New Investigations of Marx's Method

208 Pages·1997·6.125 MB·English

by  Fred Moseley and Martha Campbell (eds.)

New Investigations
of Marx’s Method
Edited by
Fred Moseley
and
Martha Campbell
Humanity Books
An lmprint of Prometheus Books
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Amherst, New York 14228-2197
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New hit-c.m'gar1'mi.i of Marx's Method. Copyright © I997 by Humanity Books. All rights
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- _ Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
New investigations of Marx's method I edited by Fred Moseley and Martha Campbell.
p cm.
Originally published: Atlantic Highlands. NJ : Humanities Press lntcmational.
lnc. I997.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN I-$7.‘l92~36-t-8 (cloth)
I Marx. Karl. lltllt-llltll. Kapital. 2. Marxian economics. 3. Dialcc1jca|
materialism l Mmi.-ley. Fred. l946- ll. Campbell. Martha. I946. ,
HIHOI ‘H‘l2‘l I907
I15 -I‘ l—dc2l
96-48493
Primed in ll’: United States ol/trrierica on acid-free paper
Contents
Introduction 1
Fred Moseley
Against the Logical-Historical Method:
Dialectical Derivation versus Linear Logic 9
Christopher Arthur
Redoubled Empiricism: The Place of Social Form
and Formal Causality in Marxian Theory 38
Patrick Murray
Theory as Critique: On the Argument in Capital 66
Paul Mattick _]r.
Marx's Theory of Money: A Defense 89
Martha Campbell
The Development of Marx's Theory
of the Distribution of Surplus-Value 121
of Profit 150
Fred Moseley
The Notion of Tendency in Marx's 1894 Law
Geert Reuten
Marx's Theory of Social Forms and Lakatos's
Methodology of Scientific Research Programs 176
Contributors 199
Tony Smith
Name Index 201
Subject Index 204
Introduction
Fred Moseley
This book is a successor to an earlier book by the same group of au­
thors which was entitled Marx’: Method in Capital: A Reexamination (1993).
Like the first book, this book is also concerned with the methodologi­
cal principles that underlie Marx's theory in Capital, a subject which is
essential to an understanding of Capital, but which so far has received
very little attention, and certainly insufficient attention. These authors
do not think that “Marx was always right"; indeed they all have criti­
cisms of Marx's theory, some of them quite significant. However, they
do all insist that a proper evaluation of Marx's theory. and especially
its logical coherence, requires first and foremost a clear and thorough
understanding of Marx's theory in terms of its own logical structure.
There are three main prevailing interpretations of Marx's logical
method in Capital: (1) the logical-historical interpretation s ested first
by Friedrich Engels and later developed by R. L. Meek; (2 the “suc­
cessive approximations” interpretation introduced by l-lenryk Grossman
and adopted by Paul Sweezy; and (3) the neo-Ricardian or Sradian
interpretation based on linear production theory and represented by
M. Morishima and l. Steedman. which has been widely adopted in re­
cent years. The authors of this book reject all three of these prevailing
interpretations of Marx's logical method, for various reasons. This rejec­
tion of these interpretations implies that the voluminous secondary
literature on Marx's theory must at least be reexamined and is probably
largely erroneous.‘ This recognition in turn implies the urgent need
to return to Marx's own writings and to thoroughly reexamine the
methodological principles of Marx's economic theory.’ If the prevailing
interpretations are erroneous. what is the logical structure of Capital?
This book deals with many of the same methodological issues ad­
dressed in the first book. including: the meaning of dialectical logic,
the relation between Marx and Hegel, criticism of the "logical-histori­
I *1‘ \
cal’ interpretation of Marx's method. Marx's emphasis on social forms.
the historical specificity of Marx's concepts, the commodity as the starting
point in Marx's theory, Marx's theory of money. Marx's distinction
2 I-‘RED MOSELEY
between capital in general and competition, and Marx's critique of
bourgeois economics. This book also addresses several important addi­
tional methodological issues, including: Marx's concept of totality, Marx's
concept of tendency (especially the tendency of the rate of profit to
fall), and an appraisal of Marx's theory in terms of Lakatos's method­
ology of scientific research programs. All in all, this book represents
continued progress on these important topics and toward a better
understanding of Marx's logical method in Capital.
