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SAMUEL B. ROBERTS’ WRECK FOUND x F-35 ORDERS SLOWED Navylimes : PROUD TO SERVE THOSE WHO SERVE™ X Ay NEW DETAILS EMERGE ON AMPHIB BLAZE \ WHY COMMAND = AND CONTROL FAILED —— INBONHOMME 3 —=,, RICHARD DISASTER = «MORE = — DESTROYERS 7-70 +, ARE ROTA-BOUND Le ia/ Bo . ae - yt LITTLE GUIDANCE TS PILE —-——~ FOR TROOPS SEEKING i AN ABORTION JULY 2022 , r ot VOL. NO. 72 ISSUE NO. 7 ee ss : a NOT A US NAVY PUBLICATION 100 YEARS OF SERVICE 9 ***° Membership eligibility and product restrictions apply and are subject to change. USAA means Unites Services Automobile Association and its affiliates. No Department of Defense or government agency endorsement. ©2022 USAA. 285645-0422 One hundred years ago, a group of soldiers couldn’t get auto insurance, so they insured each other, creating USAA. Thousands of patents, inventions and solutions later, that spirit of innovation still drives us to find new ways to support the military community. 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EIR NEW DETAILS ON AMPHIB FIRE A 3-STAR’S TAKE ON WHAT WENT WRONG IN BONHOMME RICHARD BLAZE, AND WHY HE’S NOW FACING CENSURE THE NAVY SLOWS ITS F-35 ORDERS CONFIDENCE IN RISING READINESS RATES OF FIGHTER FLEET SPURS SERVICE TO TAKE A RISK NEW DESTROYERS WILL GO TO ROTA NAVY WANTS MORE WARSHIPS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER EXTRAORDINARY DEEDS MEET MILITARY TIMES’ SERVICE MEMBERS OF THE YEAR PREGNANT AND IN THE DARK FEMALE SERVICE MEMBERS SEEKING ABORTIONS HAVE LITTLE GUIDANCE TO GO ON Top lefi Fla Rahman/AFP/ Getty Images Cover photo: Kazuhiro Nogi/AFP/Getty Images Cover design: Jared Morgan/Staff = EY : AUSSIE SUBMARINERS MAY SOON TRAIN HERE WITH USN SAILORS U.S. lawmakers have introduced a bill that would establish a program to train Royal Australian Navy officers to operate nuclear- powered submarines, as Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. work on a collaborative path toward developing and fielding the boat type for the Pacific ally. The Australia-U.S. Submarine Officer Pipeline Act would allow Australian naval officers to begin training in America to learn how to operate and maintain nuclear- powered subs, before eventually becoming commanding officers of the future boats. Australia currently operates six IWO JIMA CO TAKES HIS 700-MAN CREW TO SEE TOP GUN’ Ship life is hard, and ship life while said ship is in dry dock for maintenance in Norfolk is its own kind of suck, as anyone following the Navy in recent months has come to understand. So, a big Bravo Zulu to Capt. Judd Krier, skipper of the amphibious assault ship lwo Jima, who took his massive crew of 700 sailors — minus the duty section, of course — to see “Top Gun: Maverick” at a local theater. Krier didn’t stop there; he sprang for drinks and popcorn, too. 4 NAVYTIMES.COM July 2022 diesel-electric guided-missile submarines. Twelve French-built diesel- electric subs were to replace those Collins-class boats. But Australia last fall changed course and announced the AUKUS plan to field nuclear-powered submarines with the help of the U.K. and the United States. The program would induct at least two Australian officers each year to receive training at the Navy Nuclear Propulsion School, enroll in the Submarine Office Basic Course and then be assigned to duty on an operational U.S. submarine at sea. ae: \ 5 =e = EXPLORERS FIND THE & OF THE SAMUEL B. ROBERTS MANILA, Philippines — A U.S. Navy destroyer that engaged a su- perior Japanese fleet in the largest sea battle of World War Il in the Philippines has become the deepest wreck to be discovered, according to explorers. The USS Samuel B. Roberts, popularly known as the “Sam- my B,” was identified as broken into two pieces on a slope at a depth of 22,916 feet. That puts it 1,400 feet deeper than the USS Johnston, the previous deepest wreck, discovered last year in the Philippine Sea also by American explorer Victor Vescovo, founder of Dallas-based Caladan Oceanic Expeditions. He announced the latest find together with U.K.-based EYOS Expeditions. “It was an extraordinary honor to locate this incredibly famous ship, and by doing so have the chance to retell her story of heroism and duty to those who may not know of the ship and her crew’s sacrifice,” Vescovo, a former Navy commander, said in a statement. The Sammy B. took part in the Battle off Samar, the final phase of the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944. The Imperial Japa- nese Navy suffered its biggest loss of ships but failed to dis- lodge from Leyte the U.S. forces that had invaded earlier as part of the liberation of the Philippines. According to some records, the destroyer disabled a Japanese heavy cruiser with a torpedo and significantly damaged another. After having spent virtually all its ammunition, she was critically hit by the lead battleship Yamato and sank. Of a 224-man crew, 89 died and 120 were saved, including the