national integrity system assessment albania 2016

237 Pages·2012·5.03 MB·English

NATIONAL INTEGRITY
SYSTEM ASSESSMENT
ALBANIA 2016
This project is funded by
The European Union.
Transparency International is a global movement with one vision: a world in
which government, business, civil society and the daily lives of people are free
of corruption. With more than 100 chapters worldwide and an international
secretariat in Berlin, we are leading the fight against corruption to turn this
vision into reality.
www.transparency.org
Authors: Adela Halo, Megi Llubani (Country profile, Corruption Profile, Anti-Corruption
activities)
Assistant: Megi Llubani, Inesa Hila
ISBN: 978-3-96076-028-3
Printed on 100% recycled paper.
© Cover photo: iStockphoto.com/ollirg
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under CC BY-ND 4.0
Every effort has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in this
report. All information was believed to be correct as of June 2016. Nevertheless,
Transparency International cannot accept responsibility for the consequences of its use for
other purposes or in other contexts.
This publication has been produced with the assistance of the European Union. The
contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of Transparency International and
can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTORY INFORMATION 2
II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7
III. ABOUT THE NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM ASSESSMENT 15
IV. COUNTRY PROFILE 20
V. CORRUPTION PROFILE 28
VI. ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTIVITIES 32
VII. NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM 35

1. LEGISLATURE 35
2. EXECUTIVE 50
3. JUDICIARY 60
4. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR 79
5. PUBLIC SECTOR 93
6. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 110
7. CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION (CEC) 125
8. OMBUDSMAN 140
9. SUPREME AUDIT INSTITUTION 153
10. HIGH INSPECTORATE FOR THE DECLARATION AND AUDIT OF ASSETS AND
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (HIDAACI) 163
11. POLITICAL PARTIES 175
12. MEDIA 186
13. CIVIL SOCIETY 199
14. BUSINESS 208
15. STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES 223
I. INTRODUCTORY INFORMATION
Analysing the strengths and weaknesses of Albania’s institutional design and practice in the fight
against corruption has been a great challenge and responsibility. This first National Integrity System
assessment for the country would not have been possible without the precious cooperation and
assistance of a number of people.
I would like to express my gratitude to all those in public institutions, civil society, and international
organisations who agreed to be interviewed, some of them more than once. While some could not
speak openly, I am honoured that they still decided to offer the insights of their experience and
expertise under conditions of anonymity. I hope to have deserved their trust and made good use of
their contributions.
I am especially grateful to the European Union Delegation, the National Democratic Institute, the
Balkan Investigative Regional Network – Albania, and the non-governmental organisation Res
Publica for all the support they have provided throughout. In particular, I would like to thank Lora
Ujkaj, Ana Kadovic, Dorarta Hyseni, Kristina Voko, Gjergj Erëbara, Besar Likmeta, and Dorian
Matlija for their invaluable time, orientation, and insights.
It is this team I would like to finally express my deep gratitude to Conny Abel, Andrew McDevitt, Julia
Mager, Giulia Sorbi, and Tinatin Ninua. Thank you for your unwavering trust, guidance, patience and
support.
What is best in this assessment I owe to all the named and unnamed contributors above. Its
weaknesses are entirely my own.

