Navy and Air Force Joint Acquisition of Aircraft

105 Pages·2002·0.82 MB·English

STRAPPING IN AND BAILING OUT:

NAVY AND AIR FORCE JOINT ACQUISITION OF AIRCRAFT

BY

MICHAEL E. GANTT

A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF

THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES

FOR COMPLETION OF GRADUATE REQUIREMENTS

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES

AIR UNIVERSITY

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

JUNE 2002
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Strapping In And Bailing Out: Navy And Air Force Joint Acquisition Of
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DISCLAIMER

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author.
They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense,
the United States Air Force, or Air University.

ii
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Michael E. Gantt graduated from the United States Air Force Academy in
1988 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Aeronautical Engineering. Major Gantt’s
assignments include: Williams AFB, AZ (1988-89), Luke AFB, AZ (1989-90), Kunsan
AB, ROK (1990-92), Ramstein AB, GE (1992-94), Aviano AB, IT (1994-95), Moody
AFB, GA (1995-98), Nellis AFB, NV (1998-2000), Maxwell AFB, AL (2000-02).
He is a senior pilot and a Fighter Weapons School Graduate with over 2200 hours in the
F-16.
Major Gantt’s academic accomplishments include a Masters of Aeronautical
Science from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and a Masters of Military Science
from Air Command and Staff College. In June 2002 Major Gantt was assigned to HQ
AF/XOOC Checkmate, Pentagon.

iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to acknowledge several individuals for their concerted effort in the
completion of this project. I want to thank “His Royal Chiefship” Bob Laymon of
Raytheon Aircraft Corporation for granting me several interviews and for his insight into
the acquisition world. I would also like to acknowledge the tireless efforts of Paul
“Wiedie” Wiedenhaefer of the Joint Strike Fighter Program Office. These two gentlemen
provided knowledge and guidance through the maze of current and past acquisition
programs.

I would also like to recognize Colonel Chiabotti and Major Terino for the lengthy
discussions and tireless efforts in reviewing and editing my futile attempts. Colonel
Chiabotti deserves special credit for kicking me back into play after straying off the
subject several times.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Erica, and my son, Alex. Without their
love and support this project would have infinitely more difficult.

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ABSTRACT

This study analyzes past Air Force and Navy trainer and fighter aircraft
programs and determines when conditions may be favorable for joint acquisition
opportunities. Five case studies are examined with respect to cost, schedule, and
performance characteristics and the interactions of the Air Force and the Navy.
Specifically, the details of the Tactical Fighter, Experimental (TFX), the Next Generation
Trainer (NGT) T-46A, the T-45A Goshawk, the Joint Primary Aircrew Training System
(JPATS), and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) are reviewed and compared.
The study indicates that for joint acquisition to be a profitable venture, two
conditions must be met: a common mission and a definite need, absent suitable
alternatives. The type of mission matters less than commonality of performance
requirements, while need generally brings money to the table.

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CONTENTS

Chapter Page
DISCLAIMER………………………………………………………….. ii
ABOUT THE AUTHOR………………………………………………. iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS……………………………………………… iv
ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………….. v
INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………… 1
1 HISTORY OF ACQUISITION…………………………………….. 3
2 TACTICAL FIGHTER, EXPERIMENTAL (TFX)…………………. 19
3 TRAINING AIRCRAFT……………………………………………….. 31
4 JOINT PRIMARY AIRCREW TRAINING SYSTEM (JPATS)…… 48
5 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER (JSF)…………………………………… 60
6 CONCLUSION………………………………………………………… 72
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………. 75
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Illustrations

Table
1 TFX Operational Requirements…………………………………… 25
2 Advanced Trainer Aircraft Comparison…………………………. 45
3 JPATS Key Parameters……………………………………………… 54
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Introduction
The Department of Defense oversees the acquisition of equipment for all the
services. Because the amount of funding available for new systems is finite, difficult
decisions must be made every budgeting cycle. The services can collude on a project and
theoretically save the government significant amounts of money. By jointly acquiring
weapon systems, the services mutually agree that all involved possess both the need for
the equipment a reasonable probability of arriving at common performance requirements.
But the history of joint acquisition would suggest otherwise. The Air Force and
the Navy, in particular, have not been able to jointly acquire an aircraft that satisfied both
services. What drives the perceived inability of the services to work together in this
process? Several factors come to mind: parochial interests, “top-down” demands for
commonality, disparate missions and operating environments, differing priorities attached
to flying aircraft, etc. Any of these factors alone could kill a program, and a combination
is sure to be deadly.
In an attempt to identify where the problem may lie, this thesis poses the question:
can joint acquisition and joint procurement of aircraft be achieved without endangering
requirements specialized for separate services? To help answer the question, five case
studies will be examined using an analytical framework composed of three factors: cost,
schedule, and performance. These were selected because they directly relate to the
service needs and resources available to fund those needs. These three factors are key in
determining if a program will be acceptable to all concerned parties. The case studies to
be examined are: Tactical Fighter, Experimental (TFX), the Next Generation Trainer
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(NGT) T-46A, the T-45 Goshawk Navy advanced trainer, the Joint Primary Aircrew
Training System (JPATS), and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).
Before delving into the case studies, the thesis will provide a brief history of joint
acquisition. As will be demonstrated, the services have had a difficult time working
together to solve the problems of joint acquisition.
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