Objectivism and the Corruption of Rationality: A Critique of Ayn Rand's Epistemology

434 Pages·2003·1.47 MB·English

by  Scott Ryan

Objectivism and the
Corruption of Rationality

Objectivism and the
Corruption of
Rationality
✦
A Critique of Ayn Rand’s Epistemology
Scott Ryan
Writers Club Press
New York Lincoln Shanghai
Objectivism and the Corruption of Rationality
A Critique of Ayn Rand’s Epistemology
All Rights Reserved © 2003 by John Scott Ryan
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Contents
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xi
Introduction: Why Critique Ayn Rand’s Epistemology?. . . . . . . . . . 1
• Why bother? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
• A minimal idealism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
• Fear of religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
• Rand the idealist? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
Chapter 1: The (Genuine) Problem of Universals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
• What is a “universal”?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
• Scenes from a “workshop” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25
Chapter 2: The Optical Illusion of Objectivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
• Rand the nominalist?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32
• Rand’s statement of the problem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36
• Is there a “third way”?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41
• Rand the realist? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45
• The unclearness of her intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51
• A failure of introspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55
• Rand’s antireligious motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59
Chapter 3: Sensation, Perception, and the Tabula Rasa Mind. . . . . 63
• Rand’s non-account of sensation vs. perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63
• Peikoff’s problematic account. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66
• Two Objectivist counterarguments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72
• Improving the Objectivist account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74
• How does a blank slate learn to perceive? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80
vii
viii Objectivism and the Corruption of Rationality
• Implicit idealism, explicit empiricism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .82
Chapter 4: The Mind’s Activity in Concept-Formation:
Universals, Units, and Natural Kinds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
• Why Rand’s concern about the mind’s “activity”?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .86
• Roy Wood Sellars: logical conceptualist and ontological nominalist . . . . . . . . .87
• Knowledge without universals?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91
• Perceiving things as “units” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97
• Are “kinds” real or not? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99
• “Innovations” or failures?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101
Chapter 5: Rand’s Theory of Measurement-Omission . . . . . . . . . 105
• A realistic resemblance theory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .105
• Perceiving commensurability?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .111
• Apprehending logical relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .114
• Measurement without measurements?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .116
• Sense and reference, idea and object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119
Chapter 6: Concepts, Propositions, and Truth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
• Truth: a matter of propositions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .125
• “Invalid” concepts: from where? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .130
• Rand the idealist vs. Rand the empiricist (again). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .134
• Contextually absolute knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .136
• Objectivism and pragmatism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .143
Chapter 7: Universals, Particulars, and Direct Realism. . . . . . . . . 156
• Is Rand a direct realist? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .156
• Direct awareness of entities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .160
• An entity is its attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .164
• Universals and particularity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .167
• The collapse of Objectivism’s perceptual realism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .170
Chapter 8: Two Views of Reason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
• Rand’s view of reason. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .172
• Blanshard’s view of reason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .174
Contents ix
• Objectivism’s deflationary account of necessity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .177
• Necessity in causation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .184
• Nondeterministic causation and the principle of sufficient reason . . . . . . . . .189
• Objectivism and explanation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .195
• Straw-man determinism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .200
Chapter 9: Axioms and Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
• Objectivism and the a priori . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .206
• Are “axiomatic concepts” concepts? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .208
• Implicit reliance on a priori insight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .213
• “Stolen concepts” and the absolute presuppositions of thought . . . . . . . . . . . .220
• More fear of religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .224
• What does Rand mean by “concept”? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .225
• Still more implicit idealism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .234
Chapter 10: The Correspondence Theory of Truth . . . . . . . . . . . 239
• Rand’s theory of truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .239
• Correspondence or not? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .241
• Association with “external realism”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .245
• Does correspondence preclude coherence?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .247
• Rand’s inconsistent “external realism”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .253
Chapter 11: The “Primacy of Existence” vs. the “Primacy of
Consciousness”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
• The rationality of theism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .256
• Rand’s fundamental dichotomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .267
• Atheism as Rand’s philosophical motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .269
• “Existence exists”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .272
• A false dichotomy and a presumption of materialism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .277
• Disconnecting mind from reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .279
Chapter 12: Values and Volition: The Objectivist Ethics . . . . . . . 285
• Idolizing autonomy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .285
• Rand’s theory of value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .287