Occupation Haiti - The eagle is landing (The Nation, 3 Oct 1994).pdf (PDFy mirror)

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The Nation.
344 October 3, 1994
Washington, where only one proposed sale has even been planner, to stay for three years, bringing in several hundred
voted on by Congress in the past decade. U.S. trainers to mold a 5,000-man Haitian force.
It must be asked whether generating smaller-than-imagined “For me, the occupation will be an invasion against the
net trade surpluses andjo bs while diverting economic resources Haitian people,” says exilepde asant leader and Aristide Cab-
into a wasteful, unpalatable and ultimately unsustainable sec- inet member Chavannes Jean-Baptiste. “And nothing good
tor of economic activity is a habit America can or should pro- will come of this for the popular movement.”
long. Given the long-range prospects, it’s clethara t disclosing
the now-hidden costs associated with sales, gradually phasingT h e United States has long demonstrated its aversion to
out government financing of weaponst ransfers, establishing mass politics in Haiti. Jean-Claude Duvalier, for exam-
controls on offsets and transferring fundtos public and civilian ple, was toppled, according to a colonel who helped do it,i n
spending would enhancen ot only world peacaen d America’s an attempt to stave off “massivien ternal uprisings.” Col. Ste-
human rights record but its economy too. 0 ven Butler, the former planning chief for U.S. armed forces
in the Caribbean, says, “In terms of maintaining the military
OCCUPATION HAITI as an institution, Duvalier had to be eased out.”
The Eagle Washington had backed Duvalier even though, according
to Butler, U.S. radar had detected that his ranch was being
used to run cocaine intot he United States.O nly when it looked
Is Landing as if the populace might sweep the system aside did Washing-
ton decide that he had tog o. Likewise, it backed the military
plotters who ousted DuvaIier eventh ough Butler says thetyo o
ALLAN NAIRN wanted a share of the drug trade. In both cases the United
States preferred criminals to a spontaneous popular force.
or the second time this century,t he U.S. government The same feeling holds today, though complicated circum-
has announced that itw ill occupy Haiti to establish stance has put Washington in an awkward relationship with
democracy. The result the first time was a nineteen- the exiled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. But even if the
_I year occupation that re-instituted virtual slavery, United States formally has to back the man (and some offi-
claimed more than 15,000 Haitian lives and ended in the crea- cials are still searching for a way out), there is nothing that
tion of an army that has terrorized the country to this day. compels it to tolerate his constituents, much less the radical
This time, many thingasr e different but, as beforet, he Unit- ideas that drew them to him.
ed States is planning to prevent the Haitian population from In early September, speaking on background, one of the
taking politics into its own hands andt o forestall the danger Pentagon’s senior occupation policy-makers said that joint
of radical mass mobilization. patrols between U.S. troops and “the rump of the Haitian po-
According to documents and extensive conversations with lice” willp robably be usedt o maintain order in thee vent that
US. military and intelligence planners, no matter how Lieut. “somebody from the hills decidest o starta n insurgency.” Po-
Gen. Raoul CCdras is removed-whether through invasion, tential insurgents, he said, include “Aristide followersa cting
coup or deal-the United States intends to contain Haiti’s in the spirit of Lavalas,” the political coalition that brought
popular movement, by force if necessary. The objective, in the Aristide to power.
words of one U.S. Army Psychological Operations official, One US. Psy Ops official who specializesi n Haitip redicts
is to see to it thaHt aitians “don’t get the idea that they can that, if there is an invasion, initially peoplwe ill cheer the ouster
do whatever they want.” of CCdras, but that‘ ‘canti-U.S.s entiment”-indeed, popular
The occupation scenarios being discussed involve elements attacks on U.S. forces-could be expected within a four-week
from thev ery Haitian armed forces and police whoa re today period. This would be less likelyA irfi stide were to come back
the ostensible U.S. adversary. These scenarios also include fast, but even then, he said, the danger of uprising would re-
faces familiar from earlier U.S. assaults on Panama, El Sal- main if popular expectations were not met soon. He said,
vador, Nicaraguaa nd Guatemala, as wella s such familiart ac- “You publicize that you’re simply not going to tolerate that
tics as suppression of demonstrations, activation of U.S. kind of stuff.)’
intelligence cent-acts within rightist paramilitary fronts, mass With regard to mass. demonstrations, .an intelligence offi-
detention of civilians and theta pping of political databanks. cial said: “Simple. You don’t let it happen. There is no such
Although the Phase I US. occupation force is expected to thing as a demonstration while you’re there.”
