On Aristophanes, Plato, and Sokrates

16 Pages·1977·1.24 MB·English

by  Allan Bloom

RESPONSE TO HALL
ALLANB LOOM
Universitoyf Toronto
[Plato in the Republic] soughta nd made a citym ore
to be prayedf or than hoped for . .. not such that
it can possibly be but one in whichi t is possible to
see the meaning[ ratio] of political things.[ Cicero,
Republic II 52]
I am gratefult o ProfessorH all fora numbero f reasons,e specially
for the seriousnessw ithw hichh e has taken my interpretationof the
Republic. That he disagrees with it is secondary.W e do agree on
the fundamentatl hing:i t is of utmosti mportancet o understandP lato.
The issues raised by Hall are enormous,a nd an adequate response
to his argumentsw ould requirev olumes,b ut what we reallyd isagree
about is how to read Plato. He asserts that I read my prejudices
into the text. I respond that he does not pay sufficienatt tentiont o
the text. In lookinga t a few of his centralc riticismsI, shall attempt
to prove my contentiona nd show the characteristice rrors of his
approach to the Platonic dialogue.
A UTHOR'S NOTE Hall is quiter ighti n sayingt hatm yi nterpretatioonf theR epublici s
derivativfe rom thato f Leo Strauss. It is the natureo f derivativew orkst o be on a lower
level thant hosefromw hicht heys tem.T herei s muchi n Strauss'i nterpretatiotnh atI have
understood,b ut therei s also surelym ucht hatI have not understood.I cannots peakfor
him. In whatfollowsI refero nlyt o mye ssay and leave Strauss' to speakf or itselfa, s he
would certainlyh ave wished.
POLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 5 No. 3, August1 977
i 1977S age PublicationIsn, c.
[3161 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1977
I
In the firstp lace, Hall presupposest hat he knows the Platonic
teaching and reads his understandingo f it into the text. Arguing
against my contentiont hat the best regimeo f the Republic is not a
serious proposal, he tells us, "Socrates is explicit that his polis is
natural."I searchi n vain forS ocrates's tatementto thate ffectI.n deed,
I know of no assertion anywherei n the Platonic corpus that the
cityi s natural or that man is by naturea politicala nimal. Whatever
the ideas may be-and they are the highesta nd most elusive theme
to whichw e musta scend veryc arefullyan d slowlyf romt hec ommonly
sensed particulars-there is not the slightesti ndication that there
is an idea of the cityo r of the best city,a s therei s said to be an idea
of the beautifulo r an idea of thej ust. What the omission means is
debatable,b ut one mustb eginb y recognizingt hat it is so. Obviously,
fromt he point of view of the ideas, the naturalnesso f the citym ust
have a status very differentf romt hat of, for example, man. The
kallipolisc annot participatei n an idea whichi s not. While therea re
manym en and an idea of man, the cityd oes not exista s a particular
or as a universal;i t is neithers ensedn or intellected.
Careful observation of what the text says about this question of
naturalnessw ould have helped Hall. In his discussion of the three
waves of paradox in Book V, Socrates says (a) the same education
and way of lifef orw omen as form eni s possible because it is natural
(456b-c); (b) the communityo f women and childreni s not against
nature( 466d)-however, now Socrates shiftst he criteriono f possi-
bilityf romn aturalnesst o comingi nto being (many thingsw hicha re
not natural, and even against nature,c an come into being); (c) the
coincidenceo f philosophya nd rulei s just that,c oincidenceo r chance
(473c-d). All the attentioni s given to the possibilityo f that highly
improbablec oincidence. Cities, let alone the best city,d o not come
into being as do plantsa nd animals.S ome men are by naturef itb oth
to philosophizea nd to rulei n thec ity,b ut it is not said thati t is natural
thatt heyd o so. Ift heya ctuallyd o both,t hec ause is art,h umanm aking,
not nature.I f I were to use against Hall the methodsh e uses against
me, I would say that, with respectt o the naturalnesso f the city,h e
has read Aristotle'sP olitics, not Plato's Republic. He does not see
thatt he cityi s more problematicf or Plato than for Aristotle.