captain, Lt. Cmdr. Robert W. Copeland. According to Samuel J. Cox, a retired admiral and naval histo- rian, Copeland stated there was “no higher honor” then to have led the men who displayed such incredible courage going into battle against overwhelming odds, from which survival could not be expected. “This site is a hallowed war grave and serves to remind all Americans of the great cost born by previous generations for the freedom we take for granted today,” Cox said in a statement. The explorers said that up until the discovery, the historical records of where the wreck lay were not very accurate. The search involved the use of the deepest side-scan sonar ever installed and operated on a submersible, well beyond the standard com- mercial limitations of 19,685 feet), EYOS said. CLOCKWISE: PETER PARKS/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES; CALADAN OCEANIC VIA AP; IWO JIMA FACEBOOK [4 Serve my country ( Rice through the ranks a |] Save 30% and starfa x \ grad program > ae L] Thrive in a new career 2A Nie Succeed Again. Eligible new military students can save 30% per credit toward a UMGC.EDU graduate degree or certificate program in business, cybersecurity, data analytics, healthcare and more » 100% online and hybrid courses available * Personalized advising and lifetime career services : ZZ UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND ; Scan the QR code to learn more. A, GLOBAL CAMPUS “x Grad classes start soon. ey AT YOUR SERVICE SINCE 1947 *For active-duty military students, reserves, and their spouses and dependents. _ ; Other terms and conditions apply. Visit umge.edu/milsavings for details. © 2022 University of Maryland Global Campus. YOUR NAVY By Megan Eckstein [email protected] The initial response to the July 2020 fire that destroyed the amphibious assault ship Bonhomme Richard was uncoordinated and hampered by confusion as to which admiral should cobble together Navy and civilian firefighters, according to new information from the then-head of Naval Surface Forces. The discombobulation in those early Sunday hours on July 12 meant sailors may have missed a window to contain the fire in a storage area. One admiral, who said he lacked authority to issue an order, pleaded with the ship’s commanding officer — who was waiting on the pier with the crew — to get back on the ship and fight the fire. When that admiral — now-retired Vice Adm. Rich Brown — called on other another command to intervene, it refused, he said in an interview. Brown, who led Naval Surface Forces and Naval Surface Force Pacific from January 2018 to August 2020, said he set up an ad hoc chain of command to coordinate efforts to save the ship that morning after seeing lower-level leaders struggle to communicate or fight the fire aggressively. The move came after the fleet’s operational chain of command declined to step in due to confusion over who had control of the ship. An investigation, released October 2021, outlined failures leading up to the fire and during the response. But Brown’s comments offer additional details and perspective on how the fire response came together. Brown said he is sharing his story now as he faces a secretarial letter of censure. He was named in the investigation as contributing to the ship’s loss, despite not being interviewed, he said, but was cleared by a Consolidated Disposition Authority in December. 6 NAVYTIMES.COM July 2022 A BOTCHED RESPONSE NEW DETAILS EMERGE ON DEVASTATING BONHOMME RICHARD FIRE Capt. J.D. Dorsey, a spokesman for Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro, said “the secretary is still in the process of reviewing the command investigation and has not yet made any final decisions on actions beyond what the CDA has imposed.” THE MORNING OF THE FIRE Brown, as the type commander for surface ships, said he should have played a supporting role the morning the fire broke out. He scrambled to his Naval Base San Diego office and began making calls, including to Naval Sea Systems Command to understand what risk the ship’s fuel tank posed and whether the ship needed to be towed out to sea. But he grew concerned the ship’s crew and federal firefighters were squandering a limited opportunity to contain the fire in the lower vehicle storage area. The investigation into the fire noted the ship’s crew was slow to call for help and did not take actions to prevent the fire from spreading. Brown called ship commanding officer Capt. Greg- ory Scott Thoroman, who said he and the crew had left the ship and were on the pier. Thoroman should have been coordinating with the base’s federal fire department and the Southwest Re- gional Maintenance Center, collectively forming the incident command team, according to a 2018 Navy instruction laying out fire prevention and response responsibilities for ships in maintenance. Instead, Brown said, “I could just tell in his responses that he was unsure how to coordinate the resources that were at his disposal. It was