Adela Halo
Lead Researcher, National Integrity System (NIS) Albania

2 NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM ASSESSMENT ALBANIA
Interview respondents

Aleksandër Çipa, Chair of the Albanian Union of Journalists, 29 September 20141
Ardian Visha, Lawyer, assisting the ad-hoc parliamentary committee on justice reform, 16 and 24
July 2015
Besar Likmeta, Journalist, BIRN Albania, 21 December 2015 and 16 March 2016
Former civil servant in central administration, 22 December 2015
Civil servant involved in policy making relevant to SOEs, 8 May 2016
David Grise, former OPDAT/US Embassy Officer, 17 July 2015
Dorarta Hyseni, Program Manager, National Democratic Institute, 11 August 2015
Dorian Matlija, Director, Res Publica, 8 April 2015
Eralda Çani, Prime Minister’s Adviser for Public Administration, 23 April 2015
Expert of an international organisation, 25 April 2016
Gent Ibrahimi, Constitutionalist, Anti-corruption and judicial expert, 31 March and 8 April 2015
Gentian Elezi, Expert, 22 March 2016
Gjergj Bojaxhi, former KESH Director and business administrator in the oil sector, 8 April 2016
Gjergj Erëbara, Journalist, BIRN Albania, 21 December 2015 and 16 March 2016.
Gledis Gjipali, Executive Director, European Movement Albania, 1 March 2016
Head of International Organization in Tirana, 21 April 2016
High-ranking official in the Executive, 18 January 2016
Human Rights Activist, 19 February 2016
Igli Totozani, Ombudsman, 25 February 2016
International Expert, 27 October 2015
Judge in Tirana, 23 July 2015
Kathleen Imholz, expert on judiciary, 27 April and 17 July 2015
Laerta Poda, Director, Finance Department of OMJB, 28 July 2015
Luljeta Laze, Head of Office, Management of the Judiciary Budget, 28 July 2015
Luljeta Nano, Secretary General, Supreme Audit Institution, 20 February 2015
Marsida Xhaferllari, Chief Inspector, High Council of Justice, 10 June and 24 July 2015
Mirela Gega, CEC Director of Finance, 6 February 2015
Premto Gogo, Coalition of Domestic Observers, 3 February 2016
Prosecutor in Tirana, 3 November 2015
Public finance expert, 20 November 2015
Remzi Lani, Executive Director, Albanian Media Institute, 14 October 20142
Representative of a trade chamber in Albania, 22 April 2016
Shkëlqim Ganaj, Inspector General, HIDAACI, 12 February and 21 July 2015
Vjollca Meçe, Executive Director, Albanian Helsinki Committee, 18 February 2016

1 This interview was conducted by the previous Lead Researcher on the project, Ervin Karamuço.
2 This interview was conducted by the previous Lead Researcher on the project, Ervin Karamuço.

3 NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM ASSESSMENT ALBANIA
List of Abbreviations

ACA – Albanian Competition Authority
ACFA – Assessment of the Anti-Corruption Framework Albania
ADL – Law on Declaration of Assets
AMA – Audio-visual Media Authority
ART – Albanian Radio Television
ASCS – Agency for the Support of Civil Society
BCC – Ballot Counting Center
BEEPS – Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey
BIRN – Balkan Investigative Reporting Network
CAP – Code of Administrative Procedures
CCEJ – Consultative Council of European Judges
CDO – Coalition of Domestic Observers
CEAZ – Commission of Electoral Administration Zone
CEC – Central Election Commission
COCS – Commissioner for the Oversight of the Civil Service
CoE – Council of Europe
CoM – Council of Ministers
CPC – Criminal Procedure Code
CSL – Civil Servant Law
CSO – Civil Society Organization
DoPA – Department of Public Administration
DP – Democratic Party
EBRD – European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC – European Commission
EMA – European Movement in Albania
EPA – Law on Ethics in Public Administration
ERE – Energy Regulatory Entity
ERRU – Regulatory Entity on Water Supply and Removal and Treatment of Sewage Waters
EU – European Union
FSA – Financial Supervisory Authority
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
GNI – Gross National Income
GRECO – Group of States Against Corruption
HC – High Court
HCJ – High Council of Justice
HIDAACI – High Inspectorate for the Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflict of Interest
HSC – High State Council
ICS – Internal Control Service
IDM – Institute for Democracy and Mediation
IDRA – Institute for Development and Research Alternatives