leave within weeks or monthso f Cedras’sd eparture, and the A contractor who works for the State Department said
Phase I1 U.N. forcet o get out by February 1996, a host of U.S. that then aval task force now standing off Haiti hasr eplaced
military, C.I.A. and civilian advisers arsel ated to stay behind, its stocks of anti-armor weaponry with crowd-control gear
participating in Haitian affairs more deeply than they have including shields, gas masaknsd clubs. He said fearsw ere run-
in years. ICITAP, for example, tlie-U.S. agency assigtnoe rde - ning high in Haiti about thep ossibility of U.S. troops con-
build the Haitianp olice, is due, according to its chief Haiti fronting organized slum dwellers, an encounter that would
have “obvious consequences” for the unarmed Haitians.
~
Allan Nairn has coveredU S. operatrons m Latin America and Some U.S. officials who’ve workedi n Haiti over the years
Asia since 1980. are fairly frank ind escribing what they see as theb asic U.S.
The Nation.
October 3, 1994 345
program. One veteran intelligence officer said that ane arly
priority for occupying forces should be to establish comfort
for “the people who would feel protected by us: the middle
class, the US.-educated, some oft he business community77-
those who live up on thhei lls above the privation of Port-au-
Prince. He stressed the need to keep the bourgeoisie from flee-
ing, and from getting the idea that “their servants might come
at them with tires,’’ or that, if they left, they mightr eturn home
one night and find that “thepeupleh ave movedi nto the house
and are building fires on the floor? The goal of an occupa- “The Assassinatiolz is a hard-
b
tion, he said, should be “to doi t right, which means people swin~~ ging, unapologehc indict-
don’t resist and people don’t go up the hill.” ment of the communication
culture that refusest o admit the
He added thatA ristide’s old reformist economic program
humanity of black Amencans,
had now passed into history and would probably not be per- especiallyI f they’re men. Those who
mitted to be revived.I f Bill Clinton had tried a minimum-wage desplse code and value wordws ill
hike the magnitudeo f Aristide’s (from $2 to $4 per day), he marvel at Hutchmson’s ability to cu i
to the chase and make eacpho mt
said, “they’d be hanging[ him]i n the Congress.’, The blunt fact unequivocally, forcefully, cogently,
is that “if you want to compet‘e youd o it theo ld-fashioned irrefutably in as short a space as
way: You havec heaper labor than Mexico, cheapert han Santo possible
”
-Mike Dunham
Doming0 and theC aribbean.” Echoing U.S. Commerce and
Andzorage D~a.d y News
Labor Department reports, which persistently makteh e same ISBN 1-881032-11-6 $9.95
point, he said, “You.’ve got to take advantage of what asset 160pp Softcover
Published Aprd 1994
you have, and in Haiti that happenst o be cheap labor.”
Maj. Louis Kernisan,a Defense Intelligence Agency (D.I.A.)
Ask for it at your local bookstore
attach6 in Haiti from 1989 through 1991, says, “Popular upris- ’
ing? Under the watchful eye of 6,000 or 7,000 international MIDDLE PASSAGE’PR0 5E,51S7 S& est Drive,
observers? I doubt it. This is onlyt he kind of shit they’ve been LOS h~eleCs,A 90083-2029 1-800-959-9323
. . .
able to get away with when there is nobody watching.
They tried that before and it brought themt wo years of,em-
bargo and their Iittle guy in golden exile in,the States.”
Kernisan, who was born in Haiti and grew up in the States,
with a French father and Haitianm other, went into business
in Haiti afters erving in the U.S. Embassy; he returned to the,
States after the post-couepm bargo wrecked hisi mport firm.
Earlier, while at the U.S. Army Command andG eneral Staff
College, he did his thesis on Aristide, attacking him for views
“radically out of the Haitianm ainstream.” He writes: “There
is no question that Aristide was popular, especially qongt he
wretched Haitian masses,’’ but “no one checked his qualifica-
tions’, and he “didn ot take into considerationt he needs oft he
bourgeoisie, the army, and other influential sectors.’’ According
to Kernisan, the 1915-34 U.S. occupation “clearly benefited
the island in a number of respects, IbutI’Haitian xenophobia
took over and the Americans were asked to leave,’, whereupon
the people “went backt o their old shenanigans.” Fortunately,
he says,“ an able referee was poised to call the game, the Garde New England Lives in
d’Haiti,” which became today’s Haitian armed forces. He
the Industria€R evolution
also questions Aristide’s abolition of “the dreaded ‘section
chiefs,’, the rurals ecurity czars whhoa d offered “an uncom-
”
fortable but working legal arrangement.” Without them,
. .
