On Revolution

175 Pages·1982·25.28 MB·English

by  Hanna Arendt

HANNAH ARENDT
On Revolution
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FirstpublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericaby
TheVikingPress1963
FirstpublishedinGreatBritainbyFaber&Faber1964
VikingCompassEdition,containingminorbut
importantchangesandadditionsmadebytheauthor
bothinthetextandinthedocumentation,published1965
PublishedinPelicanBooksinGreatBritain1973
PublishedinPelicanBooksintheUnitedStatesofAmerica1977
ReprintedinPenguinBooksin1990
17
Copyright©HannahArendt,1963,1965
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Contents
INTRODUCTION:
WarandRevolution II
I. TheMeaningofRevolution 21
2. TheSocialQuestion 59
3. ThePursuitofHappiness 115
4. FoundationI: ConstitutioLibertatis 141
5. FoundationII: NovusOrdoSaec10rum 179
6. TheRevolutionaryTraditionandItsLost
Treasure 215
283
NOTES
BIBLIOGRAPHY 331
. INDEX 341
Acknowledgements
THE topic of this book was suggested to me by a
seminar on 'The United States and the Revolutionary
Spirit', held at Princeton University in the spring of
1959 under the auspices of the Special Program in
American Civilization. For the completionof the work
I am indebtedto a grantfrom the RockefellerFounda
tion in 1960and to my stayas Fellowofthe Centerfor
AdvancedStudiesat Wesleyan Universityin the fall of
1961•
HANNAH ARENDT
INTRODUCTION
~r and Revolution
WAilS and revolutions - as though events had only hurried up
to fulfil Lenin's early prediction - have thus far determined
the physiognomyofthe twentieth century. Andas distinguished
from the nineteenth-century ideologies - such as nationalism
and internationalism, capitalism and imperialism, socialism and
communism, which, though still invoked by many as justifying
causes, have lost contact with the major realities ofour world
warandrevolution stillconstituteits two central politicalissues.
They have outlived all their ideological justifications. In a con
stellation that poses the threatof total annihilation through war
against the hope for the emancipation of all mankind through
revolution-leadingonepeopleaftertheotherinswiftsuccession
'to assume among the powers of the earth the separate and
equal station to which the Laws ofNature andof Nature's God
entitlethem' - no cause is left but the most ancient of all, the
one, in fact, that from the beginning of our history has deter-.
mined the very existenceofpolitics, thecause offreedom versus
tyranny.
Thisinitselfissurprisingenough.Undertheconcertedassault
of the modern debunking 'sciences', psychology and sociology,
nothing indeed has seemed to be more safely buried than the
concept of freedom. Even the revolutionists, 'fhom one might
have assumed,to be safely and even inexorably anchored in a
traditionthatcouldhardlybetold,letalonemadesenseof, with
out thenotion offreedom, would much rather degrade freedom
to the rank of a lower-middle-class prejudice than admit that
theaimofrevolution was, andalways has been, freedom. Yet if
it was amazing to see how the very word freedom could dis
appear from the revolutionary vocabulary, it has perhaps been
12 On Revol~tion War and Revolution
no less astounding to watch how in recent years the idea of aggressive and defensive warfare. 'The war that is necessary is
freedom has intruded itself into the centre of the gravest of all just,' said Livy, 'and hallowed are the arms where no hope
presentpoliticaldebates,thediscussionofwarandofa justifiable exists but in them.' ('Iustum enim est bellum quibus neces~
use of violence. Historically, wars are among the oldest pheno~ sarium, et pia arma ubi nulla nisi in armis spes est:) Necessity,
mena of the recorded past while revolutions, properly.speaking, since the time of Livy and through the centuries, has meant
did not exist prior to the modern age; they are among the 'many things that we today would find quite sufficient to dub a
most recent ofall major politicaldata. In contrast to revolution, war unjust rather than just. Conquest, expansion, defence of
the aim ofwar was only inrare cases bound up with the notion vested interests, conservation ofpower in viewofthe riseofnew
offreedom; and while it is true that warlike uprisings against a andthreateningpowers,orsupportofagiven powerequilibrium
foreign invaderhave frequently been felt to be sacred, they'have - all these well-kown realities of power politics were not only
never been recognized, either in theory or in practice, as the actually the causes of the outbreak ofmost wars inhistory, they
onlyjustwars. werealsorecognizedas'necessities', thatis,aslegitimatemotives
Justifications of wars, even on a theoretical level, are quite
to invoke a decision by arms. The notion that aggression is a
old,although,ofcourse,notasoldasorganizedwarfare.Among crimeand that warscanbejustifiedonly ifthey wardoffaggres
their obvious prerequisites is the conviction that political
sion or prevent it acquired its practical and even theoretical
relations in their normal course do not fall under the sway of
significance only after the First World War had demonstrated
violence, and this conviction we find for thefirst time in Greek
the horribly destructive potentialof warfare under conditionsof
antiquity,insofarastheGreekpolis,thecity-state,defineditself
moderntechnology.
