Non-State Armed Groups in the Myanmar Peace Process

42 Pages·2014·0.52 MB·English

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Non-State Armed Groups in the Myanmar
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Peace Process: What are the Future
Options?

Helene Maria Kyed and Mikael Gravers
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HELENE MARIA KYED
Seniorforsker, forskningsområdet Fred, Risiko & Vold, DIIS
[email protected]
MIKAEL GRAVERS
Lektor i antropologi, Aarhus Universitet
[email protected]
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract 5
Introduction 7
The armed conflict in Myanmar – in brief 9
Colonialism and the ensuing ethnic divide 9
Conflicts after Independence and previous ceasefires 10
The ethnic NSAGs: The examples of Karen and Mon 12
The Karen 13
The Mon 15
The challenging peace negotiations (2012–2014) 17
Obstacles to peace and a political settlement 17
Future options for the armed actors 20
Security sector integration 21
Community policing and private security guards 23
Political parties and positions 24
Civil service and local government positions 27
Economic integration: job creation, education and training 28
Economic integration: large scale agro and mineral business
development 30
Civil Society Organisations and NGOs 30
Conclusion 31
References 35
Appendix: List of ethnic armed groups 39

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Myanmar∕Burma - Location of ethnic non-state armed groups (NSAGs)
NAGA
KACHIN
Mainly India-based
Separatist struggle from 1961.
separatist struggle
Ceasefire 1994–2011 and 2013.
from 1980. Ceasefire
Sporadic fighting ongoing.
2012.
*NDA-K
NSCN-K KIA
CHIN
AA, ABSDF
Low-level insurgency
SSA-S
over diffuse area
*KDA
from 1988. Cease-
*MNDAA (BGF)
fire 2012.
WA
MNDAA
ZRA PALAUNG Largely autonomous.
TNLA
Separatist SSA-S UWSA Ceasefire 2011.
struggle from *PSLA
1963. No cease-
CNA SSA-N SHAN
fire. Recent UWSA
Fragmented
RSO fighting.
NDAA separatist
SSA-S struggle from
PA-O WNO 1958. Multiple
ALA Separatist SSA-S *Lahu ceasefires but
struggle PNLA LDU sporadic fighting
1949–58, KNLP continues.
again 1967. UWSA
Ceasefire KNPLF
KARENNI
2012.
KA Separatist struggle from 1948.
Ceasefire 2012.
RAKHINE
*DKBA
Fragmented KNLA
struggle by DKBA-5 KAREN
Manerplaw
various groups Separatist struggle
from 1947. *DKBA from 1949, splits in
1994, 1997, etc.
mixed KNLA, KPC
MNLA Multiple ceasefires
DKBA-5, MNLA
2010–12.
*DKBA and *KPF
ROHINGYA
MNLA
Fragmented MON
DKBA-5
struggle by Separatist
Group still in conflict
various groups struggle from
KNU with government
from 1947, mainly 1948. Cease- MDUF
from outside fire 2012. Group in ceasefire
Myanmar. agreement
MNLA
Group converted to
border guard/militia
Non-combatant group
TAVOY MDUF
or inactive in Myanmar
Low-level insurgency from
1948. Inactive. KNU *KDA Defunct group
KIA Full names of armed
groups listed in text
© NIAS Press 2014 2012 Latest ceasefire date
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ABSTRACT
In Myanmar/Burma the government and the many ethnic non-state armed
groups (NSAGs) are close to signing a national ceasefire agreement that will
end almost 65 years of conflict in the country’s resource-rich borderlands.
This is taking place alongside a transition from totalitarian military rule
towards democracy, and a rapid influx of international aid agencies and foreign
investors. While there is progress in the peace negotiations, the process has
been contested and fighting has continued in Kachin state. A key controversy
concerns the future status of the many NSAGs that represent different ethnic
nationalities, such as the Karen and the Mon. The NSAG leaders demand a
political settlement that allows them to retain arms and political positions within
a federalist system. The government has now agreed to discuss a federal system,
but this is not backed by the powerful Burmese army generals. Moreover, the
term ‘federalism’ can have many meanings. Left out of the peace negotiation
talks has been any open discussion of what will happen to the many middle-
and lower-ranked armed actors after an agreement has been reached. Failure to
include this may be detrimental to sustainable peace and to the building of trust
in the peace settlement. This paper is a preliminary attempt to discuss the future
options for the members of the ethnic NSAGs in Myanmar: what ‘exit’ options
do the NSAG members have after decades of conflict and, for many of them,
entire lives spent inside the armed groups? How do they envision their future
– as armed actors, civil servants, politicians, businessmen or something else?
