not only on the sinai. islamic extremism in egypt

12 Pages·2015·0.27 MB·English

Analysis No. 289, August 2015

NOT ONLY ON THE SINAI.
ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN EGYPT

Wolfgang Pusztai

On 29 January 2015 the Islamic extremist group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis conducted a coordinated attack with

suicide bombers, car bombs, mortar and small arms fire on a military base, a police station, a hotel, a
newspaper office, several checkpoints and various other targets in northern Sinai. In total, 29 people were
killed and 58 wounded. Unofficial sources reported even higher figures (74 wounded and 45 killed)

Egypt is the birthplace of the Muslim Brotherhood. The later Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri joined the

organization in 1965. President Anwar el-Sadat was assassinated in 1981 by the Islamic extremist groups
Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya. Islamic extremism is not a new phenomenon in Egypt, but it
seems to be on the rise again.

Colonel Wolfgang Pusztai is a Policy and Security analyst. He was the Austrian Defense Attaché from 2008 to
2012

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The opinions expressed herein are strictly personal and do not necessarily reflect the position of ISPI.
The ISPI online papers are also published with the support of Fondazione Cariplo.
Strategic Environment and Risk Pointers
The vast majority of the Arab Republic of Egypt´s territory of 1,002,000
km2 is covered by desert. The fertile valley of the Nile River forms only 4%
of the country, but is home to 99% of a population of 86.9 million1.
The geostrategically important location of the country at the intersection
of historic trade routes and of modern strategic lines of communication, its
proximity to Israel and its role in the Middle East peace process ensures
the steady attention of the West. The 167 km long Suez Canal is one of the
most important trade routes in the world, providing the shortest route for
vessels travelling from the Persian Gulf and southern Asia to Europe. In
2014 16,744 ships with 784,191,000 cargo tons passed through the canal2.
Environmental degradation through the loss of agricultural areas, oil
pollution threatening the marine environment as well as water pollution
from agricultural pesticides, raw sewage, and industrial effluents
threaten not only the quality of life of the Egyptians, but also the
economy. The emissions of almost 5 million cars on the streets of Cairo,
the burning of refuse and industrial smog makes Egypt´s capital, with a
population of 20 million, one of the most polluted cities on earth.
Egypt’s proven oil reserves are estimated at about 4.4 bn barrels as of
2014 (Libya: ~ 50 bn). In 2013 about 189,000 bbd of crude oil were
exported. The country has the largest oil refinery capacity in Africa, but
since 2011 local production has been lower than consumption, making
imports necessary.
Proven natural gas reserves are estimated at about 77 trillion cubic feet
(the 4th largest amount in Africa)3. New discoveries are made almost
yearly. Much of the natural gas consumed domestically is used to fuel
electric power plants. Due to rising domestic demand, gas exports have
declined since 2010. As the price that Egypt’s government is willing to pay
to foreign operators is quite low, some investment projects are
commercially unviable.
Revenues from Egypt’s Suez Canal are one of the main sources of foreign
currency, reaching about $5.5 billion4 in 2014. The currently ongoing
construction of a parallel waterway and widening the existing canal will

