On Behalf of Controversial View Agnosticism PDF
Preview On Behalf of Controversial View Agnosticism
ForthcomingintheEuropeanJournalofPhilosophy On Behalf of Controversial View Agnosticism J. Adam Carter University of Glasgow Controversialviewagnosticism(CVA)isthethesisthatwearerationallyobligatedtowithhold judgmentaboutalargeportionofourbeliefsincontroversialsubjectareas,suchasphilosophy,re- ligion,moralityandpolitics. Giventhatone’ssocialidentityisinnosmallpartafunctionofone’s positivecommitmentsincontroversialareas,CVAhasunsurprisinglybeenregardedasobjection- ably‘spineless.’Thatsaid,CVAseemslikeanunavoidableconsequenceofaprominentviewinthe epistemologyofdisagreement—conformism—accordingtowhichtherationalresponsetodiscover- ingthatsomeoneyouidentifyasanepistemicpeerorexpertaboutpdisagreeswithyouvis-à-vis pistowithholdjudgment. Thispaperproposesanovelwaytomaintainthecoreconciliatoryin- sightwithoutdevolvingintoanagnosticismthatisobjectionablyspineless. Theapproachoffered takesasastartingpointtheobservationthat–forreasonsthatwillbemadeclear—thecontemporary debatehasbypassedtheissueofthereasonablenessofmaintaining,ratherthangivingup,represen- tationalstatesweakerthanbeliefincontroversialareas.Thenewpositiondevelopedanddefended hereexploresthisoverlookedspace;whatresultsisakindofcontroversialviewagnosticismthatis compatiblewiththekindsofcommitmentsthatareintegraltosocialidentity. introduction SupposeyoubelievethatMarilynMonroewasbornbeforeQueenElizabethII,and— asyoujustnowfindout—IbelievethatQueenElizabethIIwasbornbeforeMarilyn Monroe;priortoourdisagreement,weeachreckonedtheothertobeequallylikelyto berightonthismatter–viz.,weeachtooktheothertobeepistemicpeersonmattersof th century celebrity birthdates. A popular position in recent social epistemology insists that, in situations like the one just described, rationality requires that both partiesshould‘movetothecenter’. Callhere,followingLackey(),positionsthat embrace this general insight about the epistemic significance of peer disagreement conformist views,andthegeneralpositionembracedconformism. Inabitmoredetail: Astandardwaytothinkaboutepistemicpeerhoodisintermsofcognitiveandevidentialparity, vis-à-visthetargetquestion. SeehereLackey(). Cf. Conee(). QueenElizabethIIwasborninApril,,whileMarilynMonroewasbornjustafewmonths laterinJune,. Conformism: In a revealed peer disagreement over p, each individual shouldgiveequalweighttoherpeer’sattitudesuchthatneitherisjusti- fiedinstayingasconfidentassheinitiallywasregardingwhetherp. Conformist(e.g. Elga(),Christensen(),Feldman())approaches to peer disagreement, construed in this inclusive way, are popular in recent social epistemology,thoughthereisawell-knowntroublewaitinginthewings. AsLittlejohn(,)putstheproblem: Most of the interesting things we believe (i.e., most of what we believe about epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, politics, and religion) are con- troversial. Muchofthiscontroversyseemstoinvolvepeerswhodisagree witheachotherfullyawareofthefactthattherearepeersthattheydis- agreewith. Because[conformism]iscorrect,wecannotrationallyremain committedtothesecontroversialpropositions. Thus,fewoftheinterest- ing things we believe we believe rationally…The pessimistic conclusion isthatweshouldsuspendjudgmentonmostoftheinterestingthingswe believe. Butsubtractfromanindividualmostofherinterestingandcontroversialbeliefs, andwhat’sleftisapicturewhereanimportantchunkofone’ssocialidentityismissing. Thisisaprimafaciebadresult. Thus, the skeptical worry waiting in the wings for conformism is that it entails precisely this bad result, by entailing something along the lines of controversialview agnosticism: Controversial View Agnosticism (CVA): We are rationally obligated to withhold judgment about a large portion of our beliefs in controversial subjectareas,suchasphilosophy,religion,moralityandpolitics. Aswithanycasewhereaprimafacieintuitivethesisentailsanunwelcomeresult, we meet with