On Proclus and his influence in medieval philosophy

216 Pages·1992·5.318 MB·English

by  Bos, Egbert P., Meijer, P. A.

ON PROCLUS AND
HIS INFLUENCE
IN MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY
PHILOSOPHIA ANTIQUA
A SERIES OF STUDIES
ON ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY
EDITED BY
JJ. MANSFELD, D.T. RUNIA
WJ. VERDENIUS ANDj.C.M. VAN WINDEN
VOLUME LIII
ON PROCLUS AND
HIS INFLUENCE
IN MEDlEYA L PHILOSOPHY
EDITED BY
E.P. BOS AND P.A. MEIJER
ON PROCLUS
AND HIS INFLUENCE
IN MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY
EDITED BY
E.P. BOS AND P.A. MEIJER
EJ. BRILL
LEIDEN • NEW YORK • KOLN
1992
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ISSN 0079-1687
ISBN 90 04 09429 6
© Copyright 1992 by E.]. Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands
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PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS
CONTENTS
vn
Preface
PART ONE
ONPROCLUS
Causation and Participation in Proclus. The Pivotal Role of "Scope
Distinction" in His Metaphysics.................................................................. 1
L.M.DERUK
Accorder entre elles les traditions theologiques: une characreristique
du Neoplatonisme Athenien......................................................................... 35
H.D. SAFFREY
Le Sophiste comme texte theologique dans !'interpretation de Proclus....... 51
C. STEEL
Participation and Henads and Monads in the 'Theologia
Platonica" III, 1 -6. .. . .. .. ... .... ... .. . .. ..... .... ... .. ... .. ... .... ... .. ... .... ... .... ... .... ... ... ...... 65
P.A. MEDER
PART TWO
ON PROCLUS' INFLUENCE IN MEDlEY AL PHILOSOPHY
a
Albert le Grand et le platonisme. de Ia doctrine des idees Ia theorie des
trois etats de I 'universe!............................................................................... 89
A. DE LIBERA
Ontology and henology in Medieval Philosophy (Thomas Aquinas,
Master Eckhart and Berthold of Moosburg)................................................ 120
J.A. AERTSEN
Primum est dives per se. Meister Eckhart und der Liber de Causis............. 141
W. BEIERWALTES
William of Ockham' s Interpretation of the first proposition of the
Liber de causis ............................................................................................. 171
E.P. Bos
VI CONTENTS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Sources...................................................................................................... 190
I.
IT. Literature................................................................................................. 194
INDEX ......................................................................................................... 200
PREFACE
On 7 and 8 september 1989 a symposium was held at the University of Leiden
to celebrate Professor L.M de Rijk' s 65th birthday. The title of this symposium
was On Proclus' thought and its Reception in the Middle Ages. In the present
volume the proceedings are published.
The contributions are divided in two parts. The first part is about Proclus'
thought, the second about its reception in the Middle Ages. In each part the
texts are ordered according to the chronological order of the subjects they deal
with.
The editors wish to thank E.J. Brill of Leiden for publishing this book in the
series Philosophia Antiqua.