1 Central Intelligence Agency, CIA Factbook,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html.
2 Suez Canal Authority, Brief Fiscal Year Statistical Report,
http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/TRstat.aspx?reportId=9.
3 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Brief: Egypt”, 14
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http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/03/20/egypt-canal-idINL6N0MH4T720140320.
increase its capacity by allowing a longer portion of two-way traffic in the
canal. It is estimated that the revenues will increase by nearly $9 billion
annually over the next decade.
Remittances and tourism are the other important sources of foreign
currency income. If the political situation stabilizes, the future prospects
for tourism are bright.
The agricultural sector has been since ancient times a vital component of
the country’s economy. The sector employs the largest portion of the
workforce (almost 30%). Nevertheless, because of the rapid growth of the
population and the loss of agricultural land, Egypt is no longer
self-sufficient in food.
The infrastructure is well developed in comparison to neighboring
countries, but suffers from chronic underinvestment. Train accidents are
frequent. A lack of water system maintenance could lead to poor quality
drinking water. Electric power generation is inadequate and results,
particularly during the summer months, in blackouts. This has
contributed to a shrinking industrial production and growing discontent
with the authorities. A nuclear power plant project with a desalination
facility was agreed upon during the visit of Russia’s President Putin to
Cairo in February 20155 and should improve the situation significantly.
Egypt's government is almost entirely dependent on aid from Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE to maintain food and energy subsidies until
the restoration of investor confidence and external financing help the
country to regain some financial independence. These states were
alarmed by the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, while Qatar was the only
GCC state to back the Morsi administration.
Approximately 40% of Egypt’s exports are to the EU, with Italy the single
most important destination (6.7% in 2013).
In 2014 the GDP growth rate was only about 3% (compared to 5.2% in
2010)6. But economic growth is expected to increase over the medium
term. A key focus of the economic program is to stimulate economic
activity through major infrastructure projects. But nevertheless it
remains unlikely that Egypt will be able to address its economic problems
any time soon on its own.
There is alarming growth in the population (98% Egyptian Arabs), which
will increase to 95.6 million by 2026. The increment is highest in the