Justa s Hall reads in, he reads out. In tryingt o argue thatf orP lato
there is no significantd istinctionb etween the theoreticala nd the
practicall ife,h e says that Plato "does not suggestt hatp hilosophising
Bloom / RESPONSE TO HALL [317]
and rulinga re unrelatedf unctions."C ompare that to the text: "each
of [the philosophers]w ill go to ruling as a necessarya s opposed
to a good thing. .. if you discovera lifeb ettert han rulingf ort hose
who are going to rule,i t is possible that your well-governedci tyw ill
come into being. . . . Have you anotherl ife that despises political
officeso ther than that of true philosophy?. . . But men who aren't
lovers of ruling[ theyl ove somethingo ther: wisdom] must go to it"
(521a-b). The philosophersw on't be willingt o act [engage in praxis]
(519c). There could be no more radical distinctionm ade betweent he
practicala nd theoreticalli vest han thatd rawni n Books V-VII and IX
of the Republic (cf. especially4 76a-b). The separatenesso f the forms
is stronglyas serted,a s are thep ossibilitieso f a reasonu singo nlyf orms
withouta dmixtureo f the senses and a life lived in contemplation
of the formsp urely.T his latterl ifei s the best life,t he onlyg ood life.
It is preciselyt he differencbe etweeni t and the life of rulingt hat is
the artificet hat is supposed to make the cityw ork. Deed and speech
are also radicallyd istinguisheda,n d the latteri s said to be absolutely
superior.' I reallyf indi t hard to imagineh ow Hall is able to say the
thingsh e does in the face of the evidencet o the contraryI. challenge
him to finda singles tatementin the Republic that indicatest hat the
philosophic life requires rulingo r that the activityo f rulingi n any
wayc ontributetso philosophizing.W2 hati s strikingab out theR epublic
is the distance Socrates puts between the theoreticala nd practical
lives, a distance belied by thingsh e says elsewherea nd by his own
life. But that is what he does here,a nd, as Hall says, "we are accus-
tomed to taking Socrates seriously."T here is simplyn ot a scintilla
of prooft hatt hem aking,p aintingo, r" creating"a ctivityo ft hef ounders
of the cityi s a part of the philosophersl ifea s such. Hall piles abstrac-
tion on abstraction,u nrelatedt o the text,i n ordert o constructa case
for the sameness of the two lives, but he has no evidence.T he most
strikingas pect of thel ast halfo f his paper is itsa lmoste ntirelyp ersonal
charactera nd almost total absence of referencet o text. It is true,a s
he says, that the potentialp hilosophersm ust be compelled to leave
thec ave as well as returnt o it. But once out, theyr ecognizeh ow good
it is to be out. They nevers ee a reason to go back, and compelling
themt o go back is said to be good for the city,n ot the philosophers.
If theyt houghti t good to go back, theyw ould not be good rulers.I t is
onlyb y goingo ut thatt heyb ecame aware thatt he kallipolisi s a cave,
nay Hades, and to be in it is as to be a shade (516d; 521c; cf. 386c).
In the midsto f his complex prestidigitatorayc tivity,H all announces
that it is because I am a modernp olitical scientistt hat I cannot see
[318] POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1977
that Platonic rulingi s really philosophizing.I would like to accept
that testimonialt o impress some of my colleagues who have their
doubtsa bout the genuinenesso f myc redentialsa s a politicals cientist,
but unfortunatelyth e explanation does not work. Again, one must
look at the text. Rulers, in the best city,p rovidef orf ood, clothing,
and shelter,a nd theyl ead the soldierst o war. Above all, Hall forgets
the reasons the philosophersa re invoked:t heya re primarilym atch-
makerso r eugenicistsw ho have to spend a great deal of time and
subtletyo n devising "throngs of lies and deceptions" designed to
gett her ightp eople to have sexual intercourswe itho ne another (458d-
460b). Is that a philosophica ctivity?