“rural populations [were] left to police themselves.” “Impressively researched. , A valuable addition to the
Kernisan is now one of the key occupation figures, and is scholar‘s shelf. The data provide the single m.o .s .t detailed
description of women and work a century ago. A striking
devising the plan to retrain Haiti’sp o1ice:As soon as the occu-
revision of [Dublin’sj previous work.”
pation is under way, he is due to go to Haiti toim plement it.
-John‘ Mack Faragher, The New Ymk Times Book Review
He operates out of ICITAP,a n offshoot of the’F.B.1.t hat was
created in 1986 to provide training for the security forces of $35.00 cloth At bookstores or to charge call 607-277-2211
El Salvador and Guatemala. C O R N E L L U N Z V E R S Z T Y P R E S S
Current US. planning calls for dissolving the Haitian Army Sage ,House 512 East State Street 0 Ithaca NY 14850
346 The Nation. October 3. 1994
,
and police, and then reconstituting them under close U.S. The United States, though, has always found,s omeoge to
management. Approximately 1,500 of the current officer perform that role if necessary. Colonel Butler, sfaoyrs ,e xam-
corps and enlisted men would be musteinretdo the new forces. ple, that after Baby Doc was ousted and the HaitianA rmy
U.S. spokespeople have said publicly that thew orst human disarmed its rivals in the TontonMacoutes, there was~“ato tal
rights violators will be “screened out.” vacuum” in the internal security role:“ In thaty ear and a half
But, within the Haitian security forces and paramilitary to two yearsa fter Duvalier fell, things werien such a flux. De-
i fronts, the United States has a large network of U.S. Army mocracy, freedom, people were suddenly publishing-writing
trainees,D .I.A. inforrnants and paid C.I.A. assets,A nd some in Creole for the first time-everybody was very enthusiastic,
I U.S. officials say, not surprisingly, that theyf ully intend to and really thought something was going to change, and so
use these men. Kernisan,f or one, saysh e has a Iist of reliable there were a lot of strange people coming and going, and we
,
. Haitian officers. Although U.S. intelligence may be willing didn’t know who they wereA. nd nobody had a handle on it,
to cashier specific abusers-especially those who’ve become particularly in the outback, because the Tonton Macoutesh ad
political burdens-the distinctions they make while doing had total control in the interior and now they were gone.”
their sorting do not center on questions of human rights. The Macoutes, not thea rmy, Butler saysh,a d run the main
I When it comes, for example, tot he F W H ,t he right-wing informers network, and had even been in charge of tapping
paramilitary hit squad,o ne U.S. intelligence official who knows phones. The army, seeking to rebuild itself ,and the system,
the force well says that its numberdwo man, Louis Jodel turned to the United States for help. But Congress blocked
Chamblain, is “a cold-blooded, cutthroat, psychopathic kill- the requested aid, and theC .I.A. moved in, quickly fillingt he
’
er,” but that his boss, FRAPH chief Emannuel Constant,i s vacuum by creating Haiti’s National Intelligence Service,o r
a leading “young pro-Western intellectual . . . no further SIN, ostensibly an antinarcotics group, which watcahnedd at-
right than a Young Republican;, he would be considered center-ta cked Haitian dissidents. Aristide attempted-without’suc-
right in the United States.”H uman rights groups and survivors cess-to shut it down. Informed officials say that Donald
of FRAPH torture detect no difference betweenth e two. The Terry, then with the C.I.A. station in Haiti, told Aristide’s
US. official, though, calls c,cT~toC’o7n stant a man one could people that the United States would seet o it that the SIN was
work with,a nd even divulgedt hat, contrary to Washington’s reformed but that its continued operation was beyond ques-
public posture, U.S. intelligence “encour~ged”C onstant to tion. Reached for comment at his current post in Pqis, Terry
form what emerged as the FRAPH. said he did not speak to journalists.