This group of authors has met annually for the last four years at
Mount Holyoke College. The seven authors consist of three econo­
mists and four philosophers, reflecting the interdisciplinary nature of
the subject of the logical method of Marx's economic theory. It should
be emphasized that this group does not represent a new monolithic
point of view on Marx's theory. As should be apparent from the previ­
ous book and from this book, there are many disagreements among
these authors, some of them quite fundamental and important (see
the introduction to the first book for a discussion of the important
agreements and disagreements among these authors). However, these
authors do share the rejection of the prevailing interpretations of Marx's
logical method mentioned above and they also share the desire to
rediscover Marx's method.
The first paper, by Chris Arthur, critically examines Engels's influ­
ential interpretation of Marx's method as a “logical-historical" method,
according to which the order of Marx's categories in Capital corre­
spond to an idealized periodization of history, such that the subject of
Part 1 of Volume 1 is not capitalism, but rather a precapitalist “simple
commodity production.” Arthur argues that Engels was mistaken in
attributing such a “logical;historical" method to Marx. Arthur first critically
examines the three texts in which Engels presented his interpretation
of Marx's method: his l859 review of Marx's A Contribution to the C11’­
tique of Political Economy, his preface to Volume 3 of Capital, and his
supplement to Volume 3. Arthur then presents his own interpretation
of Marx's method, and especially of Part 1 of Volume 1, which is based
on systematic dialectics and the Hegelian concept of “totality.” Arthur
argues that the subject of Marx's theory throughout Capital is a “struc­
tured totality." the system of capitalist production. The starting point
of such a dialectical analysis of a structured totality is the most ab­
stract, universal element of this totality, which provides the basis for
the derivation of the other key elements of this totality. Thus, the com­
modity in Chapter I of Capital is an abstract element of the totality of
capitalist production, the starting point for the analysis of this totality,
not the product of an earlier historical mode of production.
Introduction 3
Patrick Murray argues that Marx's philosophical method can be char­
acterized as “redoubled empiricism." “Redoubled empiricism” is con­
cerned not only with the empirical validity of theories. but also with
the connection between theoretical concepts and the social forms of a
historically specilic type of society. Ordinary empiricism does not ex­
amine the empirical foundations of its concepts because it is trapped
in the dualist split between subject and object, a split which is charac­
teristic of modern philosophy in either its rationalist or empiricist
branches. Murray argues that Marx's method of “redoubled empiri­
cism” enabled him to overcome this pervasive dualist split. Marx's
emphasis on social forms and formal causality places him within the
tradition of Aristotle and Hegel, and his “redoubled empiricism” places
him in the company of pragmatists such as james and ‘post-dogmatic"
empiricists such as Quine and Davidson. Murray then examines two
prior comparative appraisals of Marx's theory and neoclassical economic
theory by Moseley, and argues that, while correct in so far as they go,
these appraisals miss the crucial feature that Marx's theory explains
the nature and effects of social forms and neoclassical economics does
not. Murray argues further that both classical and neoclassical eco­
nomic theory are incapable of analyzing social forms and their effects
precisely because they remain trapped within the dualist split of objec­
tivism (classical economics) or subjectivism (neoclassical economics).
Murray concludes that all these considerations suggest the scientific
superiority of Marx's theory.
Paul Mattick emphasizes that Capital not only presents Marx's theory
of capitalism, but also presents a thorough-going critique of ‘classical’
and “vulgar” economics (it is to be recalled that the subtitle of Capital
is A Critique of Political Economy). Indeed. these two aspects of Capital
are directly linked in that. according to Marx. the reality of capitalism,
which his theory explains. itself determines the limited and mistaken
theoretical expressions of this reality by those who take this reality as
the natural form of social life. In the words of Marx's famous ‘Pref­
ace’ to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy: ‘social being
determines consciousness." Mattick argues that Marx's critique of po­
litical economy in Capital is an application of this ‘guiding principle"
to the reality of capitalism. With regard to the structure of Capital.
Matticlt argues that Marx begins with the commodity. not because the
commodity is logically prior to money or capital (thus disagreeing with
most of the other authors in this book). but because the commodity
represents the classical economists’ understanding of capitalism as a
system of market exchange, which implies the freedom of individuals
and the exchange of equivalents. Marx's theory then proceeds to
4 FRED MOSELEY
explain the reality of the exploitation of workers beneath this appearance
of equal exchange. However, Capital does not simply reveal the reality
of exploitation. It also explains how this reality is necessarily misperceived
as characterized by freedom and equality. The argument continues in
Volume ‘2 to explain how the circulation of capital as a system of ex­
tracting surplus labor necessarily appears on the market as the de­
mand for commodities by capitalists and workers. The climax of Marx's
critique is in Volume 3, in that it is explained how the reality of sur­
plus-value necessarily appears to capitalists and their theoretical repre­
sentatives as the particular forms of income to capital (profit, interest,
and rent), and as originating from capital itself (and land). Mattick
concludes that, according to Marx, these normal forms of understand­
ing break down when social reality itself breaks down (i.e., in times of
economic crisis), thus opening the possibility of a new understanding
of society and of the transformation of society.
