neame's armoured division

366 Pages·2012·1.65 MB·English

THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

THE “LOST” BATTLE OF MERSA EL
BREGA
LIBYAN DESERT 31 MARCH 1941

Being a thesis submitted for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
In the University of Hull

BY

NORMAN KENNETH MURPHY B.A., M.A.

NOVEMBER 2011

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It is true to say that this thesis would not have been written without the help and support
of several individuals and institutions. I should therefore here like to thank those who
assisted me in this endeavor. My first thanks must go to my supervisor Dr David
Lonsdale. Without whose unstinting advice and encouragement this work could not
have been written. His helpful, and often much needed guidance, kept me focused on
the task in hand, when I could so easily have gone astray.
I must also pay tribute to my friends who have listened tirelessly to my endless
references to the events chronicled in the work. Prominent among these are my work
colleague and friend Leigh Emerson who listen patiently to rereads of extracts from the
work on an almost daily basis for three years. Also in this regard I must thank Phil
Kershaw for his practical help and for at least pretending to be interested in the detailed
workings of British, as opposed to Italian, tanks.
My thanks must also go to the staff of several institutions. First among these are the
staff of Scarborough Library who always went the extra mile to search out some
obscure book for me. Likewise gratitude must go to the staff at the Liddell-Centre,
Imperial War Museum, and Public Records Office who were all equally helpful.
Lastly I must thank my wife Eileen for her patients, understanding, and the support
she has given me, throughout the writing of this work. Indeed she has marched up and
down so many sand dunes with me that she deserves a campaign medal.

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Contents
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 7
METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................ 9
METHODICAL INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 10
UNDERPINNING THE METHOD OF RESEARCH .......................................................................... 12
EXAMPLES OF RESEARCH .............................................................................................................. 15
SECONDARY SOURCES ................................................................................................................... 19
ASSEMBLING SOURCES .................................................................................................................. 20
ACCESSING SOURCES: ARCHIVAL RESEARCH ......................................................................... 23
COMMAND AND COMMANDERS IN CONTEXT .......................................................................... 26
REFERENCE TO THE LITERATURE ON COMMAND................................................................... 27
CONTRADICTIONS: TERRAIN AND UNIT AVAILABILITY ....................................................... 32
UNIT DEPLOYMENT AND CAPABILITY ....................................................................................... 37
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................... 39

LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................................ 39
MAJOR-GENERAL HENRY ROWAN-ROBINSON ......................................................................... 42
CORRELLI BARNETT ........................................................................................................................ 46
JOHN CONNELL ................................................................................................................................. 48
MORE GENERAL READING ............................................................................................................. 51

ELEMENTS OF COMMAND ....................................................................................... 63
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 63
SUBORDINATE COMMAND ............................................................................................................ 67
ARMY ORGANISATION .................................................................................................................... 68
U.S. 88th INFANTRY DIVISION ......................................................................................................... 70
SO WHAT MAKES A COMPETENT COMMANDER? .................................................................... 72
PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES AND TRAITS ........................................................................................ 72
WORKING WITH THE SYSTEM ....................................................................................................... 77
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................... 80

CHAPTER 1 .................................................................................................................... 82
BRITAIN’S POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA...................................................... 82
A TENUOUS GRIP .............................................................................................................................. 84
GENERAL WAVELL: SCHOLAR AND SOLDIER? ......................................................................... 89
G.O.C. MIDDLE EAST 1939 ............................................................................................................... 89
A BASE IS BORN ................................................................................................................................ 91
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FUEL ..................................................................................................................................................... 92
TRANSPORT ....................................................................................................................................... 92
HOBART ARRIVES ............................................................................................................................ 94
WILSON ARRIVES ............................................................................................................................. 95
PLANS FOR ATTACK ........................................................................................................................ 99
FRANCE FALLS ITALY ENTERS THE WAR ................................................................................ 102
WAVELL IS CALLED HOME .......................................................................................................... 105

