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Planning Perspectives Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rppe20 New socialist cities: foreign architects in the USSR 1920–1940 Koos Bosmaa a Faculty of Arts, Research Institute for the Heritage and History of the Cultural Landscape and Urban Environment (CLUE), De Boelelaan 1105, Amsterdam NL 1081 HV, The Netherlands Published online: 17 Sep 2013. Click for updates To cite this article: Koos Bosma (2014) New socialist cities: foreign architects in the USSR 1920–1940, Planning Perspectives, 29:3, 301-328, DOI: 10.1080/02665433.2013.825994 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02665433.2013.825994 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE PlanningPerspectives,2014 Vol.29,No.3,301–328,http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02665433.2013.825994 New socialist cities: foreign architects in the USSR 1920–1940 Koos Bosma∗ FacultyofArts,ResearchInstitutefortheHeritageandHistoryoftheCulturalLandscapeandUrban Environment(CLUE),DeBoelelaan1105,AmsterdamNL1081HV,TheNetherlands (Received20August2012;finalversionreceived15June2013) The creation of a Communist society between 1917 and 1939 implied the concomitant establishment of a non-capitalist economy and a non-bourgeois culture and lifestyle. In terms of the rhetoric used at the time, the Communist utopia was based on confidence in the beneficial impact of science, technology, planning and management. This necessarily presupposed alternative (new) town planning concepts, a reformed building industry, a new housing typology, and new management styles. Solutions for this mission were expected to come from foreign (mostly German) engineers, architects, and town planners who were invited to the USSR to realize the Communist utopia during the first Five-Year Plan(1928–1933). Keywords: space; heritage; new towns; socialist city; city planning; building industry; housingtypology;architecture;ErnstMay A new civilization ThefoundationofaCommunistsocietyinRussiainOctober1917musthavebeenafascinating spectacle. One of the challenges of the new Communist regime was the question of whether it could create an alternative, non-capitalist economy and a non-bourgeois culture. As Kotkin puts it: Bolshevismitself,includingitsevolution,mustbeseennotmerelyasasetofinstitutions,agroupof personalities,oranideologybutasaclusterofpowerfulsymbolsandattitudes,alanguageandnew formsofspeech,newwaysofbehavinginpublicandprivate,evennewstylesofdress – inshort, asanongoingexperiencethroughwhichitwaspossibletoimagineandstrivetobringaboutanew civilizationcalledsocialism.1 AgreatmanypeopleintheWestwerefascinatedbytheart,literature,theatre,film,andConstruc- tivist architecture inspired by the October Revolution. In the 1920s and 1930s, about 100,000 foreignersvisitedtheSovietUnion:professionalsofallsorts:writers,scientists,artistsandintel- lectuals(someofthemfamous),mostlyduringthefirstFive-YearPlan.Thesevisitswerecrucial for Soviet-Western cultural and intellectual interactions.2 The height of Western admiration coincided,it maybeobserved,withthemostrepressivephaseofSovietCommunism.3 Someofthesevisitorswereprofessionals – townplanners,engineersandarchitects – who werecontractedtoassistinfosteringthecountry’sindustrializationandincreatinghousingpro- jects.Since1990,whenKopppublishedtheresultsofhisstudyoftheambitions,commissions, and careers of the Western architects who worked in the USSR, our perspective on their ∗Email:[email protected] #2013Taylor&Francis 302 K. Bosma activitieshaschanged.ResearchinRussianarchivesandelsewherehashelpedestablishabetter frameworkforunderstandingWesterninterventions.4Inthisarticle,wetakeacloserlookatthe importanceoftownplanning,modernhousingtechnology,andsocialengineeringandplanning inCommunistsociety.5Wedonotadoptanavant-gardeperspectiveorlookatindividualbuild- ingsasobjectsthatsomehowdirectlyrepresenttheproletariat,butfocusinsteadonthestructure and concept of the socialist city. Our basic assumption is that the driving force behind all the efforts to import Western expertise was the regime’s desire that the