitinstate de
schools is different from the duty to actively participate in a religious ceremony or ritual D
e
(ibid.atpara72).Note,however,thattheCourtdidnotexplainwhythecrucifixonthewall re
c
is not a ‘powerful external symbol’ within the meaning of the decision in Dahlab v h
o
Switzerland2001-V. s H
17 TheCourtstated,LautsiII,supran13atpara61,thattherequirementsofthenotionof‘re- u
m
spect’for parents’religious and philosophical convictions ‘vary considerably from case to a
n
case, given the diversity of the practices followed and the situations obtaining in the o
s
ContractingStates’,andtherefore‘theContractingStatesenjoyawidemarginofappreciation o
n
indeterminingthestepstobetakentoensurecompliancewiththeConvention’. F
e
18 InassessingtheargumentoftheItalianGovernmentaccordingtowhichthepresenceofcru- b
cifixesinstateschoolclassroomscorrespondstoatraditionwhichtheItaliansconsiderim- rua
portanttoperpetuate,theCourtheld,ibid.atpara68,that‘thedecisionwhetherornotto ry
1
perpetuateatraditionfallsinprinciplewithinthemarginofappreciationoftherespondent 8
State.’ , 2
0
19 ‘ThefactremainsthattheContractingStatesenjoyamarginofappreciationintheireffortsto 15
reconcileexerciseofthefunctionstheyassumeinrelationtoeducationandteachingwithre-
spect for the rightof parents,’and‘[t]he Court thereforehas a duty inprinciple to respect
theContractingStates’decisionsinthesematters,includingtheplacetheyaccordtoreligion.’
Seeibid.atpara69.
20 TheCourtacknowledged,ibid.atpara66,thatthecrucifix‘isaboveallareligioussymbol’
and,ibid.atpara71,‘undoubtedlyreferstoChristianity’,butadded,ibid.atpara68,witha
patentcontradiction,that‘[a]sregardstheGovernment’sopiniononthemeaningofthecru-
cifix...itisnotfortheCourttotakeapositionregardingadomesticdebateamongdomestic
courts’,thatis,theItalianConsigliodiStatoandtheCourtofCassation.
292 HRLR13(2013),287^308
‘margin of appreciation’recurs with great frequency in the judgment. For the
reasonsoutlinedbelow,thisconceptisbothinterestingandpuzzling.
2. The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine
The concept of margin of appreciation is not peculiar to the jurisprudence of D
o
w
the ECtHR, but isawell-established notion in Europeanadministrativelaw: in n
lo
France it isknownas marged’appre¤ciation, in Italyas marginedidiscrezionalita', ad
e
in Germanyas Ermessensspielraum. It means that, in certain matters, the law d fro
recognisesthe discretionary powers of theadministrativeandpolitical bodies; m
h
therefore, the standards of judicial review should be constructed in a way ttp
that respects this necessaryautonomy, the‘room for manoeuvre’of the public ://h
authorities.21 The courts should not replace the independent evaluations rlr.o
x
made by other authorities, if they have not overstepped the boundaries of fo
rd
theirlegitimatediscretion. jo
u
OnemightrecalltheItalianlawontheestablishmentandfunctioningofthe rn
a
ls
Constitutional Court: ‘The review of constitutionality of legislation shall ab- .o
rg
stain from any political evaluation and control over the exercise of a/
Parliament’s discretionary power.’22 Or one might recall the political question t C
o
doctrine of the United States Supreme Court, which was first formulated in rte
In
Marbury v Madison: ‘The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the te
ra
rights of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, m
e
performduties inwhichtheyhaveadiscretion.’23 Inbothcasesand inseveral ric
a
n
othersthelegalculturehasdevelopeddoctrinalinstrumentsçinternacorporis, a d
e
justizlose Hoheitsakte, actes de haute administrationçin order to express the D
e
notion that certain kinds of decisions must be immune from judicial scrutiny re
c
h
or, alternatively, can be subject to limited judicial review according to less o
s
H
exacting, more deferential standards. Indeed, in national law as well as in u
m
European lawavarietyof standards of review has been developed in order to an
o
express this principle of judicialdeference:‘Well knownare such standards as s o
n
‘manifest unreasonableness’,‘arbitrariness’,‘clear excess of the bounds of dis- F
e
b
cretion’,‘manifest error’. Althoughthe precise judicial test resulting from such ru
a
ry
1
8
, 2
0
1
5
21 Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 222; and Yourow, The Margin of
Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamic of European Human Rights Jurisprudence (Dordrecht:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1996) at 13. On the origins and development of the doctrine, see
Arai-Takahashi,TheMarginofAppreciationDoctrineandthePrincipleofProportionalityinthe
JurisprudenceoftheECHR(Antwerp:Intersentia,2002).