Displayingt he same tendencyt o neglectw hat is reallyi n the text,
Hall spinsa subtlew eb of reasoningsa bout a Platonicn otiono f happi-
ness which is franklyb eyond my comprehensiona, notion evidently
intendedt o overcome the tensionsb etweenp hilosophya nd ruling.
In this context he insistst hat "Plato, clearly,d oes not definee udai-
monia in termso f felt satisfaction. . . and the personal happiness
of the philosophersi s not his primaryd esideratum."N ow, the culmi-
nationo f the whole dialogue-the judgmentc oncerningt heh appiness
of the unjustm an versust hat of thej ust man,w hichw as demandedb y
Glaucon at the beginningo f the dialoguea nd was itse xplicitm otive-
concerns,i f I understandw hat Hall meansb yp ersonal happiness,t he
personal happiness of the philosopher( 576b-588a). The termso f the
comparisonh ave been quietlyc hanged duringt he course of the dia-
logue fromt he unjustm an versust hej ust man to thet yrantv ersust he
philosopherT. hree testsa re made,a ll threeo fw hicha re won byt hep hi-
losopher. The firstt est is self-sufficienctyh: e philosopher can get
the good thingsh e desires withoutn eedingo r depending on other
menw hilet he tyrantli ves in feara nd is fullo fu nsatisfiabled esiresb e-
cause of his dependencyo n men. The othert wo testsp rove thatt he
philosopheri s the expertp ar excellencei n pleasurea nd thath e expe-
riences the purest and most intense pleasures. Socrates calculates
thatt he philosopher'sl ifei s 729 timesm orep leasantt hant het yrant's.
Is this not "felts atisfaction"o f a whollyp ersonal kind? Philosophy
is presenteda s choiceworthyo n the groundt hat it provides perma-
nentlya ccessible pleasures for the individual,a nd the philosopher
herei s not presenteda s rulingo r in any way concemnedw itht hec ity.
In addition to making Plato answerh is own questionsr athert han
discoveringw hat Plato's questionsa re and distortingt he phenomena
by castinga gray web of abstractiona round themr athert han letting
themc ome to lighti n theirf ullnessa nd complexityH, all moralizes,
not open to the possibilityt hatj usticei s not preachedi n the Republic
Bloom / RESPONSE TO HALL [3191
but ratherq uestioned and investigated.F or example, so sure is he
that benefitingo ne's fellow man is an imperativeo f Plato's thought
thath e does not take note of the factt hatt hec ityh as no concernf or
otherc ities and is even willingt o harm and stiru p factionsi n them,
supportingt he inferiore lements,s olely to keep themf romt hreaten-
ingi t. Best would be isolation,a nd nextb esti s cripplingo ne's neighbor;
never would it try to improve them (422a-423a). Since the soul is
said to be like thec ity,w ould not it,t oo, be concernedo nlyw ithi tself?
The vulgar standardso f just conduct to whicht he well-ordereds oul
is said to conforma re all negative-things it does not do, such as
stealing,l ying,a nd committinga dultery( 442e-443a). As was indi-
cated early on, Socrates' just man does no harm; he is not said to do
good, to be a benefactor(3 35d). And the reason whyt he well-ordered
soul does not do harm becomes clear when it is revealed to be the
philosophics oul. The philosopher'sa bstinencesa re not due to good
will, a Kantian "settled and sincere dispositiont o behave justly,"
but to a lack of caringf ort he vulgart hingso n whicht he vulgars tan-
dards are founded. His passionate love of wisdom makes him
indifferentto , fore xample,m oney( 485d-486b).T his is no morep raise-
worthyt han a eunuch's abstinence fromr ape. There is no "moral"
motivei nvolved.3I t escapes Hall that of the threec lasses in the city,
two have no concern for the common good at all-the artisansa re
in it for gain or out of fear,a nd the philosophersa re thereb ecause
they are compelled to be-while the dedicated class, the warriors,
are dedicated only because they believe in a lie and are deprivedo f
any possibilityo f privacy.T here is, on the evidenceo f the Republic,
no enlightenedn, onillusionarylo ve of thec ommong ood. The virtues
of the warriorsa re finallys aid to belong more to the body than to
the soul, to be mereh abits (518d-e). The onlya uthenticv irtuei s that
of the mindc ontemplatingit s propero bjects.I t is not I who Aristote-
lianize. The Republici s not the Ethics; therea re no moralv irtuesi n it.