a nest of questions: which versions, precisely, of the conformist thesis most clearly generate the CVA result? What moves can be made to block CVA, IamfollowinghereBallantyneandCoffman()inmycharacterisation. Foratypicalkindof caseusedtomotivatethisposition,seeChristensen()‘s’MentalMath’example. Forsomenotableopposition,seeKelly()andInwagen(). SeeInwagen()forarangeofreasonstofindthiskindofresultworrying. Conformism,iftrue,ofcoursehasimplicationsthatgobeyondtheimplicationsitstruthwould haveforourrationalrequirementsincontroversialareas.WhatI’mcalling‘CVA’is,tobeclear,athesis justaboutwhatrationalityrequiresincontroversialareas,andisassuchcompatiblewithconformism’s havingapplicability(e.g.,especiallyinindividualcases)outsideofcontroversialsubjectareas.Thanksto arefereeattheEuropeanJournalofPhlosophyforsuggestingclarificaitononthispoint. MathesonandCarey()andGrundmann()explorethispointinsomedepth. by proponents of conformism? Is CVA really so bad? These issues continue to be explored, though in what follows I’ll be taking a different tack. I’ll argue that controversialviewagnosticism–oratleast,aversionofit–istrue,butthatfactsabout expert (rather than peer) disagreementultimately provide the most compelling kind ofsupportfortheposition. I’llthenproceedtoshowhowtheversionofCVAIthink weshouldacceptisnotasobjectionableaswewouldinitiallybelettothink. Inorder togettheargumentupandrunning,it’simportanttofirstlookmorecloselyatsome of the assumptions lurking in the background of the argument from conformism to controversialviewagnosticism–whichwillbeourstartingpoint. the triad view The philosopher perhaps most responsible for generating debate about controversial view agnosticism is Richard Feldman. Feldman is aware that the conformist line he’sadvancedimplieswemustgiveupalotofourcontroversialbeliefs,andFeldman (,)thinkswe’rerationallyrequiredtodoso‘evenifsuspendingjudgmentin suchcasesmightbeextremelydifficulttodo.’ Feldman’s thinking here is undergirded by a commitment to what Turri (, )callstheTriadViewofdoxasticattitudes: TriadView: (i) There are only three doxastic attitudes: belief, disbelief, andwithholdingand(ii)onceyou’veconsideredaproposition,thereare, intellectuallyspeaking,onlythreeoptionsopentoyou: youeitherbelieve it,disbelieveit,orwithholdjudgment. The Triad View is, as Turri notes, ‘a common view in epistemology’; for one thing, the view turns up (at various junctures) in the work of an impressive range of thinkers. With the Triad View in play, it looks like a relatively seamless step from the thought that conformism is a reasonable response to peer disagreement to the unwanted implication that we must withhold judgment vis-a-vis most of our interestingviews. Bogardus()hasrecentlyarguedagainstthereceivedsuggestionthattheequalweightversion actuallyhasthisimplication. SeeFeldman(,)foranattempttoembracethiskindofconclusion. Forarecentcollectionofworkonthistopic,seeespeciallyMachuca(). AparticularlyinfluentialpaperingeneratingdebateonthetopicisFeldman(). (Turri,). TheTriadViewisslightlyamendedforpresentation. Forsomerepresentativestatementsofthisview,seeFeldman(),Bergmann(),Conee andFeldman(),Chisholm(),andSosa(). TheTriadViewissurelyrightifqualifiedsoastosay: withrespecttotheparticular attitudeofbelief theoptionsare: believe,disbelieveorwithhold. Theproblemwith the Triad View (qualified in this way) isn’t that it’s false. It’s that it is deployed in a waythatismisleading; withtheTriadViewinplay, theavailablereasonableavenues to take in response to disagreement seem artifically restricted. To bring this point intosharprelief,considerfirstasetofexamples. . Itisrainingrightnow. . O.J.Simpsonwasjudgedbyjuryintobeinnocentofmurder. . Ititwillcontinuetorainforthenextfiveminutes. . O.J.Simpsonwaswronglyacquitted. (-) are things I downright believe. While I wouldn’t say I believe either () or (),Idosuspectthat()and()aretrue. Nowconsider(and). . Thereareanevennumberofspidersintheroom. . Within