new towns provide an alternative to the capitalist city. Many visiting architects thought that their universal solutions, usingstandardizationandtheaestheticsofserialdesign,wouldbesuitableforeverypartofthe modernizingworld,especiallythesocialiststates.Akeyquestionwaswhetherthesocialistcity could be created only by capitalist means. How would labour, the building industry, architecture, and town planning be organized in this new civilization? Could the bourgeois family be destroyedtomakewayforacollectiveandegalitariansocialistlife?Answerstothesequestions were needed in that period as they affected the programming, the design, and the represen- tational character of all new buildings and cities. TheCommunisteraof1920–1940maybeusefullydividedintwoperiods:theexperimental periodof1920–1928,andthe Stalinization periodof1928–1933(first Five-Year Plan),when theenforcedrestructuringofmasssocietythroughindustrializationandthecultofproletariani- zationweredominanttrends.Foreachperiod,wepresentonetypicalplandesignedbyaforeign architectandevaluatetheresultsoftryingtorealizeit.Theevaluationisbasedonnewresearch publishedinarticles,booksanddissertations(someofwhichpartlyuseSovietsources),aswell as on some of our own research. The experimental era Duringthe firstdecade of the Communist era, experimentswere made in almost everyfield in order to find a suitable structure and expression for the new culture.6 The architectural experiments may be termed ‘utopian’ inasmuch as architecture always refers to a better future, although it does not itself claim to be the foundation of utopia. It reacts to and reflects society as a whole. It needs a sociopolitical reform programme as its guide in order to be capable – if materialized – of fulfilling a representative role. Communist utopia, it was thoughtatthetime,shouldtakeanaffirmativestancetowardthemoderncityandcitylife,con- ceivingtownandcountryasanurbanizingcontinuum – tobeindustrialized – andadvocating the abolition of the existing agrarian production cycle and way of life. During this first phase, some model experiments (buildings, sites, and projects) were executed that were used to impress foreign visitors: model prisons, children’s communes, schools, scientific research centres,andhygienicinstitutions.7Thesemodels – theverytermimpliesthattheywereexcep- tions – wereoftentheworkofavant-gardearchitectsandcouldbeadmiredassuch.Toacertain extenttheirproposalsanddesignsweremeanttoassertandconfirmthedictatorshipofthepro- letariat. An early experiment in this vein was the creation of the new town of Kemerovo. Kemerovo: an early new town experiment OneoftheprimarygoalsoftheSovietregimewastheexploitationofmineralsintheCaucasus, Siberia,theUkraineandtheUrals.Rightfromthestart,itwasclearthatthecountrylackedthe PlanningPerspectives 303 technicalknowledge,toolsandscientificmanagementinfrastructureforcreatingheavyindustry. Kemerovo(until1931calledSˇcˇeglovsk)wasplannedtobethecapitalcityofthecoalregionof KuznyetskiBassinorKuzbas(Siberia).ThefirstcoalminesofKemerovohadbeendugin1870 with bare hands. Coal was transported via the River Tom (a tributary of the Ob) to Omsk. In Tsarist times (1915), the first coke factory was built. A major event was the opening of the Trans-Siberian Railway (1916), after which various primitive, small miners’ settlements sprang up. The idea of constructing a sort of company town on the river’s right bank (‘Autonomous Industrial Colony Kuzbas’ [AICK]) originated with the American branch of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), or the Wobblies, as an enthusiastic reaction to Lenin’s Letter toAmericanLabourers(NewYork1918).Inthisletter,Leninstressedhisinterestinrecruiting the aid of the international proletariat for the first workers’ state. He was particularly eager to launchtheideabecauseofhisadmirationforthetechnicalandscientificmanagementofAmer- icanindustry,andheexpressedtheconvictionthattheAmericanrevolutionaryworkerswould play an extraordinary role in the industrialization of the USSR. A prominent IWW member, Herbert Henry Calvert, promoted the idea of creating a model industry for foreign