4 NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM ASSESSMENT ALBANIA
IMF – International Monetary Fund
ISA – International Standards on Audits
JIU – Joint Investigative Unit
LRI – Law on the Right to Information
LSMS – Living Standard Measurement Survey
MDG – Millennium Development Goals
MMB – Media Monitoring Board
MoJ – Ministry of Justice
MP – Member of Parliament
NAC – National Anti-Corruption Coordinator
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC – National Business Center
NBI – National Bureau of Investigation
NDI – National Democratic Institute
NGO – Non Governmental Organization
NIS – National Integrity System
NJC – National Judicial Conference
NLC- National Licensing Center
NPO – Non Profit Organization
NRC – National Registration Center
OAJB – Office for the Administration of the Judiciary Budget
OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OGP – Open Government Partnership
OPG – Office of the Prosecutor General
OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSFA – Open Society Foundation Albania
PACA – Project Against Corruption in Albania
PCI – Law on Prevention of Conflict of Interest
PG – Prosecutor General
PISA – Program for International Student Assessment
PMO – Prime Minister’s Office
PPA – Public Procurement Agency
PPC – Public Procurement Commission
SAI – Supreme Audit Institution
SIAC – Service of Internal Affairs and Complaints
SMEs – Small and Medium Enterprises
SMI – Socialist Movement for Integration
SOE – State Owned Enterprise
SP – Socialist Party
SPD – State Police Directorate
TI – Transparency International

5 NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM ASSESSMENT ALBANIA
UICA – Unit for Internal Control and Anti-Corruption
UN – United Nations
UNDP – United Nations Development Program
VAT – Value Added Tax
VCC – Voting Center Commission

6 NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM ASSESSMENT ALBANIA
II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This National Integrity System (NIS) assessment analyses whether Albania’s state architecture is
designed to operate with and promote integrity, and whether it does so in practice. It offers a
comprehensive diagnosis of the capacities, internal governance and the effectiveness of 15 key
institutions and sectors, or ‘pillars’. The NIS also examines the broader political, social and
economic context in which these pillars operate. In offering this diagnosis, the assessment seeks to
identify priorities for an anti-corruption reform agenda.
Context
Albania’s state architecture rests on political, socio-economic and cultural foundations that only
moderately support integrity. Multi-religious but marked by religious tolerance, and largely
homogeneous in ethnic terms, Albanian society suffers only minor social conflict along these lines. It
is nevertheless characterised by deep distrust, polarisation along party lines, and a struggling
economy with significant levels of informality.
Alongside partisanship, Albanians also display disillusionment with the political system. Political
parties have ranked as the least trusted actors among the public for a number of years now,
indicating serious problems of representation. A large majority of citizens do not see their
representatives in parliament as respected members of their communities. They see politicians as
“out for themselves” and understand political engagement as party engagement. Public opinion of
representatives reflects recent debates on the infiltration and promotion of suspected or convicted
criminals in public office. Citizens consider elite impunity to be pervasive, but display little readiness
to denounce corruption in their workplace. This is most probably related to the low trust in the
Judiciary and Prosecution, due to corruption, cronyism and politicisation.
Levels of civic apathy are high, with very few citizens engaging in social organisations, volunteerism,
or community work. Nevertheless, surveys indicate that Albanians find corrupt practices
objectionable and consider honesty and responsibility to be the primary qualities for public office.
Key findings
The assessment reveals significant gaps and flaws in the legal framework that serve to facilitate –
but do not fully justify – the failures of practice. Problems of legal design are most acute in three
respects: independence, integrity, and political party financing.
Independence
The law rarely guarantees the full independence of institutions meant to check political power.
Overwhelmingly, in a country where the Executive tends to control a majority in Parliament, heads of
independent institutions – constitutional or created by law – are appointed by a parliamentary simple
majority and on the basis of generic criteria. This is the case for the Supreme Audit Institution (SAI),
the Prosecutor General, High and Constitutional Court judges, the Vice Chair of the High Council of
Justice, the Inspector General of the High Inspectorate of the Declaration and Audit of Assets and
Conflict of Interest (HIDAACI), and others. The Ombudsman is the only exception, appointed by a
strong majority of two thirds of Parliament. Even the President – who is also chair of the High
Council of Justice – can be and has been appointed by a simple majority.
This has resulted in clearly political appointments in a number of these institutions, amounting to a
situation where political actors appoint their own ‘supervisors’. Alternative models, where
independence is sought by granting Political Parties a balanced share in appointments – such as in
the case of the Central Election Commission or the Audio-visual Media Authority – have also failed