I
Moreover, as one senior Pentagon official put it, “The Although it’s often claimed that U.S. training will reform
human rights abusers will be vetted out and yet somehow the security men, it is, of courset, he case that many of them
’.
taken care of.” They ared ue to be “retrained” and given U.S.- are already U.S.-trained, including CCdraas nd the legendarily
funded jobs (with the Agency forI ntefnational Development’s brutal police chief, Michel Franqois, as well as a number of
Office of Transition Initiative slated to help out) but “not FRAPH leaders. The C.I.A., for example, ran a course for
enough authority to go out and use a truncheon on somebody.” Haitian operatives, which, accordintgo Haitian officials, was
taught by two white North Americans and included instruc-
tion ins urveillance, interrogation and weaponry. The point
of training is simply efficiencyw; hat matters is the mission.
Today,’theC .I.A.i s beefing up its Haiti station,b ringing
in more operatives and recruiting’newH aitian assets. Many
such officialst,h ough brought in to help witht he occupation,
wil’l, like the hundreds of trainers with ICITAP, stay until
political order is assured.
,
Th e occupation of Haiti can be expected to be run accord-
ing to U.S. military doctrine. Among the key precepts is
what the Army’s Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict
manual calls “the Imperative of political dominance.” The
.official study of the Panamao ccupation, for example, notes
that theo riginal post-invasion plans called for outright U.S.
military government, withth e head ofU S. SouthernC ommand
acting as Panama’dse facto ruler. Att he last minutea decision
was made to install Guillermo Endara as President (he was
sworn in on a U.S. Army base), but his government was, as
the Pentagon study put it, “merely a facade.” Beyond formali-
ties for the public, the U.S. military task force “found thati t
had noc hoice but [to] lead the Government of Panama.” A
U.S. generd had a desk in Endara’s office and was patched
into the President’s radio communications network.
Relations-w ith Endara, however, were “relatively harmo-
The Nation.
1994 October 3. , 347
nious.” In Haiti, Aristide has had a program, and constitu- ing ringleaders of unrest and in weeding out troublemakers.”
ency, fundamentally at odds with U.S. goals. Although one According to Captain Vick, the Creole-speaking interpreters
senior,Pentagon planner says that “the sooner we can get at thec amps submitt o daily debriefings which “yield. . . an
Aristide in there to give his message orfe conciliation and law information harvest’’ on possible “destabilizingi nfluences.”
and order, the better off we’ll all be,” others are uncertain In August, Haitians at the Guant&namo Bay camp rebelled
about whether he will play balIb ut note that, regardless, he against the use of Duvalieristo, penly anti-Aristide interpret-
won’t really be in charge.T he Psy Ops official, for one,’says ers, some reportedly related to leaders of the FRAPH.
that, under occupation, much oft he Haitian military/admin- The 96th’~fi les on refugees, of course, enter the military
istrative infrastructure will transfer its loyalty to the new “bi inteIligence systemI.t is illegafl or the I.N.S. to share its data,
gwo neg (‘big man’),’’ meaning “whoever is settinthg erules.” and people associated with the A.I.D. programs deny that
And “the new big man,” he says, “would tbhee United States.” their files will be usfeodr any form of repression. But privacy
The U.S. planners are, nonetheless, worried about their laws and assurances have been known to fold in thef ace of
ability to use their power to maintain street-level dominance. covert operations, which are,b y their acknowledged design,
Many seem to feel they failed badly at this in Panama and illegal and based on lies.
Somalia, and are determined not to make the same mistakes One of the key I.N.S. figures involved in Haitpi olicy isa n
in Haiti. An active-dutyU S. Army colonel who serviend P an- archetypal practitioner of such operations. Gunther Wagner,
ama andis now helpintgo write occupation doctrine says that a veteran of Hitler’s army, was recruited by the United States
because the United States did not put an intimidating force as a military ‘policemani n occupied Germany and went on
on many downtown streets, the PanamaC ity population got to serve the United States in Vietnam (in the Phoenix assas-
out of hand andb egan looting and “redistributing wealth.’’ sination program) and in Nicaragua (as an A.I.DK.1.A.
trainer of Anastasio Somoza’s NationGaul ard) before working
for Somoza personally and thenr eturning to theU .S. fold as
Much of Haiti ’S administrative head of the State Department’Cs uba-Haitit ask force. In 1992,
as an I.N.S. intelligencem an, hew rote a study thati nvolved
infrastructure wZiZ transfer to ‘the compiling files on hundreds of refugees who’db een turned
back fromt he United Statesa nd ended up asserting that 95 per-
new big man’-the United States.
cent of Haitian political asylum claims were fraudulent.