workers, andhewasbroughtincontactwiththeDutchCommunistSebaldRutgers.8Thiscivilengineer, who was acquainted with the IWW, became a key figure in the construction of the colony. In October 1921, Lenin signed the agreement for the installation of the AICK. NumerousAmericanswenttoKemerovo,includingminingexperts,nurses,machinists,car- penters, electricians, accountants, and engineers. Between 1921 and 1925, the Kemerovo coal mines were modernized, and a chemical factory, coke ovens, and some offices were built. On account of difficulties with the Kremlin, the number of foreign workers was reduced. They had to sign a declaration proving their awareness that they would suffer privations ‘in a country that was quite backward and had suffered unprecedented destruction’. They also had toagreetostrivefor‘productivityoflaboranddisciplinesurpassingthestandardsofcapitalism, orelsewewillnotbeabletosurpassoreventoreachthelevelofcapitalism’.9Inanewcontract withtheleadersofthecolony,theideaofanautonomous,hugeindustrialenterpriseownedand led by workers was rejected. From a historical point of view, this was a decisive moment, because one of the basic ideas of socialism – the decentralization of power in favour of the autonomous collectives of the egalitarian proletariat – was abandoned. Oneremnantofautonomyremained:foreignworkersandengineerssupervisedthearmyof Russian workers in order to teach them modern technology. Despite all these troubles, Sebald Rutgersandhisteamsucceededincompletingalargecokeandchemicalfactoryandinreform- ing mining according to American standards of efficiency. From October 1922 until January 1927,Kemerovohousedacommunityof11,000inhabitants,amongwhomwere700foreigners (representing more than twenty nationalities). The Kuzbass colony underwent an expansive building programme.10 In 1925, Rutgers invited the Dutch architect J.B. van Loghem (1881–1940; Figure 1)11 to come to Kemerovo. ThetwomenhadstudiedtogetherattheTechnicalUniversityinDelft.VanLoghemwasa member of the Union of Revolutionary-Socialist Intellectuals and was acquainted with social housing practice. In Kemerovo he supervised a building department of the autonomousindus- trialcolony,whichcounted3Dutchengineersand15RussiantechniciansbetweenMarch/April 1926andSeptember1927.Originally,VanLoghemwasaskedtomakeaplanfortheurbaniz- ationofthewholeregionaroundKemerovo,aboutathousandhectaresonbothsidesoftheTom, 304 K. Bosma Figure1. DutcharchitectJ.B.VanLoghem(1881–1940)(photographerunknown). with the possibility of accommodating a population that might grow to 250,000. He was even supposed to make a plan within a diameter of about 250 kilometres for centres with blast-fur- naces, etc. (Gevresk, Leninsk, Prokopyevsk, and Sˇcˇeglovsk on the lower part of the Tom; the latter existed already). No documentation about this regional plan has been found, and given the fact that he had no experience whatsoever with spatial planning at this scale, it seems improbable that Van Loghem ever delivered such a scheme. There is some evidence, however,thathemadeaplanforKemerovoitself,withtraditionalbuildingblocksandadiag- onalaxis.Hedidnotdrawonapre-establishedurbanmodel,butadaptedurbanfunctionstothe naturallandscape.Thecitywassplitup,or,toputitinapositiveway,dominatedbytheDevil’s Valley, where a cable-lift brought the coal across the Tom River to the chemical factory. VanLoghemsupervisedtheconstructionofabout1000dwellings(ofthreedifferenttypes), and some collective facilities were realized, such as an electric power station, a fire station, a communitycentre,shops,andaschoolwithaconcretewatertowerandabathhouse(withacon- crete vault) (Figure 2). In fact it was a rather small company town designed in the manner of modernist Western ‘white’ architecture, or at least it appeared so at first sight (Figure 3). The houses and facilities were situated near the coal mines. Van Loghem used the tower of one of the coal factories as a visual marker in the axis of the main road. Some individual houses PlanningPerspectives 305 Figure2. ReconstructionbyMrsSchoorl-Laubin1965ofVanLoghem’splanforKemerovo,1926– 1927. Notes:1 – chemicalfactory,2 – cable-lift,3 – Devil’sValley,4 – schoolwithwatertower,5 – coop- erative building, 6 – coal mine, 7 – ferry-road, 8 – chain-ferry, 9 – old village, 10 – stadium. A – housingtypeA,B – detachedhousesinthewood,C – housingtypeB. Figure3. VanLoghem,rowhousinginKemerovojustaftercompletion,1926–1927(kindlyprovided byDrIvanNevzgodin). 