Omaha beachhead (6 June-13 June 1944)

176 Pages·1945·27.888 MB·English

by  United States. War Dept. Historical Division., Center of Military History

OMAHA
BEACHHEAD
June-13 June 1944)
(6
American Forces in Action Series
Historical Division
WAR DEPARTMENT
Facsimile Reprint, 1984, 1989, 1994
CMH Pub 100-11
Center of Military History
United States Army
Washington. D.C.
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents. Mail Stop: ssoP, W8.!Ihington, DC 20402-9328
FOREWORD
In the thick of battle, the soldier is bttsy doing his job. He has the knowledge
and confidence that his job is part of a unified plan to defeat the enemy, but
he does not have time to survey a campaign from a fox hole. If he should
be wounded and removed behind the lines, he may have even less opportunity
to learn what place he and his unit had in the larger fight .
AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION is a series prepared by the War
Department especially for the information of wounded men. It will show
these soldiers, who have served their country so well, the part they and their
comrades played in achievements which do honor to the record of the United
States Army.
G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff·
111
WAR DEPARTMENT
Historical Division
Washington 25, D. C.
20 September 1945
Omaha Beachhead, seventh of a series called American Forces In Action, is the
first of a number of narratives dealing with U. S. military operations in
France. Utah Beach to Cherbourg, planned for later publication, will round
out the account of the invasion at corps level and below. Larger phases of
the NEPTUNE operation, including high-level planning, naval operations,
and the action of British units, are treated here only in outline.
Omaha Beachhead was prepared in the field by the 2d Information and
Historical Service, attached to First Army, and by the Historical Section,
European Theater of Operations. Although as published this book con
tains no documentation, the original manuscript, fully documented, is on
file in the War Department. It is based on complete unit reports and
records, on interviews, and on available enemy records. Some unit records
for the period concerned are inadequate, and despite all care used in re
search and assembly of the materials, it i$ recognized that the information
is not complete in all details and may involve minor errors of fact. Before
a final official history of the campaign in France is prepared, the gaps
should be filled and the errors corrected. This can be done only if indi
viduals who possess additional information will furnish it to the War
Department. Readers are therefore urged to send directly to the Histori
cal Division, War Department, Washington 25, D. c., all comments, criti
cisms, and additional data which may help in the preparation of a complete
and definitive history of this operation.
PHOTOGRAPHS. Sources of photographs are as follows: Acme Newspictures, Inc. (pp. 26, 45, 51, 55, 68,118,
137.152); Associated Press (pp_ 107 and 108); Life (p. 109); the U. S. Navy (pp. 12, 13, 36, 39, 90. 94, 105, 131,
131); the U. S. Coast Guard (pp. 15, 24,37,40,44); the U. S. Army Air Forces (pp. 11, 15, 27, 59, 64, 66, 72, 84,
86,102,124)' All other photographs acc by the U. S. Army Signal Corps, except eight from official War Depart
ment sources (pp_ 23. 67. 69. 104, 105. 142, 146, 160). Photographs from Acme Newspictures, Inc., Associated
Press, and Life may Dot be reproduced without the approval of Ihe War Deparrment.
FAA-7
IV
CONTENTS
P4&'
OPERAn ON NEPTUNE ....... ....•....... , ........ , . , .... , . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . 1
Navy and Air Forces. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
21 Army Group."" .................... ........ .. . ............ 3
V Corps Planning .. , . ... . ... . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . 6
ASSAULT PLAN." ............. . 8
Terrain. . . . . . . . . . . . ......... . 10
E'lemy DejmseJ. . .......... . 20
Pre-Assault Bombardmmt Plans. 28
Plan of Assat"t Landings ......... . 30
Plan for Movement to Inland Objectives. 33
D DAY: THE LANDINGS ............................ ................ ... .. 35
Approach to the Beach. . ................................... . 38
The Initial Assault Wave .......................... . , ......... ... ........ . 42
Th, Later Assault Waves: 116th RCT ....................... ,., ............ , 49
Th, Lat" Assault Waves: 16th RCT .. ................. , ............... .. . ,' 53
Conditions on th, B,ach: 0730-(}800 ... ....•...•..............•..•.. .•..... .• , 54
ASSAULT OF THE BLUFFS ......... . 58
Th, Advance from Dog Whit, ............. . 59
Th, Advanc< b,tween D-3 and E-l Draws .. 63
Th, Adva1lce from Easy Red ... 65
The Adva'lce from Fox Grem. 73
Other Assault Actions ............ . 75
The B,ach: 0800-1200. . ......•. .. , . 79
Landing oj RtinJorcemmts on Easy Red ....... .... .... . 82
The Rangers at Poillte du Hoe. . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . ........ ...... . 87
ADV ANCE INLAND ..................................... ........... ...... . 92
Vierville Area. .. . .... ............................. .. .. .......... . 93
St-Laurent Area ................... .................. ........ ........ .... . 97
Col/,vil/, Ar'a ..................................................... .... . 98
Afternoon on the Beach. ........ . ........... . 101
At th, End of D Day. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. . 107
Th, En,my Sid,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... . 112
ATTAINMENT OF D-DAY OBJECTIVES (7-8Juno). ......... . 116