So me U.S. officials say that though they are prepared to
In Panama, the 4th Psychological OperationsG roup, which rein in the popular movement, its capacity for frontal
’ is now preparing to go into Haiti, established a hotline on resistance has been hurt by the winnowing terror of the armed
which memberso f the public were encouraged to dial direct forces and the FRAPH. ThPesy Ops man says that through
to Southern Command and denounce Noriega backers,c rim- spies and “demonstration killings,” the “military has tried to
inals, subversivesa nd anti-U.S. fighters, whow ere then picked atomize society much the way that Pinochet did in Chile. . . .
up by U.S. troops and consigned to detention camps. (In El they’ve largely destroyed civil societ.y . . and the dual use so-
Salvador the 4th Group helped run the army radio station, cial networksth at might be used to plot somes ort of uprising.”
’ which broadcast repeated threats against the Jesuits in the Current planners,h owever, pride themselveso n understand-
days prior to their assassination.) ing that politics and control turn on far more than simple
The U.S. Army also shut down newspapers and radio sta- force. They say they aim to use nuanced analysis and tactics
tions in Panama and rounded up thousands of dissidentsa nd to achieve their goals, with an economical application of vi-
unionists. Kernisans ays mass detentions are “quite possible” olence and even a sensitivity to language. The Psy Ops man
in Haiti. But one knowledgeable colonel said he wonders says this one won’t be like the first ‘occupation“:W e’re not
whether such targeted roundups could be done well in Haiti, going to have our Secretary of State’sayingt hings like William
in part because “there’s probably only three or fouro f us in Jennings Bryan. He entertained some Haitians in Washington
the U.S. military that know Haiti well enough to really get and afterward he said, ‘Imagine that, a nigger speaking
down to the weeds liket hat. We had been in Panama forever French.’ It’s a much more sophisticated world now.’:
’
‘L’
and knew it like the back of our hand.” On August 10, Marine Corps Intelligence convean esedm inaf
But in factv arious U.S. agencies possessr ich lodes of in- at its Quantico, Virginia, headquarters, where its War G,iming ’
telligence: A.I.D., from its programfso r financing and guiding section questioned people from human rights and develop-
Haitian popular groups; the Immigration and Naturalization ment groups. They wanted to know, as one participant put
Service, with computerized files on 58,000 politicaI-asylum it, “who the key players are.’, They were particularly interested
applicants; and Army Intelligence, via the S-2 section of the in voodoo priests and section chiefs, and asked specifically
96th Civil AffairBs attalion, which has been assignedt o mon- about whether there were “warlords” in Haiti. The Army’s
itor the refugees at the GuantSnamo Bay detention camp. 416th Civil Affairs Battalion is setting up similar sessions.
According to a report by Capt. James Vick of the’96th,w ho Likewise, the Pentagon’s Atlantic Command (ACOM)
also served in Panama anidn Desert Storm, the undiet velops has commissioned Booz, Allen, Hamilton, a corporate con-
“networks of informants’’ among the Haitiand etainees and sulting firm, to devise a computer model of Haitian society.
works with Marine CorpsC ounterintelligence in “identify- A similar model was ordered of Iraq for Desert Storm. The
I
348 The Nation. October 3, I994
model tries to predict “the effects of social,p olitical and eco- ation was conceivedo perationally as, essentially,t he United
nomic actions on various sectors of society.” In anA pril 29 States versus the poor. As Butler explains, “You have massive
report BOOZ, Allen presentead “ Power RelationshipM atrix” slums betweent he airport and thhee art of Port-au-Prince,
which dividesH aitian society into seven groups, includingth e and also in anda round the port.” To extract the Americans
“LowerC lassM ajority,” and asks questions like “What from tbe embassy and their suburban homes, you havteo sur-
would mobilize the masses to take action? ” mount the problem that “once internal dissent really starts
The crux of the BOOZA, llen/ACOM planning theory is in Haiti-and it generally starts in Port-au-Prince and ripples
thus: “Whether political power isa direct function of popular outwaJd-the reaction of all these little villages along the
~
support or based on the allegiance of key groups and coer- roads is’immediatelyt o put uapr med barricades. So anybody
~
cion of the remainder of the populace, cohesion of support trying to get in or out of Port-au-Prince has to runa gantlet.”