Martha Campbell defends Marx's theory of money against influen­
tial recent criticisms presented by Levine and Ong. Both of these cri­
tiques have to do with Marx's theory of commodity money. Levine and
Ong argue, first of all, that Marx's derivation of commodity money is
invalid because it is based on an artificial barter economy. Campbell
carefully reviews Marx's arguments in Chapter 1 of Volume 1 of Capi­
tal and shows that this criticism is mistaken and is based on ignoring
Marx's theory of value, from which his theory of money is derived.
Secondly. Ong also argues that money cannot be a commodity in capi­
talist economies because the supply of the precious metals is exogenously
determined and too limited to accommodate the needs of capital ac­
cumulation. Campbell again reexamines Marx's texts and shows that
this criticism is based on a failure to distinguish between two diH'erent
functions of money—as measure of value and as means of circulation.
According to Marx's theory. money must be a commodity only in its
function as a measure of value. As a means of circulation, commodity­
mooney can be rreplaced by a m ere sym bol. Inodeed Marx hifmself ar­
gued that the needs of capital accumulation would have to be met by
credit money. thus anticipating Ong's argument. Campbell also argues
that the main point of Marx's theory of money is that soda] |ab0r
must be represented as money in an economy of private and inde­
pcndocnl. producers. Marx made the assumption that money is a com­
modity in order to emphasize that, in such a private economy, it is
beyond social control. Money need not be a commodity, but whatever
form it takes must remain beyond soda] comm].
p us-va ue. which is eventually presented in Volume
Introduction 5
3 of Capital. Moseley reviews the various drafts of Capital and espe­
cially the recently published (in English) “l86l-63 Manuscript,” in which
Marx began to work out his theory of the distribution of surplus-value
for the first time in detail. Moseley argues that Marx's theory of the
distribution of surplus-value is based on the fundamental methodo­
logical premise that the total amount of surplus-value is determined
prior to and independently of the division of this total amount into
individual parts. The individual parts of surplus-value are then deter­
mined at a subsequent stage of the analysis, with the predetermined
total amount of surplus-value taken as a given magnitude. The paper
provides substantial textual evidence that Marx consistently adhered
to this methodological premise throughout the various drafts of Capt’­
tal, both in his theory of equal rates of profit and prices of production
and in his theories of merchant profit, interest, and rent, the other
individual parts into which surplus-value is divided. This conclusion
has significant implications for the debate over Marx's solution to the
“transformation problem.” Moseley argues that if Marx's theory of prices
of production is correctly interpreted to include this premise of the
prior determination of the total amount of surplus-value and hence of
the rate of profit, then there is no logical error in Marx's theory, con­
trary to the widely-held contrary view, based on the neo-Ricardian in­
terpretation of Marx's theory.
Geert Reuten examines the concept of “tendency” in economic theory
in general and especially in Marx's theory of the tendency of the rate
of profit to fall. The main question addressed is whether Marx's con­
cept of tendency refers to a “power” or “force” which may not be di­
rectly observable or to an “expression” or “result” which is directly
observable. Reuten first reviews related notions of tendency in the works
of Roy Bhaskar and J. S. Mill. He then carefully examines all the edi­
tions of Volume 3 of Capital, including a recently published German
edition of Marx's I864-65 manuscript without Enge|'s editing. Reuten
concludes that Marx's texts are ultimately ambiguous. One can inter­
pret the texts as supporting either the “power” notion of tendency or
the “expression” notion of tendency. Reuten concludes by briefly sketch­
ing the implications of the “power” notion of tendency for empirical
research, and argues that the cross-fertilization of methodological, theo­
retical, and empirical research is the most promising way to reclaim a
“real world political economy” whose aim is to provide theoretically
informed explanations of important empirical phenomena.