Trlvieres-Tour-en-Beuin (lst Division) ................... . 116
Grandcamy--lsigny Ar,a (29th Division). . . . . . ........... . 122
Improvement at the Beach ............ . 131
Th, Enemy Sid, .................................................. . 134
THE ATTACK OF 9--11 JUNE ............ . 136
Adva11ce to Cerisy Forest (lst and 2d Divisions). 138
Acro.I! the Lower Aure (29th Division) ... . 143
The Elltm] Sid,. . . . . . .. .. ...... . 147
THE ATTACK OF 12-13 JUNE .............. .... ... , ............. ......... . 150
Advance to Caumont. . ................ . 151
Crouing the EUe River. . . ....... .............. . 153
Action West of the Vire. . . . . . . . . ...... . 157
Th, Enemy Sid,. .. . ....... . 159
CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . .. .. .. .. .. .. 163
ANNEX NO. 1: Unit Citations............. .......... .......... ........ 164
ANNEX NO. 2: Abbreviations. .......................... ... .......... " 165
v
Illustrations
PII&'
U. S. Commanders .......... ....... ............ .. ...................... . VILt
Unit Comtnanders ....................................... .. .. ........... . 8
Th, Cwetnt Curv, of Omaha B,ach ..... ........•........ ..•. 10
Th, Gent!. Sloping Tidal Flat ........•...•..........•..... 11
Th, Shingle Embankment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... .....•.. ..... 12
Th, B,ach Flat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .• . . . . . . . . . . . .... ............. . 13
Atth, Westtm End of Omaha. . ....... ........ . 14
Marshes Alon~ th, B,ach Flat. . ...... . 14
Along Easy R,d Sector. .... ...... .. . . . . . . . . . . ... ...... .. ........ ...... . 15
E-1 Draw..... . .... ... ................ ......... ... .. .... ............ .. . 15
Hedgerows .... . 17
Sunkm Roads .......... . 18
T,tvieres . 18
Underwater ObstacLes. . . . ........ ...... ............ .................... . 21
Pillbox near Vier.iII, Draw CD-1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... .... . 23
GU,J Emplacement Ovtrlooking Beach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. . 24
Trwches Along th, Bluff Edg'. . ..... .. ........ .......... ........ .. 26
Emmy Short De/enses . . ............. ....... .. .. .... ....... ............ . 27
German Mortar Position. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... ..... . 28
Landing Diagram, Omaha Beach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. . 31
Loading LST' J for the Invasion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... . 36
Th, Lane of Ships. . . . . .• . . . . . . . . . . . ................•. 37
Landillg Craft. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . ........... ....... ..... .. . 39
Mist and Smok, Obscured Landmarks. . ........ ... ....... .......... . 40
Assault lAnding ..... . . 44
Smoke From Grass Fires. 45
Men From Wreck,d lAllding Craft. 46
Th, Obstacles Wer, Used as Shelter ...................•..... .. 51
Artillery Fire Cotlcentrated on Larger Craft ............. ........ . 55
Noon of D Day, Dog White ..................... ...............•. 59
Penetration Area, 116th Infantry ..... .. ........... ......... .. . 60
Profile Vi,w of Bluffs, Dog Whitt ......... ................ .. . 61
Easy Green. ......... . ..... .......... . 63
Easy R,d. . . ....................... . 67
E-1 StrongpOitlt. . . . . . .......... ..... .... . 68
Path Through Mimfields. . ................. . 69
Ad.allet from Easy R,d ..... ................... . 70
Roc~. L,dges. . . . . . . .. . .....•... .... .... ..... 74
Beach Sector Charlie. 76
The !lFortified" House. 76
Th, Bluffs on Dog Gmll. 78
Vehicles are Held on the Tidal Flat ..... ... ......... . . 81
High-Tid, Landings. 83
A Crowd,d B,ach. 84
Th, Tip of Point, du Ho,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .• . . . 89
Th, Cliffs at Point, du Hot. . . •. . . . . . . . . . 90
The Viert!ille Draw Under Fire. . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . '. ..... 94
H,ad of D-J Draw. . . .. ............................. ......... .... ..... .. .. ... 96
Entrance t~ Colleville from West. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
VI
p,,&,
Landings Were Delay,d. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • • . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . 102
Breaches itt the Shingle Emhankment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
The E-1 Exit Road. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . • . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . • . 105
Roadblocks Were Demolished. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . 105
Wreckage on Easy R,d ..........•.......•..... , . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . 107
D,btis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . .• . . . • . . .• . . . . . . • . . . •. . . . . . • . . .•. . . . . 108
Wreckage Littered the Beaches. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 109
A Pillbox Used as H,adquarters. . . . . . . . . . . . •. . . • .. . . . . .• . . •. . . •. ..• . .• . . . . . . . . . 115
Tanks Roll Through Coli, viII,. . . . . . • • . . • . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Observation Was Difficult. . . . . . . . . .. . . .• . . .. . . .• . . . • . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . 120
T.,pical Norman Orchard. . . . . . .•. . . . . ... . .•. . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . .• . . .• .. .•. . .•. ... . 125
Damag' in Isigny. . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . • • . . . • . . • . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Organizing th, B,ach.. ......... ..•..••......•... ....••.•...........•..••. .•.. 131