clear to me there was friction” developing between the Navy and civilian commands, with the federal firefighters having been pulled out of the ship multiple times and the Navy firefighters lacking the gear they needed to Massive blaze and confusion Firefighters battle the raging inferno onboard the amphibious assault ship Bonhomme Richard at Naval Base San Diego on July 12,2020. — | re fully tackle the fire on their own. With the Navy’s organization falling apart, he called the Expeditionary Strike Group 3 commander, Rear Adm. Phil Sobeck, around 11 a.m. “Phil, you can tell me to eff off, because I’m not in your chain of command, but you have to get down to that pier and provide leadership and guidance because they’re all sitting at the end of the pier watching the ship burn,” Brown said he told Sobeck. “And he goes, ‘Admiral, I’m getting in the car. ’m on my way.” Brown took other actions during that time, including some outside his typical authorities as a type commander. He ordered destroyers Fitzgerald and Russell to leave the pier they shared with Bonhomme Richard, even if it meant damaging brows and cables. Brown directed his staff to contact U.S. 3rd Fleet around 12:30 p.m., but 3rd Fleet’s position was, “The ship’s in maintenance, it’s not our problem,” he said. He got the same response, he said, in a call to 3rd Fleet commander Vice Adm. Scott Conn. Brown argues it was the fleet’s responsibility: Dur- ing weekly meetings with PACFLT leadership, 3rd Fleet routinely briefed on the manning, training and equipping status of all the ships in maintenance, with Brown on the call in a supporting role. A retired flag officer who served in San Diego and understands the command and control structure there, also said 3rd Fleet should have been the organization to manage the failing efforts by the ship captain. The officer did not wish to go on the record. Rear Adm. Charlie Brown, the Navy’s chief of information, said two policies — OPNAVINST 3440.18 and the NAVSEA 8010 manual — “were not fully consistent, but they placed command and control responsibility on the administrative chain of command Ds $= Sec FIRE page 8 cS q Zz COMMISSARY | OR DELIVERY AT SHOP.COMMISSARIES. COM cee From FIRE page 6 for a ship in this configuration. Third Fleet was the operational commander two echelons above the BHR.” All the relevant leaders were already connected in a teleconference, so Brown went into the ad hoc command center in his office and told everyone Sobeck was in charge and made sure they all understood their supporting roles to assist Sobeck. He then called the then-Pacific Fleet commander, Adm. John Aquilino. “T told him what I had done, what I was seeing: the C2 degrading on the pier, there’s no focus of effort, people are off doing their own things. I told him that I had asked Scott to take command and he said no. And I said ... ‘Phil now works for me, and I’ve got it.’” “Absolutely, Rich, you got it, put the fire out,” the admiral replied, according to Brown. Brown didn’t dispute the investigation’s account of the rest of the five days of firefighting, but said its findings on how command and control fell apart is incomplete, and the investigation itself was “fatally defective” without interviewing him or including a full picture of what would be a key lesson learned. FLAWED COMMAND STRUCTURES Brown said one of the reasons he wanted to share his perspective about the fire is because the same command and control flaw played a role in the 2017 collisions of destroyers Fitzgerald and McCain. He led the McCain investigation and participat- ed in the Fitzgerald investigation, and said one of the recommendations he made at the time was to reinstate a Cold War-era command structure that had two chains of command: one for ships in maintenance and the basic phase, led by a one-star focused on ensuring a build-up of readiness; and one for ships in advanced training and deployments, led by a one- star focused on employing warfighting capabilities. “T was told, ‘It’s not going to happen; there’s one chain of command.’ That’s what they all kept saying to me, there’s one chain of command, and that’s the operational chain of command, which the [type com- 8 NAVYTIMES.COM July 2022 “Rich Brown Forceswaddresses thererew from Aye GF He Nttoral Combat ship Coronado U! ) inpparengores manders] are not in.” Brown said that, with the operational chain of command in charge of the ships in maintenance, his job as the type commander was to ensure ships were up to date on their certifications — which Bonhomme Richard was. Still, he said, the operational chain of command had made clear in the past the ship was always their ship, regardless of what phase of maintenance, training or operations it was in. Had the Navy made Brown’s recommended change in 2017, Bonhomme Richard would have been clear- ly under Brown’s control in 2020 and he could have taken more aggressive measures, he said. Other Navy leaders agreed command