I have chosent o mentiont hesep ointsb ecause theyh elpt o illustrate
what is requiredt o read a Platonic dialogue; and Plato intendedt o
make the requirementfs or readingh imi denticalt o thosef orp hiloso-
phizing;h is littlew orld is the preparationf or the big world. In fine,
what is needed is an openness to thingsa s theya ppear unaided by
the abstractionsw hich so impoverisht hingst hat theyc an no longer
cause surpriseo r wondera nd a freedomf roma moralismw hichf orbids
us to see what in nature defiesc onventiona nd refusest o console us
in our hopes and fears.
[320] POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1977
II
My differencwe ithH all can be summarizedb y sayingt hath e does
not take the formo f the dialogue seriously,t hat he does not begin
where it fairlyc rieso ut foru s to begin,w itht he storyo r the drama,
with those pictureso f life on the basis of whichw e mightg eneralize
about lifea nd whicha re so muchm orea ccessiblet o us thana re "Plato's
metaphysicso" r thei deas.I f I mayb e permittedan Aristotelianex pres-
sion, but one which is of Platonic inspiration,w e must begin from
thet hingsw hicha re firsta ccordingt o us in ordert o ascendt o thet hings
which are firsta ccordingt o nature.W e mustt alk about shoemakers
and pilots and dogs and such things,t he Socratic themess o despised
by his less wise interlocutorsI. can appreciate Hall's opinion that
therei s somethingm ad in the assertiont hat a work of political phi-
losophy which argues that philosopherss hould be kings actually
means thatp hilosopherss houldn ot be kingsB ut ifw e weret o suppose
fora momentt hatt hisi s not preciselya book of politicalp hilosophy,
at least such as we know books of political philosophyt o be, but is
a drama at one momento f which one of the charactersm akes an
unusual proposal that is designedt o affectt he action,a s are so many
speeches in dramas, then the paradoxical charactero f my interpre-
tation disappears. The tale would go roughlya s follows. Socrates
visitst he Piraeus in the company of a young man whom,a ccording
to Xenophon, he is tryingt o cure of excessive political ambitiona s
a favort o his brother,P lato (Mem. 111,v i). There theym eeta group
of men among whom is a famous intellectualw ho argues thatj us-
tice is abiding by laws set down in the interesto f the rulers. It is,
thereforei,n one's interestt o be rulero r, put otherwiset, o be a tyrant.
Glaucon, evidentlym otivatedb ym oret hani dlec uriositya,s ks Socrates
to show him thatj ustice (understooda s concernf ore quality or law-
abidingness)i s a good outweighingal l the obvious good things( pleas-
ures and honors)w hicht yranny(u nderstooda s the peak of injustice)
can procure. Socrates neverp reciselys hows Glaucon thatj ustice as
Glaucon conceivesi t is good. Rather,i n the course of foundinga city
and, thus, learningt he nature of justice, Socrates introduces,a s a
politicaln ecessityt,h e philosophersG. laucon learnst hatt o be a ruler
in the city he has foundedh e mustb e a philosopher.T hen, whenh e
is shown what philosophyi s, he learns that it is the best lifea nd is
essentiallyi ndependento f political life. From the point of view of
philosophy-which Glaucon had not considereda nd, thus, had not
considereda s a good thing-the city looks like a cave or a prison.