306 K. Bosma weresituatedattheedgeofthewoods.Theotherhousesweredesignedinarowandplacedona grid (type a and b). The houses, however, could not possibly be built according to Western methods; the material was not available and, regardless, would have been too expensive. Van Loghem,therefore,usedlocaltimber-framingtechniquesthatofferedtheadvantageofenabling onetocontinuetobuildinwinter,whichwasimpossiblewithbricklaying.Timberframingalso allowedstandardizationofelements,andthustheprefabricationofmanyhousesdidintheend becomea reality. The walls of the houseswere plastered, whichgave the impression that they were monolithic concrete structures, but because of the timber framing the roofs had to be pitched. The ‘normal’ dwelling, standardized by Van Loghem, was extremely small: only about 3.6 square metres per person. One of the dilemmas he faced was the fact that the Russian workers were farmers who took cattle with them and needed a vegetable garden as a means to survive. Aftertwoyears,VanLoghemleft,havingbeenobligedtohandoverthejobtohisRussian colleagues.NomorebuildingactivitieswereundertakenalongsidetherightbankoftheTom.In 1927,thecityanditsfactorieswerebroughtunderthecompletecontroloftheKremlin.Forthis reason most foreigners in Kemerovo left the country at that time. WhathappenedtotheplansofVanLoghem,whoendedhisstaywiththecreationofwooden houses – instead of avant-garde architecture – in Kemerovo, was a early warning of the hin- drances encountered by the groups of German architects and engineers who came in large numbers to Russia around 1930. The second period: the Five-Year Plan (1928–1933) Although the avant-garde had been active in the production of all sorts of model institutional architecture, the crucial problem the Communist state had to face was the creation of an inde- pendenteconomicstructureintheshortestpossibletime.Acentralizedstatewasnowincharge of the industrialization processes, which were channelled into a new framework: a Five-Year Plan. In the latter, the state opted for an accelerated industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture. In its efforts to overcome the old structures and create new socialist ones, the government invited foreign experts, counting on them to help speed up the transition. The rhetoric used to discuss the Communist utopia was rooted in a firm confidence in the beneficial impact of science, technology, and planning. Such notions functioned well in the geopolitical context of the Soviet Union, and were also well suited to describing the activities of managers, engineers, architects, and urban planners (four professional groups which, given the nature of their jobs, were obviously oriented toward future developments). After the experimental era, the second decade of socialism was characterized by a radical industrialization,aplannedeconomy,Fordism(rationalization,standardization,andtheassem- blyline),andsocialistcompetition – allcrucialelementsinfurtheringapolicyofproletariani- zation.DuringthefirstFive-YearPlan,itwasnecessarytodomorethanovercomethebackward Czaristeconomyandculture;themodernizationcampaignhadtobeseenasagreatleapforward that would surpass even capitalism. Sincethestatecouldeasilytakethelanditwanted,townplanningwasexpectedtobemuch easier and quicker in the Soviet Union than in Western Europe. Under Stalin, socialism was interpreted as a form of Party monopoly. This notion found expression in a radical expansion PlanningPerspectives 307 ofheavyindustryandthecollectivizationofagriculture,inplanning,andinscientificmanage- ment,whichtooktheplaceofthemarketeconomy.ThecoreoftheFive-YearPlanwasthecre- ationofnewfactoriesforheavyindustrycombinedwiththefoundingof200industrialand1000 agrarian cities. In many ways, they can be compared with nineteenth-century company