Table Of Content

LAR pi Se elo eg Sus A coe Cece dab? a care an Klabagim Coeol—td) «= Shore, Wid Ss te Kix he Bd Awa? Bie Contin? so erates Abo Nreihsis? AAR ole My Linrrnal, ote as tt has, Opn rntel des CEEP reyes og ass BIH R GO R 290 1930 ae es int Tes g— e rories (468 are ‘=OBp 14s-q N Doro: Bhs a b Drelb dada After the terorise attacks of September 11, 2001, President Busht raised the specter ofan alliance of terrorist groups and rogue regimes, armed this time with thermonuclear weapons. Bush argued that we eould fot let nuclear weapons Fall into the wrong bunds, whore the world’s mist da dangerous weapons. In building support For the 2003 invasion of Tra. nothing was more effective than the Bush administration's argument that we didn’t want che next smoking gun to bea mushroom cloud, In the post 9 11 world, the Bush administration and its allios argued, we couldn't afford to weit, lest the next attack against the US be one with ‘nuclear weapons ok hornets, +R? rots regimes have the world's most OF course, we now know thatthe argument that lag had reconstituted its nuclear capability was hase on False intelligence anid conscious deception of the publi at the Tighest levels, ns was the ide that Tray would tura over such desteuetive capability, ia the unlikely event i id aequire it to its sworn enemies Al Qaeda. And with the failure to find nuclear weapons or ather “weapons of mass dasttuction” in Iraq, publie concern ‘with the nuclear threat appears to have declined again, even in the face of reports that the Bush administration is considering attacking [ran ~ including through the possible use of ‘nuclear weapons ~ to prevent that country from aequieing a nuclear capability ‘What has thus been overlooked in all ths is thatthe invasion of Iraq was one of “7 the first uclear wars, inthe specific sense that this was tne first time the US invaded a country by arguing that it was on the verge of getting or had already reconstituted its nuclear capability, the argument being that the US needed to attack Iraq lest Iaq or its cstensible cerrorist allies launch a surprise attack against the LS with nuclear weapons. And as US policy towards Iran shows, inereasingly the LIS counter: proliferation policy includes the option of preventing adversaries of the US from acquiring nuclear weapons, if need be through US military actions against these states, ‘To be sure he failures ofthis policy can already be seen in the recent North Korean nuclear test, only after which did the US articulate that it would not attack North Korea, an assurance the regime had long ‘been seeking and which was surely one of the reasons for its desire to aequire nuelcar ‘weapons as a deterrent. US policy then. of relying on the threat of military force to deter the acquisition of nuclear weapens to powers it considers adversarial, however unevenly applied, is dangerous in the extreme, and will ikely encourage, not discourage proliferation. The ikely result of pursuing such a policy will be similar enough to the effects of Hurricune Katrina on the Gulf Coast of the US, as ety aller city is destrayed by thuclear weupoans, The only difference i that whereas Katrina ots force of nature destroying cities, supp as itwere, by the effects of human-made global warming induced b a8 emissions thought to inereuse husricare intensity, Trom the eta of strategic bombing up through the mucleur era leaders planned tod whit Hurricane Katrina did, namely, to destroy eties, as evidenced inthe fain of destruction to Nagasaki. And like Katrina, such np outsome ~ the destruetion of city lier city - will have been boll predictable and predicted ‘The Bush administration is not wrong to highlight the dangers of nuclear proliferation. Yet in highlighting the dngers of proliferaion, one does not hase 10 suppose, as the Bush administration seers 10, that new countries uequiting nuclear weapons for the firs time will be any more dangerous than those couatres that have From Dresth already acquired nuclear weapons. Instead, one only has to assume that the neve nuclear powers will he just as reckless and dangerous asthe already constituted nuclear poss2ss To understand just how dangerous nuclear weapons in human hands are, evan tae "vist hands.” requires a new look atthe still largely scerct history of the-nuclear era, Here. the Bush administration's focus on the dangers of nuclear weapons getting into the wrong; hnands invites us towards a closer look at the dangers of nuclear weapons in the “right Thands,” namely our hinels and those of our adversaries and allies, throughout the nuclear era. as a way of highlighting the real dimensions ofthe present nuclear threat and the trgent need to acidress the challenge this presents to humanity inthe 21° century Suggestion: Novy put in your bringing of your own unique perspective as / someone who came to work on war plans and studied command ane contral, Deal with {question of hows somebunly se opposed to nuclear weapons anu killing of innocents edme {to he working on nuclear plans (Fear of missile gap, Sovict surprise attack), And canier concerns with preventing catastrophe, Perhaps mention relatively carly knowledy, ‘unknown to others afer revelations af missile gap, whieh it turns out was bussed gh Intelligence of Air Foree,as you mentioned, and related fear of surprise nuclear attack justas weong as intelligence on WMD’ in Iraq) of the first strike presmptive charactor oF US warplans. Calike others, who exme to the problem after Soviet buieup rationalized our own stanee. Perhaps pul in here learsing in 1974 sbout nucleat threat plans for Vietnam and how you thus eventually came to realize both the reality of US early superiority, contrary 4 most overs, and long history of US nuclear thncats, nel we later discussion by perhaps mentioninig your early work on risk, decisionmaking and uncertainty. and threats, madman theory.| Then lay out how this book will be part ‘memoir. part analysis, first going imo your personal experience, including with nuclear weapons, from let's say the accident, iF you want to pul this in, up unl learning about ‘the reality of the missile gap in “61, the revelations about Duck Hook threats in “74, and ‘then backtracking into the analysis part of the book, starting with strategic bomnhing, and supplemented with memoie like material as necessary. ‘Phe materia presented herein fies in the face of arguments stressing a supposed nuclear taboo. which hs ostensibly prevented leaders from using nuclear weapons. Whatever the ments of this approach, what this history obscures is how nuclear weapons have been used by leaders, both through nuclear shreats and through expliie doctrines ~for example Eisenhower's massive retaliation policy and NATO"s firs use doctrine the latter basing the dofense ot Western Euroge on an explicit alliance commitment to use nuclear weapons to fend off a possible Soviet conventional assault Moreover, the material. based both on my personal experience in nuclear matters and a lifetime of studying sbout these problems, may have special relevance for the period we tare entering. For iteomes ata time when some analysts are Warning about the dangers of ‘new eri of US nuclear superiority, replete with @ US first strike capability. As Lieber and Press argue, “new research on the political utlty of nuclear superiority and the sirength ofthe nuclear taboo is necded, Unfortunately, the end of the Cold War Limnished interes in these questions just as high quality data on decision-making during nuclear erises became available in historical archives.” One of the key questions raised by their work is that of “bargaining leverage...whether gains oucweish the dangers..." Ik so happens that [have specialized, both as a government official and as a private researcher, on studying nuclear crises, knowledge supplemented by my ovsn participation in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, ‘The matcrial presented here thus olTers muck food. foe thought not only about previous eras of US nuclear superiority and the one we may be entering, aut also new perspectives om the dangers of nuclear planning and nuclsar war inthe era of relative party. While king much frem previous research, this book offers nothing less than a new perspective on the nuclear era, one which tiopefully ean make some meaningful contribution to publie debate and thus to ending the nuclear era's unprecedented dangers s,s §F tee @ rw fem (988-6) of OY gn oe frreh—/ cage debe? 0° (enact AD Len at) poh ome wll Morena inte dr BF ome ges te oe (Ck pure fie