Bloom / RESPONSE TO HALL [3211
The movementf rom rulers simply to philosophic rulers is a stage
in Glaucon's liberationf romt he desiret o rule. The dialogue has the
charactero f an ascent,l ike the ascent fromt he cave to the regiono f
the ideas. At the peak of thata scent Socratesr eveals himselft o be the
happy man. He does not persuadeG laucon thath e should not pursue
his own good. He only makes hima ware of goods to whicht het yrant
cannot attain and the pursuito f whicht akes away the temptationt o
meddlei n politicsa nd, hence,t o be unjusta s a tyranti s unjust.A t the
end of the comparison betweent he tyrant'sa nd the philosopher's
lives, close to the end of his education,G laucon recognizest hatt he
philosopher'sc itye xists only in speech, and that no longer disturbs
him. Socrates tells him it makes no differencwe hetheri t exists,f or
it can exist in the soul and that is enough (592a-b). A man can be
happyb einga good citizeno ft hec ityo fp hilosophyw ithouti tse xisting.
Timocratsa nd timocraticc itiese xist;d emocratsa nd democraticc ities
exist; tyrantsa nd tyrannicalc ities exist; but, although therea re no
philosophical cities, philosophers exist. The tyrannical man who
does not rule a city is not fullya tyrant(5 78b-c); the philosopheri s
a philosopherw hethero r not he is a kingi n a city. And therei s, at
this finals tage, no suggestiont hat Glaucon should work to establish
this city or that he should even long for its establishmentG. laucon
has moved fromt he desire to be a rulert o the desire to be a ruler-
philosophert o the desire to be a philosopherT. he conceit of philoso-
pher-kingws as thec rucials tagei n hisc onversionI.n thel ast wordo ft he
Republic, Odysseus-the archetypeo f the wise man-cured of love
of honor or ambition and, having seen all the human possibilities,
chooses the life of a privatem an who minds his own business.T he
Republic, while demonstratingS ocrates' concern for justice, culmi-
nates in providinga foundationn ot forj ustice but for moderation.
Hall rightlyco ncentrateos n thes tatementth at" unless philosophers
rulea s kingso r those now called kings. .. philosophize. .. therei s no
restf romi lls fort he cities."T hat therew ill be no restf romi lls fort he
cities is the teachingo f the Republic,a nd this is what distinguishes
ancientf romm odernp hilosophicalp olitics.S ocrates, moreover,d oes
not suggestt hat therea re ills of philosophyt hat would be cured by
the union of wisdom and politics.T he proposal is for the sake of the
city,a nd not the philosopher.T he distinctionm ade in the discussion
withT hrasymachusb etweenj ustice as devotion to a community(b e
it band of thieves),w hichi s onlyn ecessarya, means to an end (35 lc-d;
352c-d), and justice as perfectiono f the soul, which is good in itself
(352d-354a), persists throughout.T he philosophers' service to the
[322] POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1977
communityis necessaryw, hilet heirl ifeo f contemplationo n the Isles
of the Blessed is good (540b). The two senses of justice a.e never
resolvedi nto a singlec oherento ne.