Finally, Tony Smith argues that a consideration of Marx's theory
from the perspective of Laltatos's methodology of scientific research
programs clarifies the crucial role of systematic dialectics in Marx's
6 l-‘RED MOSELEY
theory and, at the same time, reveals some important weaknesses of
Lakatos's methodology. Smith First argues that Marx's systematic dia­
lectics of social form (discussed in Smith's paper in the first collection
and at length in an earlier book by Smith) can be interpreted as the
“hard core" of Marx's theory, i.e., as the basic postulates that are taken
for granted and as mostly inviolable by those working within the Marxian
research program. However, Smith argues further that Lakatos’s con­
ception of the hard core is mistaken because it assumes that the hard
core by itself has no explanatory power, whereas Marx's hard core of
systematic dialectics has significant explanatory power, and much greater
explanatory power than the hard core of neoclassical theory, the rational
maximizing choices of atomized individuals. Smith argues further that
from the hard core of systematic dialectics one can derive the “posi­
tive heuristics” of Marx's theory, i.e., the set of questions that should
be pursued. These consist of questions that emphasize the nature of
class relations in capitalism and the historical development of capi­
talism. The hard core of systematic dialectics can also be used to de­
rive the more concrete theories in the “protective belt” of Marx's theory,
e.g., the source of profit, the persistence of class conflict in capitalism,
inherent technological change, the increasing concentration of capi­
tal, recurring crises, etc. Finally, Smith argues that, on the Lakatosian
appraisal criterion of the prediction and corroboration of “novel facts”
derived from the hard core in the protective belt, Marxian theory more
than holds its own against the competing neoclassical theory. How­
ever, Smith argues that the usefulness of novel facts as a criterion for
theory appraisal is limited because of the complexity and interrelated­
ness of the open system of‘ capitalism, which makes it very difficult for
theories of capitalism to make definite predictions. Smith suggests that
a more appropriate criterion of theory appraisal is “retroduction” (as
developed by Andrew Sayer), or the explanation of phenomena by
postulating the real mechanisms which are capable of producing the
phenomena (e.g.. the law of value, exploitation. the distribution of
surplus-value. etc.). On the basis of this broader criterion, Smith ar­
gues that Marxian theory is far superior to neoclassical theory.
Further research is clearly needed on all the important topics ad­
dressed in these papers: the reason(s) why Marx began his theory of
capitalism with the commodity; the double character of Capital as both
a critique of bourgeois economics and the presentation of an alterna­
tive theory of capitalism; the relation between concepts and empirical
reality in Marx's theory; whether Marx's theory of money requires that
money be a commodity; Marx's distinction between capital in general
and competition and the challenge implied by this distinction to the
Introduction '7
currently dominant neo-Ricardian interpretation of Marx's theory; the
precise logical and empirical status of Marx's theory of the tendency
of the rate of profit to fall; the comparative methodological appraisal
of Marxian and neoclassical theories, programs in this comparative ap­
praisal. The authors of these papers hope that the papers will serve to
stimulate further research and discussion of these and other impor­
tant issues related to Marx's method in Capital.
i would like to express a special thanks to my co-editor. Martha
Campbell, who was a very capable and thoughtful collaborator throughout
the process of putting this book together. I would also like to express
appreciation to Mount Holyoke College for its ongoing and generous
financial support of our working conferences. I also thank various mem­
bers of the Mount Holyoke staff, especially Dawn l.arder, who have
very ably assisted in the logistical arrangements for these conferences.
Notes
I. This view is also expressed by Scott Meikle (1985): ‘Much of what is written
today from within the Marxian tradition is as deeply flawed in method and
conception as most of what is written about Marxism from outside it. This
is true in political economy. in sociology. and in political. historical, and
philosophical analysis. There is little today that can be viewed as constitut­
ing the regeneration of Marxism that was expected and hoped for in the
l960s. in spite of the enormous increase in published material which is in
one way or another Marxist. On the contrary. there is no shortage of evi­
dence of profound and pervasive methodological disorientation. and it shows
itself most starkly in the spectrum of attitudes taken to dialectics" (p. l).
2. Meikle (I985) again writes: “What is needed. and missing. is the underpin­
ning philosophy upon which Marx's now unfamiliar concept of science and
explanation are founded’ (p. 5). Other works that have pioneered this
reexamination of Marx's logical method (besides other works by the au­
thors of these papers) include: Rosdolsky (I973). _Zeleny' (I977). Eldred
and Roth (l978). Echeverria (I980). Sekine (I982). Albritton (I986).
Shamsavari (l99l).
W ‘A Wu
References
Albritton, Robert (I986). A japanm Reconstruction of Marxian 1'Iuor). London:
Macmillan.
Echeverria, Rafael (1978). ‘The Later Marx and Hegel: A Study on the Devel­
opment of the Marxian Concept of Science.‘ Raearch in Political Economy 3.
l55—208.
Eldred. Michael and M. Roth (i978). A Guide to Marx’: ‘Capital’. l.ondon:
CSE Books.