Landing Supplies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . • • . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . • . . 132
The 2d Division Starts Inland. . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • . . . •. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . •.. • . . 137
The Approach to Trtvieres. . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . .. . . .. .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
The Aure Rivrr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .• . . . •• . • . . . •• . . • . . • . . .• . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . .. . 142
eerisy Forest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . .. . 146
Caumont. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . 152
A German 88-MM. . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . • . 160
I,1Jignia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . ... .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . ... . .. . . . .. . .. ... . . . . . . .. .. . . 162
LCI 91. . .. . .. . .... .. .. .•. . .. . . ........•..••..•.. ... . .. .. .. . . ... .•. .. . . . . ... 167
Maps
N •. p,,&,
1 Disposition of German Forces in the West, 6 JlIne 1944 .. ....................... . 4
2 Emmy D'fenses at D-3 Draw (Its Moulins) ................•.. .. ..•...•.. .... 22
3 The Advance hetwem D-3 and E-1 Draws ........... ........... ............. . 64
4 Advance from Easy Red .................... ........•..............••..... 66
5 The Penetration at Fox Green ......... ................................. ... . 72
6 The 2d Ranger Battalion at Pointe du Hoe, 6 June .......................•... .. . 86
7 Th, Relief of Pointe d" Hoe, 7-8 fum. . ..................•...•...•..... 124
8 Action a! Gralldcamp, 8 June . . . . . . . . .. . ................................. . 129
9 Caret/lan- Isigny Area, 12-13 June ..................................... .. . 156
Maps I- XVI are in attached envelope
I Invasion Area
II Omaha Beach Te"ain
III Terraill IlIlalld from Omaha B,ach
W D-Day Obj,ctives, V Corps
V First Wave Lalldings (Illfantry)
VI Later Auault Landings (Infalllry)
VII Vierville-St-Laurent Area (To Noon 6 fum)
VIIf St-Laurtllt-Col/,vi/l, Ar,a (To Noon 6 fum)
IX Evening of D Day
X The D-Day B,achh,ads
XI 1st Division, 7-8 June
XII 29th Division, 7-8 june
XIII Enem,'Y Rein/orcemmts, 6-8 June
XW V Corps Attack, 9-11 j um
XV V Corps Attack, 12-13 jun,
XV I Development 0/ the Beachheads
Vll
U. S. COMMANDERS IN THE OMAHA BEACHHEAD OPERATIONS
Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, General Dwight
D. Eisenhower (Ranks as of June 1944; Photograph taken July 1944)
V1l1
OPERATION NEPTUNE
Two YEARS of planning and prepara bourg and Ie Havre were within striking
tion led up to the Allied landings in Nor distance; and air attacks on railways and
mandy on 6 June 1944. British and Ameri river bridges might be able to isolate the
can staffs had to work out every foreseeable region behind the assault area from the main
detail for an undertaking that would involve enemy centers of supply and reinforcement
the major military resources of the two to the east, In comparison with the stretch
Allied powers; immense stocks of shipping, of coast northeast of the Seine (Pas-de
aircraft, and supplies were assembled in the Calais), along the narrowest part of the
British Isles in an effort that taxed the war English Channel, western Normandy was
industries of both countries; before D Day somewhat further from English bases but
the Allied air forces had carried out several was not as heavily fortified. At the Quebec
months of bombing operations which were Conference in August 1943 Allied leaders
an integral part of the invasion itself. approved the choice of -chis battleground
The first decisions were strategic in the for invasion.
broadest sense, since the opening of a front The staffs of ground forces, air forces, and
in Western Europe had to be considered in navies had now entered the second stage of
reference to over-all Allied plans for offen planning for the largest amphibious opera
sive operations against Germany, as well as tion in military history. The tactical diffi
the developments of the war in Russia and culties to be faced were only one part of a
of the war against Japan. In May 1943 the problem that required complete coordina
Anglo-American conference in Washington tion and teamwork, not merely between the
concluded this stage of strategiC planning; military forces of two nations but also be
Prime Minister Churchill and President tween all arms of those forces. Planning
Roosevelt together with their highest mili necessarily included preparation for opera
tary advisers decided to launch an offensive tions over an extended period of time, and
in 1944 against Hitler's Atlantic Wall. had to cover far more than the initial task
Allied planners, after weighing all the of securing beachheads. In some respects
possibilities, finally selected SO miles of the critical factor was the Allies' ability to
coast in western Normandy, from the Vire reinforce and supply the assault rapidly
Estuary to the Orne, as the assault area for enough both to meet enemy counterattacks
securing a lodgement. This area was near and to prepare for a larger Allied offensive
good, relatively undamaged ports in south beyond the landing area. The Allied navies
ern and southwestern England, and was in and services of supply had to solve logistical
range of fighter planes operating from Eng problems on which would depend the fate
lish bases; the major French ports of Cher- of the whole undertaking.
1