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6 “Egypt 2014”, Oxford, Oxford Analytica Ltd, 17 September 2014.
poorest regions. 49.9% of the population is aged below 25. The growing
unemployment rate stands at 13.4%7.
Social and cultural divisions are sharpened by rising levels of wealth
inequality. Westernized, liberal elites are faced with the more
conservative religious majority of Egyptian society who do not get their
share of the country´s wealth.
The Egyptian population is mainly Sunni Muslim. Al-Azhar University in
Cairo is the foremost center of Arab literature and Islamic learning in the
world.
Three out of the four predominant Sunni schools of law (fiqh) are
represented in Egypt (Hanafi in the Nile Delta, the Western Desert and
northern Sinai; Shafi’i in the Nile valley, the Eastern Desert and southern
Sinai; Maliki in the south). The mystical Islamic tradition of Sufism is
quite popular in various forms. Allegedly there are between 6 and 15
million followers. The Salafi movement is becoming increasingly
important. Salafists believe that the Sufi practices are ‘un-Islamic’. In the
Nile delta there are also a few Shia.
Although the population is mainly Muslim, there is a powerful Coptic
Christian minority estimated as between 6 and 15% of the population. The
majority belongs to the ancient Coptic Orthodox Church, the largest
Christian community in the Arab world.
Although it is frequently denied by religious leaders, there are significant
divisions between Christians and Muslims and occasionally some
sectarian violence takes place, involving in particular Salafists. These
incidents are frequently triggered by issues like forced conversions,
alleged rapes, and land disputes. The protection of the Copt community
had a low priority for Mubarak and Morsi.
As the 2012 constitution failed to adequately protect their rights and
religious freedoms, Copts strongly supported Morsi’s removal from power.
As a consequence the number of attacks on Christian businesses,
churches and homes is increasing.
A main reason for concern is the ongoing civil war in Libya whose territory
is used for terrorist training and as a staging area for attacks abroad.
Weapons smuggling and the successful infiltration of jihadis could
significantly contribute to the destabilization of Egypt. Therefore it will
try to prevent the establishment of a fundamentalist Islamic State on its
western border by supporting the anti-Islamist coalition of the
internationally recognized government in future, regardless of who is in
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https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html.
charge of it. As a measure of last resort the Egyptian military would also
intervene directly on the ground.
Egypt´s armed forces have intervened in domestic politics twice in recent
years, in February 2011 removing President Mubarak by withdrawing its
support for him and in July 2013 by suspending the constitution and
deposing President Morsi. Claiming that the military was not interested
in assuming power on a permanent basis, democratic presidential
elections were facilitated in May/June 2012 and May 2014. The military
still considers itself the main guarantor of national security and ultimate
political arbiter.
Although Islamists or suspected Islamists are prohibited from serving in
the armed forces it can be assumed that there are thousands of soldiers, in
particular from the rural areas, having a religiously conservative
background. The crackdown on Islamists has not been met with universal
approval among the conscripts. Since the ousting of Morsi all of his
identified sympathizers have been discharged from the military.
Egypt's defense industry is the largest in the Arab world and entirely
under military control. The military also oversees several other
companies ranging from agricultural product and construction/real estate
concerns to various industries. The military industry is exempt from some
taxes and regulations that affect civil businesses.
There are three risk indicators that can be derived from the strategic
environment.
The upcoming parliamentary elections will be protest flashpoints, in
particular in the areas where there is still strong support for the Muslim
Brotherhood. A heavy security force presence will probably be successful
in minimizing protest escalation and property damage.
Although the Islamic insurgency is a growing threat it will not be able to
entirely destabilize the country with terroristic acts. The main danger is
that terrorism, targeting not only security forces but also infrastructure,
the economy, and civilians, expanding from the Sinai to the Nile river
valley, will deepen the economic difficulties of the country.
The main threat for the stability of the country is socioeconomic protests.
They could be triggered by rising unemployment, subsidy cuts, price
hikes, energy shortages, and more generally by the disappointed economic
and political expectations of the people. If the required reforms are
mismanaged destabilizing unrest may ensue.
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Analysis of the Islamist Groups
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB, al-ʾIkḫwān al-Muslimūn) was born in
Egypt 1928 from an anti-colonial movement directed against imperialism
and against the establishment of the state of Israel. It subsequently
spread to numerous other countries. Its ideology has a pan-Islamic,
political and social agenda which differs from the Salafists. The MB
inspired many Islamist parties, but also Hamas, AQ and other terrorist
organizations.
The MB is dominated in many countries by the middle class. Most of its
members adopted a policy of non-violent reform, but this is different from
country to country. Currently the MB is the world´s most influential
Islamic movement.
After Mohamed Morsi was ousted from power the MB was banned and
listed as terrorist organization. The assets of its affiliated organizations
have been frozen. Many of its members, including the leadership, have
been imprisoned.
The Egyptian branch of the MB has between 100,000 and 600,0008
members which makes it the largest single political group in Egypt,
although it does not represent a majority view of Islam. The loyalty of its
members and its organizational strength makes the Brotherhood very
powerful. It remains the main political opposition to President al-Sisi’s
government. In the future MB supporters will likely try to exploit possibly
mounting popular discontent.
Ayman al-Zawahiri took over as leader of Al-Qaeda (AQ) in May 2011
during one of the most significant periods of change in the Arab world. The
“Arab Spring” provided an opportunity for AQ, but it could finally not be
exploited. Zawahiri released more than a dozen messages directly
addressing the uprisings. His special focus was on his homeland, Egypt.
The AQ leader has encouraged and praised the repeated attacks on a gas
pipeline on the Sinai. According to him, the future of Egypt is central to
the destiny of the whole Muslim world.
There are several Islamic extremist groups currently active in Egypt. As
the majority of the attacks is unclaimed, it is difficult to assess their
individual dangerousness. The criminalization of the MB has forced its
members into the underground and closer to militant groups. It is likely
that several of them joined the armed fight against the government. Many