towns. Americanengineersandarchitectswerecontractedfortheintroductionofscientificmanagement in heavy industry.12 Foreign experts were also invited to organize the Sotsgorod, the socialist newtowns.Tocreatethem,theCommunistPartyneededfeasibletownplans,andsincenotech- nicalororganizationalknow-howwasavailablelocally,ithadtobeimported.Numerousarchi- tects and engineers came from abroad. The Soviet government signed a contract with Henry Ford and the Austin Company.13 Americanengineersevenproducedadesignforacarmanufacturingcityof150,000inhabitants inspired byDetroit(Avtostroj orNizˇnijNovgorod;during1932–1991officially calledGorki), with two axes that led to official Communist buildings. ThelargesttractorfactoryintheworldwasbuiltinStalingrad.Thearchitecturewasdesigned bytheAmericanarchitectAlbertKahn(1869–1942),whosestarhadrisenthroughhisworkon theadvanceddesignofHenryFord’sfactoriesinDetroit,homeofthelegendaryfirstassembly- lineproductionofmotorcars.UnderthesupervisionofAlbertandhisbrotherMoritzKahn,who had an office in Moscow (where more than 1500 Soviet engineers worked and gained experience), more than 500 specialized factories were built in the USSR between 1929 and 1932. Working with prefabricated prototypes, standardized structures, his designs were extremely rationalized.14TheseeffortsalsowerealsoinstrumentalinacceleratingStalin’sdrivetocollec- tivizeagriculture,aprocessthatwasgoingfullspeedinthoseyears.Theindividualfarmershad toberemovedfromthelandandtakentothefactories.Thenewagriculturalstructurewithcol- lectivefarmswouldbeadornedwiththetractorastheiconofCommunism’sgloriousprogress. Ahugenumberofpeasantswereforcedtoleavetheirlandsinordertofindfoodandworkelse- where, often in the production processes involved in creating buildings, factories and new towns. Between 1926 and 1939, the number of people living in cities increased from 26.3 to 55.9 million. The proletarianization cult The Five-Year Plan campaign was accompanied by military rhetoric, and sometimes even includedorganizedviolence.Seenintermsofgeopolitics,industrialization,includingthecollat- eral social engineering, can be interpreted as a form of inner colonization in the Caucasus, the Urals,theUkraine andSiberia.Thenewsocialist manorwomanwouldlivein a newsocialist town that was the front of the battle against backward Czarist structures and extreme climatic conditions: mountains, rivers, deserts, and steppes. In the USSR, the organization and use of the labour force underwent a radical change. In white collar and planning circles, the watch- words were scientific management, planning, measuring, counting and (the manipulation of) statistics, while for workers shock work and socialist competition became the rule. In order to heighten productivity and strive for records, the system of shock work was standardized: ‘... the whole point was sheer energy and persistent hard work’.15 Lenin and Stalin thought they couldimportcapitalistproductionprocesses‘withoutimportingthesensoryshockthatafflicted workerswithinit’.16Thebasicideabehindtheshockworkwasthat‘centuriesofbackwardness were[tobe]madeupinadecade’.17Thisnotionservedasanalibitoimportcapitalistmeasures 308 K. Bosma andtoolstoheightenefficiencyandproductivity.Theseshockprojectswereaccompaniedbyall kindsof propaganda,and even well-known Russianfiction writers were ‘invited’ to be part of thepropagandacampaign.Theywerepresentedasabrigadeofengineersofthesoul.Oneofthe resultsofallthispropagandaandsocialistcompetitionwasaninfectiouscumulativeradicalism: thepraiseoftheirengineeringachievementswassogreatthatthecallforever-moreambitious projectsgrewsteadilylouder.Atthesametime,itbecameincreasinglydifficulttodisguisethe hellish execution of these projects and their painful collateral effects on the environment. This overly demanding proletarianization, forcing the young adult shock troops to work extra hard, exhausting and sacrificing their bodies and souls for an idea, cleared the way for playing workers against each other. Those who were not fanatic could be branded as ‘class enemies’, and Party stalwarts could be rewarded with medals for ‘Worker