Hall's failuret o read the dialogue as a dialogue, his unawareness
of its movementc, auses him to give undue weightt o isolated phrases
or passages torn fromt heir contexts. His greateste rrori s to take
the discussion of logismos-calculation or deliberation-in Book
IV as providinga definitiono f the "natural function"( both words
are Hall's, not Plato's) of reasonr athert hana s a provisionals tatement
correspondingt o the incompletes tage of the argumenta nd of the
interlocutorsa'w areness.F ollowingt hep arallelo f ther ulersi n thec ity,
who deliberatea bout thea ffairso f thec ity,r easonf irstc omest o lighti n
the Republic as thee lemento f the soul whichc alculatesa bout thed e-
sires,d ecidingw hichs hould and whichs hould not be indulged.T his
descriptionis a consequenceo f thea nalogyb etweenc itya nd soul which
is beingp ursuedi nt hed iscussion.W hath as firstb eend etermineadb out
thec ityi s appliedt o thes oul (althoughS ocrates pointso ut thatt hed is-
cussion is inadequate,4 35c-d). What we get in Book IV is a plausible
accounto f reason'sa ctivityin thea ffairso f dailyl ife,a n activityak int o
thato f rulersw ho deliberatea bout publica ffairso, ne thats upportst he
viewt hatm an and citya re in perfecth armonyB. ut aftert hee mergence
of philosophyi n Book V, a totallyd ifferenatc counto ft her ationalp art
of the soul is given,o ne whichs howst hatt hep arallelb etweenc itya nd
soul breaksd own. The highestr eacheso f thes oul are said to longo nly
to see what is (437c-487a;5 09c-51l e; 514a-518b;5 32a-534d).D elibera-
tion or calculation( logismos),w hichw as the onlya ttributeo f ther a-
tional part of thes oul giveni n Book IV, is no longere ven mentioned.
The oppositionb etweend esirea nd calculationw hichw as thed efining
characteristiocf calculationi n thee arlierp assage is overcomea nd phi-
losophyi s describeda s a formo f eros (485c; 499b). The contemplative
activityo f thes oul is simplys omethingen tirelyd ifferenftr omt hed elib-
erativea ctivityo f a rulingc lass in a city( 533b). Such contemplationis
alien to ther ulerse' nds,a nd as a bodyt heyp ossessn o organf ori t.W hat
the soul reallyi s is both a revelationa nd a surprisei n Book V, and its
almost accidentald iscoveryc hangese verythingT.h e philosophicp art
oft hes oul has no use fora ction,a nd deliberationi s notp arto fi tsf unc-
tion( 527d-528e);i t does not calculate.O ne mustl ook to thed ifference
betweenl ogismosa nd nous to appreciatet hes ignificancoef t hisd evel-
opment.L ogismos is fora ction; nous is fori tselfT. he rulerso ft hec ity
are highestb ecause theya re most usefult o the citya nd its nonphilo-
sophic ends. Reason in the soul is highestb ecause it is the end of man
Bloom / RESPONSE TO HALL (3231
and should be the end of the city.U nless ones reads the Republic as
a drama, one does not see that it has a reversala nd a discovery,t hat
therei s a peripety.P latonic books are closer in formt o dramas than
to treatises.
III
I have put offu ntilt he end discussiono f what is onlya subsidiary
part of Halrs criticism-whath e says about Plato's relationt o Aris-
tophanes. But this issue seems to me centralt o our differencesT. he
elusive texture of Platonic thought-so differentf rom our own-
can, I believe, only be approached when one becomes aware of its
peculiar combinationo f what we take to be poetrya nd philosophy.
Or, put otherwiseP, latonicp hilosophyis poetic,n otm erelys tylistically
but at its intellectualc ore, not because Plato is not fullyd edicated
to reason, but because poetryp oints to problems for reason that
unpoetic earlier and later philosophyd o not see and because poetic
imaginationp roperlyu nderstoodi s parto f reason. The Socrates of the
Clouds-an account of the early Socrates substantiallyc onfirmedb y
the Platonic Socrates (Phaedo 96a ff.)- was unpoetic,a nd this had
somethingt o do with his incapacityt o understandp olitical things.
