Nuclear Arms Control: Nuclear Deterrence in the Post-Cold War Period

158 Pages·1998·14.05 MB·English

by  Tom Sauer (auth.)

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
Nuclear Arms Control
Nuclear Deterrence in the
Post-Cold War Period
Tom Sauer
Research Fellow
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
First published in Great Britain 1998 by
MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London
Companies and representatives throughout the world
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
ISBN 978-1-349-26731-6 ISBN 978-1-349-26729-3 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-26729-3
Farst published in the United States of America 1998 by
ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC.,
Scholarly and Reference Division,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010
ISBN 978-0-312-21196-7
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Sauer, Tom.
Nuclear arms control : nuclear deterrence in the post-cold war period
/Tom Sauer.
p. em.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-312-21196-7 (cloth)
1. Nuclear arms control. 2. Nuclear nonproliferation. I. Title.
KZS66S.S28 1997
341.7'34---dc21 97-38222
CIP
© Tom Sauer 1998
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1998
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made
without written permission.
No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with
written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by
the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 9HE.
Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to
criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.
The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance
with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and
sustained forest sources.
s
10 ~ 8 7 6 4 3 2 1
07 06 OS 04 03 02 01 00 99 98
To Astrid and to my parents, Rina and Frank
Contents
Acknowledgements lX
Acronyms X
Introduction Xlll
1 Nuclear Deterrence Revisited 1
1.1 The nuclear paradox 1
1.2 Conditions for nuclear deterrence 3
1.2.1 The opponent must be susceptible
to deterence 4
1.2.2 Vital interest must be threatened 8
1.2.3 A credible nuclear strategy 9
1.2.4 Conclusion 23
1.3 Nuclear deterrence and nuclear
proliferation 24
1.4 Nuclear deterrence: the risk of accidents
and unauthorized use 25
1.5 Nuclear deterrence: a minimalist approach 26
1.6 Conclusion 27
2 Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear
Proliferation in the Post-Cold War Period
Introduction 30
2.1 Nuclear risks in the post-Cold War period 30
2.1.1 Nuclear proliferation 31
2.1.2 Nuclear terrorism 35
2.1.3 Accidents with nuclear weapons 36
2.2 Answers to these 'new' nuclear risks 36
2.2.1 The traditional nuclear non-
proliferation regime 36
2.2.2 'Extended deterrence' 44
2.2.3 Nuclear deterrence as an answer
to the 'new' nuclear risks 45
2.2.4 Counterproliferation 51
2.3 Conclusion 55
Vll
Vlll Contents
3 Nuclear Arms Control in the Future: Heading
Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World 59
Introduction 59
3.1 Is a nuclear weapon free world (NWFW)
desirable? 61
3.1.1 Risks in an NWFW and possible
solutions 61
3.1.2 Absolute requirements for an NWFW 65
3.1.3 An NWFW: more than desirable! 68
3.2 Nuclear addiction 76
3.2.1 Belief in nuclear deterrence 76
3.2.2 Prestige 77
3.2.3 Personal (or group) interests 78
3.3 Towards an NWFW 80
3.3.1 Stage one: the further
marginalization of nuclear weapons 81
3.3.2 Second stage: a quasi-NWFW 91
3.3.3 Third stage: an NWFW 91
Conclusion 92
Epilogue: The possible 'Europeanization' of the
French (and British?) nuclear weapons 96
Appendices
Appendix I: List of quotations in favour of an
NWFW 103
Appendix II: Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(1968) 108
Notes 114
Bibliography 128
Index 141
Acknowledgements
I have been very fortunate in my critics: Patrick Nopens,
Wilfried Van Hoeck, and especially Patrick Morgan, for
their valuable suggestions.
I would also like to thank the following people who have
helped me in diverse ways: Richard Baldwin, Werner
Bauwens, Gregory Schulte, Lamberto Zannier, Jos De la
Haye, Stephan de Spiegeleire, Roger Busby, Eddy Hartog,
Bart Ouvry, Steve Miller, Peter Saverys, Jef Segers, Richard
Latter, Harald Muller, Stef Smet, Rebecca Johnson, Edmond
Poullet, Eloi Glorieux, Chris Mulready, Jan vande Putte
and Matthew Bunn. The views expressed in this work are
solely those of the author and should not be ascribed to
the persons acknowledged above.
Special thanks are due to Herman Vos, Christian Franck,
Luc Reychler and Nicholas Wheeler. Their teaching was
extremely stimulating.
A first draft of this study was prepared under the auspices
of a NATO Individual Research Fellowship.
IX
Acronyms
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
BMD Ballistic Missile Defence
CBW Chemical/Biological Weapons
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CSBM Confidence and Security Building Measure
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
ewe Chemical Weapons Convention
DEFCON Defense Condition
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
EU European Union
HEU Highly Enriched Uranium
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IFOR Implementation Force (Bosnia)
IGC Intergovernmental Conference (EU)
INF Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
kg Kilogram
kt Kiloton
LEU Low Enriched Uranium
MOX Mixed Oxide
mt Megaton
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NNWS Non-Nuclear Weapon State
NORAD North American Air Defense Command
NPG Nuclear Planning Group
NPT Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
NSC National Security Council
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
NWC Nuclear Weapons Convention
NWFW Nuclear Weapon Free World
NWFZ Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
NWS Nuclear Weapon States
Prepcom Preparatory Committee
X
Acronyms Xl
SAC Strategic Air Command
SDI Strategic Defense Initiative
SLBM Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile
START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
THAAD Theater High Altitude Area Defense
TMD Theater Missile Defense
TNT Trinitrotoluene
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
us
United States
USIS United States Information Service
WEU Western European Union