is a critical question in assessingp olitical power.” They place The pivotal notions behind this practical planning-the
greatest emphasis on theim portance of “Organized CiviSlo - equation of dissent withar med uprising, the definition of the
ciety”“ijopu1ar and profeksional groups, unions and asso-
local poor as the ultimate security threat-are ideas that not
ciations, development workers-seeking to identify the points
, only are deeply embeddedi n U.S. doctrine but also grow out
at which mass cohesion,w ill crack. This, they say, ist he key
of an experienced appreciation of Washington’s actual role in
to any program for “control of the populace.”
exploited countries. Despitthee talk of US. military actions for
Their priority is to build an “organized information bank”
the common good, nuts-and-bolts planners know that in the
and to ruan systematic, ongoing “assessment of the relative
end the United States works through local armies and busi-
strengths of opposition organizations,” as well as of leading
ness classest hat are often not beloved by the local majorities.
“political personalities.” “The tracking of opposition organiza-
The Pentagon can’t usually draw its battle plans counting the
tions,” they say“, should be limited to those which are known
poor on the U.S. side.
to have a basis of political power and some established capa-
Experienced U.S. military officials know that the role of
bility for taking political action.”
occupier-more than thato f swift invadero r covert boss-
As the Washington Office on Haithi as documented in de-
often dramatizes ugly truths. Colonel Butler recalled his ex-
tailed reports, A.I.D. is already exploring this divide-and-
perience in the Dominican Republic in 1965: “For a while we
conquer strategy in Haiti, seeking to cultivate and fund, as
ran these huge detainee camps, and we came under increas-
one embassy memo put it, “responsible elements within the ing flack. . . . What do you do with the civilian detainees if
popular movement” along with “moderate Duvalierist fac-
you’re the intervening power? You’ve got to do something
tions.” When Aristide was in office, U.S. intelligence closely
with them, but for how long and who decides what? These
watched his work with grass-roots groups. Kernisan compiled
are the ,thingsp eople don’t think about when they say let’s
an inventory of “Actions Takebny Aristide Which Ledt o His
just send the military down theraen d kick some butt.” There’s
Overthrow”; it includes a detailed breakdowno f government
also the matter of what Butler calls “the massive needs that
payments to the popular groups, complete witbha nk account
will suddenly revert to thes houlders of the United States im-
numbers, paymendt ates and individuals’ names. This timthee
mediately once youta ke that government out.” Nowth e United
United States wants to choose where the money goes. A.I.D.,
States elite has the best of both worlds: Its firms extract reve-
for one, is planningto target paymentst o local elected officials,
nue from thep eople but Washington is not held accountable
D uring the first week of September, U.S. Marines began for the fact that many of them starve. In an occupation the
United States will openly face a population to which it had
to train in PuertRo ico for a possible evacuation of U.S.
citizens from Haiti.C olonel Butler says hep lanned such an been accustomedt o relating mainly as a distant labor source.
operation in 1986 to be launched in the event that the army As one colonel puts it, “It’sa bject misery, then you look up,
coup against Duvalier did not succeed in pre-empting a mass on the hill at all the mansions. . . . When you occupy,y ou go
popular revolt. Event hat seemingly technical task of evacu- in andt ake over responsibility for all these things.”
Nevertheless, the occupation is still on. And U.S. officials
who know Haiti predict matter-of-factly that after the U.S.-
managed “democratization”th e same classes will bine charge.
envlronmentale quw. the peace movement
far horsing. nuclearwaste, toxlc M~S “Who are we going to go back to save?” Kernisan asks rhe-
tramportotbn. mental heath rlghts
mIe conomies. grcm-rmts bbbylng torically. “You’reg oing-toe nd up dealing witht he same folks
newcwlittm and more
as before, the five familiest hat runt he country, the military
Nineteen leading activists write on the past, present and theb ourgeoisie. They’ret he same folks that are supposed
and future of citizen action in the U.S. to be the badg uys now,b ut the bottomli ne is you know that
’ 48POQeP %a) you’re goingt o always end up dealing with them because they
speak your language, they understand your system, they’ve
been educated in your country. It’s not going to be the slum
guy from CitC Soleil. The best thing he can hope for is prob-
ably ‘Oh, I’ll help you offload your cargo truck.’ Because
from Southwest Research and Information Center, that’s all he has the capacity to do. It’llb e thes ame elites, the
P.O. Box4524, Albuquerque, NM 87104. 505/262-1862
bourgeoisie and the’fivef amilies that run the country.” 0