and control was an issue the day of the fire, but disagreed that 3rd Fleet should have taken a bigger role. Conn was appointed to lead the investigation, not in his capacity as 3rd Fleet commander but as an in- dividual three-star admiral in the San Diego area with the experience to lead a command investigation. In October, when the fire investigation was released, Conn said Navy policy was for ships in maintenance to go through the administrative chain of command, through the type commander. He added that “one of our recommendations going forward is to review where should the operational chain be aligned as part of the oversight in a lengthy availability.” Rear Adm. Paul Spedero, who led the major fires review that accompanied the Bonhomme Richard investigation, added during the roundtable that there had been confusion and inconsistency in the past between administrative control and operational control of ships in maintenance. He said that issue had been largely solved as the Navy made reforms following the Fitzgerald and McCain collisions. But, he agreed, the Bonhomme Richard fire response “certainly had issues. ... There was a lack of clarity in [administrative control] and [operational control] responsibilities.” Rear Adm. Charlie Brown, the Navy spokesman, added in his statement that “there were multiple contributing factors that caused confusion on the {command and control]. First, there was a failure to adequately train for a fire in an industrial environment, and more specifically, exercise the various supporting and supported command relationships. Second, some of the policies in place were in conflict or unnecessarily redundant. ... Finally, practices and procedures had developed over time that were accepted and followed but were inconsistent with written policies, which allowed the [command and control] in the circumstances of the industrial environment to become varied.” ACCOUNTABILITY ACTIONS Brown said, despite the major role he played while the ship was on fire, he was never interviewed. Conn emailed him to ask five specific questions related to the roles and functions of the type commander. Brown answered the questions, but said Conn never followed up to arrange a formal interview. He said he had no indication he would be named as contributing to the loss of the ship until the report came out. “Tam convinced that there was undue command influence on that investigation at the end, because when you look at the findings of facts, in the findings of facts behind my name, they just don’t make any sense. And why won’ they talk to me?” he added. Rear Adm. Charlie Brown, the spokesman, said retired Vice Adm. Rich Brown’s input via email was included in the investigation and “it is not uncom- mon for an investigation to use written questions to gather information.” Overall, he added, “the investigation was thorough, is being reviewed by all echelons of the chain of command, and has been extremely valuable in helping to identify corrections across the fleet to help get at the challenges of shipboard fires.” Pacific Fleet Commander Adm. Sam Paparo, who serves as the consolidated disposition authority for the incident, sent Brown a letter in December stating, “T have determined your case warrants no action.” Brown said he thought the issue was resolved until his lawyer in early June warned him Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro would be sending a letter of censure. “T just don’t know what facts changed in the last six months,” he said. Lauren Hanzel, a former Navy judge advocate general who now works in private practice, said that Conn and his team not interviewing Brown in the first place was unusual, particularly when it started to look like Brown was turning into a subject of the investigation and might be named as accountable. Sending a censure after the CDA cleared Brown, she said, is even more unusual. The process Brown described “is about as unique as us losing a capital ship,” she said. “It’s unconvention- al, and I’m a little bit disappointed, because if you look at due process and the appearance of fairness,” the Navy will come out looking bad in this case.” Asked what he hoped would happen by talking to the media, Brown said the Navy has a pattern of punishing three-stars for political expediency without examining root causes and making reforms. “T think the Navy is destined just to make the same mistakes again and again, especially the surface Navy, because we don’t have the [C2] right.” MC1 MARCUS STANLEY/NAVY SAVE A VETERAN’S LIFE - BECOME A DEVAUGHN PHILLIP Navy Veteran 66 Since being on dialysis | hadn’t had the energy to be active. Now that! have a new kidney, | am looking to being active and engaged with my family. | can’t wait to teach my 6 year old football. 