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Ockham’s Assumption of Mental Speech <UN> Investigating Medieval Philosophy Managing Editor John Marenbon Editorial Board Margaret Cameron Simo Knuuttila Martin Lenz Christopher J. Martin VOLUME 6 The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/imp <UN> Ockham’s Assumption of Mental Speech Thinking in a World of Particulars By Sonja Schierbaum LEIDEN | BOSTON <UN> Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Schierbaum, Sonja. Ockham’s assumption of mental speech : thinking in a world of particulars / by Sonja Schierbaum. pages cm. -- (Investigating medieval philosophy, ISSN 1879-9787 ; VOLUME 6) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-27734-2 (hardback : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-90-04-27762-5 (e-book) 1. William, of Ockham, approximately 1285-approximately 1349. 2. Philosophy of mind. 3. Language and languages--Philosophy. 4. Semantics. 5. Thought and thinking. I. Title. B765.O34S35 2014 128’.2--dc23 2014016069 This publication has been typeset in the multilingual “Brill” typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, ipa, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities. For more information, please see www.brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 1879-9787 isbn 978-90-04-27734-2 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-27762-5 (e-book) Copyright 2014 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Global Oriental and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. 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This book is printed on acid-free paper. <UN> Contents Acknowledgements vii Abbreviations viii Introduction 1 1 The Basic Characteristics of Language: Signification and Supposition 12 1.1 Introduction 12 1.2 Signification and Supposition of Terms: First Approximation 14 1.3 Absolute vs. Connotative Terms 21 1.4 The Narrow and the Wider Sense of ‘Signify’ (significare) 24 1.5 The Property of Supposition 37 1.5.1 The ‘Standard’ Case: (Personal) Supposition and the Truth and Falsity of Affirmative Propositions 47 1.5.2 Personal Supposition of Terms and ‘Taking a Term Significatively’ (sumi significative) 55 1.5.3 Improper Use and Improper Supposition 64 1.5.4 Simple and Material Supposition 70 1.6 Summary 78 2 Ockham’s Semantic Model: Subordination, Correspondence, and the Role of Mental Speech with Respect to Spoken Language 80 2.1 Introduction 80 2.2 Signification in Relation to Subordination and Imposition 82 2.3 Conventional Signification and Equivocation 93 2.4 Mental Propositions and Spoken Propositions: The Relation of Correspondence 102 2.4.1 The General Explanation of ‘Truth’ and ‘Falsity’ 111 2.4.2 Correspondence: Synonymy Again 123 2.4.3 Correspondence: Equivocation Again 129 2.5 Demonstratives, Correspondence, and Supposition of Mental Terms 134 2.6 Summary 143 3 Ockham’s Model of Thought 146 3.1 Introduction 146 3.2 How to Acquire an Absolute Simple Concept 152 <UN> vi contents 3.2.1 The Three Steps of Concept Acquisition 155 3.2.2 Some Objections 171 3.3 Ockham’s Model of Non-Propositional and Propositional Acts 174 3.3.1 Propositional Acts of Apprehension: Mental Propositions 178 3.3.2 Propositional Acts of Apprehension: Spoken Propositions 185 3.3.3 Acts of Judgement 190 3.3.3.1 The First Kind of Assent 194 3.3.3.2 The Second Kind of Assent 199 3.4 Intuitive Cognition and Evident Judgement 203 3.4.1 General Propositions and Evident Judgement: propositiones per se notae 215 3.5 Summary 228 4 Why Ockham Is Not Fodor 231 4.1 Behaviourism vs. Cognitive Science 233 4.2 Fodor on Language Acquisition 236 4.3 Fodor’s Language of Thought (lot) 240 4.4 Fodor on Mental States and Acts 242 4.5 Why Ockham Is Not Fodor (Summary) 249 5 Conclusion 251 Bibliography 257 Index of Names 264 Index of Subjects 266 <UN> Acknowledgements The present work is a revised version of my doctoral thesis, which I defended in June, 2012 at the University of Hamburg, Germany. My doctoral research was conducted under the supervision of Wolfgang Künne and Dominik Perler. I am deeply indebted to both. As a student, I learned from Wolfgang Künne how to use the ‘tools’ of analytical philosophy fruitfully. I benefited enormously from his incisive criticism. Dominik Perler made me aware of the richness of medieval philosophy. He always gave me the greatest possible encouragement and support. I am also indebted to many colleagues for much feedback and stimu- lating conversations about Ockham’s philosophy, especially to Martin Klein, Martin Lenz, Calvin Normore, Claude Panaccio, and Mikko Yrjönsuuri. Special thanks go to Christian Nimtz for taking the trouble to go through drafts of this work. His detailed comments helped to give it its final shape. Any remaining errors in form and content are entirely my own. <UN> Abbreviations Brev. Summa Physic. Brevis Summa Libri Physicorum Exp. Aur. Expositio aurea et admodum utilis super artem veterem edita per venerabilem inceptorem fratrem Guilielmum de Occham cum questionibus Alberti parvi de Saxonia Exp. in Libr. Art. Logicae Expositionis in Libros Artis Logicae Prooemium Exp. in Perih. Expositio in Librum Perihermenias Aristotelis Exp. Porph. Expositio in Librum Porphyrii de Praedicabilibus Exp. in Praedicament. Expositio in Librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis op Guillelmi de Ockham Opera Philosophica Ord. Ordinatio. Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum ot Guillelmi de Ockham Opera Theologica Rep. Reportatio. Quaestiones in Libros II, III, IV Sententiarum sl Summa Logicae Summ. Phil. Nat. Summula Philosophiae Naturalis Quaest. in Phys. Quaestiones in Libros Physicorum Aristotelis Quaest. Var. Quaestiones Variae Quodl. Quodlibeta Septem <UN>