CHAPTER 2 .................................................................................................................. 114
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 114
THE FIRST THREE DAYS ............................................................................................................... 118
THE EXCHANGE OF 4 INDIAN & 6 AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONS ................................................ 120
SHIPPING ........................................................................................................................................... 122
4 INDIAN: CHARACTER, TRAINING & ADMINISTRATION ..................................................... 123
SPEED ................................................................................................................................................ 125
LOGISTICS ........................................................................................................................................ 126
WAVELL’S LUCK HOLDS .............................................................................................................. 129
INEVITABLE PROBLEMS ............................................................................................................... 130
WATER .............................................................................................................................................. 132
BARDIA: THE FIRST AUSTRALIAN VICTORY ........................................................................... 133
TOBRUK ............................................................................................................................................ 135
THE GEOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................... 137
THE SPOILS OF WAR ...................................................................................................................... 141
THE LOST OPPORTUNITY: ............................................................................................................ 143
ATTACK TURNS TO DEFENCE ..................................................................................................... 146
THE OPPOSITION & TIMING ......................................................................................................... 149
MILITARY LOGISTICS .................................................................................................................... 150
THE NAVY AND RAF ...................................................................................................................... 154
PRELUDE TO DISASTER: ADVANCE TURNS TO DEFENCE .................................................... 156
THE WIND OF CHANGE ................................................................................................................. 158
WAVELL’S GREEK TRAGEDY: ..................................................................................................... 160
CHANGE OF PLAN IN THE DESERT ............................................................................................. 173
NEAME TAKES COMMAND: THE POISONED CHALLIS .......................................................... 174
WAVELL’S VIEW: INTELLIGENCE .............................................................................................. 175
FEBRUARY BRINGS THE WEHRMACHT .................................................................................... 180
POST LATE FEBRUARY .................................................................................................................. 181

CHAPTER 3 .................................................................................................................. 184
NEAME AND HIS ARMOURED DIVISION ................................................................................... 184
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2nd ARMOURED DIVISION .............................................................................................................. 187
3rd ARMOURED BRIGADE .............................................................................................................. 189
3 HUSSARS ........................................................................................................................................ 191
A PASSAGE TO EGYPT ................................................................................................................... 192
CHRISTMAS 1940 ............................................................................................................................. 193
WHERE HAVE ALL THE TANKS GONE ....................................................................................... 197
6 ROYAL TANK REGIMENT .......................................................................................................... 201
5 ROYAL TANK REGIMENT .......................................................................................................... 204
1st REGIMENT ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY ................................................................................ 206
THE 2nd SUPPORT GROUP .............................................................................................................. 207
9th BATTALION THE RILE BRIGADE ............................................................................................ 207
MACHINE GUNNERS PAR EXCELLENCE: 1st NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS ................. 208
ANTI-TANK GUNNERS: 3rd REGIMENT, ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY ................................... 210
104th REGIMENT ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY ............................................................................ 212
CREDITABLE INTELLIGENCE ...................................................................................................... 215
WAVELL ASSESSES THE SITUATION ......................................................................................... 219
WAVELL SAVES THE ARMOUR? ................................................................................................. 227
CAIRO REFLECTIONS ..................................................................................................................... 231
ITALIAN TANKS .............................................................................................................................. 236
5 RTR .................................................................................................................................................. 240
FINAL DISPOSITIONS OF 3AB ....................................................................................................... 243
2nd SUPPORT GROUP ....................................................................................................................... 244
THE IMPORTANCE OF HOLDING BREGA .................................................................................. 246
THE BRITISH DEFENCE. THE TERRAIN ...................................................................................... 248
DEPLOYMENT .................................................................................................................................. 252
THE GERMANS TURN UP THE HEAT .......................................................................................... 255
THE GERMANS PREPARE FOR ATTACK .................................................................................... 258
30/31 MARCH DEPLOYMENT: THE TAKING OF BREGA .......................................................... 261
THE BATTLE BEGINS ..................................................................................................................... 262

