Neutrality and Alignment

457 Pages·2014·14.03 MB·English

Neutrality and Alignment: Selected Aspects of Swedish and Norwegian
Foreign Policies toward the Soviet Union, 19^17=194% 1987-1991
by
Trevor Julien Gunn
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at
The London School of Economics and Political Science
UMI Number: U062752
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Abstract
The chief aim of the thesis is to develop a clearer understanding of the factors
which affect a state leadership's tendencies to behave in particular ways towards other
states. It seeks to compare and contrast the effect of different security policy choices
upon the Swedish and Norwegian leaders' attitudes, approach and diplomatic style
towards the Soviet Union. The aim is to observe important differences and similarities
in the responses to largely equivalent stimuli across a cross-section of issue areas most
relevant for the Scandinavians' respective bilateral relationships with the Soviet Union.
More precisely, what difference does Sweden's choice to pursue neutrality and
Norway's decision to become a member of NATO make in their respective relations to
a superpower?
Based upon the secondary literature on alliances and neutrality, several working
hypotheses which are proposed to affect Sweden's and Norway's relationship with the
Soviet Union were generated: most important to a neutral power is that it be seen to
pursue a credible policy of indifference in relation to the East-West Cold War; actions
which may be interpreted as being partial to either side of East-West conflict will be
avoided; as a neutral Sweden must defend its territorial integrity. Finally, Sweden's
neutrality can also be promoted through playing the role of impartial mediator in
conflict situations, advocating disarmament in international fora, and resorting to
international norms and organisations in its relationship with the Soviet Union.
NATO member Norway must make sure that it pursues policies which are partial
to its alliance members. Much of what Norway does with respect to the Soviet Union
is motivated by a desire to demonstrate NATO's credibility as a cohesive, credible
deterrent force to the Soviet threat. Here, demonstrations of loyalty to alliance ideals
and solidarity with alliance partners are key to understanding why Norway acts as it
does in relation to the Soviet Union. Policy co-ordination and consultation between
NATO members are important parts of maintaining a cohesive viable deterrent against
the Soviet Union. Finally, Norway has shunned arrangements which could result in
isolation from fellow NATO members in order to further insure NATO credibility and
its position within the NATO organisation.
The body of the thesis examines crucial bilateral issues in two time periods: 1947-
1949 and 1987-1991. In 1947-1949 the Swedish and Norwegian decisions to participate
in the Marshall Plan and general trade questions are discussed. Also examined in this
period are both leaderships' reactions to the Communist coups in Eastern Europe, and
Norwegian and Swedish interpretations of Finland's destiny. In the period 1987-1991
the Norwegian and Swedish leaderships are contrasted over their handling of the
Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Proposal, border security issues, legal-maritime
disputes, the Baltic recognition question, trade, environmental and economic
cooperation with the Soviet Union. Finally, Swedish and Norwegian interpretations
of the changing Soviet military threat are also compared and contrasted.
The thesis concludes that although commitments to neutrality and alignment
provide powerful explanations for why Swedish and Norwegian leaders behave in
observed ways, they can only provide one such explanation. The hypotheses provided
at the outset are, in the main confirmed, and help to illuminate the junctures where
neutrality and alignment actually do play important roles in determining Swedish and
Norwegian attitudes, diplomatic style and approach toward the Soviet Union.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 An Introduction: Neutrality, Alignment and
the Soviet Union 10
2 Neutrality and Alignment under development: 1947-9 28
A brief Wstorical introduction 29
Timetable of events 1947-9 31
Historical background-Norway 31
Historical background-Sweden 33
Swedish and Norwegian perceptions of Finland 35
The Finnish Argument 35
The Finnish FCMA 37
Concrete efforts to affect Finland's destiny 38
Opposition to the effort 39
Norwegian consideration of Finland 41
Norway, Finland and bad timing 42
Rumours, rumours and more rumours 43
Press offensives as tool of Soviet influence 45
Swedish and Norwegian reactions to East Europe 46
The Prague Coup 46
Reactions within Swedish officialdom 48
Norwegian élite perceptions 51
Sweden and Norway weigh defence alternatives 54
Soviet view of neutrality 56
Perception of Soviet threat 58
The Scandinavian Defence Union 59
Post-SDU 60
Norway and the SOU 61