L.M.DERUK
CAUSATION AND PARTICIPATION IN PROCLUS
TilE PIVOTAL ROLE OF SCOPE DISTINCTION IN HIS METAPHYSICS
1 Status quaestionis
Quite a lot has been written about what are taken to be inconsistencies in
Proclus' doctrines and arguments, and they have provoked quite a lot of irrita-
tion among modem scholars.' Proposition 98 of the Elementatio is surely not
the most appropriate evidence to free our author from such charges. It is the
proposition in which the author supposedly2 outlines his solution3 to the intri-
cate problem of transcendence vs immanence of the Platonic Forms: "Every
cause which is separated <from its effects> is at once everywhere and
nowhere." Reading such statements might easily lead you to the middle of
nowhere.
Quite understandably, at first glance at least, Dodds claims4 that Proclus
lays himself open to charges of inconsistency: the One, Proclus asserts, is
unshareable (aJ.L£9H'tov), yet we are told at the very beginning of the
Elementatio that "every manifold in some way partakes of the One". For a
reply Dodds refers5 to Proclus' exposition of prop. 56, from which Dodds
seems to gather that what is proprie aJ.L£9eK'tov 6 is nevertheless indirectly
J.L£9e1C'tov through the J.LE't£"X.OJ.Leva it generates. Most unfortunately Dodds joins
(ibid.) Emile Brehier7 in suggesting that "the ciJ.LffielC'tov is the intension of the
concept (sic!, see n. 5), the J.LE'ttxov'ta are its extension, and the J.LE't£"X.OJ.Leva are
that which links intension with extension". Rosan is quite right in rejecting8
such a comparison. For one thing, it would seem that the notion of intension
should be associated with the JlE't£"X.OJlevov rather than the aJ.L£9elC'tov (as Rosan
1 Our colleague Dr. Piet Meijer has already drawn our attention to charges of the kind
in E.R. Dodds, Proc/us. The Elements of Theology. A Revised Text with Translation,
Introduction and Commentary, Oxford 2. 211, A.J. Festugiere, Commentaire sur le Timie de
Proclus. Trad. et notes, Paris 1966 - 1968, II, 52 and K. Kremer, Die neuplatonische
Seinsfhilosophie und ihre Wirkung auf Thomas von Aquin,L eiden 1971, 212 ff.
See Dodds, Proclus. The Elements of Theology, 211.
3 For its historical background, see Dodds, Proclus. The Elements of Theology, 251 ff.;
cf. 211.
4 Dodds, Proclus. The Elements of Theology, 211; cf. below, P.A. Meijer, 'Participation
in Henads and Monads in Proclus Theologia Platonica III, chs. 1-6', 81 ff.
5 Dodds, ibid.
6 Dodds has "a term which is proprie cilli9enov" as he is in a constant habit of talking
about terms where nothing of the kind is found in Proclus. Our author definitely does not
substitute logical for metaphysical labels. See for the use of "prop." and "cor." note 40.
7 E. Brehier, Histoire de Ia philosophie, I, 477.
8 L.J. Rosan, The Philosophy of Proc/us. The Final Phase of Ancient Thought, New
York 1949,89, n. 80.
2 L.M.DERUK
remarks), for another it might reasonably be asked what on earth, from the
logical point of view, should be understood by "that which links intension with
extension".
The present paper aims to investigate in some more detail the transcend-
ence-immanence antinomy. First an outline of its historical background will be
presented from Plato onward through Plotinus and Jamblichus up to Proclus.
Next I shall discuss Proclus' doctrine on these matters in the larger perspective
of his philosophy, and focus on the intriguing notion of O.l!ffieK'tov. Finally a few
remarks will be added on the important role of what we might call "scope
distinction" in Proclus' doctrines and dialectical arguments.
2 Causation and Participation in Plato
Guthrie's likening9 of the causal function of Plato's transcendent Forms to
Aristotle's Unmoved Mover can definitely find some support in Plato's works.
Indeed, "of all the expressions with which Plato tried to convey the relationship
between Forms and particulars, that of pattern and copy does seem to go
nearest the root of the matter."IO To Plato, the Forms really combine the
formal, efficient and final causes in one, a conception of "cause" which was to
become typical of all Platonism since then. It will suffice on this score to recall
the important Neoplatonic doctrine of Reversion (tlttcr'tpo<p{]), which is what the
product of an efficient cause obtains in returning to its cause which acts, then,
as a goal, really desired by its effect.
In Plato's Phaedo this is, of course, not so clearly profiled as it is in later
Platonism. However, the procedure is quite similar: physical things are not only
said to partake of ·Forms and possess the latters' copies as "present in"
themselves, but also to emulate the state of perfection characteristic of the
Forms, albeit, of course, with a limited amount of success.
In this picture, the mutual relationship between the transcendent Forms and
their instances or particulars occurring in the physical world can most aptly be
described in terms of a continuous tension between causation from above and
participation from below, indeed a tension which, especially in Neoplatonism,
was considered the main concomitant of the ontological process.
As is well-known to every student of Plato, the notion of participation had
met severe criticism from the old master Parmenides in Plato's dialogue of this
name, and thus gave rise to a basic metaphysical problem (Parm. 130 e- 135
b): if participation is to be really active, the Form must be present in particulars
and therefore split up; but if participation is to be ontologically effective and
founded on a firm basis, the Forms must be transcendent.
9 W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy. V: The Later Plato and the Academy,
Cambridge etc. 1978, 146.
10 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy V, 146.