CHAPTER 4 .................................................................................................................. 275
THERE WAS NOTHING INEVITABLE ABOUT DEFEAT AT BREGA ....................................... 276
WATER .............................................................................................................................................. 278
FOOD .................................................................................................................................................. 283
FUEL ................................................................................................................................................... 289
AMMUNITION/MINES ..................................................................................................................... 292
DUMPS ............................................................................................................................................... 294
TRANSPORT ..................................................................................................................................... 295
BUILDING A FORCE TO DEFEND BREGA .................................................................................. 298
ARMOURED CARS........................................................................................................................... 299
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ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS .................................................................................................................. 302
15 LAA ............................................................................................................................................... 305
6 LAA ................................................................................................................................................. 306
DEPLOYMENT .................................................................................................................................. 306
ARTILLERY....................................................................................................................................... 308
ANTI-TANK GUNS ........................................................................................................................... 314
MACHINE GUN BATTALION ......................................................................................................... 316
INFANTRY......................................................................................................................................... 317
ARMOUR ........................................................................................................................................... 321
AIR POWER ....................................................................................................................................... 323
OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................................................... 327

CHAPTER 5 .................................................................................................................. 333
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................... 333
BIBLIOGRAPHY/WORKS CONSULTED ....................................................................................... 353

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Liddell Hart was to write in 1950: Lord Wavell’s star rose high at an early stage of the
war. Its glow was the more brilliant because of the darkness of the sky. His victories
over the Italian armies in North Africa and East Africa in the winter of 1940-41, were
Britain’s first striking success after the catastrophic run of defeats in the West. They
came as a great tonic – not only to the British people but even more to others who had
been shocked and alarmed by the apparently irresistible advance of the Nazi and
Fascist dictators.1

INTRODUCTION
In central Libya on the border between the provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, on
31 March 1941, a battalion of British infantry supported by a regiment of field artillery
were occupying hastily constructed defensive positions in front of the small fishing
village of Mersa el Brega. These meagre forces were according to General Archibald
Percival Wavell the then Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C)2 of all British forces in the
Middle East all that could be found to defend what British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill, called, Britain’s “Desert Flank” ‘the peg on which all else hung’.3
The all-else upon which Churchill considered everything hung was, in fact, the
lifeblood of any modern army, oil, without which it would be almost impossible for
Britain to continue fighting the war. ‘For the British the Middle East was only just less
important to the waging of the war than their homeland; for it contained round Mosul,
in Iraq, and at the head of the Persian Gulf the oilfields without which the Royal Air
Force, the Army and the Royal Navy would be paralysed’.4 Although Britain was not
wholly dependent on Middle Eastern oil to supply the home island with fuel; its forces
in the Middle East certainly relied on local sources.5 Moreover, as Wavell correctly
observed in May 1940; ‘Germany was short of oil and its naval power was not equal to

1 Harold E. Raugh, Jr. quoting Basil Liddell-Hart, found in Wavell in the Middle East (London: Brassey’s
1993) p. 269.
2 Robert Woollcombe, The Campaigns of Wavell 1939-1943 (London: Cassell, 1959) p. 6.
3 Winston Churchill, The Second World War Volume III (London: Cassell & Co, 1950) p. 173.
4 Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals (London: William Kimber & Co, 1960) p. 22.
5 Len Deighton, Blood, Tears & Folly (London: Jonathan Cape, 1993) p. 498.
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that of the Allies; unless Germany could obtain oil in sufficient quantity, Germany
could not pursue the war. To win the war, therefore, Britain needed to focus on
preventing Germany from obtaining oil’.6
Churchill understood perfectly Wavell’s logic in regard to Britain’s need to deny her
enemy Middle Eastern oil. Furthermore, he recognised that if the enemy defeated the
British forces in the Western Desert he might, if he was able to exploit his initial
success, push on through the Libyan/Egyptian desert and jeopardise Britain’s oil
supplies coming from the Middle East. He recognised that such an advance would
threaten Egypt, the Suez Canal and ultimately the oilfields of Mosul and Arabia.
Churchill realised that if this eventuality occurred, and the enemy gained control of the
Middle East’s oil, then Britain’s war waging capacity would quite quickly grind to a
fuel starved halt. Moreover, Germany’s oil requirements would be amply satisfied.
There was, therefore, according to Churchill, ‘no idea in any quarter of losing or risking
that [the “Desert Flank”] for the sake of Greece or anything in the Balkans’.7
However, despite Wavell’s and Churchill’s fears and warnings of how disastrous an
enemy breakthrough on the “Desert Flank” would be, because of the inadequacy of the
defence at Brega this was exactly what was allowed to happen. In the early morning of
31 March 1941 a large German force attacked the defenders of British interests in the
vital Middle East. Rommel was to write; ‘our attack moved forward against the British
positions at Mersa el Brega, and a fierce engagement took place’.8 The approximately
six hundred young infantry men, mostly recruited from Tower Hamlets in London’s
East End, fought doggedly most of the day to defend Churchill’s “Desert Flank”.
However, by late afternoon these troops under relentless pressure, alone and
unsupported, were forced to abandon their positions. ‘By 6 April, 1941, with most of