the past five minutes, some golfer, somewhere in the world, has hit a hole-in-one. Idon’tbelieve(-),butneitherdoIsuspectthemtobetrue. Idon’tsuspect() to be true in part because I have good reason to believe that () is the sort of claim thatwillbejustaslikelytrueasfalseatanygiventime. Regarding(),Isimplycan’t (sitting here, with my current evidence) competently assess whether it’s more likely ornottobetrue,andthusIdon’tsuspectit’strue. NowwiththeTriadViewinplay,itwillbenaturaltolump(-)intothe‘belief’ categoryand(-)intothe‘withholding’category,glossingoveranyinterestingsense inwhich(-)areviewsIdohold(evenifweakly). I’llreturnmorecarefullytowhat ImeanwhenIsayIhold(-)weakly. Onealternativetothispicture,consideredbyTurri,istorejecttheTriadViewforaQuartetView, whichisTriad+theoptionof‘withdrawing’fromtheproposition. Ishouldaddherethat,whilesome philosophers(e.g. Friedman(b))drawmorefine-graineddistinctionsbetween‘withholding’and ‘suspending’,Iamforthepresentpurposesgoingtobeusingthesetermsinterchangeably–aspicking outoneofthethreekindsofoptionsadvertedbytheTriadView.Iamopentothesuggestionthatthere aremultiplewaysonemightcountaswithholdingorsuspending. TheargumentI’lldevelopherewon’t atanyrateturnonanydistinctionhere. Maybeahole-in-oneishiteverytwohourssomewhereintheworld,inwhichcase()isprobably falseinmostcontextsofevaluation. Maybeahole-in-oneishiteverytwominutes,inwhichcase()is probablytrueinmostcontextsofevaluation. Ihaven’taclue. Cf. Friedman(b), especially§, forsomehelpfuldiscussiononconditionsforsuspending judgment. Bywayofemphasis,Iamnotdenyingthattheoptionsforbelievingarejustbelief, disbeliefandwithholding. TheproblemisthatwhenwefollowFeldman’sleadand approach the available responses to peer disagreement through the lens of the Triad View, the game looks rigged so as to exclude from discussion representational atti- tudesweaker thanbelieffromtherangeofreasonableoptions. Anditmightnotbe unreasonabletomaintain,ratherthangiveup,theseweakerattitudesincontroversial areas. the ‘twin goals’ model It’s tempting to wonder: can’t the threat of controversial view agnosticism sketched in § be circumvented entirely by simply swapping out representational state talk for credencetalk? Asthislineofthoughtwillgo,somethinglikethe‘RealNumberView’ is more fundamental (when characterising our possible epistemic stances vis-a-vis propositions)thananyviewthattradesonlyinrepresentationalstates. However, as Friedman (a) has recently argued, it’s not at all obvious that suspensionofjudgmentshouldbemodeledsimplybyassigningastandardcredence. Butevenifitcouldbemodeledunproblematicallyinthisway,amoment’sreflection IhavebeeninterpretingtheTriadViewasaviewthatexpressesouroptionsvis-a-visathree-place relationbetweenanagent,abelief andaproposition.Assuch,theviewisveryplausible.Comparethis articulationoftheTriadViewwiththefollowingexpressionoftheideaofferedbyBergmann(): ‘Threeattitudesonemighttaketowardsapropositionparebelievingp,disbelievingp(i.e.,believingp isfalse),andwithholdingp(i.e.,refrainingfromeitherbelievingordisbelievingp’. Bergmann(, ).Ononewayofreadingthisclaim,Bergmannisjustsayingthatthesethreeattitudesareamongthe possibleattitudesforanagenttotakevis-a-visaproposition,andthisistrue.ButBergmann’sexpression oftheviewalsolendsitselftoastrongerreadingaccordingtowhichthesethreeattitudescomprisethe onlyavailablerepresentatalstatesonthetable. SettingasidewhatBergmannactuallythinks,Iwantto makeclearthatthisstrongreadingoftheTriadViewwouldbenotmerelymisleadinginthecontextof thepeerdisagreementdebate,butmanifestlyfalse. Notethatsomephilosophershaveapproachedpeerdisagreementbyassessingprimarilytherea- sonablenessofhigher-orderepistemicattitudes,asopposedtofirst-orderattitudes. Foranexampleof thiskindofapproach,seeHazlett(). Toemphasise,thesenseinwhichweshouldacceptthistriadviewisjustrelativetotherepresenta- tionalstateofbelief. Withrespecttobelief,theoptionsare: believe,disbelieveandwithhold. However, itisamistaketoinferfromthefactthattheseoptionsareavailable,withrespecttotherepresentational stateofbelief,thattheyaretheexhaustiverepresentation-stateoptionsinresponsetorevealedpeerdis- agreement. Thisis,inshort,because(asIwilldevelopinthenextsection)therearerepresentational statesotherthanbeliefwhichwemighttakeupwithrespecttoapropositionevenwhilenotbelieving thatproposition. Friedman(a,–)aimstoestablish,moregenerally,thefailureofwhatshecallsstraightfor- wardreduction,the‘reductionofthetraditionalist’sdoxasticattitudestoformalist’sdegreesofbeliefthat saysthatbelievingp,disbelievingp,andsuspendingaboutparejustmattersofhaving(somespecified) standardcredencesforp’. suggeststhatcredencetalkhardlydisarmstheworry; rather, totalkaboutcredences willjustbetoturnourattentionawayfromtheproblem. InthissectionIwanttobrieflysketch, withreferencetoabackgroundcommit- ment to the twin epistemic goals of maximizing truth and avoiding error, a simple picturethatshowshowwecanthinkofbeliefasoccupyingaparticularkindofspace inaheirarchyofstrongerandweakerrepresentationalattitudes. Oncethispictureis established,I’llarguethataversionofcontroversialviewagnosticismshouldbeem- braced, but that the version we should embrace does not carry with it some of the kindsofagnosticimplicationsthatothercommentatorshavefoundobjectionable. That said, the simple model I want to sketch here will (without presupposing any particular account of belief) locate ‘belief’ between two other representational attitudes: suspecting-that-p and being certain-that-p. Because I’ll be featuring just threeattitudes,it’snotacomprehensivepicture;butit’llbeenoughtomakethepoint I’mafter. It’s intuitive enough to locate ‘believing-that-p’ in between ‘suspecting-that-p’ and ‘being certain-that-p.’ Though, as is indicated by the examples (-) in §, there is a sense in which my believing that p is correct when p is true, but so is theweakerattitudeofmerelysuspecting-that-p, aswellasthestrongerattitudeof beingcertainthatp. Butwhatexplainsbelief’ssituatednessbetweenthesetwoother representationalstatesthatsharethesameaim? Whileallthreeoftheseattitudessharethesameaim,wepursuethetruthaim— theaimofmaximizingtruthandavoidingerror—differentlydependingonwhichat- titude we take up, and as a function of how we weight, in taking up each of these attitudes, respectively, the twin goals of possessing truths and avoiding error. Con- sider that truly representing and not misrepresenting are clearly competingaims, de- Afterall,wemightagreethattherealnumbers-areadequatetorepresentourpossibleepistemic positionsforanyproposition(Cf. Easwaran()). Butitremainsthatcredencesaren’t representa- tionalstates, andunlessweshouldthinkthatonewhotakesherselftoberationallyrequiredtogive upmostofherinterestingbeliefswillbecomfortedwhenitispointedoutthatshecontinuestohave credences,weshoudn’tthinkthethreatofcontroversialviewagnosticismcanbesoeasilydispelled. Theclaimthat‘suspecting-that-p’isaweakerrepresentationalstatethan‘believing-that-p’iscom- patiblewithgrantingthatwecan(andoftendo)holdsuspicionsmaximallyvigorously. Thesensein whichsuspecting-that-pismoreweaklyaffirmativethanbelieving-that-pis(asisarticulatedfurtherin this section) this: that an agent, in taking up the attitude of suspecting that p, affords more weight to possessing truth than avoiding error, than does one in, by comparison, taking up the attitude of believing-that-p. Thispointissharpenedfurtherinthisandlatersections. See Engel () for an overview. For a defence of truth as a constitutive norm of belief, see Williams(),ShahandVelleman(). Cf. Gibbons(). Formoreonthispoint,seeOwens(),whonotesthatitisbecauseone’ssuspectingthatpis incorrectwhenfalsethatsuspectingislikebeliefbutunlikeattitudessuchasimagining. Thisisjustasketchofsomeofthecoreelementsofamoredetailedviewthathasbeendefended inCarter,Jarvis,andRubin(). spitejointlycomprisingtheaimmaximizingtruthandavoidingerror. Thisisbecause onecanonlyfulfillthefirstaim(trulyrepresenting)byputtingoneselfatriskofnot