Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia

277 Pages·2004·1.405 MB·English

by  Michael Krepon (eds.)

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uclear isk eduction in
N R R
outh sia
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Edited by
Michael Krepon
A Henry L.Stimson Center Book
NUCLEARRISKREDUCTIONINSOUTHASIA
© Michael Krepon,editor.
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2004 978-1-4039-6702-2
All rights reserved.No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any
manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief
quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews.
First published 2004 by
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ISBN 978-1-349-52986-5 ISBN 978-1-4039-8168-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781403981684
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Nuclear risk reduction in South Asia / Michael Krepon,editor.
p.cm.
“A Henry L.Stimson Center book.”
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-349-52986-5
1.Nuclear weapons—South Asia.2.South Asia—Military policy.3.Nuclear
disarmament—South Asia.4.South Asia—Politics and government—21st
century.I.Krepon,Michael,1946– II.Henry L.Stimson Center.
UA832.7.N83 2004
327.1(cid:2)747(cid:2)0954—dc22 2004045506
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd.,Chennai,India.
First edition
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
o n t e n t s
C
Preface vii
Introduction 1
Michael Krepon
I
Reducing Nuclear Dangers 5
1. Is Cold War Experience Applicable to Southern Asia? 7
Michael Krepon
2. Nuclear Restraint, Risk Reduction, and the Security–Insecurity
Paradox in South Asia 19
P.R. Chari
3. Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia: Building on
Common Ground 43
Chris Gagné
II
Avoiding the Nuclear Threshold 67
4. Missiles and Nuclear Risk-Reduction Measures 69
W.P.S. Sidhu
5. Missile Threat Reduction and Monitoring 101
Kent L. Biringer
6. Nuclear Risk Reduction and Cooperative Aerial Observation 125
John H. Hawes and Teresita C. Schaffer
7. Risk-Reduction Measures in Kashmir 145
Brian Cloughley
8. Nuclear Risk-Reduction Centers 171
Rafi uz Zaman Khan
III
Missile Defense and Regional Stability 183
9. Missile Defense: An Indian Perspective 185
Rajesh M. Basrur
vi Contents
10. Missile Defense: A Pakistani Perspective 203
Mutahir Ahmed
11. Missile Defense and Strategic Modernization in Southern Asia 209
Arvind Kumar
12. The Challenges of Nuclear Minimalism 223
W. Lawrence Prabhakar
13. Missile Defense and the Asian Cascade 237
Michael Krepon
Contributing Authors 271
Index 275
r e f a c e
P
The Stimson Center is pleased to present this updated volume of essays,
which have appeared over the past decade in various publications on the
general theme of reducing the risk of nuclear war between India and
Pakistan. Over the years, the Stimson Center, under the leadership of its
founding president and current project director for South Asia, Michael
Krepon, has examined the evolving state of thinking about nuclear danger in
the Subcontinent by U.S. arms-control experts and by intellectuals and
decision makers in the region. We are proud to have been involved in this
critical and changing conversation about one of the most serious threats
facing the international community today.
The current volume pulls together a selection of chapters from previously
published work, organized into three main sections. It begins with
three essays that are largely theoretical, and introduce the vocabulary and
methodology of nuclear risk reduction as it has evolved since the end of the
Cold War. The second section addresses more specific measures that could
be considered in the South Asian arena, and tries to take into account which
of these various “tools” of risk reduction might fare best in the turbulent
waters of the region. The final section examines the consequences and
implications of missile defense options for stability in Asia.
We are cognizant of the fact that these sophisticated ideas and concepts
can only contribute to peace if the political environment is receptive. We are
aware that the application of these ideas requires a willingness to seek
outcomes that address the needs of all parties, not the zero-sum approach
that too often characterized thinking in the region. So we know that our
contribution here is but a piece of a larger puzzle. There is much work to be
done by diplomats, politicians, journalists, and military thinkers, and leaders,
to create a political and psychological context for risk-reduction efforts. We
hope that they and others will find this volume useful.
Ellen Laipson
President and Chief Executive Officer,
The Henry L. Stimson Center
ntroduction
I
Michael Krepon
T
he Stimson Center began programming on confidence building and
nuclear risk reduction on the Subcontinent in 1991. Back then, we believed
that the Cold War experience in such matters would be of interest to policy
makers, military leaders, and researchers in India and Pakistan. We under-
stood that the Cold War experience between the two nuclear superpowers
was unique, but we hoped that some of the techniques and procedures
applied to reduce nuclear danger and build confidence might usefully be
adapted for this region. A mutual learning process ensued as U.S. advocates