6 Victoria Schofield, Wavell: Soldier & Statesman (London: John Murray, 2006) p. 143.
7 Churchill, The Second World War Volume III, p. 173.
8 Ronald Lewin, Rommel as a Military Commander (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2004) p. 33.
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the senior commanders captured, the British forces in what had so recently been the
quiet backwater of Cyrenaica were now headless as well as disjointed. Benghazi and the
Jebel Akhadar had fallen; Tobruk formed a precarious rock amid the rising German
tide’.9 The British withdrawal from Brega opened the way for the Germans and their
Italian allies to gain access to the road to Cairo, Suez Canal and potentially the oilfields
beyond.
So why, when the consequences of defeat at Brega were so ruinous, was the enemy
allowed to succeed? In an effort to answer this question this thesis will focus of four
separate areas of research which, when brought together collectively, will hopefully
explain why the British were defeated at Brega. Firstly the work will seek to establish
how command and command structures functioned in WWII. Secondly the thesis will
review why, when the consequences of failure at Brega were so great, the very situation
Churchill and others foresaw, and indeed warned of, was allowed to happen. The works
third objective will seek to establish whether the various reasons put forward by Middle
East Command for the loss of Brega stand up to scrutiny. Fourthly the work will
endeavour to establish whether a creditable military force could have been provided to
defend Brega adequately and thus avert the defeat.

METHODOLOGY
Stephen Spender the British novelist and essayist wrote; ‘History is the ship carrying
living memories to the future.’ However, to bring the ship of memories to the future, to
chart a course that will hopefully deliver the memories accurately and cogently to
future readers, rigorous methods of research need to be employed. In this regard, as
we shall see, the river of history upon which the ship sails to the wide ocean of
discovery is long and meandering, sometimes slow and peaceful, sometimes raging and
fierce but always exciting to navigate.

9 Barnett, p. 67.
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METHODICAL INTRODUCTION
This section of the work will seek to illustrate for the reader how this research project
was designed and how the various research methods employed were used to support the
conclusions reached. Looking at the focus of the project, the “lost” Battle of Mersa el
Brega, we may see that certain facts, although few in number, are readily available and
are, perhaps, self explanatory. We know for example that the battle was fought on 31
March 1941 at a place called Mersa el Brega, and the main protagonists involved were
primarily British and German forces; and we know that the battle was lost by the
British.
However, considering the devastating consequences which followed on from the
defeat at Brega for the British this degree of information seemed to the author to be a
rather scant appraisal of what by any yardstick was a pivotal battle. Consequently in
order to establish how and why events evolved as they did at Brega a research
framework was designed to answer several, key, and many peripheral, questions.
The problems needing answers were considerable. Why, for example, were the
British so ill prepared to defend Brega? Why, when the consequences of failure were so
dire, conceivably the loss of the Middle East and its precious oil, were not adequate
resources brought to bear? Were adequate forces available, if not why not, if they were
why were they not at Brega? Even had resources been available was the Brega position
defendable? Was the defeat made possible because the British were surprised; was there
a lapse of intelligence? Might the loss of Brega be the result of poor command and poor
command decisions? Or was there some systemic flaw in British tactics? All these
questions, and many more, were tabulated into a step by step research brief designed to
establish the “truth” behind the defeat.
To achieve the goals set out above various research stratagems and methods have
been employed. The importance of undertaking extensive background reading was
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