of the Month’, etc. ‘Shock work,combined with socialist competition, became a means of differentiating individ- uals as well as a technique of political recruitment within the working class.’18 The cruelty of shock work was presented in a poetic, dreamlike way and combined with scientific exactness. Speed, standardization, and ‘technical spirit’ were necessary. ‘Catastrophes’ – destruction and death–wereinevitable.Thepowerof‘machinism’wouldproduceanewhumansensoriumofelec- tricnerves,brainmachines,andcinemaeyes;andaglobal,massbodywithcollectivemovements, collectivefeelings,collectivegoals.19 Infact,shockconstructionwassuperhumananddidnotfitwellwiththeideaofscientificman- agement.TherealreasonforitwassimplythattheSovietUnionneededcheaplabourinorderto preventitfrombeingcompletelydependentoninvestments,technology,andlogisticsfromcapi- talist nations. Scientific management and Fordism ScientificmanagementandFordismwereleadingconceptsduringthefirstFive-YearPlan.This hadimplicationsfortownplanningandhousing.Amongtheissuesbeingdebatedweretheabol- ishmentofthecity–countrycontrast,thetheoryofthesocialistcity,andthesocialistwayoflife. Theprospectsseemedideal:anationallandpolicy(nomoreprivateownership),thePartyasthe almighty patron of the whole building industry, a city image that would be dominated by the architectural visualization of the one and only class, and the creation of the new socialist humanbeing – onewithacollectivistidentityresultingfromacompletelydifferentkindofedu- cation.Theabolitionofthecontrastbetweentownandcountrysidecouldbemanagedspatially accordingtodifferentconcepts,stilltobedetermined.Inanycase,thefactorieswouldbenew vitalcentres,andresidentialareaswouldbedominatedbycollectivehousing.Russianeconom- ists,planners,andarchitectshadbeenquarrellingabouttheextenttowhichthecitiesshouldbe decentralizedbyleavingtheoldcitiesbehindanddistributingnewproductioncentresoverthe countryalongsidethetransportandenergynetworks.Linearcities,sometimesconceivedasana- logous to the assembly line, were also under consideration, for example, in Nikolai Miljutin’s conceptforStalingradorIvanLeonidov’splanforMagnitogorsk.20Didlinearcitieswithscat- tered cultural institutions along traffic arteries offer a solution? Or was reduction of cities to a closed community of no more than 50,000 inhabitants connected to centres of heavy industry (company towns) sufficient? In the event, a third way was chosen: housing and industrial areas would be planned as ribbons parallel to the main traffic arteries. PlanningPerspectives 309 Russian architects were discussing not only the decentralization of housing but also the nature of the dwelling itself. Vehement debates took place about women in the labour process,thedestructionofthe‘bourgeois’family,stateeducationofchildren,andeventhecre- ationofseparatecitiesforchildrenandtheirschools.Inshort:thearchitectshadtolookforade- quate artistic concepts for a new way of housing and a new life style. Western participation BecauseGermanyandtheUSSRfosteredspecialrelationsduringtheWeimarRepublic,itisnot surprising that a large number of German specialists worked in the Communist country.21 A Sovietreportof1928listedabout80,000foreigners,ofwhich20,000–30,000workedinindus- try.About10,000ofthemwereGerman:politicalexpatriates,Communists,andshockworkers, but also well-paid bourgeois technical experts.22 The town planners, engineers, and architects were high profile and privileged, and their participation brought prestige to the projects they worked on: ‘Intense, even utopian, hopes were invested in their presence during the period of the Five-Year Plan.’23 The most prominent group was the so-called May ‘brigade’, named for the German architect and town planner Ernst May (1886–1970; Figure 4).24 Along with May’s brigade, other German brigades were engaged in the planning of new towns. In some cases they collaborated with May’s team. Another influential group, known as the Rotfront Figure 4. German architect and planner Ernst May (1886–1970). Fragment of a collage presented to Maybyhiscollaboratorsontheoccasionofhis70thbirthday,1956(collectionJoSillich).