explicitly as a way of life that was basedexclusively upon per·
Perhaps it is because of this noticeable absence ofthe freedom
suasion and not upon violence. (That these were no empty
argument from the traditional justifications of war as the last
words, spoken in self-deception, is shown, among other things,
resortofinternational politicsthat we have thiscuriously jarring
by the Athenian custom of 'persuading' those who had been
sentimentwhenever we hearitintroduced into the debateofthe
condemnedtodeath to commitsuicideby drinking the hemlock
warquestiontoday.Tosoundoffwithacheerful'givemeliberty
cup, thus sparing the Athenian citizen under all circumstances
or give me death' sort of argument in the face of the unprece
the indignity of physical violation.) However, since for the
dented and inconceivable potential of destruction in nuclear
Greeks political life by definition did not extend beyond the
warfare is not even hollow; it is downright ridiculous. Indeed it
wallsofthe polis, theuseofviolenceseemedto them beyondthe
seems so obvious that it is a very'different thing to risk one's
need for justification in the realm ofwhat we today call foreign
own life for the life and freedom of one's country and one's
affairsorinternationalrelations,eventhoughtheirforeignaffairs,
posterity from risking the very existence of the human species
with theoneexceptionofthePersianwars, which sawallHellas
for the same purpose that it is difficult not to suspect the
united, concerned hardly more than relations between Greek
defenders of the 'better dead than red' or 'better death than
cities. Outsidethe wallsofthe polis,thatis,outsidetherealmof
slavery' slogans of bad faith. Which of course is not to s~y the
politicsintheGreeksenseoftheword, 'thestrongdidwhatthey
reverse, 'betterred thandead',hasanymore torecommendItself;
could,andtheweaksufferedwhattheymust'(Thucydides).
whenanold truthceasestobeapplicable, itdoes notbecomeany
Hence we must turn to Roman antiquity to find the first
truerbybeingstoodonitshead. Asamatteroffact, to theextent
justification of war, together with the first notion that there are
that the discussion of the war ques~ion today is conducted in
just and unjust wars. Yet the Roman distinctions and justifica·
theseterms, itiseasytodetectamentalreservationonbothsides.
tionswerenotconcernedwithfreedomanddrewnolinebetween
Those who say 'betterdead than red' actually think: The losses
14 On Revol.ution War and Revolution
may not be as great as some anticipate, our civilization will military and the civilian branches of government rests: it is the
survive; while those who say 'better red than dead' actually function of the army to protect and to defend the civilian
think: Slavery will not be so bad, man will not change his population. In contrast, the history of warfare in our century
nature, freedom will not vanish from theearth forever. Inother couldalmostbetoldasthestoryofthe growingincapacityofthe
words, thebadfaith ofthediscussantsliesinthatbothdodgethe army to fulfil this basic function, until today the strategy of
preposterousalternative they themselves have proposed; theyare deterrencehasopenlychangedthe roleofthe military from that
notserious.1 ofprotectorintothatofabelatedandessentiallyfutileavenger.