Russian 'note' and Norway's Atlantic choice 62
Norwegian threat perception 63
Economic relations between Sweden, Norway and USSR 65
Swedish-Soviet economic relations 65
Miljardkredit 66
Content 67
Divisions of opinion 68
Criticism begins 69
Norwegian-Soviet economic relations 72
Volume, composition and character of trade 73
Swedish road to the Marshall Plan 75
Political divisions 76
Discussion in Government 77
Norway and the Marshall Plan 79
Norwegian debate 79
Trade statistics 82
Timetable of events -1957-1991 84
The Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone proposal 86
Background 86
Brief history 87
The Undén Plan 89
The Kekkonen Plan 90
1980-present 92
The Evensen initiative 92
Consensus building after Evensen 95
Swedish reactions post-Evensen 96
NNWFZ descends political agenda 99
Nuclear-Free Baltic proposal 101
Why the Soviets pressed the issue 104
Inconsistent view of Nordic cooperation 106
Soviet Union, NNWFZ and Scandinavia: issue on hold 107
Reason for de-prioritization 111
Norwegian fear of Soviet droit de regard 115
NNWFZ: success or failure 117
Sweden, Norway and Security-related Boundary issues 120
Swedish boundary violations 120
"Whisky on the rocks" 121
Incursions in perspective 122
Nationality question 124
Unchanged military motivation? 126
Identification: process of elimination 129
Reacting as a neutral 130
The Soviet explanation: to believe or not? 134
Norwegian-Soviet boundary issues 137
Submarine issue in Norway 137
Other border violations 139
Norwegian-Soviet Incidents-at-Sea Treaty 142
Port calls: to declare or not to declare 151
Superpower port call policies 153
Port calls to Sweden 154
Port calls to Norway 156
The political debate 157
Guarantees and enforcement 158
Effects of tighter port call policy 160
Future prospects of port call policies 161
Maritime Jurisdictional Disputes with the USSR 165
The Swedish approach 168
Overview of events 169
Evolution of the Agreement 171
Baltic Agreement concluded 173
Attribution of Soviet motivation 175
The Agreement's significance 175
The Barents Sea Delimitation question 181
The Players 182
The Norwegian approach 184
The Soviet approach 185
Evolution of events 187
Oslo trip: unfulfilled expectations 188
Norwegian explanations of lack of movement 192
Explanation of Soviet change of position 195
Future prospects 198
6 Aspects of Norwegian and Swedish recognition policies
in the Baltic independence question 199
Historical background: the awakening 199
Discussion when subject not popular: 1986-88 201
Sweden's official position 201
The initiators 202
Early debate in Sweden 203
Baltic support: Perestroika endangered 207
The seeds of consensus 1988-1989 209
Concretizing cooperative forms 211
Government's foreign policy collision course 212
The Lithuanian declaration of independence 216
Background: the problem of recognition 216
Swedish approach and behaviour 217
Norwegian approach and behaviour 223
Oil diplomacy 224
Polishing Norwegian support 228
Balticum on the Nordic agenda: 1990-1 231
Ronneby Conference 234
Baltic case sealed 235
Swedish and Norwegian reactions to violence 236
Nordic cooperation flourishes 244
Recognition of independence 247
7 Norwegian-Soviet, Swedish-Soviet Trade relations 249
Statistics 250
Political involvement in trade questions 257
Foreign aid policy 258
Trade financing 259
Export promotion 259
Role of parliaments 260
Élite characterizations of Soviet trade 261
Degree of interest 261
Complicating factors 262
Where does fault lie? 262
Decisional confusion 264
Payment problems 265
Swedish and Norwegian export credit decisions 267
In the aftermath of decisions 269
Payment patterns and improvement 273
Foreign currency problems 276
Interest incompatibility 278
Overcoming problems: multinational advantage 279
Facilitating factors 281
Soviet trade priorities 282
Norwegian and Swedish trade possibilities 284
Trade with centre or periphery 286
COCOM: head of political debate 291
Different points-of-departure 292
Actors 293
Issues at stake for Norway and Sweden 293
Norway: the legality question 293
Sweden: legality and neutrality 295
Swedish debate in the 1980's 298
COCOM, Sweden and Norway under Gorbachev 299
The Norwegian KV Affair 300
Sweden tightens the bolts 302
Soviet and American views 304
Developments 1989-1991 305
Soviet economic problems: is hi-tech panacea? 307
First signs of Norwegian change 309
Swedish opinions of lightening 312
Élite perceptions of COCOM: help or hindrance? 314
COCOM: a veritable trade barrier? 314
Impact on Sweden 314
Hardest-hit industries 315
Impact on Norway 318
COCOM complexity as hindrance 320
COCOM loyalty no insurmountable hindrance 321
8 Environmental, economic and Scientific cooperation
in the North: the Murmansk initiative 324
Chief loci of inquiry 324
Speech content 325
Background and significance 327
Comparing Swedish and Norwegian reactions 328
Realistic proposals and follow-up 329
Soviet follow-up 329
Steps towards increased scientific cooperation 331
Swedish follow-up 331
