Natural Law and the Good Life

178 Pages·2017·1.13 MB·English

It’s For Your Own Good: Natural Law and the Good Life
Submitted for the completion of a PhD at the University of Reading
Department of Philosophy
Richard Playford
October 2016
Acknowledgements:
My thanks go to both of my supervisors David Oderberg and Philip Stratton-Lake. Their
advice and support has been invaluable and I have learnt a tremendous amount from working
with both of them.

My thanks go to both of my parents Ray and Diane Playford as well as my brother
Christopher for their endless support and kindness whilst writing this thesis. Without them
this would not have been possible.

My thanks also go to the countless others who have helped and encouraged me during my
philosophical journey. Each of you individually deserves my thanks in person, but this will
have to do: thank you all.
Declaration:
I confirm that this is my own work and that the use of all material from other sources has
been properly and fully acknowledged.
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It’s For Your Own Good: Natural Law and the Good Life
Richard Playford, University of Reading, [email protected]

Abstract
The goal of this thesis is to create a distinctively Aristotelian-Thomistic ethical schema. I
shall do this in four stages. First, in chapter one, I am going to present a summary of
Aristotelian metaphysics. I will present a slightly Thomistic take on Aristotelian metaphysics
specifically when it comes to the distinction between accidental and substantial form.
However, I will present a more classically Aristotelian account when it comes to the source
of teleology. Along the way I will explore whether science can disprove any aspects of
Aristotelian metaphysics. In particular, I will examine whether science can show that there
are no final causes, and whether evolution poses problems for the Aristotelian concept of
form and essence in biology. Second, in chapter two, I shall explain the nature of goodness
within this metaphysical schema. I will also engage with competing accounts of the nature of
goodness and will argue that my Aristotelian account is superior. Third, in chapter three, I
will list and defend my account of the basic goods. I will also explain why certain things,
such as pleasure and freedom, are not included in my list of the basic goods. I will then
explain how and why they do fit into my schema. Finally, in chapter four, I will move onto
duties. I will show how we can derive a list of pro tanto duties from the Aristotelian ethical
schema. Along the way I will also briefly sketch out an account of human rights. My ethical
theory will differ from many contemporary neo-Aristotelians in that it will place emphasis
on, and smoothly follow from, Aristotelian metaphysics. At the same time, my ethical theory
will differ from more traditional neo-Aristotelians and the medieval neo-Aristotelians in the
way that it reconciles an Aristotelian ethical schema with a non-natural account of goodness
and a reasons-based account of obligation.
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Contents
Chapter 1: Aristotelian Metaphysics and Modern Science ............................................................... 6
1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 6
2. Act and Potency .................................................................................................................... 6
3. The Four Causes.................................................................................................................... 7
3.1. Science and Final Causes ..................................................................................................... 10
3.2. Hylemorphism .................................................................................................................... 12
4. Essence............................................................................................................................... 14
4.1. Evolution and Essence ......................................................................................................... 16
4.2. Aristotelian Biological Kinds ............................................................................................... 16
4.3. Evolutionary Anti-Essentialism ............................................................................................ 18
4.3.1. Taxonomic Anti-Essentialism ....................................................................................... 18
4.3.2. Explanatory Anti-Essentialism...................................................................................... 19
4.4. The Role of Essence in Evolution ......................................................................................... 21
4.4.1. Stability ...................................................................................................................... 22
4.4.2. Mutability ................................................................................................................... 22
4.4.3. Phenotypic Plasticity .................................................................................................... 23
4.4.4. Essence Playing a Crucial Role in Evolution.................................................................. 23
5. Conclusion.......................................................................................................................... 24
Chapter 2: The Nature of Goodness ............................................................................................. 25
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 25
2. Geach on Attributive and Predicative Adjectives ................................................................... 26
2.1. Thomson on Goodness-In-A-Way ........................................................................................ 29
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2.2. My Account of Goodness..................................................................................................... 35
2.3. A Preliminary Argument for my Aristotelian Account of Goodness ........................................ 40
3. Engaging With Alternatives ................................................................................................. 41
3.1. Naturalism and Supernaturalism ........................................................................................... 41
3.2. The Open Question Argument .............................................................................................. 42
3.3. Non-Natural Natural Law and Essential Reasons ................................................................... 46
4. Just Good............................................................................................................................ 50
4.1. The Fact/Value Dichotomy .................................................................................................. 51
4.2. Responding to the Fact/Value Dichotomy ............................................................................. 52
4.3. Orsi and Zimmerman’s Argument ........................................................................................ 54
4.4. Zimmerman’s Ethical Goodness Point One ........................................................................... 54
4.5. Zimmerman’s Ethical Goodness Point Two........................................................................... 55
4.6. Zimmerman’s Ethical Goodness Point Three ......................................................................... 56
4.7. Zimmerman’s Account of Intrinsic Goodness........................................................................ 59
4.8. Foot’s Account of Intrinsic Goodness ................................................................................... 59
4.9. My Response to Zimmerman’s Third Point ........................................................................... 65
4.10. Who’s The Best? ......................................................................................................... 68
4.11. Superman or the Hulk? Who Would Win? ..................................................................... 69
4.12. Better in Some Ways, Worse in Others.......................................................................... 71
4.13. KISS (Keep It Simple Silly).......................................................................................... 72
5. Concluding Our Discussion of the Nature of Goodness .......................................................... 74
Chapter 3: What Things Are Good? ............................................................................................. 77
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 77
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2. Substantial Form and Ends Revisited .................................................................................... 77
3. What is man? ...................................................................................................................... 84
3.1. A Psychological Objection ................................................................................................... 90
3.2. A Lean Mean Killing Machine?............................................................................................ 91
3.3. One End to Rule Them All? ................................................................................................. 93
4. It’s Good! ........................................................................................................................... 96
5. Engaging with Competing Accounts of the Human Goods ....................................................106
5.1. Pleasure: It Feels So Good ..................................................................................................107
5.2. Freedom, Equality and Justice: The Political Goods..............................................................115
5.3. Other Natural Law Theorists and Other Goods .....................................................................119
5.4. The Virtues ........................................................................................................................122
6. Conclusion.........................................................................................................................124
Chapter 4: What Should I Do? ....................................................................................................125
1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................125
2. What About ME!? Are Aristotelians Egoists?.......................................................................125
2.1. The Ultimate Sacrifice ........................................................................................................132
3. The Scope of the Moral Community ....................................................................................137
4. The Bigger the Better? The More the Merrier? Why Not Consequentialism? ..........................145
4.1. The Incommensurability Thesis...........................................................................................147
5. Duties, Obligations and Rights ............................................................................................153
5.1. Clash of Titans: When Duties Conflict .................................................................................160
5.2. Human Rights ....................................................................................................................163
6. Conclusion.........................................................................................................................166
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Bibliography .............................................................................................................................168
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Chapter 1: Aristotelian Metaphysics and Modern Science

1. Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to sketch out the metaphysical theory with which I shall be
working. I shall be relying on a basic Aristotelian metaphysical schema, in particular on the
concept of form and ends (or final causes). To fully articulate and adequately defend an
Aristotelian metaphysical theory is a thesis in and of itself and goes beyond the scope of what
I want to accomplish here. As such, in this chapter I will not defend the full Aristotelian
metaphysical schema from the full variety of criticisms that are available in contemporary
metaphysics. Instead I will simply sketch out a very simplified version of Aristotle’s
metaphysical schema and will respond to objections which stem from modern science, in
particular, whether science can show that there are no final causes and whether evolution has
shown that there are no such things as essences. I do this simply to show that Aristotelian
metaphysical schemas remain plausible candidates in the 21st century and I do not claim to
have adequately demonstrated their superiority or correctness when compared to other
contemporary metaphysical schemas.
I shall focus primarily on Aristotle’s concept of form and ends because my ethical
theory relies very heavily on these two concepts. Along the way I will briefly sketch out the
concept of material causes and efficient causes and the distinction between act and potency
for the sake of completeness and because they will be referred to from time to time. However,
it should be noted that precisely how we should conceptualize material and efficient causes is
not important for this thesis.

2. Act and Potency
The everyday objects that we are familiar with, according to Aristotle and Aquinas, are
combinations of actualities and potencies (sometimes also called potentialities). The
actualities of an object are the various ways, states and properties that it is or has currently.
The potencies of an object are the various ways, states and properties that an object could be
and have but is not, and does not have, currently. As an example, a red rubber ball is actually
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round, but it is potentially flat and squishy (if melted). The distinction between act and
potency is also necessary when trying to understand how an object can undergo change. This
is because change is the actualization of a potency. The distinction between act and potency
is crucial when trying to understand the Aristotelian metaphysical schema.
Things can be differentiated by their actualities and their potencies. Two red rubber
balls are both actually red and rubber, but one may be actually rolling and potentially on a
shelf whilst the other may be potentially rolling and actually on a shelf. Act is prior or more
fundamental than potency. There are a number of reasons for this. Two of which are, first,
that any potency is defined in relation to act. A rubber ball’s potency for melting just is a
potency for being actual in those ways (for actually being melted). The second is that a
thing’s potencies are grounded in its actualities. A ball has the potency to roll down a hill
because it is actually round.
There are a number of different types of potency. The most important distinction to
make is between pure or logical possibility and real potency. Imaginary creatures such as a
gryphon or a dragon would be examples of the logically possible because there are no such
things but there is no contradiction in the notion and thus they could potentially exist. Real
potencies are grounded in the natures of real things such as a ball’s potential to melt or roll. It
is real potencies that we shall be interested in from now on.
With regard to real potencies there is a further distinction to be made between an
active potency which is the ability to bring about an effect and a passive potency which is the
ability to be affected. An active potency is a power and is strictly speaking a kind of actuality.
It is a kind of actuality relative to the substance possessing it, although it is a potency relative
to the action it grounds. A passive potency is a potency in the strict sense and usually what is
meant by potency is passive potency.

3. The Four Causes
Aristotelians distinguish between four causes: efficient, final, formal and material. I shall
discuss each of these in turn.