It is important to remember that the idea of freedom was Closely connected with this perversion in the relationship
introduced into the· debate of the war question after it had between state and army is second the little-noticed but quite
become quite obvious that we had reached a stage of technical noteworthy fact that since the end of the First World War we
development where the meansofdestruction were suchas toex.. almost automaticallyexpect that no government, andno stateor
clude theirrationaluse. Inotherwords, freedomhasappearedin form of government, will be strong enough to survive a defeat
this debate like a deus ex machina to jU:~tify what on rational in war. This development could be traced back into the nine
groundshas becomeunjustifiable. Isittoomuch toreadintothe teenth century when the Franco-Prussian War was followed by
current rather hopeless confusion of issues and arguments a the change from the Second Empire to the Third Republic of
hopeful indication that a profound change in international rela France; and the Russian Revolution of 1905, following upon
tions may be about to occur, namely, the disappearance of war defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, certainly was an ominous
from the scene of politics even without a radical transformation sign of what lay in store for governments in case of a military
of international relations and without an inner change ofmen's defeat. However that may be, a revolutionary change in govern
hearts and minds? Could itnot be thatourpresentperplexityin ment,eitherbroughtaboutbythe peoplethemselves,asafter the
thismatterindicatesourlackofpreparednessforadisappearance FirstWorld War, orenforced from theoutside by the victorious
ofwar, our inability to think in terms offoreign policy without powers with the demand of unconditional surrender and the
having in mind this 'continuation with other means' as its last establishment of.war trials, belongs today among the most cer
resort? tain consequences of defeat in war - short, of course~ of total
Quite apart from the threat of total annihilation, which con.. annihilation. Inourcontextitis immaterialwhetherthis stateof
ceivably could be eliminated by new technical discoveries such affairs is due to a decisive weakeningof government as such, to
asa 'clean' bombor an anti-missilemissile, thereareafew signs a lossofauthority in the powersthatbe, orwhethernostateand
pointing in this direction.There is first thefact that theseedsof no government, no matter how well established and trusted by
total war developed as early as the First World War, when the its citizens, could withstand the unparalleled terror of violence
distinctionbetweensoldiersandcivilianswasnolongerrespected unleashed by modern warfare upon the whole population. The
because itwas inconsistent with the new weapons then used.To truth is that even prior to the horror of nuclear warfare, wars
be sure, this distinction itself had been a relatively modern had become politically, though not yet biologically, a matter of
achievement, and its practical abolition meant no more than the life and death. And this means that underconditionsofmodern
reversion of warfare to the days when the Romans wiped warfare, that is since the First World War, all.governments
Carthage off the face oftheearth. Undermodern circumstances, havelivedonborrowedtime.
howev~r, thisappearanceorreappearanceoftotalwarhasa very The third fact seems to indicate a radical change in the very
important political significance in so far as it contradicts the nature of war through the introduction of the·deterrent as the
basic assumptions upon· which the relationship between the guiding principle in the armament race. For it is indeed true
16 On Revolution War and Revolution 17
that the strategy of deterrence 'aims in effect at avoiding rather scientiststoforce theirgovernmentintounconditionalsurrender,
than winning the war it pretends to be preparing. It tends to for such a demonstration to those who knew would have con
achieve its goal by a menace which is never put into execution, stitutedcompellingevidenceofan absolutesuperiority which no .
rather than by the act itself.'2 To be sure, the insight that peace changing luckoranyotherfactor couldhope to alter. Seventeen
is theendofwar, and that thereforea war is the preparation for years after Hiroshima, our technical mastery of the means of
peace, isatleastasoldasAristotle,and thepretencethat theaim destruction is fast approachingthe pointwhere all non-technical
of an armament race is to safeguard the peace is even older, factors in warfare, such as troop morale, strategy, general com-
namely as old as the discovery of propaganda lies. But the point .petence, and even sheer chance, are completely eliminated so
of the matter is that today the avoidance of war is not Qnly the that results can be calculated with perfect precision in advance.
true or pretended goal of an over-all policy but has become the Once this point is reached, the results ofmere tests and demon
guiding principle of the military preparations themselves. In strationscouldbeasconclusiveevidencetotheexpertsforvictory
other words, the military are no longer preparing for a war or defeat as the battlefield, the conquest of territory, the break
which the statesmen hope will never break out; their own goal down of communications, et cetera have formerly been to the
hasbecometodevelopweaponsthatwillmakewarimpossible. militaryexpertsoneitherside.
