Objects and Persons

216 Pages·2001·0.83 MB·English

by  Trenton Merricks

Objects and Persons
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Objects and Persons
Trenton Merricks
CLARENDON PRESS · OXFORD
2001
Great Clarendon Street,Oxford OX2 6DP
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© Trenton Merricks 2001
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First published 2001
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Merricks,Trenton.
Objects and persons / Trenton Merricks.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Ontology. 2. Whole and parts (Philosophy). 3. Agent (Philosophy).
4. Causation. I. Title.
BD396.M47 2001 110—dc21 00–068260
ISBN 0–19–924536–3
For Laura
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Preface
Ontological discovery is not empirical. But ontologists do make discoveries. Empirical investigation might tell us that
an object is perforated. But it won't discover that there are holes,surrounded by (or partially composing) perforated
objects. Only a good argument could discover that. We can see that one thing is the same colour as another. But
whether this implies the existence of a universal,present in both,must be resolved philosophically. Census-takers may
count us. But only an ontologist can find out whether there is a number that numbers us.
Ontological discovery is not empirical. But ontologists do make discoveries. Or so say believers in ontology. And I
believe. If seeing were believing,then by the end of this book you would believe too. For—assuming my arguments are
successful—ontological discoveries follow.
I shall argue that there are no inanimate macrophysical objects such as statues or baseballs or rocks or stars. But my
‘eliminativism’ about these objects—like (so one might argue) controversial ontological claims about holes,universals,
and numbers—is consistent with the empirically established facts. This is because,as we shall see,I agree with my
opponents that there are microscopica arranged in various ways,such as ‘statuewise’, ‘baseballwise’, ‘rockwise’,and
‘starwise’.
Chapter 1 explains eliminativism in detail and addresses challenges to its coherence. Chapter 2 raises a number of
considerations that motivate eliminativism. In Chapter 3 we find that,if things like statues and baseballs existed,
everything they allegedly cause would be caused by their parts; if statues
viii PREFACE
and baseballs existed,they would be —at best—wholly causally redundant. This,I argue,leads to their elimination.
So much for what there is not. The next three chapters deal with what there is,focusing primarily on us human
organisms. Chapter 4 argues that we have ‘non-redundant’ causal powers—we can cause things not causally
overdetermined by our proper parts—and that this keeps us from being eliminated by the arguments of Chapter 3.
Chapter 5 shows why Chapter 2's considerations do not motivate eliminating us.
Chapter 4's arguments work only if some conscious mental states are causally efficacious. So Chapter 6 blocks a serious
argument for mental epiphenomenalism. That chapter also argues,among other things,that incompatibilists about free
will should endorse the claim that we have non-redundant causal powers of the sort defended in Chapter 4. At least,
incompatibilists should endorse this if they believe that we are human organisms who act freely.
The seventh and final chapter argues that,though both believe falsely,someone who believes in statues (and baseballs
and rocks and the rest) is better off than someone who believes in unicorns.
My ontology is,more or less,in the tradition of those (arguably Aristotle's,obviously van Inwagen's) that endorse
organisms and eliminate inanimate composite objects. But only more or less. For while I deny the existence of
inanimate macroscopica—statues,baseballs,rocks,stars,etc. —their problem is not that they are inanimate. Their
problem is,among other things,that were they to exist,the ir causal powers would be at best redundant. (Thus it makes
no real difference to my ontology if there happen to be some exotic inanimate macroscopica,just so long as they have
non-redundant causal powers.) And I defend our existence—not on the grounds that we are alive—but on the
grounds that,among other things,we have non-redundant causal powers. I am happy to eliminate any alleged
organisms that,if they
PREFACE ix
existed,would at most cause only what their parts overdetermine.
I wrote most of this book during the academic year 1999/2000,while enjoying a fellowship from the National
Endowment for the Humanities and a leave from Virginia Commonwealth University. I am grateful to the NEH and
to VCU for their generosity.
Close ancestors of two short arguments in Chapter 1,and of an argument in Chapter 4,have already been published.
They can be found in ‘Composition as Identity,Mereological Essentialism,and Counterpart Theory ’, “ ‘No Statues’ ”,
and ‘Against the Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience’. The first two articles appeared in the Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, the third in Mind. I presented other arguments from this book at the University of Virginia (1999),the
Eastern Division APA Symposium on Ontology (1999),and Notre Dame's awkwardly named but smoothly run
Mighty Midwestern Metaphysical Mayhem IV (1999).
I received a great deal of help on this book. I here offer my thanks to the many who made suggestions,raised
objections,and responded to my questions. Thanks also go to Randy Carter,Tamar Gendler,John Hawthorne,Mark
Heller,Jaegwon Kim,Al Plantinga,Thomas Williams,and Dean Zimmerman. They gave careful attention to extensive
stretches of one or another draft of this book. And I am especially grateful to the following who provided valuable
comments on (in some cases multiple drafts of) the entire manuscript: Mike Bergmann,Jonathan Lowe,Gene Mills,
Mark Murphy,Eric Olson,Mike Rea,Alan Sidelle,and Ted Sider.
T. M.
Richmond, Virginia