fulfilling the second (not-misrepresenting). For example, weighting the second aim more than the first would naturally lead one to be more cautious in order to avoid possible misrepresentation. Correspondingly, weighting the first aim more would leadonetoberiskierinordertopossessmoretruths. Being certain-that-p (in a sense that will soon be clearer) corresponds with af- fording much more weight to avoidingerror than to possessing truth, and viceversa forsuspecting-that-p. Toseethisideainaction,supposetherearequestionsona multiple-choicetest,withA,B,C,andDastheavailableoptions,foreachquestion. Suppose for each of the questions, you have ruled out at least one or two of A, B, C, and D and are, in each case, leaning just slightly toward one of the remaining options. Theideathatbeing-certain-that-pisanattitudethataffordsmuchmoreweightto avoidingerrorthanpossessingtruthcanbeappreciatedwhenconsideringthatbeing- certain-thatisnotanattitudeyoutakeuptowardanyofthequestions. Youthus foregothe chanceto possesstruth, with that attitude, ineach case. Youdo however rightlysuspectineachofthecasesthattheanswertowardwhichyou’re(modestly) leaning is right. It is in this sense that, in taking up the attitude of suspecting-that, you’reaffordingmoreweighttopossessingtruthsthanavoidingerror. Belief, onthe simple picturesketched, falls somewherebetweensuspecting-that and being certain-that. Where exactly belief falls in this space is beyond what I can argue for here. Brief reflection, though, indicates that, in taking up the attitude of belief, we are giving more weight to avoiding error than to attaining truth–that this muchissowouldexplainwhy,forinstance,‘belief’isnotanattitudeI’dtakeupvis- a-vis(-),in§,eventhoughIsuspect (-)aretrue. Ibid.,-. Arelatedexpressionofthispointisembraced,albeitwithinatwo-tieredaccountofknowledge, bySosa(). Inparticular, onSosa’smodel, twotypesofbelief—whathecallsguessing aswellas whatjudging—involveaffirmingapropositionwiththealethicaimofbelievingtruly.However,thetwo statesdifferwithrespecttothelevelofrisktheytolerate. Takinguptheattitudeofguessing(aswhen weareaskedtoreadthesmallestrowoflettersinaneyeexam)isanaffirmationthatendeavoursto attaintruthwhiletoleratingsignificantlevelsofrisk. Judgment,accordingtoSosa,isnotthekindof attitudewetakeupwhensuchriskistolerated. Rather,judgmentinvolvesaffirmingwiththealethic aimofbelievingtruly,butalsowiththeepistemicaimofbelievingaptly—viz.,believingtrulybecauseof competence(Sosa(Ch. )). WhileIamsympathetictothisproposal,Iamnotinclinedtoregard ‘guessing’asavarietyofbelief.Giventhelevelofriskittolerates,itwouldbelocated(onthetaxonomy I’mproposing)somewhereclosertosuspicion,perhapsriskier. SeeCarter(forthcoming)forarecent discussionofvarietiesofguessing,fromeducatedguessingtoblindguessing. AmorecomprehensiveaccountofthisproposalisofferedinCarter,Jarvis,andRubin()and Carter,Jarvis,andRubin(). expert disagreement and epistemic danger Againstthebackgroundofthe‘twingoals’model,itshouldbeevidentthat(fordif- ferentreasons)somesubjectareas areoneswhereriskoferroris(asitwasinthecase ofthequestionsfeaturingintheexaminationexample)simplytoogreatforbelief tobetheappropriatedefaultattitudetotakeup. Callsuchsubjectmatters,foreaseof reference,epistemicallydangerous. Toofferaneasy(albeit,near-trivial)caserightout oftheblocks,takeastrology–wherethesubjectmatterinquestioniswaysthatcosmic alignmentaffectsfortune. Tosaythatbelievingastrologypropositions(i.e.specifying differentcelestial-fortunerelations)isepistemically‘risky’isanunderstatement. The risk of error is almost maximally high (astrology beliefs, so construed, will be true onlyinfar-offworlds,wherethelawsofnatureareverydifferent.) Astrology would thus count as epistemically dangerous, for a given thinker, be- causeofpropertiesinternal toastrology–itsownprinciples. Let’shereaftersetastrol- ogy (and similar such subjects) aside. The interesting cases I’ll turn to will be ones