Networked Forces in Stability Operations 101st Airborne Division, 3 2 and 1 25 Stryker Brigades in Northern Iraq

221 Pages·2007·2.24 MB·English

by  Daniel Gonzales

Networked Forces in
Stability Operations
101st Airborne Division,
3/2 and 1/25 Stryker Brigades
in Northern Iraq
Daniel Gonzales, John Hollywood, Jerry M. Sollinger, James McFadden,
John DeJarnette, Sarah Harting, Donald Temple
Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).
The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded
research and development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant
Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense
Intelligence Community under Contract DASW01-01-C-0004.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Networked forces in stability operations : 101st Airborne Division, 3/2 and 1/25 Stryker
brigades in northern Iraq / Daniel Gonzales ... [et al.].
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-0-8330-4303-0 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Command and control systems—United States—Evaluation—Case studies.
2. Communications, Military—Evaluation—Case studies. 3. Stryker brigade
combat teams—Evaluation—Case studies. 4. United States. Army. Airborne
Division, 101st—History—21st century. 5. United States—Armed Forces—Stability
operations—Evaluation. 6. Iraq War, 2003–—Campaigns. I. Gonzales, Daniel,
1956–
UA943.N48 2007
956.7044'342—dc22
2007041879
Public release of this report was granted by the Chief of the DoD Office of Security Review
on 17 September 2007, per DD Form 1910.
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Preface
This case study report examines the network-centric operations (NCO) capabilities
and the operations of Stryker brigades and the 101st Airborne Division that conducted
stability operations in Iraq in the 2003 to 2005 time frame. We investigate how the
NCO capabilities and other resources available to these units were utilized to conduct
stability and counterinsurgency operations and whether these capabilities resulted in
improved mission effectiveness.
The monograph should interest U.S. Army and joint task force designers, those
concerned with the development of digital battle command and communications sys-
tems, and those interested in the implications of NCO for the transformation of mili-
tary forces.
This research was sponsored by the Office of Force Transformation and con-
ducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of the RAND National
Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center spon-
sored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the unified combatant
commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and
the defense Intelligence Community.
For more information on RAND’s Acquisition and Technology Policy
Center, contact the director, Philip Antón. He can be reached by email, Philip_Anton@
rand.org; by phone at 310-393-0411, ext. 7798; or by mail at RAND, 1776 Main Street,
Santa Monica, California, 90407-2138. More information about RAND is available at
www.rand.org.
iii

Contents
Preface................................................................................................. iii
Figures................................................................................................. ix
Tables .................................................................................................. xi
Summary.............................................................................................xiii
Acknowledgments................................................................................ xxxv
Abbreviations.................................................................................... xxxvii
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction........................................................................................... 1
Background............................................................................................. 1
Objectives............................................................................................... 3
Analytic Approach..................................................................................... 4
Sources of Information................................................................................ 9
Organization of Monograph.........................................................................10
CHAPTER TWO
Iraqi Operational Setting and Unit Characteristics ..........................................13
Characteristics of Anti-Iraqi Forces ................................................................16
Phases of the Insurgency.............................................................................17
Unit Organization ....................................................................................18
Areas of Operation................................................................................... 20
AO Sizes, Personnel, Funding, and Attached Units............................................. 23
Timeline of Events .................................................................................. 28
U.S. Casualties ....................................................................................... 36
v
vi Networked Forces in Stability Operations: 101st ABD, 3/2 and 1/25 SBCTs in Northern Iraq
CHAPTER THREE
Force Networking, Quality of Information, and Quality of Shared Situation
Awareness ........................................................................................39
Networking Systems..................................................................................39
Effect of Networking Systems on Quality of Information...................................... 48
Specific Effects of Networking Systems on Quality of Information .......................... 54
Effect of Networking Systems on Quality of Collaboration.................................... 56
Quality of Shared Situation Awareness.............................................................58
CHAPTER FOUR
Tactical Stability Missions, NCO-Enabled Processes, and Tactical Mission
Effectiveness .....................................................................................65
Tactical Military Operations in Stability Operations.............................................65
NCO-Enabled Processes ........................................................................... 68
Speed and Agility of Command.....................................................................69
Responsive Maneuver.................................................................................72
Networking with Aerial Support and Surveillance Assets .......................................74
Robustness to Enemy Attack........................................................................75
Stability Operations Intelligence Needs............................................................91
CHAPTER FIVE
Mission Effectiveness in Stability Operations..................................................95
U.S. Strategic Objectives and MNF–I Campaign Plan..........................................95
Assessment Framework ............................................................................. 98
Assessment of Effectiveness—Political Progress................................................. 101
Assessment of Effectiveness—Defeating Terrorists and Containing the Insurgency....... 108
Summary of Mission Effectiveness................................................................ 123
CHAPTER SIX
Summary: Findings and Recommendations.................................................. 129
Assessment of 101st ABD Mission Effectiveness in Stability Operations.................... 129
Assessment of 3/2 SBCT Mission Effectiveness in Stability Operations..................... 133
Assessment of 1/25 SBCT Mission Effectiveness in Stability Operations.................... 136
Role of NCO Capabilities in Improving Force Effectiveness in Stability Operations ..... 139
Summary of Network and Intelligence Capabilities............................................ 142
Contents vii
Additional Findings................................................................................. 144
Recommendations .................................................................................. 145
APPENDIX
A. Director, Office of Force Transformation, Study Authorization Memorandum... 147
B. SBCT Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Used in OIF.............................. 151
C. Detailed Results of the Quality of Information and Collaboration Surveys....... 161
D. Iraqi National Elections...................................................................... 165
Bibliography........................................................................................ 171

Figures
S.1. Civilians Killed in All of Iraq and in Mosul .........................................xv
S.2. U.S. Personnel Killed and Wounded in Action per Enemy Attack............... xvi
S.3. U.S. Personnel Killed and Wounded in Action per Offensive Operation ....... xvi
S.4. Key Factors Influencing 101st ABD Performance in Stability Operations .... xviii
S.5. Key Factors Influencing 3/2 SBCT Performance in Stability Operations ..... xxii
S.6. Key Factors Influencing 1/25 SBCT Performance in Stability Operations..... xxv
S.7. Adaptation of Materiel and Nonmateriel NCO Force Elements.................xxix
1.1. NCO Conceptual Framework .......................................................... 6
1.2. NCO Analysis Approach ................................................................ 8
2.1. The “Sunni Triangle” and U.S. Unit Operating Areas..............................14
2.2. Locations of Frequent U.S. Military Casualties Between May 2003 and July
2005.......................................................................................15
2.3. 101st ABD, 3/2 SBCT, and 1/25 SBCT Organizational Structures...............19
2.4. 101st ABD and 3/2 SBCT Area of Operations ......................................21
2.5. The 1/25 SBCT Area of Operations.................................................. 22
2.6. Causes of Death for U.S. Troops ......................................................31
2.7. U.S. Military Casualties in OIF since March 19, 2003.............................37
3.1. 101st ABD Infantry Brigade Network............................................... 40
3.2. 3/2 SBCT Communications Network............................................... 42
3.3. IKSS Network........................................................................... 44
3.4. UAV Imagery Received by Rover III..................................................45
3.5. Predator Control Using Rover III and SIPRNET MIRC ......................... 46
3.6. C2/BC Systems ..........................................................................47
3.7. Quality of Information for Cordon-and-Search and Knock-and-Raid
Missions...................................................................................52
3.8. Quality of Information for Convoy Missions........................................53
3.9. Survey Results on Quality of Collaboration..........................................57
ix