Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective

273 Pages·2013·2.24 MB·English

by  Lynne Rudder Baker

N AT U R A L I SM A N D T H E F I R ST-PE R SON
PE R S PECT I V E
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N AT U R A L ISM A N D T H E
F I R ST-PER SON PER SPECT I V E
L ynne Rudder B aker
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3
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L ibrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Baker, Lynne Rudder, 1944–
Naturalism and the first-person perspective / Lynne Rudder Baker.
p. cm.
ISBN 978–0–19–991474–6 (pbk. : alk. paper)—ISBN 978–0–19–991472–2
(hardback : alk. paper)—ISBN 978–0–19–991473–9 (updf) 1. Naturalism. 2. Self
(Philosophy) 3. Perspective (Philosophy) I. Title.
B828.2.B35 2013
146—dc23
2012030940

I SBN 978–0–19–991474–6
ISBN 978–0–19–991472–2
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
P rinted in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
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T o my dear sister and f iend, C atherine Rudder,
and to her partner, Helen Gibson
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C ON T E N TS
A cknowledgments x i
I ntroduction x iii
W hat is the Problem? x iii
P ART I
T HE CORE ARGUMENT
1 . V arieties of Naturalism 3
W hat Counts As “Science”? 6
R eductive Naturalism 6
N onreductive Naturalism 1 0
T wo Responses to Naturalism: Disenchantment
and Optimism 1 7
2 . O n Naturalizing the First-Person Perspective 2 8
W hat Is Naturalization? 2 8
T he Robust First-Person Perspective 3 0
T he Rudimentary First-Person Perspective 4 0
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C O N T E N T S
3 . R eductive Approaches to the First-Person Perspective 4 8
J ohn Perry and an Epistemic Account of the Self 4 9
D avid Lewis on De Se Belief 5 6
A Comment on John Searle 6 1
D oes Cognitive Science Save the
Day for Naturalism? 6 3
C onclusion 7 2
4 . E liminative Approaches to the
First-Person Perspective 7 4
D aniel Dennett on Consciousness 7 4
T homas Metzinger on a Self-Model Theory 8 0
M y Recommendation 1 00
5 . A rguments against First-Person Naturalization 1 02
F rom First-Person Concepts to
First-Person Properties 105
A Linguistic Argument: A Complete Ontology
Must Include First-Person Properties 1 09
A Metaphysical Argument against
Ontological Naturalism 1 13
C onclusion 1 22
PART II
A N ACCOUNT OF THE FIRST-PERSON
PERSPECTIVE
6 . F rom the Rudimentary to the Robust Stage of the
First-Person Perspective 1 27
T he First-Person Perspective: Consciousness
and Self-Consciousness 1 28
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C O N T E N T S
L anguage and the Acquisition of Concepts 1 30
H ow to Acquire a Self-Concept 1 35
H uman Persons: Wrap Up 1 41
7 . I s the Idea of the First-Person
Perspective Coherent? 1 44
P ersonal Identity: A First-Personal
Approach 1 47
O bjections and Replies 1 56
M ark Johnston on the Self as Illusory 1 60
J ohnston’s Critique Sidestepped 1 63
C onclusion 1 68
8 . A Metaphysical Framework for the
First-Person Perspective 1 69
F irst-Person Properties 1 72
D ispositional Properties 1 73
H aecceitistic Implications 1 79
C onclusion 1 82
9 . A gents, Artifacts, Moral Responsibility: Some
Contributions of the First-Person Perspective 1 83
P ersonhood 1 84
V arieties of Agency 1 86
A rtifacts 1 98
M oral Responsibility 2 00
C onclusion 2 06
1 0. N atural Reality 2 07
N ear-Naturalism 2 07
P roperty-Constitution and Causation 2 09
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