that are, like astrology, epistemically dangerous (e.g. too risky to ordinarily traffic in beliefs),but(unlikeastrology)epistemicallydangerousbecauseofrelational orextrin- sicpropertiesofthesubjectmattersinquestion,ratherthanpropertiesintrinsictoor constitutiveofthesubjectmatter. Takehere,asapetcase,thesubjectmatterofattentiondefecithyperactivitydis- order (ADHD) management. What combination of counseling, medication and lifestyle choice are most effective in managing ADHD? Here it turns out that the recognised experts are sharply divided, and fundamentally so–those best suited to gettingitrightonthetopic,ifanyoneis,disagreestrikingly. Thisfactlookstobeepistemicallysignificant. Thereareanumberwaysonemight attempt to motivate the point. Matheson and Carey (, ), for instance, have suggestedthat: …significantdisagreementamongsttheexpertsindicatesthateitherour evidence on the topic is not very good or that we aren’t very good at evaluatingit. Ineithercase,agnosticismtowardthedisputedproposition seemscalledfor. Thereisofcoursealsoa‘subjective’senseinwhichasubjectmatterϕcouldbeepistemicallydan- gerous; forinstance, ϕmightbedangerousforS, butnotforS, andbecauseofadifferenceinS andS’sϕabilities. Thesubjectmatteroftree-(ratherthanbird-)identificationmightinthiswaybe epistemicallydangerousfor theornithologist, butnottheforthearborist. Thecasesofepistemically dangeroussubjectmattersI’minterestedinwillnotbeagent-orability-relativeinthissubjectivesense. Rather, I’llbeexploringcasesthatareobjectivelyepistemicallydangerous, givenfactsindependentof whatabilitieswebringtothetable. SeeJadadetal. (). NotethatthereisalsocontroversyoverthestatusofADHD,apartfrom issuestodowithitsmanagement. I’ll outline why I think the kind of expert disagreement we find in cases like ADHD management is epistemically significant in §.. I want to leave it open, tobeclear,whetherandtowhatextentdiscoveredpeer disagreementisepistemically significant. WhatIwanttosuggestisthattheADHDmanagementcaseturnsout to be closely akin to a range of other controversial subjects[ˆcs], including subjects that fall within philosophy, politics, religion, and other controversial (or, as Little- john puts it, ‘interesting’, areas). Roughly, the idea I’ll pursue now is that the risk oferrorintheseareasis(withreferencetoour‘twingoals’model)higherthanwillbe toleratedbytheattitudeofbelief. Centralityandsymmetryconditions It’s important to make clearer what I take to be going on in cases where I say ‘the experts disagree’ in a way that will make the subject area epistemically dangerous (and thus, make trafficking in beliefs problematic). For one thing, the mere fact of expertdisagreementvis-à-visagivensubject,ϕ,isn’talwaysepistemicallysignificant. The kind of disagreement matters. Take, for instance, the subject matter of early th-centuryAntarcticexploration. Expertsintheareamightdisagreeaboutwhether Shackleton’sdesperatecrewatemoresealsormorepenguinstostayalive. However, expertsunanimouslyagreethat ShackletonattemptedtoreachtheSouthPoleinthe early s. We aren’t inclined to think that th century Antarctic exploration is epistemically dangerous in virtue of the kind of expert disagreement that we find here. This speaks to a centrality constraint on the epistemic significance of expert dis- agreement; consider that in the ADHD management case, experts are divided on issues central to the subject matter in question, whereas, in our case of th Cen- Onewaytoseethecomparativesignificanceofexpertversuspeerdisagreementwillbetocontrast thesubjectofADHDmanagementwiththehot-wireissueofanthropogenicclimatechange. Many individualswhomIregardasepistemicpeersaredivided(passionately)here, thoughexpertsarenot. AccordingtoametastudyconductedbyCook()inwhich,abstractspublishedinpeer- reviewedscientificjournalswereevaluated,itwasfoundthatoverofthosearticlesembracedthe ‘consensuspositionthathumansarecausingglobalwarming’. Asimilarmetadatastudyconductedin