groups claim that their violence against security forces is in response to
the suppression of public protests.
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8 The MB doesn’t release membership figures.
On the Sinai many extremists try to embed themselves with the Bedouin
tribes who have had an ambivalent relationship with the government,
building on the historic absence of the state in the region. Many Bedouins
have the perception that the reaction of the state to terrorist attacks is
random and too heavy-handed, with an excessive use of force.
Occasionally, moderate Bedouin leaders are attacked and killed by
terrorists. In 2011 and 2013 the extremists had benefited from the
withdrawal of security forces to Cairo during and after the riots.
Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (Group of Partisans of Jerusalem, ABM)
announced its existence ‘officially’ on 24 July 2012 claiming responsibility
for 13 attacks on the Trans-Sinai pipeline since February 2011. The
campaign of ABM intensified following the ousting of President Morsi.
Occasionally the group expressed its solidarity with the MB-led protests
against the new government. The most important leaders of the group are
probably Ahmed Salam Mabruk, a long-term Islamic extremist with some
ties to AQ, and Abu Osama al-Masri, who pledged obedience to Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi, the ‘caliph’ of the Islamic State.
ABM adheres to a Salafi jihadi ideology while keeping its activities in the
area local. The primary objective of the group is presumably the
establishment of a fundamentalist Islamic state in Egypt, while the
liberation of Jerusalem serves as long-term goal. The group does not show
any interest in participating in the political process. Like several other
Islamic extremist groups, it considers the end of Morsi’s presidency as
proof that the democratic process is a failure. Any process that provides
power to make laws without directly referring to the Sharia is a priori
unacceptable.
ABM has no known links to any other state, but coordinates with
Gaza-based Palestinian terrorist groups like the “Popular Resistance
Committee” and the “Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of
Jerusalem”, organizations in the orbit of the Islamic State. It is very likely
that there are also contacts with Salafi jihadi groups in Libya.
The main operational focus of ABM remains in northern Sinai and along
the border with Israel, although attacks are also mounted in the southern
part of the peninsula, the Nile Delta, along the Suez Canal, in Cairo and
in the western part of the country close to the Libyan border.
The core of the group consists of members of Bedouin tribes of the Sinai.
As the activities were expanded into other parts of the country,
non-Bedouin Egyptians were recruited to support and conduct attacks.
Currently it numbers probably up to 1,000 members.
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targets in Egypt are security forces for the economy (in particular oil and
gas pipelines, energy supply, other infrastructure, and tourism), and
government officials.
Preferred tactics applied in Egypt include the use of remote controlled and
time-fused explosive devices, suicide bombers, small arms ambushes,
assassinations, kidnapping, and coordinated larger-scale attacks. The
group also has a very limited number of serviceable MANPADS9
available, probably smuggled over the border from Libya.
The funding of the group is unclear, although it is obvious that ransom
payments contribute in part.
ABM’s pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State in November 2014 will
facilitate the incorporation of other Islamic extremists and the spread of
violence. Future targets will probably also include, in line with the
strategy of the Islamic State, Western assets and individuals.
A further increase of the attacks of the group outside of the Sinai can be
expected. The main focus will shift from security forces to the economy.
ABM will remain the most active and most deadly extremist group in
Egypt.
In January 2012 the newly founded jihadist group Ansar al-Jihad (also “Al
Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula”) pledged obedience to Zawahiri. Its leader,
Ramzi Mahmoud al-Mawafi, is known as the former doctor to Osama bin
Laden. The Sinai-based group rose to prominence with a brutal attack on
19 August 2013 when 25 soldiers were executed, although it is not sure
that Ansar al-Jihad was really responsible for the massacre. More recent
activities of the group are unknown. Perhaps it has merged with Ansar
Bayt al-Maqdis.
Ajnad Misr (Soldiers of Egypt) has been active since early 2014 in the
capital area, where it claimed several attacks on security forces with small
arms and IEDs10. The group is loosely connected with ABM and follows a
Salafi jihadi ideology although it doesn’t insist on the establishment of a
caliphate. It is the most active terrorist group operating outside of the
Sinai.
Ansar al-Sharia fi Ard al-Kinanah has conducted a few attacks in the
Sinai, but after a senior commander of the group was arrested there have
not been many activities.
Kataib al-Furqan, which has links to the al-Qassem Brigades in Gaza, has
claimed several ambushes on security forces all over the country with a
5 specific focus along the Suez Canal and in Cairo. The group has also
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10 Improvised Explosive Device.
attacked a tanker sailing along the Canal and a SATCOM-station in Cairo
with RPGs.
Muhammed Jamal is an Egyptian militant who fought as a jihadi in
Afghanistan and since the 1990s in Egypt, where he was arrested several
times. Over the years he has always maintained a close relationship with
AQ (including with its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri), AQIM, AQAP and
various other AQ affiliates. After he was released from prison in 2011 he
created his own terrorist group (Muhammed Jamal Network, MJN) and
established several training camps for jihadis in Egypt and Libya with
financial support from AQIP.
Jamal and 25 other members of his group were arrested in November
2012. They were accused by the Egyptian authorities of having planned to
establish a terrorist cell in Cairo, in the Nasr City district (“Nasr City
Cell”). The leaders of this cell were Muhammed Jamal, Sheik Adel
Shehato (former member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and co-founder of
the MJN), and Tariq Abu al-Azm (a former air force officer, arrested in
2002 by the Mubarak regime and charged with terrorism). There is no
confirmation that the group is still active following these arrests.
There are several more or less important extremist groups like Al-Takfir
wa al-Hijra, Jund al-Islam, Al-Salafiyya al-Jihadiyya Fi Sina, Tawhid
wal-Jihad, and others.
The strategy of the Islamic extremists is obviously to initially weaken
security forces in specific areas and the economy of the country. All the
three main sources of foreign currency - Suez Canal shipping,
hydrocarbons, and tourism - have been the targets of terrorist attacks
since the army toppled President Morsi in July 2013. Over-reactions by
the security forces are provoked by intent to alienate them from the
population.
The worsening security and socioeconomic situation should prepare the
ground for mass protests and a public uprising to finally overthrow the
government.