22 Article28,L.11March1953,No87,G.U.14March1953,No62.
23 MarburyvMadison5U.S.(1Cranch)137,170(1803).
TheLautsiCase 293
formulaic standards is not always clear, the formulas all clearly point in the
directionof judicialrestraint.’24
TheEuropeanConventiondoesnotexplicitlyprovideforthedoctrineofthe
marginofappreciation.It wasinitiallyproposedbythe EuropeanCommission
of Human Rights,25 then it was introduced by the ECtHR in the1961Lawless
vIreland(No3)case26anditwasfurtherdevelopedinthe1976leadingcaseof
HandysidevUnitedKingdom.27Inthejurisprudenceof theECtHR,thedoctrine Do
w
has graduallyobtained significant relevance and is now generallyconsidered n
lo
as one of its most characteristic features. Every textbookand scholarlyarticle ad
e
d
dealing withthe methods of interpretation of the Convention reserves special fro
attention for the margin of appreciation doctrine.28 Already in 1980, Sir m
h
HumphreyWaldock, former President of the ECtHR, described the doctrine as ttp
‘one of the more important safeguards developed by the Commission and the ://h
CourttoreconciletheeffectiveoperationoftheConventionwiththesovereign rlr.o
x
powers and responsibilities of governments in a democracy’.29 Arguments fo
rd
basedonthenotionthattheContractingPartiesenjoyawidemarginofappre- jo
u
ciation in implementing the Convention are among the most recurrent and rna
ls
typical in the case law of the ECtHR. It seems that by the end of the 1990s .o
rg
over 700 of itsjudgments hadendorsedthe marginofappreciationdoctrine30 a/
and, since then, references to the margin of appreciation have constantly t Co
increased,promptingcommentatorstospeakofan‘inflation’of thedoctrine.31 rte In
As mentioned, Lautsi II is remarkable as it is almost entirely based on the te
ra
marginofappreciationdoctrine,butit is notextraordinary.Onthe contrary,it m
e
is quite common that the Court rejects the applicant’s complaint by holding ric
a
n
thatthematterfallswithinthemarginofappreciationof therespondentstate. a d
e
The doctrine establishes a method for supervising the decisions of national D
e
authorities. It demands deference and self-restraint on the part of the ECtHR re
c
h
and it is based, first and foremost, on the principle of subsidiarity. The o
s
H
u
m
24 Gerards,‘Pluralism,DeferenceandtheMarginofAppreciationDoctrine’(2011)17 European a
n
LawJournal80at85,makingreferencetoTridimas,TheGeneralPrinciplesofECLaw,2ndedn o
s
(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2006)at143. o
n
25 GreecevUnitedKingdom(1958-9)2Yearbook174(Cypruscase). F
e
26 A3(1961);1EHRR15(1940EmergencyActempoweringtheIrishGovernmenttoarrestand b
detainpersonswithouttrialwhennecessarytopreservepeaceandpublicorder). rua
27 A 24 (1976);1EHRR 737 (seizureand destructionof the‘Little Red Schoolbook’under the ry
1
ObscenePublicationsAct1959). 8
28 See,forexample,Letsas,ATheoryofInterpretationoftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights , 2
0
(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2007);Jacobs,WhiteandOvey,TheEuropeanConventionon 15
HumanRights,5thedn(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2010)at78ff.;andGerards,supran
24.
29 Waldock,‘The Effectiveness of the System Set Up by the European Convention on Human
Rights’(1980)1HumanRightsLawJournal1at9.
30 Editor’sNote,‘TheDoctrineoftheMarginofAppreciationundertheEuropeanConventionon
Human Rights: Its Legitimacy in Theory and Application in Practice’ (1998) 19 Human
RightsLawJournal1.
31 Kratochv|¤l,‘The Inflationof the Marginof Appreciation by the European Court of Human
Rights’(2011)29NetherlandsQuarterlyofHumanRights324.