andpublishedintheProceedingsoftheNationalAcademyofScienceintheUSreachedasimilar conclusion(-)andalsonotedthat‘therelativeclimateexpertiseandscientificprominenceof the researchers unconvinced of [Anthropogenic Climate Change] are substantially below that of the convincedresearchers’Soanthropogenicclimatechangeisanissuewheremypeersaredivided,butthe expertsarenot.ADHDmanagementisalsoasubjectwheremypeersaredivided,butsoaretheexperts. Perhapsthefactthatmanyofmypeersrejectanthropogenicclimatechangeisepistemicallysignificant vis-à-vismybeliefsonthetopic,eventhoughIamawarethatexpertopinionisnotdivided. Iwon’t weighinhere. AsChristensen(,)observes,‘Onmanyfactualquestions–examplesfrompoliticsoreco- nomicsareeasytothinkof–widespreaddisagreement,evenamongexperts,isthenorm.’ turyAntarcticexploration,expertdisagreementliesmerelyattheperiphery. Indeed, most subject matters feature expert disagreement at the periphery–it is thus expert disagreement on matters at the very heart of a subject matter that will be of interest here. Along with a centrality constraint, there will also need to be a kind of symmetry constraint; the interesting cases will be cases where there is thought to be roughly symmetrical expertdisagreementonissuescentraltoasubjectmatter. Let’sassume for a moment that the individuals taking the recent Phil Papers survey are ‘experts’. (This is an idealisation, but it will work for illustrative purposes). In that survey, / (.) endorse a truth-relativist semantics for knowledge attributions. Here,therelevantexpertsaremoreconvinced–(andevenmoresothantheyarethat anthropogenicclimatechangeistrue)–thatatruth-relativistsemanticsforknowledge attributionsisfalse. Thustheexpertshere‘disagree’intheweaksensethattheyarenot unanimous,buttheydonotapproachanythingnearroughlysymmetricdisagreement. Things are much different though, with respect to the issue of Platonism versus nominalism with respect to abstract objects. Here the Phil Papers survey partici- pantsaredividedabout-—astatisticthatintuitivelytracksafamousdivision amongstheexpertsonanenduringmetaphysicalissue. InthePlatonism/nominalism case, it looks like both the symmetrical and the centrality constraints are easily met: theroughlysymmetricdisagreementconcernsnotperipheralbeliefs,butissuesatthe very heart of the subject matter–what kind of thing is an abstract object; do such thingsexist? Nothinghereisremotelysettled. Whatdistinguishesbeliefsperipheraltoasubjectmatterfrombeliefscentraltoasubjectmatter? ThebestaccountI’mawareofhereisfoundintheliteratureonobjecutalunderstanding–thestateone attainswhenonecountsasunderstandingasubjectmatter(e.g.‘Timunderstandsalgebraicgeometry’.). AsKvanvig()notes,thedistinctionbetweencentralandperipheralbeliefs(withrespecttoasubject matter)iskeytoaplausibleconceptionofthehowunderstandingasubjectmattershouldbeheldto afactivityconstraint. Forinstance,twohistorianscanbothunderstandwhyCaesarwasassassinated, evenifone(falsely)believesthattheco-assassinBrutuswasborninlate(ratherthan,correctly,early) June,BC.Thisfalsebeliefisattheperipheryofthesubjectmatterinquestion. Thissamehistorian surelyfails,however,tounderstandwhyCaesarwasassassinatedifhefalselybelievesthatBrutuskilled CiceroratherthanCaesar—apropositioncentraltothesubjectmatter.Accordingly,wecanthinkofthe central/peripheraldistinctionasmappingcloselywiththosebeliefsthatareessentialforunderstanding asubjectmatter,andthosewhicharenot. Thischaracterisationofthedistinctionofcourseidentifies thecentralandtheperipheralbytheirepistemicproperties. Forsomefurtherdiscussiononthefactivity conditiononunderstanding, asitstandstoilluminatethedistinctionbetweencentralandperipheral beliefs, see also Riggs (), Carter and Gordon (), Gordon () and Gordon (). Cf. Elgin(). Fordiscussiononthispoint,seeGrundmann(,). Seeherehttp://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl. Seeherehttp://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl.
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