began to understand more clearly the complexities of the Subcontinent,
while strategic analysts within the region dropped reflexive opposition to
concepts derived from the Cold War.
Over time, a creative synthesis began to emerge as U.S. analysts spent
more time in South Asia, and as our colleagues in the region began to appre-
ciate more deeply the dangers associated with offsetting nuclear weapon
capabilities. The old days, when Americans would confidently offer “fixes”
and when South Asians would abruptly reject external prescriptions, are
thankfully behind us. Substantive interactions have become possible as a
result of a decade of conversations that have generated mutual respect and a
common desire to learn from one another. This synthesis was nurtured in
“Track II” meetings, a process which is sometimes maligned, but which has
periodically infused official government-to-government interactions with
useful ideas. Indeed, many of the proposals found in these pages have found
expression in proposals subsequently suggested by the Indian, Pakistani, and
U.S. governments.
Developing professional contacts and working relationships with colleagues
half-a-world away has been extremely rewarding. It is also gratifying to hear
echoes of analyses nurtured by the Stimson Center emanating from capitals.
This work has also been extremely frustrating. Good ideas have repeatedly
been stymied by political impasses, tragic events, and the imposition of link-
ages between nuclear risk reduction and progress on other fronts, particularly
Kashmir. During the Cold War, we joked that the United States and the Soviet
Union often endorsed the same positions—but not at the same time. This
maddening phenomenon is not unknown to South Asia, as well.
Much work is needed to reduce nuclear dangers on the Subcontinent.
The “stability–instability” paradox that was formulated in the West to
M. Krepon (ed.), Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia
© Michael Krepon 2004
2 Michael Krepon
characterize the dangers of nuclear deterrence is alive and well in South Asia.
This paradox holds that, while offsetting nuclear capabilities might indeed
prevent a full-blown conventional or nuclear war, the presence of these fear-
some weapons could also encourage the use of violence at lower levels in the
expectation that escalation would be contained by a mutual desire to avoid
the nuclear threshold.
One fundamental premise behind the stability–instability paradox—
heightened tensions and increased violence at lower levels—is beyond
dispute. Kashmir has been inflamed since the advent of covert nuclear
capabilities on the Subcontinent, and tensions have grown even more
pronounced with the demonstration of overt nuclear capabilities in 1998.
The region is now experiencing crises with greater frequency and severity.
One such crisis erupted into a limited war in the heights above Kargil in
1999. For almost a year after Islamic extremists attacked the Indian parlia-
ment in December 2001, over one million soldiers assumed battle-ready
positions along the Kashmir divide and the international border. Despite
these crises, conventional war has been avoided, and the nuclear threshold
has not been crossed. Perhaps both tenets of the stability–instability paradox
will hold true in South Asia, as was the case during the Cold War. Much is
now being left to chance, however. As of this writing, nuclear risk reduction
measures have not been formally implemented between India and Pakistan.
Serious, sustained effort is required to act on the analysis and to put in place
the recommendations offered in these pages.
These essays first appeared in reports released by the Henry L. Stimson
Center, beginning in 1994. They have been updated and reproduced in one
volume because of their heightened relevance and to introduce this body of
work to new readers. When the Stimson Center first began publishing these
essays, we focused more on confidence-building measures (CBMs) than on
nuclear risk reduction. We hoped that CBMs might be pursued in a cumula-
tive and progressive fashion so as to facilitate a resolution of highly con-
tentious issues. This hope foundered on the region’s hard geopolitical
realities. During the 1990s, CBMs were often viewed as temporizing rather
than permanent measures. Sometimes they were adopted in the wake of a cri-
sis to demonstrate responsible behavior to Washington and other foreign
capitals. When the crisis was over, proper implementation by Pakistan or
India could be turned on or off to reflect displeasure, to purposefully annoy,
or to seek leverage on more important matters. These CBMs were debased
because they were treated as tradable commodities rather than as essential
goods. They could not serve as a springboard to nuclear risk reduction when
national leaders failed to value them and to implement them properly.
Naturally, as nuclear programs evolved and as dangers grew in the region,
the Stimson Center’s research turned toward nuclear risk-reduction and
conflict-avoidance measures. If these arrangements to reduce nuclear danger
are also viewed as tradable commodities or as sops to the outside world,
India and Pakistan will face an exceedingly long and dangerous passage. The
suggestions contained in these pages are not favors to be dispensed by