On the Difficulties in the Church Fathers: The Ambigua

388 Pages·2014·8.54 MB·English

by  Maximus the Confessor, Nicholas Constas (ed.)

T he A m b i g u a
Maximos the Confessor
-Du m b a r t o n oa ks
M e d i e v a l o^i_b r a r y
Jan M. Ziolkowski, General Editor
Ο Ν D I F F I C U L T I E S I N T H E
C H U R C H F A T H E R S
V O L U M E I I
Μ A I M O S T H E C O N F E S S O R
DO ML 29
On Difficulties in
the Church Fathers
T h e A m b i g u a
V O L U M E I I
M a x i m o s t h e C o n f e s s o r
Edited and Translated by
N I C H O L A S C O N S T A S
^Du m b a r t o n o a k s
M e d i e v a l ^ i_b r a r y
H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s
C A M B R I D G E , M A S S A C H U S E T T S
L O N D O N , E N G L A N D
2 0 1 4
Copyright © 2014 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
A L L R I G H T S R E S E R V E D
Printed in the United States o fA merica
Library o fC ongress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Maximus, Confessor, Saint, approximately 580-662.
{Works. Selections]
On difficulties in the church fathers: The ambigua / Maximos the
Confessor; edited and translated by Nicholas Constas.
pages cm.—(DOM L; 28-29)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-674-72666-6 (vol. 1, doml 28 : alk. paper)
ISBN 978-0-674-73083-0 (vol. 2, doml 29: alk. paper)
1 .Theology; Doctrinal—Byzantine Empire. 2. Theology, Doctrinal-
History—Early church, ca. 30-600.3. Pseudo-Dionysius, theAxeopagite.
4. Gregory; of Nazianzus, Saint. I. Constas, Nicholas. II . Maximus,
Confessor, Saint, approximately 580-662. Works. Selections. English.
2014. III . Maximus, Confessor, Saint, approximately 580-662. Ambigua
ad Iohannem. IV. Maximus, Confessor, Saint, approximately 580-662.
Ambigua ad Iohannem. English. V. Maximus, Confessor, Saint,
approximately 580-662. Philosophika kai theologika erotemata. V I.
Maximus, Confessor, Saint, approximately 580-662. Philosophika kai
theologika erotemata. English. V II. Title.
BR65.M412E5 2014
230'.14—dc23 2013022234
Contents
A m b i g u a t o J o h n , 2 3 - 7 1 1
Abbreviations 333
Note on the Text 337
Notes to the Text 343
Notes to the Translation 333
Bibliography 373
Index 383
A M B I G U A T O J O H N
Ambiguum 23
έ
Λ- j κ τού περί Τίοΰ πρώτου λόγου, εις τό·
Δια τοΰτο μονός άπ’ αρχής εις δυάδα κινηθεϊσα
μέχρι Τριάδος έστη.
2 Π αν κατά φύσιν κινούμενον δι’ αιτίαν πάντως κινείται,
και παν τό δι' αιτίαν κινούμενον δι’ αιτίαν πάντως και
έστι, πάν δέ τό δι’ αιτίαν 6ν καί Si’ αιτίαν κινούμενον
αρχήν μέν είχε πάντως τού είναι την δι’ ήν έστι καί έξ ής
προς τό είναι ήρχθη: αιτίαν, τέλος δέ τού κινείσθαι την
αύτήν δι’ ήν κινείται καί προς ήν επείγεται αιτίαν. Πάν δέ
τό δι’ αιτίαν καί δν καί κινούμενον καί γενητόν πάντως·
εί δέ τού κινουμένου τέλος έστΐν ή δι’ ήν κινείται αιτία, ή
αύτή πάντως έστι τη δι’ ήν γεγένηται καί έστιν αίτίςι. Μία
ούν άρα παντός2 τού όπωσοΰν δντος καί κινουμένου κατά
φύσιν, ώς άρχή καί τέλος, αιτία δι’ ήν καί έστι καί κινείται
πάν τό δν καί κινούμενον. Δραστήριος γάρ ύπάρχουσα
δύναμις καί ποιεί τά γινόμενα θεοπρεπώς, ώς άρχή, καί
2
Ambiguum 23
F rom Saint Gregory’s First Oration On the Son:
For this reason the Monad from the beginning moved
toward a dyad and at the Trinity came to a halt.1
Everything which is moved according to nature is nec- 2
essarily moved in consequence of a cause, and everything
moved in consequence of a cause necessarily also exists in
consequence of a cause; and everything that exists and is
moved in consequence of a cause necessarily has as the be­
ginning o f its being [1257D] the cause in consequence o f
which it exists and from which it was initially brought into
being; likewise, the end of its being moved is the same cause
in consequence o f which it is moved and toward which it