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WWW.DOVETRANSPLANT.ORG DVE LIVING KIDNEY DONATION FOR VETERANS Healthier. fleet An F-35C Lighting II from the “Argonauts” of Strike = mitts Squadron 147 sits on D tide ofthe aircraft 7 calitier CarkVinson RISING READINESS RATES OF ITS FIGHTER FLEET IS ONE KEY FACTOR By Megan Eckstein [email protected] The Navy will order fewer F-35C jets in fiscal 2023 than manufacturer Lockheed Martin could produce under a pandemic catch-up plan, with officials hoping to use the lull to spend money on other priorities. Though top Navy leaders told lawmakers that supply-chain shortages drove the decision to ask for fewer F-35C Lightning Hs in next year’s budget, that is only half the story. Equally important is Navy leadership’s belief that the current fighter inventory is the healthiest it’s been in two decades, meaning the service's self-declared fighter shortfall can be safely left to linger past 2030, officials told Navy Times. Naval aviation has undertaken two major efforts recently: closing a nearly 50-jet shortfall on a quicker timeline, and boosting the readiness rates of its current jets. The head of Naval Air Forces in February said the fighter inventory — the combination of fourth-generation F/A-18E-F Super Hornets and fifth-generation F-35C Joint Strike Fighters — could reach its required size by 2025, and the Navy was developing even more aggressive readiness goals after seeing early success. The timing of the strike fighter shortfall being closed — originally estimated for 2030 before being shortened to 2025 — was credited to work the Navy and its industrial base were doing to extend the lives of Super Hornets, despite COVID-related slowdowns of the F-35 production line. But seven weeks later, the Navy released a proposal for FY23 that would extend the shortfall out to 2031. Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro and Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday highlighted the COVID- and supply chain-related issues as a reason for requesting just nine F-35Cs in the FY23 request during multiple hearings this spring. Two factors were key in the Navy choosing to slow down its F-35 acquisition, they said: The service needed to free up funds for other top acquisition priorities, and the high readiness of the jets today made it a less risky decision to extend the shortfall and divert funding elsewhere. When the Navy released its budget request in March, Rear Adm. John Gumbleton, the deputy as- sistant secretary of the Navy for budget, told reporters the smaller request for F-35Cs — nine, compared to the 15 Congress funded in the current fiscal year — was reflective of the tight expected topline. “The fact that we did come down in our JSF request was more about balance than anything else — it was about balancing a ship construction portfolio, aviation portfolio, weapons, R&D, etc. So I think we would have liked to have had more JSFs, but that’s the balance that we can yield,” he said. Gilday told lawmakers that Boeing has a turnaround time of about 18 months for each jet entering the program but that would be shortened to about 15 months by 2023 and then to 12 months by 2024. TWO MORE DESTROYERS TO HOMEPORT IN ROTA, SPAIN By Geoff Ziezulewicz [email protected] As the war between Russia and Ukraine rages on, rearranging the security priorities and alignments of Europe and NATO for the first time in decades, the Navy will grow its destroyer fleet at Naval Station Rota, Spain, from four to six warships, the White House announced June 28. But officials with the Italy-based U.S. 6th Fleet told Navy Times that those additional warships won't arrive in Rota until at least fiscal 2024. Those two additional destroyers have not yet been named. White House National Security Advisor Jake Sul- livan told reporters that the ships “will help increase the United States’ and NATO’s maritime presence in all the relevant maritime domains in the 10 NAVYTIMES.COM July 2022 Sea Breeze Hardy stands lookout onboard the destroyer Porter during a simulated towing exercise with the \ Spanish frigate Alvayo de Bazan during = Seaman Nakia Exercise Sea ae c7° in July 2020. Euro-Atlantic area.” The ballistic-missile defense destroyers Ross, Roo- sevelt, Arleigh Burke and Porter are already stationed in Rota. Fellow destroyer Paul Ignatius completed a homeport swap from Mayport, Florida, to Rota to replace one of those four ships earlier this month. However, the Navy has not yet announced which of the four ships Paul Ignatius is replacing as part of the standard rotation schedule. Before the war in Ukraine started, the Navy sortied four additional East Coast destroyers to 6th Fleet, although officials at the time insisted they were not sent in response to Russian aggression. The beefing-up of ships at Rota is one part of an overall U.S. military increase in Europe announced by President Joe Biden during a NATO summit in Madrid, the most significant bolstering of U.S. forces there since the Cold War. The U.S. will also step up rotational deployments to Romania and the Baltic region. FROM TOP: MC3 ERIN ZORICH/NAVY; IC2 JEFFREY ABELON/NAVY