Neurolaw: An Introduction

287 Pages·2016·2.451 MB·English

by  Eugenio Picozza (eds.)

Eugenio Picozza
Editor
Neurolaw
An Introduction
Neurolaw
ThiSisaFMBlankPage
Eugenio Picozza
Editor
Neurolaw
An Introduction
Editor
EugenioPicozza
UniversityofRome
Rome,Italy
Translation from the Italian language edition: Neurodiritto. Un’introduzione by Eugenio
Picozza, ©G.Giappichelli Editore2011.All rights reserved
ISBN978-3-319-41440-9 ISBN978-3-319-41441-6 (eBook)
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-41441-6
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Foreword: The Neurocognitive Turn in Law and
Its Epistemological Aspects
Introduction
Inrecentyears,theoriesandapplicationsfromcognitiveneurosciencehavestarted
affectingthelaw.Thisimpactregardedlegalsystemsaroundtheworld—especially
common law systems such as the United States (Garland 2004), but also Europe
(see Spranger 2012) and civil law systems such as Italy1 (Bianchi et al. 2009;
Santosuosso2009;Sirgiovannietal.2016).Theinteractionbetweenneuroscience
and the law has been characterized mainly by a practical dimension. What hap-
penedisthatneuroscientifictheoriesandtechnologieshavebeenusedasevidence
in trials, especially in criminal trials, and particularly in the context of expert
assessment of insanity (see Sirgiovanni et al. 2016), whereas other marginal uses
includedneuroscientifictestsofliedetection2(seeCorbelliniandSirgiovanni2013;
DiGiovine2014;GoodenoughandTucker2010).
Neurolaw, to which this volume is dedicated, has the aspiration to indicate a
theoretical dimension as well. Peculiarly, neurolaw, like all new theoretical
approaches to traditional disciplines terminologically identified by a neuro-root
(primarily the forerunner “neurophilosophy”, see Churchland 1986, 2002), is
1Two famous cases in Italy have been: Corte d’Assise d’Appello di Trieste, 18/09/2009, no. 5;
TribunaleordinariodiComo,20/05/2011,no.536.Othercases:CassazioneSezioneIVPenale,
04/06/2009,no.1671;TribunalediTorino,19/04/2011,no.2029;TribunalediCremona,19/07/
2011, no. 109; Tribunale di Venezia, 24/01/2013, no. 296. Italian cases have been debated
internationally.
2InIndia,awomanwasconvictedoffirstdegreemurderbasedontheresultscomingfromabrain
technique(BrainElectricalOscillationsSignature,orBEOS)usedasliedetector,butshewaslater
exonerated on appeal for lack of evidence (see Murphy 2009). Even in Italy, cognitive tests
(ImplicitAssociationTest,orIAT,andTimedAntagonisticResponseAlethiometer,orTARA)
havebeenusedinatrialforsexualabusetoestablishthepresenceofautobiographicalmemoriesin
the victim’s mind/brain (Tribunale di Cremona, 19/07/2011, no. 109; see Agosta and
Sartori2013).
vii
viii Foreword:TheNeurocognitiveTurninLawandItsEpistemologicalAspects
intended as a project of conceptual reformulation of current legal notions and
theories,areformulationinformedpreciselybycognitiveneuroscience.
This introductory chapter focuses on the epistemological aspects of neurolaw,
specifically on the problem of the relationship between folk psychology and
scientific psychology (understood today as part of the cognitive neuroscience
project) in the law. This is a specific theoretical issue afflicting neuro-approaches
in general, and more recently neurolaw, which aims to handle the discrepancy
betweencommonsenseviewsofbehavior,astodayrepresentedwithinthevarious
legal systems, and scientific views, as offered by contemporary cognitive neuro-
science. This epistemological question represents a turning point in the current
internationaldebateaboutneurolaw.Inthischapterthisquestionservestowonder
about the epistemological legitimacy and relevance of neurolaw, as it will be
describedanddiscussedinotherchaptersofthisvolume.
Hereafter, I will defend, although critically and with some clarifications, the
viewthattherearegoodandsubstantialreasonstoconvertfolkpsychologyguiding
currentlegalsystemsintoaneuroscientificconceptionoflaw.Asweshallsee,this
doesnotmeanthatpsychologicallanguageisgoingtodisappear,butthatitisgoing
to align to mature scientific theories about the brain and human behavior. In
particular, I will argue against a specific approach in the international debate,
which defends folk psychology in the law and whose argument is actually, as we
shallsee,arestatementoftheinstrumentalistthesisindefenseoffolkpsychology
whichemergedpreviouslyinthecognitivedebate.
Clearlythisquestionneedstobedifferentlyaddressedbycivillawandcommon