7 NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM ASSESSMENT ALBANIA
as party politics have disrupted institutions’ functioning and credibility. Such fundamental flaws must
be addressed as a matter of priority, and before institutions’ mandates are expanded, as is expected
with HIDAACI through the new Law on Whistleblowers expected to enter into force soon.
Integrity
The legal framework for conflicts of interest and gifts and hospitality is inadequate, lobbying
regulation is entirely lacking, and post-employment restrictions are only in place for the director of
the State Police. Definitions of basic terms – including conflicts of interest and prohibited gifts – are
convoluted and erroneous, if not self-defeating. Conflicts of interest legislation is both too complex
and fragmented. It is of utmost importance that Albania overhauls its integrity framework through an
ad hoc parliamentary committee grounded in a comprehensive and thorough audit of integrity
systems in the public sector by the Supreme Audit Institution, with the cooperation of HIDAACI and
the Ombudsman.
Political finance
The oversight of political party finances is ineffective, as parties are not required to publish
information on their funds and expenses during electoral campaigns, other publication deadlines are
not clear in law, expenditure thresholds are too high to be relevant, and other rules serve to facilitate
the artificial break-up of funds. This is in addition to a politicised Central Election Commission,
tasked with managing the audits of political party finances.
Combined, these gaps dramatically undermine oversight of political and other entrusted powers.
Politically appointed ‘supervisors’ with significant legal loopholes at hand will not deliver on their
missions of identifying, investigating, prosecuting and sanctioning corruption and malpractice.
Standards and norms
Legal gaps do not fully justify the underperformance revealed by the assessment. For instance,
there is almost no record of conflicts of interest or gifts and hospitality management in Albanian
institutions, even though the law prescribes that registers should be kept for both. The research
team requested evidence from 14 institutions on their conflicts of interest registers, all of which
reported empty records or did not respond at all. While some institutions – such as HIDAACI and the
Ombudsman – claim that they prevent situations when a conflict of interest would need to be
declared, it is hard to reconcile such a claim across the board with widespread perceptions and
anecdotal reports of pervasive corruption and conflicts of interest.
Problems of legal design notwithstanding, the importance of politico-institutional norms conducive to
integrity cannot be understated, or simply replaced by extensive and highly restrictive regulation. It is
hard to imagine that the solution to the massive turnover and overall abysmal independence of the
Police, for example, is the complete removal of the role of the Minister of Interior and Executive, as
law enforcement is a key political responsibility of the government. The same applies to the Public
Sector and the politicisation observed therein. Legal improvements need to be accompanied by
cross-party commitment to instituting meritocracy in these sectors as the foundation of
professionalism.
Thus poor performance in a number of pillars is often attributable to inadequate politico-institutional
will and norms; and examples abound. Parliament’s inquiry committees have never produced
credible results or concrete policy outputs, and its standing committees do not make good use of the
work of oversight institutions to hold the government to account, which affects the ability of these
institutions to effectively fulfil their roles. MPs also underuse mechanisms such as interpellations.
HIDAACI’s full audits have only started to produce results that might be considered more systematic
in the past two years. The Inspectorate of the High Council of Justice also only put the system of the
professional evaluation of judges to the test in the past two years. In both cases – the HIDAACI and
High Council of Justice (HCJ) Inspectorate – institutional performance increased after a change of
leadership, rather than dramatic legal changes.

8 NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM ASSESSMENT ALBANIA