Moreover, it is quite in linewith these, as it were, paradoxical There is finally, and-in ourcontextmostimportantly, the fact
efforts that a possible serious substitutionof 'cold' warsfor 'hot' . that the interrelationship of war and revolution, their recipro
wars becomes clearly perceptible at the horizon of international cation and mutual dependence, has steadilygrown, and that the
politics. I do not wish to deny that the present and, let us hope, emphasis in the relationship has shifted more and more from
temporary resumption of atomiC tests by the big powers aims warto revolution. To be sure, the interrelatedness of wars and
primarily at new technical developments and discoveries; but it revolutionsas such isnota novelphenomenon; itisasoldasthe
seems to me undeniable that these tests, unlike those that pre revolutions themselves, which either were preceded and accom
ceded them, are also instruments of policy, and as such they panied by a war of liberation like the American Revolution, or
have the ominous aspect of a new kind of manoeuvre in peace led into wars of defence and aggression like the French Revolu
time, involving in their exercise not the make-believe pair of tion. Butinourowncentury therehasarisen,inadditiontosuch
enemies of ordinary troop manoeuvres but the pair who, poten 'instances, an altogether different type of event in which it is as
tially at least, are the real enemies. It is as though the nuclear
though even the fury of war was merely the prelude, a prepara
armament race has turned into some sortof tentative warfare in
tory stage to the violence unleashed by revolution (such clearly
which the opponents demonstrate to each other the destructive
was Pasternak's understanding of war and revolution in Russia
ness of the weapons in their possession; and while it is always
in Doctor Zhivago), or where, on the contrary, a world war
possible that this deady game of ifs and whens may suddenly
appears like the consequences of revolution, a kind ofcivil war
turn into the real thing, itisbyno means inconceivablethatone
raging allover the earth as even the Second World War was
day victory and defeat may end a war that never exploded into
consideredbya sizeable portionofpublicopinionand withcon
reality.
siderablejustification.Twentyyearslater, ithasbecom.ealmosta
Is this sheer fantasy? I think not. Potentially, at least, we
matter of course that the end of war is revolution, and that the
were confronted with this kind ofhypothetical warfare the very
only cause which possibly could justify it is the revolutionary
moment the atom bomb made its first appearance. Many people
cause of freedom. Hence, whatever the outcome of our present
then thought, and still think, it wouldhavebeen quite sufficient
predicaments may be, if we don't perish altogether, it seems
to demonstrate the new weapon to a selectgroup ofJapanese
more than likely that revolution, in distinction to war, will stay
18 Oil Revolution War and Revolution 19
with us into the foreseeable future, Even ifwe should succeed in because of this silence that violence is a marginal phenomenon
changing the physiognomy of this century to the point where it in the political realm; for man, to the extent that he is a
would no longer be a century of wars, it most certainly will political being, is endowed with the power of speech. The two
remain a century of revolutions. In the contest that divides the famous definitions of man by Aristotle, that he is a political
world today and in which so much is at.stake, those will prob being and a being endowed with speech, supplement each other
ably win who understand revolution, while those who still put and both refer to the same experience in Gr.eek polis life. The
their faith in power politics in the traditional sense of the term point here is that violence itself is incapable of speech, and not
and, therefore, in waras the last resort ofall foreign poliG:Ymay merely that speech is helpless when t.:onfronted with violence.
well discover in a not too distant future that they have become Because of this sperchlessness political theory has little to say
masters in a rather useless and obsolete trade. And such under about the phenomenon of violence and mustleave its discussion
standing of revolution can be neither countered nor replaced to the technicians. For political thought can only follow the
with an expertness in counter~revolution; for counter-revolution articulations of the political phenomena themselves, it remains
- the wordhavingbeencoinedbyCondorcet inthecourseofthe bound to what appears in the domain of human affairs; and
French Revolution - has always remained bound to revolution these appearances, in contradistinction to physical matters, need
as reaction is bound to action. De Maistre's famous statement: speech and articulation, that is, 'something which transcends
'Lacontrerevolution ne serapointune revolutioncontraire, mais mere physical visibility as well as sheeraudibility, inorder to be
Ie contraire de la revolution' ('The counter-revolution will not manifest at all. A theory ofwar ora theory ofrevolution, there
be a revolution in reverse but the opposite of revolution') has fore, can only deal with the justification ofviolence because this
remained '.vhat it was when he pronounced it in 1796, anempty justification constitutes its political limitation; if, instead, it
witticism.3 arrives at a glorification or justification of violence as such, it is
Yet, how~ver needful it may be to distinguish in theory and nolonger_politicalbutantipolitical.
