Network Theory and Violent Conflicts: Studies in Afghanistan and Lebanon

231 Pages·2017·1.99 MB·English

by  Christian R. Kramer (auth.)

NETWORK THEORY
& VIOLENT CONFLICTS
STUDIES IN
AFGHANISTAN
& LEBANON
CHRISTIAN KRAMER
Network Theory and Violent Confl icts
Christian   R.   Kramer
Network Theory and
Violent Confl icts
Studies in Afghanistan and Lebanon
Christian   R.   Kramer
Independent Scholar
Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
ISBN 978-3-319-41392-1 ISBN 978-3-319-41393-8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-41393-8
Library of Congress Control Number: 2016960331
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For Joanna
C
ONTENTS
1 Introduction 1
2 Networks, Complexity and International Relations 2 7
3 Networks and Violence 65
4 Disintegrative Violence 9 3
5 Lebanon 1 17
6 Afghanistan 1 53
7 Network-centric Peacebuilding 191
Index 227
vii
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1 I NTRODUCTION
What is most remarkable about the assassination of the former Lebanese
Prime Minister Rafi k Hariri in February 2005 is not what happened, but
what did not happen. Hariri was one of the country’s most infl uential poli-
ticians and wealthiest individuals—he was a central fi gure in the political
and economic landscape of the nation. It would not have been surprising
if his execution—by a suicide bomber using 1.8 tons of TNT, which not
only killed Hariri but also resulted in the deaths of a further 22 inno-
cent bystanders—triggered an immediate and severe violent backlash. The
assassination could easily have triggered a chain of violent reactions, and
Lebanon could have been plunged back into the all-out civil war that
destroyed much of its urban centres between 1978 and 1990. The per-
petrators have still not been identifi ed—an incomplete and still on-going
investigation into the incident is being run, not by Lebanese bodies but
by a UN special tribunal, and the matter has still not been brought to a
conclusion. Hariri was not only a very infl uential political leader, but had
also made much of his fi nancial wealth through what are alleged to have
been corrupt and illegal property transactions related to Solidere, a private
company tasked with rebuilding Beirut following the Civil War. Hariri had
emerged on the stage of Lebanese politics thanks to his personal friend-
ship with, and the fi nancial support of, the Saudi royal family, especially
the Saudi King Khaled. He is also credited with having played a major role
in the development of the Taif Accord of 1989 that led to the 1990 Taif
© The Author(s) 2017 1
C.R. Kramer, Network Theory and Violent Confl icts,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-41393-8_1
2 C.R. KRAMER
Agreement, commonly acknowledged as having ended the Lebanese Civil
War.
Despite all of this, instead of provoking further violence, the violent
and ruthless assassination of Rafi k Hariri acted as a unifying force of grief
within Lebanon. Rather than deepening the divisions that existed between
the different factions, it served as a catalyst that united them in joining
forces and ultimately led, as part of the ‘Cedar Revolution’, to the with-
drawal of Syrian forces that had been based in the country since 1976
(Knudsen and Kerr 2 012 ).
This incident is not the only recent occasion in which Lebanon has
demonstrated a remarkable resilience to economic, social, sectarian and
political stresses. The brutal and on-going civil war that began in Syria in
2011 has all but destroyed Lebanon’s most important trading partner, and
has led to a general weakening of the economy in the region (Carpenter
2013 ). It also has, via the Shiite and Iranian-supported Hezbollah, pola-
rised the domestic political debate. With Hezbollah presenting a ‘state
within the state’ (Azani 2 009 , p. 158) in the south of the country, and
Iran having a strong cultural and educational infl uence in Lebanon
(Shaery-Eisenlohr 2 008 ), the threat of the Lebanese government being
pulled into the fi ghting of the Syrian Civil War is ever present. Add to this
the infl ux of an estimated 1.1 million Syrian refugees (UNHCR 2015 )
into a society of only 4.5 million Lebanese, which is having a considerable
impact on the social services, the education system and employment, and
one might assume that Lebanon must be in a highly volatile and unstable
situation. After all, political and sectarian disagreements, economic and
demographic shifts and the country’s geographic location (in a region
where high levels of tension often turn into violent and protracted con-
fl icts) are often put forward as primary explanations for the outbreak of
Lebanon’s own civil war (Khalaf 2 002 ; Traboulsi 2 007 ). In fact, the gen-
eral absence of major violent confl ict in Lebanon becomes even more per-
plexing when assessed in light of the country’s executive, legislative and
judicative structures and institutions. Far from presenting a unifi ed and
strong government with reliable access to resources, a functioning bureau-
cracy and a solid monopoly of power, the social, economic, sectarian and
political divisions and rifts are visible in all levels and functions of the state
(Yacoubian 2 009 ; Najem 2 012 ).
Yet, with the horrors of the Civil War lying a distant 25 years in the past,
it certainly is no longer sheer exhaustion, nor memories of destruction and
brutality, that prevent the outbreak of another war in the country. There
INTRODUCTION 3
is an absence of plausible explanation as to why Lebanon has remained