294 HRLR13(2013),287^308
underlying idea is that the Contracting Parties have agreed upona set of uni-
form but minimal standards of human rights protection, or they have agreed
uponasetof vague, open-endedand flexible standards: inanycase, theyhave
not agreed upon a fixed and settled model of society. As almost everycontro-
versycanbeframedasinvolvingaconflictbetweenfundamentalrights,orbe-
tween fundamental rights and public interest, the ECtHR should stick to an
unpretentious understanding of its role. It is not for the Court to decide on Do
w
every possible questionconcerning human rights protection: different institu- n
lo
tions in different states can conceivably reach different but lawful decisions ad
e
d
on the meaning of human rights, and the Court should acknowledge that it fro
cannot always substitute its own assessment for that of the national authori- m
h
ties.32Asonecommentatorputit,‘[f]ortheCourttosubstituteitsownconcep- ttp
tion of what is appropriate might...result in it taking sides in the resolution ://h
of genuine human rights/public interest dilemmas whichare not amenable to rlr.o
x
anystraightforward legal solution’.33 Onthe contrary,‘the Court should act as fo
rd
a force contributing to the preservation of that ‘‘marvellous richness’’of [cul- jo
u
tural and ideological] diversity [among the Contracting Parties] or, at least, rna
ls
should not undermine it byseeking to impose rigidly uniform solutions valid .o
rg
forallthedifferentdemocraticsocieties’.34 a/
Whenthenationalauthoritywhoseappreciationmustbesafeguardedisthe t C
o
parliamentorthegovernment,thislineofreasoningcanbereinforcedbycon- rte
In
siderations concerning the duty torespectthe principle of democraticlegitim- te
ra
acy: ‘the democratic legitimacy of measures taken by democratically elected m
e
governments commands a degree of judicial self-restraint’.35 When the na- ric
a
n
tionalauthority is a domestic court, the respect of the marginof appreciation a d
e
canbeconceivedasapreconditionforjudicialdialogueexpressingthewilling- D
e
ness to enter intoa fruitfuland cooperative relationshipwith national judges. re
c
TheECtHRisnotafinalcourtofappealor‘fourthinstance’.36Ifitsjurisdiction ho
s
H
hastobeeffective,thentheCourtshouldstrivetogaintheconfidence,respect u
m
andcollaborationof the domesticcourts. an
o
Indeed, the doctrine of the margin of appreciation can be justified on a s o
n
principled basis (subsidiarity and democracy) but also on instrumentalist F
e
b
ru
a
ry
1
32 JamesvUnitedKingdomA98(1986);8EHRR123,atpara46. 8
33 Greer,supran21at224. , 2
0
34 Mahoney,‘Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism?’ (1998) 19 15
HumanRightsLawJournal3.
35 Supran13,atJointPartlyDissentingOpinionofJudgesWildhaber,PastorRidruejoandBaka;
Karatas(cid:2) vTurkey1999-IV;seealsoWildhaber,TheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights1998-2006:
History,Achievements,Reform(Kehl:Engel,2006)at95:‘nationalauthoritiesenjoyanareaof
discretion which derives from their role in the expression of the democratic will of their
people.’
36 Petzold,‘The Convention and the Principle of Subsidiarity’, in Macdonald, Matscher and
Petzold (eds),The European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Dordrecht: Martinus
NijhoffPublishers,1993)at41.
TheLautsiCase 295
arguments and pragmatic considerations.37 Seen from this perspective, the
doctrine appears to be a useful tool for the management of legal pluralism, a
device for avoiding antinomies between norms arising from different legal
orders,an‘importantinstrumenttonegotiatebetweentheinterestsconcerned
with national and supranational decision-making’.38 The doctrine is a‘lubri-
cant in the working of the Convention’, as it ‘gives the flexibility needed to
D
avoid damaging confrontations between the Court and the Contracting o
w
Parties over their respective spheres of authority’.39 Byadjusting ona case by n
lo
a
casebasisthewidthofthemarginofappreciation,theECtHRisabletonegoti- d
e
d
ate betweenconflicting supranationaland national interests and, in so doing, fro
it attempts to achieve greater acceptance of its decisions and to increase the m
h
degree of authoritativeness and effectiveness of its jurisdictionç‘the Court ttp
will continue to build its authority incrementally and cautiously, retaining ://h
the margindoctrine,pinningittothe securityof the consensusprinciple,and rlr.o
x
reservingunhesitatinglyautonomous interpretation’.40 ford
Giventherationaleofthedoctrinebasedonsubsidiarity,democracyanddia- jo
u
logue,itfollowsthat‘[t]hescopeofthismarginofappreciationisnotidentical rna
ls
in each case but will vary according to the context’.41 However, deference to .o
rg
the judgments of nationalauthorities is especiallyappropriate intwo kinds of a/
t C
cases. o
First,incasesthatdealwithoneoftheseveralaccommodationandderoga- rte In
tionclauses of the Convention. Here the Court oftenaccepts that it might not te
ra
be the most reliable authority in evaluating what are the‘interests of morals’, m
e
‘public order’, ‘national security’, or what is necessary for ‘the economic rica
n
well-beingof the country’,‘the prevention of disorder orcrime’,‘the protection a d
e
of health or morals’, and that it is perhaps not best suited to deciding what is D
e
a‘public emergency threatening the life of the nation’underArticle15 ECHR, rec
h
asinsuchmattersitsjudgmentsruntheseriousriskofbeingmerelyapologetic os
H
or ineffective.Thus, in these cases the Court often accepts that,‘by reason of u
m
their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, an
o
s
o
n
F
e
37 Macdonald,‘TheMarginofAppreciation’,inMacdonald,MatscherandPetzold,supran36at122^ b
123;Yourow,supran21;HelferandSlaughter,‘TowardsaTheoryof EffectiveSupranational rua
Adjudication’(1997)107YaleLawJournal273at316;Wilkins,‘InternationalHumanRightsand ry
1
NationalDiscretion’(2002)6JournalofEthics373;andGerards,supran24. 8
38 Gerards, supra n 24 at107. On the margin of appreciation and legal pluralism, see also , 2
0
Delmas-Martyand Izorche,‘Marge nationale d’appre¤ciation et internationalisation du droit. 15
Re¤flexionssurlavalidite¤ formelled’undroitcommunpluraliste’(2000)52Revueinternatio-
nalededroitcompare¤ 753.