hastens. Now everything which exists and is moved in con­
sequence o f a cause is necessarily also created, and if the end
of whatever is moved is the cause in consequence o f w'hich it
is in motion, this cause is necessarily the same cause in con­
sequence of which it wTas created and exists. From this it fol­
lows that the cause of whatever exists and is moved, in any
way at all according to nature, is one single cause encom­
passing both the beginning and the end, to which every­
thing that exists and is moved owes its existence and mo­
tion.2 For it is an actively efficacious power, [1260A} and in a
divinely fitting manner it both creates (insofar as it is the
3
A M B I G U A T O J O H N
προβάλλεται, και έλκει τά κινούμενα προνοητικώς, ώς
τέλος, κα'ι ορίζει. Ε ΐ δέ παν κινούμενον, δν3 καί γενητόν,
δι’ αιτίαν έστι τε κα'ι κινείται καί γεγένηται, πάν δ μή δι’
αιτίαν έστίν ουδέ ποιητόν έστιν, ουδέ κινητόν δηλονότι.
Οΰ γάρ κινείται τό παντάπασι μή έχον τοΰ είναι αιτίαν. Εί
δέ τό άναίτιον πάντως και ακίνητον, ακίνητον άρα τό
θειον, ώς τοϋ είναι μηδεμίαν έχον αιτίαν, και πάντων τών
δντων ύπαρχον αιτία.
3 Πώς ούν, ΐσως έρείτις, ό θαυμαστός ούτος διδάσκαλος
κινούμενον εισάγει τό θειον έν τοΐς προτεθεΐσί; Πρός δν
έροΰμεν δτι παντός μάλλον ήδει τό θειον άκίνητον ό δι­
δάσκαλος, άλλ’ ώσπερ ό κατ’ επιστήμην4 έκάστης τέχνης
συνεκτικός λόγος, ακίνητος μενών παντάπασιν έφ’ έαυτόν,
ϊνα παραδείγματι χρήσωμαι, καθ’ έκαστον είδος τών ύπό
τήν αύτήν τέχνην μορφούμενος, κινεϊσθαι λέγεται τώ κι-
νείν μάλλον καθ’ έαυτόν τό τεχνούμενον ή τώ κινεϊσθαι
προφαινόμένος- ή, ώς φώς πρός τό όράν τήν δψιν κινούν
λέγεται κινεϊσθαι, κινητικόν ύπάρχον πάσης όψεως κυρίως
ήπερ κινητόν, οΰτω καί τό θειον άκίνητον πάντη κατ’
ούσίαν καί φύσιν ύπάρχον, ώς άπειρον καί άσχετον καί
άόριστον, οίονεί τις επιστημονικός λόγος ένυπάρχων ταΐς
τών δντων ούσίαις λέγεται κινεϊσθαι, τώ κινεΐν προνοη­
τικώς έκαστον τών δντων καθ’ δν κινεϊσθαι πέφυκε λόγον,
4
A M B I G U U M 2 3
beginning) the things that exist and sends them forth, and
(insofar as it is the end) providentially draws the things tkat
are in motion back to the limit that it has established for
them. Now if every being which is moved (which also means
that it has been created)3 exists and is in motion and has
been created in consequence o f a cause, then whatever does
not exist in consequence o f a cause is obviously neither cre­
ated nor moved. For that which does not have a cause ofbe-
ing is not moved at all. If, then, the uncaused is necessarily
also unmoved, it follows that the Divine is unmoved, insofar
as it does not owe its being to a cause, being itself the cause
of all beings.
How, then, someone perhaps might ask, does this mar- 3
velous teacher, in the passage cited above, introduce a Di­
vinity in motion? To this we respond that the teacher knew
far better than anyone else that the Divine is unmoved, but
just as the scientific principle constitutive of every art or
skill, while remaining completely unmoved in itself—if I
may avail myself of an example—is said to be moved as it
receives form [1260B] with respect to each type of art or
skill that is subject to it, it is rather the case that it moves
the artifact by its own force, and not that it itself is mani­
festly subject to motion. Or, one might say that because
light stirs the power of sight to see, it too must be subject to
motion, yet properly speaking it is not moved but rather
moves all sight and vision. In the same way, the Divine by
essence and nature is completely unmoved, insofar as it is
boundless, unconditioned, and infinite, but not unlike a sci­
entific principle that exists within the substances of beings,
it is said to be moved, since it providentially moves each and
every being (in accordance with the principle by which each
5