Lack of follow-up 333
Norwegian follow-up 333
Attempts at further developing economic cooperation 334
Plaguing environmental concerns 336
Nuclear tests resume on Novaya Zemlya 337
Norwegian reaction 339
Swedish reaction 331
Mutual Nordic follow-up 342
Gorbachev's Helsinki visit 1989 342
Nordic efforts to rectify problems at Nickel 345
9 Sweden, Norway and Soviet strategic issues, 1987-
Introduction 351
Soviet disarmament: word and deed 354
The Stockholm Conference 354
The early years of disarmament 356
Disarmament in the North 358
Swedish reactions 361
Developments in Soviet military policy 1987-8 363
Murmansk initiative 363
Swedish reactions 364
Norwegian reactions 366
INF 370
Naval disarmament: continuous disappointment 372
Developments late 1987-8 373
Soviet Northern build-up enhanced 373
Gorbachev's UN speech 1988 376
Developments 1989-90 380
Political and economic disarray in USSR 382
CPE negotiations 385
Swedish perceptions of Soviet disarmament in
their vicinity 389
Drawing conclusions 393
Explanation of Soviet motivation 397
Western strength 398
Economic weakness 400
Military interests 402
The societal good 402
Personality factor 403
10 Conclusion 404
Bibliography 429
Preface
When I began work on this thesis in the Fall of 1988,1, like many specialists in the
field of Soviet affairs, could not have imagined that the collapse of the Soviet Union
would come as quickly as it did. Indeed, Soviet experts and International Relations
specialists were caught dangerously off-guard by the scope and speed of events which
first led to the end of Soviet dominion over East Europe, then to the loosening of the
Soviet Union symbolized by the independence movement of the Baltic countries and
culminating in the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union in December, 1991.
These whirlwind events took away the breaths of world audiences and left
international politics transformed. The East-West conflict affected conflicts in every
comer of the globe. The East-West orientation which dominated International Relations
scholarship in the post-War period was a result of these trends. Now, International
Relations scholars which had once concentrated their energies on this stage must focus
on less military-oriented aspects of the former Soviet Union or totally re-orient
themselves into other areas.
I feel particularly honoured to have not only lived in, but have also been faced with
the task of documenting and analyzing a period of history which may not have a
counterpart as far back as the French Revolution. Neither have many researchers of
International Relations had the dubious distinction of having the object of their thesis
disappear before their eyes. Although my angle on this transformation has been
limited by a narrow conceptual framework which only included Sweden and Norway,
I hope that this study will serve as a small, yet meaningful contribution to the
understanding of the period.
This study analyzes the effect of neutrality and alignment on the attitudes, approach
and diplomatic style of national leaders. I have chosen Sweden and Norway as
convenient points-of-entry for the examination of this question. I have also chosen to
study Norwegian and Swedish behaviour towards the Soviet Union through looking
in detail at the most pressing issues in their respective bilateral relationships, in two
of the most tumultuous time periods in modem history. While drawing upon the
formative post-War period 1947-1949, this thesis focuses upon the final four years of
the Soviet Union, up until the end of the Norwegian and Swedish Parliamentary terms
in the Summer of 1991. This thesis stops short of covering the final period leading to
the Soviet Union's dissolution in December of 1991. However, the seeds of the
U.S.S.R.'s demise were firmly implanted during the period of this thesis.
As is traditional with Ph.D. theses, a great many thanks are due to a large amount
of people in a variety of places. However, due to the nature and extent of the research
involved, I have depended to an untraditionally large degree upon outside help. The
best assistance has been provided intemally by my chief supervisors, Mr. Ron Barston
of the LSE's Intemational Relations Department and Mr. John Madeley of LSE's
Government Department, who have been unwilling to stop short of crossing all "t's"
and dotting all "i's" and who have served as tremendous sources of encouragement and
guidance through several long years. Dr Christopher Hill of the Intemational Relations
Department also deserves a special thanks for ushering in the first several phases of the
thesis.
Other academics and practitioners of diplomacy, in the Nordic countries, the UK,
and in the U.S. have read selected parts of the thesis and have graciously provided
their comments and criticisms. Here I would like to particularly thank Dr Clive Archer
of the University of Aberdeen, Drs Christer Jonsson and Kristian Gemer of the
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