largely at peace and has not descended into an all-out civil war, and the
reasons beg for further study. This is especially so in light of the many
situations around the world where violence on a large scale continues to
dominate the discourse. In these areas it is not uncommon that ceasefi res
and peace agreements are at least initially unsuccessful, or that we see
negotiations subsisting over a long period of time without result, includ-
ing many attempts at ‘peace’ leading to renewed and even intensifi ed
hostilities (Newman and Richmond 2 006a ). Even today’s most powerful
nations and their military, political and diplomatic organisations are often
unable to terminate violent confl icts. Led into concepts with neat names
such as ‘statebuilding’ or ‘peacebuilding’, their efforts often appear to
actually prolong or even reinforce grievances and hostilities. The combi-
nation of local and international factors in prolonging and amplifying a
violent confl ict is especially visible in Afghanistan, where, despite consid-
erable international resources and funds, large-scale violence continues to
plague the country and its people (Cordesman 2 013 ).
Assassinations, for example of Vice-President Haji Abdul Qadir in
2002 (Halliday 2 002 ) or former President Burhanuddin Rabbani in 2011
(Nissenbaum 2 011 ), have been credited with triggering major armed
offensives or military campaigns in the country (Thiessen 2 014 ). With the
persistent and frequently erupting violence between a number of local,
regional, national and international actors, Afghanistan appears to share
little in common with Lebanon. Yet a closer look reveals many similari-
ties: they both lack a stable, potent and legitimate central government and
political system; both possess uneven economic development, with the
population divided into a small group of ‘haves’ and a much larger major-
ity of ‘have nots’; and in both corruption and nepotism are rampant and
organised crime, for example smuggling, kidnapping and capital crime, is
rife. Just as the Levant is a politically unstable region, so is Central Asia.
Despite the obvious poverty and underdevelopment in much of the
country, Afghanistan has been central to policies of some of the world’s
most economically, politically and militarily powerful countries. It has
received billions of dollars in foreign aid—both through public and private
organisations—and yet remains a hotbed and fertile ground for violence.
Observers struggle to explain this continuation of violence that appears to
have taken hold of Afghanistan, especially in its urban centres (Kilcullen
2 009 ), transport infrastructure (Misdag 2 006 ) and the border region with
Pakistan (Shaikh 2 009 ).
4 C.R. KRAMER
While Afghanistan has a 250-year-long history as a nation-state, those
who fi ght on Afghan soil often claim allegiance to a large number of dif-
ferent actors—both foreign and domestic. Throughout its history, and
at present, much of the country is not ruled by a strong central govern-
ment, but rather through a complex and constantly changing network
of regional, professional, ethnic, family and other groups. It is said that
shared language and customs, patronage and land-ownership relations
and, in effect, local self-rule are the factors which have kept the country
unifi ed as a nation, but not as a state (Barfi eld 2011 ).
Similarly to Lebanon, Afghanistan is situated in a volatile and politically
unstable region where historic and contemporary empires, ideologies and
ideas struggle for infl uence and strategic control. Its strong affi nity to stories
of conquest and war, vast natural resources, trade routes of legal and illicit
goods and strong sense of identifi cation of its people to both nomadic and
settled ethnicities, make the entire region prone to confl ict (Kremmer 2002 ).
Whilst most foreign actors, for example the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and India, or Russia and Iran, promote the notion
of a strong and centralised Afghan state centred on Kabul, this view has
largely failed to bear fruit. To the contrary: this strategy appears to have
alienated Afghans themselves and worsened the situation (Barfi eld 2011 ).
This is especially so since the power structure of today’s Afghan state is
associated with foreign interests and interference. Rather than being part
of a narrative with which Afghans can identify and from which they feel
they can benefi t, they are often at best ambivalent, especially in rural areas
and areas distant from the capital.
While Lebanon appears to defy the odds, portraying a remarkable
resilience towards what could be seen as an irresistible descent into civil
war once more, Afghanistan has, at least for the past half century, failed
to end the endemic violence. What these two countries highlight is the
weakness of many key concepts employed by contemporary international
relations. Already ambiguous and disputed concepts such as ‘war’ and
‘peace’ demonstrate their limitations: is Lebanon at war or at peace? Is all
of Afghanistan at war all of the time? Many observers would point to indi-
cations of both or, most likely, reject the polarity these concepts demand,
and argue for a neither-nor, hybrid or entirely different approach.
The neat concepts of ‘war’, ‘peace’ and ‘security’ begin to unravel when
applied to individual human beings who are living in the regions being ana-
lysed. There is ample evidence that, for many Afghans, the choice between
war and peace, between supporting the nascent central g overnment or