In addressing these questions we draw on interviews held in Mon and Karen
states in January 2014 and on prior research. We engage with that segment of
the international peacebuilding literature which debates the transformation of
ex-combatants through different forms of ‘Demobilization, Disarmament and
Reintegration’ (DDR) programmes. A core argument of the paper is that in
the Myanmar context it is highly unlikely that conventional DDR programmes
will suffice to support sustainable peace and stability. This is not only due to
the exceptionally low involvement of international aid agencies in the peace
process, but also because of the predominant focus in DDR programmes
on disarmament and on economic incentives to successful integration. In
Myanmar this overlooks key political motives behind both the causes of
conflict and the negotiations for peace. It also ignores the fact that the NSAGs
have enjoyed decades of state-like control over territories and people. Based on
this, we do not take a point of departure in disarmament, but instead outline
seven different integration options. These consist of a combination of different
forms of political, economic, civil society and security sector integration. We
call for more in-depth analyses of the armed groups in Myanmar as a complex
and dynamic set of actors with various motives, aspirations and incentives.
Finally, the paper concludes by reflecting on the future role of international aid
agencies in the context of the peace process.
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INTRODUCTION and the Mon. The NSAG leaders demand a
political settlement that allows them to re-
Right now there are no real ideas about tain arms and have a leverage of autonomy
what could happen to the lower ranking within a federalist system. In August 2014 the
soldiers of KNU [Karen National government agreed to include this demand
Union]. KNU soldiers feel they still in the draft ceasefire agreement, yet the de-
need arms for their own security. Lots tails are still sketchy and the term ‘federalism’
of conditions need to be in place before can mean many things (Hiebert and Nguyen
they will even think of surrendering 2014). Meanwhile the Burmese Army still
their arms. It is also about livelihood. seems to be demanding that the NSAGs re-
KNU would vanish if it became a spect the 2008 constitution and existing laws
political party. They do not want that. which, in effect, render the NSAGs illegal
Some elders and people in government rebel organisations. The army does not en-
have proposed that, but people will not dorse a federal constitution and demands
accept KNU as a political party. This can that the NSAGs disarm or join the nation-
only be realised if there is federalism and al army-commanded Border Guard Forces.
real democracy. We do not have that now Because the army acts independently and is
here in Karen state. Even if KNU wins not under government or parliamentary con-
the elections they can do nothing as it trol according to the constitution, its position
is now without democracy. And political challenges progress in the peace negotiations
reform is also needed inside the KNU (Irrawaddy 15 August; Mizzima News 17 Au-
itself. There are still splits (Chairperson gust). At the same time the government now
of Karen Development Network, 15 Jan realises that the NSAGs are unlikely to be
2014). satisfied with economic benefits and military
integration as past ceasefire arrangements
Myanmar is undergoing one of the most have shown. For instance efforts in 2009 to
multifaceted transition processes in recent transform the NSAGs through integration
decades, not steered by the international com- into military-controlled Border Guard Forces
munity: from a totalitarian military regime to- (BGF) led to renewed cycles of conflict. Sus-
wards democracy, and from almost 65 years tainable peace depends on wider changes in
of armed conflict in its ethnic minority states the political order, and the granting of polit-
towards stability. Since 2013 a union-wide ical status to the NSAGs (Hiebert & Nguyen
ceasefire agreement has been negotiated 2014). Left out of the peace negotiation talks,
between the government and coalitions of however, has been an open discussion about
the ethnic-based Non-State Armed Groups what will happen to the many middle and
(NSAGs) (see appendix 1). While there is lower-ranked armed actors after an agree-
progress, and it is anticipated that an agree- ment has been reached. Instead the negotia-
ment will be signed in 2014, the process has tions have focused on high-level political and
been contested and fighting has continued in military aspects.