39 Macdonald,supran37at122^23.
40 Yourow,supran37at196.
41 BuckleyvUnitedKingdom1996-IV;23EHRR101,atpara74;cf.RasmussenvDenmarkA27
(1984);7EHRR371atpara40:‘Thescopeofthemarginofappreciationwillvaryaccording
tothecircumstances,thesubjectmatteranditsbackground;inthisrespect,oneoftherele-
vantfactorsmaybetheexistenceornonexistenceofcommongroundbetweenthelawsof
theContractingStates.’
296 HRLR13(2013),287^308
State authorities are in principle in a better position than the international
judgetogiveanopinionontheexactcontent’of theConvention.42
Secondly, the standard of reviewof the ECtHR is less strict and the margin
ofappreciationofnationalauthoritiesiswiderwhenthereisno‘Europeancon-
sensus’onthe substantive issue of the case.The scopeaccorded tothe margin
depends on‘the extent to which there may be a pan-European consensus on
the relationship between a particular Convention right and public interest’.43 D
o
w
Whenthe question raised beforethe ECtHR is decided indifferent waysindif- n
lo
ferent countries, the Court usually accepts that there is room for reasonable ad
e
disagreement.Differentinterpretationsofhumanrightscanbeequallylegitim- d fro
ate, and the Contracting Parties enjoy the wide margin of appreciation that m
h
they,infact,alreadyexercise. ttp
Sometimes,however,whenhumanrightsareatstake,deferencetothejudg- ://h
mentsofnationalauthoritiesmightbeinappropriate.Therighttolife,thepro- rlr.o
x
hibition of torture, slavery or servitude and the principle of nulla poena sine fo
rd
praevia lege poenaliare‘absolute’rights underArticle15(2) of the ECHR: rights jo
u
whose restrictionorsuspensioncan neverbejustifiedeven ina state of emer- rn
a
gency.With regard to the negative obligation of refraining from the violation ls.o
rg
of absolute rights, it seems thatthe Contracting Parties have nomarginofap- a/
preciationwhatsoever.Moreoverthemarginofappreciationdoctrineisusually t C
o
accompaniedbyanecessarycaveat,thealmostformulaicphrases‘nevertheless rte
theConventiondoesnotgivetheContractingStatesanunlimitedpowerofap- Inte
preciation’and ‘the domestic margin of appreciation thus goes hand in hand ram
e
withaEuropeansupervision’.44 ric
a
Indeed,theargumentfrom subsidiarity,broughttoitsextreme conclusions, na
d
would call into question the point of having the European Convention and a e D
common standard of human rights protection.45 The argument from democ- ere
c
racy cannot but affect the legitimacy of judicial reviewçit is the famous ho
s
‘counter-majoritarian difficulty’affecting domestic constitutional adjudication H
u
m
as well as international courts. And the need for dialogue, the search for au- a
n
thorityand the quest forcollaborationwiththe nationaljudges, for their part, os
o
areallpragmaticconsiderationsthat differsharply fromthekindofprincipled n F
e
argumentation upon which the constitutional courts are usually expected b
ru
torely. ary
1
8
42 Handyside,supran27atparas48^49. , 2
0
43 Greer,supran21at224.OntheslipperynotionofEuropeanconsensus,seeLetsas,supran 15
28.
44 Handyside,supran27atpara49; seealsoLautsiII,supran13atpara68:‘referencetoatrad-
itioncannot relieveaContractingStateof itsobligationto respectthe rightsand freedoms
enshrinedintheConvention’;andpara70:‘Thismarginofappreciation,however,goeshand
inhandwithEuropeansupervision.’
45 SeethecriticismofBenvenisti,‘MarginofAppreciation,Consensus,andUniversalStandards’
(1999)31InternationalLawandPolitics843at852:‘Byresortingtothisdevice,thecourtes-
chewsresponsibilityforitsdecisions.Butthecourtalsorelinquishesitsdutytosetuniversal
standardsfromitsuniquepositionasacollectivesupranationalvoiceofreasonandmorality.’