The Platonic Socrates can in some sense be understooda s a response
to the AristophanicS ocrates,o r, more stronglys tated,S ocrates may
have learned somethingf rom Aristophanes.T he Republic, in one
of its guises, is the proof that philosophersa re not unpolitical( and
it must not be forgottent hat,a ccordingt o all serious testimonyi,n
particulart hato f Aristotlea nd Cicero,t herew as no politicalp hiloso-
phy prior to Socrates), that theyk now the political thingsb est and
are most necessaryf or politics. Socrates, who in the Clouds stands
aside, is neutral,i n thed isputeb etweent hejusta nd theu njusts peeches,
in the Republic-in a referencew hich is clearly to Aristophanes-
presentsh imselfa s an unconditionapl artnero f thejusts peech( Clouds.
896-7; Republic, 368b-c). And in the Symposium Aristophanesi s
Socrates' only serious competitorin the contestf or the best praise of
eros: only theset wo have some inklingo f what eros reallyi s. Socrates
the philosopher shows that his valid interlocutori s Aristophanes
the comic poet, and that he is Aristophaness' uperiori n politicsa nd
erotics.U ntil we can take Aristophaness eriouslya nd Plato comically
we shall not understande ither.I t is onlyo ur stiffp edantryt hatc auses
us to ignore Plato's countlessa llusions to Aristophanes.F or us aca-
[324] POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1977
demics they simplyc annot be important.P rofessorP lato must talk
only to his fellowp rofessorsM. y responsei s thatw e mustl ook where
Plato tells us to look and not wherew e thinkw e should look.
Now Hall says he sees nothingf unnyi n Book V. My assertiont hat
therei s somethingr idiculousa bout the two sexes exercisingn aked
togetheri s tossed off lightlyb y Hall by referencet o a passage in
Xenophon which does not exist. Hall reallym eans Plutarch,a nd a
glancea t the appropriatep assage will provet o himt hatb oysa nd girls
in Sparta did not exercisen aked together.H e, furtherf,a ilst o under-
standm e. I knowt hatt herew as homosexualityin Greece.W hatI meant
is that a legislatorc an consistentlyf orbidh omosexual relationsa nd
condemn the attractionsc onnected with them (as did the Athenian
and Spartan legislators),b ut he cannot do the same forh eterosexual
relations.S ocrates explicitlys ays that those who exercisen aked to-
gether,b ecause they do so, will be sexually drawn to one another
(458c-d). Senses of humor, I am aware, do differb, ut imagination
suggestst hat the externals igns of those attractionso n the playing
fieldsm ightp rovides ome inspirationf or tastelessw its.
Similarly,H all sayst hatS ocratesd oes nota ppeal to absurdp remises
in Book V. I do not thinki t is just mye thnocentrismw hichg ivesm e
the impressiont hat it is absurd for Socrates to found his argument
on the assertiont hat the differenceb etweenm ale and femalei s no
more to be taken into account than the one betweenb ald men and
men withh air.
But,t o speak meaningfullayb out the Republic'sd ebtt o theE cclesi-
azusae, we musts ay a few words about the meaningo f that play. I
shall not enteri nto the discussiona s to whetherS ocrates reallyr efers
to Aristophanesp' lay. It is too evidentt o need discussion,a nd only
lack of attentiono r the desire to quibble could cause one to deny
ther elation.T o supportt hed enial one has to invents choolso ft hought
the existenceo f whichh as no basis in historicalf act,o r to inverta ll
probabilitiesb ased on dates as well as capriciouslyt o neglectt he
text. Socrates calls his new projectst hef emale drama (451b -c), just
as Aristophanes'p lay is his female drama par excellence. Socrates
speaksr epeatedlyo f comedya nd laughterw ithr espectt o his proposals
(e.g., 452a-b; 473c; 518 a-b). One need only compare Praxagora's
speechp uttingf orthh er revolutionaryp lan withS ocrates'o wn speech
to see the great similaritiesin tone and content( Ecclesiazusae, 583-
709; Republic, 458-466a). There are several quotes fromt he Ecclesi-
azusae in the Republic,t wo of whichI shall mentioni n whatf ollows.
It behoovesu s to followt hes implep rocedureo fs eeingw hatt hism eans