Kachin State (see map). In this paper we discuss a number of pos-
A key controversy concerns the future sta- sible future options for the members of the
tus of the many NSAGs that represent dif- ethnic NSAGs in Myanmar within the context
ferent ethnic nationalities, such as the Karen of the current peace negotiations. We argue
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that consideration of concrete reintegration peace and stability. This is due to the predom-
options at this point in time is very signifi- inant emphasis put by DDR programmes on
cant for sustainable peace and for trust in the disarmament and demobilisation as first steps
peace negotiations. We particularly focus on to end armed conflict, and on economic in-
the Mon and Karen groups: With the advent centives as the key route to successful inte-
of peace what ‘exit’ options do the NSAG gration (Muggah 2005; Munive & Jakobsen
members have after decades of conflict and, 2012). As critics have pointed out, this eco-
for many of them, entire lives spent inside nomic focus is based on the assumption that
the armed groups? How do they themselves ‘greed’ is a key motivating factor for mobilisa-
envision their future – as armed actors, civil tion of combatants in the first place (Munive
servants, politicians, businessmen or some- & Jakobsen 2012: 363). In Myanmar this eco-
thing else? What possible experiences from nomic rationale overlooks key political mo-
elsewhere can the transformation of NSAGs tives behind both the causes of conflict and
draw on, and what role can the international the negotiations for peace and, importantly,
community play in facilitating this transfor- that the NSAGs have had decades of state-
mation, despite its limited mandate in Myan- like control over territories and people. Un-
mar’s peace process? deniably there are NSAG members who to-
We engage with these difficult questions in day are mainly driven by economic concerns
this paper, based on interviews in January 2014 about their future and war economies have
with Karen and Mon NSAG members, polit- been significant. Yet as Muggah (2005: 248)
ical parties and civil society organisations, as has argued, successful DDR “depends equal-
well as on prior research and secondary litera- ly on the management of ostensibly ‘political’
ture. We relate our findings to that segment of issues associated with reconciliation, peace-
the international peacebuilding literature that building and the meaningful reform of judi-
debates the transformation of ex-combatants cial, governmental and economic structures”.
through different forms of ‘Demobilisation, While conventional DDR programmes
Disarmament and Reintegration’, or DDR, are unlikely to prove realistic in Myanmar at
programmes (Jensen & Stepputat 2014; Mu- this point in time, there are experiences from
nive & Jakobsen 2012; Munive 2013; Muggah DDR interventions that could be a source of
2005; McMullin 2013b). This is a challenging inspiration, as long as the specific political
affair because, so far, few dare to even talk and contextual factors are considered (Mu-
about disarmament in Myanmar. However, nive 2013). We suggest that it is important
we did ask all interlocutors about ‘demobi- to initiate an open debate in Myanmar about
lisation, disarmament and reintegration’ and the future role and (re)integration of armed
this revealed very interesting insights about actors in ways that are much more concrete
the potential futures of the armed groups, and tangible than is the case in the current
and how important these imaginings are for peace talks where no mention of DDR is
the peace negotiations. made. While a peace agreement will ultimate-
One core insight from our analysis is that in ly depend on the government and the NSAG
the Myanmar context it is highly unlikely that leadership, it is also significant to create trust
the dominant international model of ‘Disar- in the peace process among the NSAG mem-
mament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration’ bers in general. This latter aspect cannot be
(DDR) will suffice to support sustainable separated from the future aspirations of the
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individual NSAG members and their sense Burman majority. Buddhists form the major-
of personal security. ity, followed by 4% Christians and 4% Mus-
In this paper we try to make a first attempt lims.1 British colonial rule politicised ethnicity
at discussing seven integration options for and it is important to first briefly probe into
the armed actors, including: integration into colonial history in order to understand both
the security sector; local and private securi- the role of the army, its nationalism and the
ty groups; political parties; civil service and armed ethno-nationalist movements that en-
local government; jobs/small businesses; gaged in major insurgencies, especially during
large-scale businesses, and civil society or- the military regime from 1962–1988.