law systems, as well as by different national legal systems, but I will discuss it
generally from a philosophical point of view without particular specifications. By
contrast,Iwillsupporttheideathatalegalsysteminspiredbyneurosciencewould
be potentially more effective than the current system because it would permit
greatercontroloverthevariablesinvolvedintheapplicationofnorms.
By addressing this question, I will also critically evaluate theoretical impli-
cationsoflawandexaminewhetherandinwhichaspectsneurolawwillbeactually
revolutionaryinepistemologicalterms.
Law and Folk Psychology
Law is full of commonsense psychological categories and theories. Psychology
comesintoplayinthelawforinstanceincriminaljustice,3primarilytocharacterize
the so-called mental elements of an offense (i.e., mens rea) and influences the
theories of responsibility, culpability, and punishment. Stephen Morse (2011b,
3Criminallawisnottheonlyfieldofneurolaw,whichhaspotentialimplementationalsoonaspects
ofprivatelaw,commerciallaw,constitutionallaw,andadministrativelaw(seeotherschaptersin
thisvolume).
Foreword:TheNeurocognitiveTurninLawandItsEpistemologicalAspects ix
pp. 530–531) describes the presence of psychological concepts in the law as
follows:
Criminallawpresupposesthe‘folkpsychological’viewofthepersonandbehaviour.This
psychologicaltheorycausallyexplainsbehaviourinpartbymentalstatessuchasdesires,
beliefs,intentions,willingsandplans.[...]
To understand the importance of mental states, consider the criteria for criminal
responsibility: the elements of the prima facie case—primarily acts and mental states—
andtheabsenceofanaffirmativedefence.Allareinfusedwithmentalstates.Allcrimes
includea‘voluntary’actrequirement,whichisdefined,roughly,asanintentionalbodily
movement[...]donewhiletheagentisinareasonablyintegratedstateofconsciousness.
[...]Otherthancrimesofstrictliability,allcrimesrequireaculpablefurthermentalstate,
suchaspurpose,knowledge,orrecklessness.Somecrimesarealsodefinedwiththemens
reaofnegligence,whichappearstobetheabsenceofmentalstate.[...]
Allaffirmativedefencesandexcuseinvolveaninquiryintotheperson’smentalstate,
suchasbeliefthatself-defensiveforcewasnecessaryorthelackofknowledgeofrightfrom
wrong.
Although rarely this is expressed in clear form, legal categories refer to a
conception of mind. The conception of mind that explicitly or implicitly appears
in legal systems, which reflects the commonsense way of interpreting these cate-
gories, is called commonsense psychology or folk psychology (henceforth, FP).
The fact that folk psychology inspires psychological categories in the law is
generally acknowledged by legal scholars (see also Morse 2013, pp. 27–52). As
wewillsee,ifFPisintendedtobeanintuitivestrategyofsocialinteraction,lawcan
indeedbethoughtasadevelopedandspecializedformofFP.
Thissectionbrieflyexplainswhatfolkpsychologyisbypresentingtheargument
ofthosewhobelievethatweshouldpreservefolkpsychologyinthelawandoppose
theideathatneurosciencewillbeabletooffer areformulationoflegalcategories
and theories.4 I will present a prototype version of this argument, although the
AmericanlawyerStephenMorse(2004,2006,2011a,b)is,asweshallsee,oneof
its main proponents. This argument in various forms finds agreement also among
neuroscientists(e.g.Gazzaniga2005;GreeneandCohen2004).
A long time before legalscholars started toget interested inneuroscience, and
overatleastthelast60years,discussionsandviewsaboutFPhadapivotalrolein
the philosophical debate of cognitive science. What is folk psychology? FP is
generically a (not necessarily specific and well defined) theory about the human
mind, a theory that ordinary people are inclined to assume and that depends on
some cognitive abilities that humans possess to—according to what many philos-
ophers and scientists think—attribute, explain, predict, and manipulate behavior5
(Stich and Nichols 2003, pp. 235–255). This general definition aims to cover
4Someauthorswhoopposesthistheoreticalreformulationprojectarealsoagainsttheuseofneuro-
technologiesintrials(e.g.PardoandPatterson2013;Morse2004,pp157–198;Morse2015).This
questionishoweverbeyondourscopehere.
5TheMachiavellianhypothesis(ByrneandWhiten1997,pp.1–23;seealsoTrivers2011)argues
thatprimitive mentalizing capacities withinancestral groups haveevolved tosucceed in social
manipulation. Other hypotheses suggest that these capacities arose with the development of