The current situation and expected future developments
Regardless of the ongoing economic difficulties, energy crisis, and wide
repression of opponents, the charismatic President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi
has remained very popular although he has retained full legislative power
in the absence of a parliament since his election in May 2014 (with 97% of
the votes). He constantly urges Egyptians to keep working with him and
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It appears that the majority of the population supports his suppression of
Islamist movements and assertive response to terrorist attacks, which
have increased to unprecedented levels.
Financial support from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE will remain
crucial for the economic survival of al-Sisi’s government for the next few
years, but will also limit his room for maneuver in dealing with the
Muslim Brotherhood significantly. Any political compromise including
this group is for the time being unrealistic.
Al-Sisi will most likely maintain good relations and counter-terrorism
cooperation with Israel, in large part with the aim of containing the Sinai
insurgency. The Gaza Strip remains of critical importance for Egypt’s
foreign policy.
Islamic extremists will continue targeting security forces in particular,
but increasingly also the state´s infrastructures (pipelines, power
installations, railway infrastructure) and civilians as well as tourism.
While in 2013 about 400 attacks took place, during the first 2 months of
2015 there were already more than 100. A further increase can be
expected. Probably the smaller groups will consolidate around Ansar Bayt
al-Maqdis and the Islamic State. Nevertheless it is unlikely that the
Islamic militants will be able to undermine state stability in the near
future with their terrorist attacks.
Sectarian violence will remain a problem. Sporadic outbreaks of local
violence and terrorist attacks are likely around Coptic Christian and
mixed neighborhoods. Risks are highest in impoverished areas of the
major cities.
Mass mobilization and social unrest for economic grievances are the most
serious risks, which could eventually be exploited by the Islamists. It is
unlikely that the government will be able to satisfy the expectations of the
population in the near future.

Conclusions
Italy has significant strategic interests with regard to Egypt. Security
interests are affected by the threat of spreading terrorist attacks and
uncontrolled migration towards Italy. For Italy, a Mediterranean
maritime nation, the Suez Canal is of particular importance. A disruption
of the canal would have a significant negative impact. Almost 160,000,000
cargo tons a year passing through the Canal originate from or are heading
to the “northern Mediterranean”11.
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http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/TRstat.aspx?reportId=6.