ganisations. These options are of our own
creation, but are inspired by the DDR liter-
ature and our interviews in Myanmar. They Colonialism and the ensuing ethnic
are in no way exhaustive, but should be read divide
as an initial contribution to the debate about The pre-colonial Burman royal state includ-
reintegration in Myanmar. In fact, we make a ed many of the present-day ethnic groups in
call for a more in-depth analysis of the armed a tributary system with fluid boundaries to
groups, not as homogenous, but as a complex neighbouring countries. The hills were not
and dynamic set of actors. Their motivations directly ruled, and rebellions were sometimes
for joining the armed conflict, and also their organised from the hills. James Scott (2009)
incentives for ending the fighting vary, and has argued that the hill peoples evaded the
thus a deeper understanding of such motiva- state and organised their own more egalitar-
tions and incentives are needed for successful ian societies. However, the Shan and Kayah
(re)integration efforts (Specht 2003: 75). princes ruled minor ‘feudal’ states, and the
Before we turn to the discussion of the Mon and Rakhine had their own monar-
seven reintegration options we provide two chies until Burman kings conquered them in
background sections. The first explores the 1757 and 1785 respectively. Many Mon and
history of conflict with a particular emphasis Karen, loyal to the Mon king, then became
on the Mon and Karen NSAGs. Secondly we refugees and citizens in Thailand. Whereas
discuss the main challenges of the peace ne- these groups have old resentments against
gotiations since 2012. Burman conquest, the tributary monarchy
was founded on personal power and patron–
client relations where allegiance to the Bud-
dhist king was more important than ethnicity
THE ARMED CONFLICT in politics. This was very different from the
IN MYANMAR – IN BRIEF modern identity politics that British colonial
rule introduced, which reified and generalised
Myanmar (or Burma) has been blighted by ethnicity.
civil war, ethno-nationalist conflict and out- Colonialism dissolved the royal adminis-
breaks of communal and religious violence tration after the final conquest in 1886. Co-
since colonial times. The country is a multi- lonial rule imposed a new order of classifi-
ethnic state with about 33% of its 55–60
1 A new, controversial census, based on the colonial categori-
million population belonging to ethnic mi-
sation, was conducted during March 2014. Figures are not yet
norities and the remainder to the Barmar or available and all figures used here are estimates.
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cation and administration upon the old and tion organised a conference in Panglong in
divided its subjects according to ethnic group 1947, where a federation was proposed that
as well as in terms of culture and religion comprised local councils and a united hill
(Furnivall 1956: 304–307). This implied new people’s council within the FA. The feder-
taxonomies and a new game of politics. One ation would be under British rule until de-
important means was the census. The new veloped, and then amalgamated with inde-
knowledge was used to create a divided ad- pendent Burma. General Aung San, head of
ministration: between Ministerial Burma, the the Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League,
plains where the ethnic Burmans (Bamar) in the end agreed to an autonomous admin-
dominated, and the hills or the Frontier Area istration for the hill people. However, the
(FA) along Burma’s border, which had a sep- constitution of 1947 only recognised Shan
arate administration directly under the gov- and Kayah States with a clause allowing for
ernor. Burmans had only restricted access to their secession from Burma after ten years.
the FA. The country was governed as a dual A Kachin State was formed later, but as an
polity based on ideas about economic and administrative region of the Union of Bur-
cultural evolution. ma. The Karen lived mostly outside the FA
Religious diversity was also central in lat- and did not get a state. The federal princi-
er conflicts. Christian missionaries converted ples in the constitution never materialised
some among the ethnic minorities and dur- and in the unclear results of the Panglong
ing the British conquests (1824, 1852, 1886) agreement lay the roots of the long civil war.
Christian converts helped the British fight Today it provides a model for the political
Burman rebels led by Buddhist monks.2 The negotiations of the NSAGs.
monks started rebellions not just to reinstall
the monarchy, but also because they consid-
ered Buddhism to be in danger. Missionar- Conflicts after Independence and
ies, for their part, viewed Burma as ruled by previous ceasefires
‘Buddhist despotism’ and thus also defined In 1949 the Kayah were the first ethnic group
the conquest as a religious war. During the to rebel, followed by the Karen and the Mon
1920s–1930s Burman nationalist organisa- (see next section). Simultaneously, dissatisfied
tions flourished and a serious rebellion broke soldiers from the assassinated General Aung
out in 1930. Many Burmese also opposed San’s Army, who were not integrated into the
the colonial-driven immigration of labourers national army, rebelled. The army had two
from India, resulting in serious anti-Muslim Karen battalions and some Karen officers
riots in 1938. stayed neutral, but many soldiers joined the
After World War II and during the nego- insurrections. In 1948 the communist party
tiations leading to Independence the eth- began a revolution, mujahideen were active
nic minorities expected their loyalty to the in Rakhine State and other ethnic groups fol-
British during the war to be rewarded with lowed such as the Pa-O people. The Kachin
autonomy. The head of the FA administra- and other groups followed in 1961 (see list of
armed groups in appendix 1).
2 Today 80–90% of the Chin and Kachin are Christian and In 1962 the army commander General Ne
about 20–25% of the Karen are Christian. On the Karen and Win staged a coup. This happened after 15
their expectation of a state, see Smith (1999); Gravers (forth-
coming). years of a democracy plagued by splits with-
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