practice between war and revolution despite their close interre In so far as violence plays a predominant role in wars and
latedness, wemustnotfail tonote thatthemerefact.thatrevolu revolutions, both occuroutside the politicalrealm, strictly speak
tions and wars are not even conceivable outside the domain of ing, inspiteoftheirenormousroleinrecordedhistory.Thisfact
violence isenough to setthemboth apartfrom allotherpolitical led the seventeenthcentury, which had itsshareofexperience in
phenomena. Itwould be difficult to deny thatoneofthe reasons wars and revolutions, to the assumption of a prepolitical state,
whywarshave turned soeasily intorevolutionsand whyrevolu called 'state of nature' which,.of course, never was meant to be
tions have shown this ominous inclination to unleash wars is taken as a historical fact. Its relevance even today lies in 'the
that violence is a kind of common denominator for both. The recognition that a political realm does not automatically come
magnitude of the violence let loose in the First WorId War intobeingwherevermenlivetogether, andtha~thereexistevents
might indeed have been enough to cause revolutions in its after which, though theymay occur in a strictly historicalcontext, are
math even,without any revolutionary tra~ition and even if no not really politicaland perhapsnoteven connectedwith politics.
revolutionhadeveroccurredbefore. The notion of a state of nature alludes at least to a reality that
Tobe sure, not even wars, letalone revolutions, areevercom cannot be comprehended by the nineteenth~century idea of
pletely determined by violence. \Vhere violencerules absolutely, development, nomatterhow we mayconceiveofit-whetherin
asfor instanceintheconcentrationcampsoftotalitarianregimes; the form of cause and effect, or of potentiality and actuality, or
not only the laws- les lois se taisent, as the French Revolution of a dialectical movement, or even of simple coherence and
phrased it- but everything and everybody must fall silent. It is sequence in occurrences. For the hypothesis of a state of nature
20 On RevQlution
implies theexistenceofabeginningthatisseparatedfromevery
thingfollowingitasthoughbyanunbridgeablechasm.
Therelevanceoftheproblemofbeginningtothe phenomenon CHAPTER ONE
of revolution is obvious. That such a beginning must be inti
of
mately connected with violence seems to be vouched for by the The Meaning Revolution
legendarybeginningsofourhistory as'both biblicaland classical
antiquity report it: Cain slew Abel, and Romulus slew Remus;
violence was the beginning and, by the same token, no begin~
1
ning could be made without using violence, without violating.
Thefirstrecordeddeedsinourbiblicalandourseculartradition, WEare not concerned here with the war question. The meta
whether known to be legendary or believed in as historical fact, phor I mentioned, and the theory of a state of nature which
havetravelledthroughthecenturieswiththeforcewhichhuman spelled and spun out this metaphor theoretically - though they
thought achieves in the rare instances when it produces cogent have often served to justify war and its violenceon the grounds
metaphorsoruniversallyapplicabletales.Thetalespokeclearly: o~anoriginalevilinherentinhumanaffairsandmanifestin the
whatever brotherhood human beings may be capable of has criminal beginning ofhuman histQry - are ofeven greater rele
gr0"Y~_?'!-t_~!_!!"atri~ide,whateverEoliticalo~ganization menmay vance to the problem of revolution, because revolutions are the
~~~~n~cp.i~Y~4_~~~.Jts origin in crime. The conviction, in the only political events which confront us directly and inevitably
beginning was a crime-='-for which the phrase 'state of nature' with the problem of beginning. For revolutions, however we
is only a theoretically purified paraphrase- has carried through may be tempted to define them, are not mere changes. Modern
the centuries no less self-evident plausibility for the state of revolutions 'have little in common with the mutatio rerum of
human affairs than the first sentenc.e of St John, 'In the begin Romanhistoryorthe crtacrl~Jthecivilstrifewhich disturbed the
ningwastheWord',haspossessedfortheaffairsofsalvation. Greek polis. We cannot equate them with Plato's 1l8taaOAa{
thequasi-naturaltransformationofoneformofg<D'ernmentinto
another,orwithPolybius's7tOAltdcovciva1C61CACO(n~~ theappointed
recurringcycleintowhich humanaffairsareboundbyreasonof
their always being driven to extremes.1 Antiquity was well
acquaintedwith politcalchangeandtheviolence thatwentwith
change,butneitherofthem appeared to itto bringabout some
thing altogether new. Changes did not interrupt the course of
whatthemodernagehascalledhistory,which,farfromstarting
with a new beginning, was seen as falling back into a different
stageofitscycle, prescribingacoursewhichwas preordainedby
the very natureofhuman affairsand which therefore itselfwas
unchangeable.
There is, however, another aspect to modern revolutions for
which itmay be'more promisingto find precedents prior to the
modern age. Who could deny the enormous role the social
questionhascome to playinallrevolutions, and whocould £ail
~poli!E:.;o"
O1lV"k yk.tO,$/2 I