NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS) 20060009469: Evaluation Of Risk And Possible Mitigation Schemes For Previously Unidentified Hazards

1.6 MB·English

by  NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

EVALUATION OF RISK AND POSSIBLE MITIGATION SCHEMES FOR
PREVIOUSLY UNIDENTIFIED HAZARDS
WilliamLinzey,MicahMcCutchan,andMichaelTraskos
LectromechanicalDesignCompany
RichardGilbrech,Ph.D.
NASALangleyResearchCenter
RobertCherney
OrbitalSciencesCorporation
GeorgeSlenski
WrightPattersonAirForceBase
WalterThomasIII
NASAGoddardSpaceFlightCenter
Preface
InApril2004,theNASAEngineeringandSafetyCenter(NESC)wascommissionedbyNASA’s Chief
SafetyandMissionAssurance(S&MA)Officertoreviewandrenderatechnicalopiniononthe
probabilityofacatastrophicfailurerelatedtothisscenario: TheSpaceShuttleProgram(SSP)recognized
azero-fault-tolerantdesignrelatedtoaninadvertentfiringoftheprimaryreactioncontrolsystem(RCS)
jetsontheOrbiterduringmatedoperationswiththeInternationalSpaceStation(ISS). Itwasdetermined
thatanun-commandedfiringofanRCSjetcouldcauseseriousdamageorlossofboththe SSPOrbiter
andtheISS. Severalscenariosweresuggestedinwhichanun-commandedfiringoftheRCSjetis
possible[1]. Thesescenariosincludeanarctrackeventinthe28-voltheatercircuitsthatcouldresultina
wire-to-wireshorttotheadjacentreactioncontroljetwire. Inthisworst-casescenario,enoughcurrent
andpowercouldbeappliedtoactivatethereactioncontroljetvalvesandfireathruster. Thefollowing
reportsummarizestheworkthatwassponsoredbytheNESCaspartoftheirassessmentoftheOrbiter
inadvertentfiringofaRCSthrusterwhileattachedtotheISS[2].
Introduction
Background
Duringthelifecycleofanaircraftorspacecraft,newinformationandperformancedatachange(andeven
invalidate) engineering assumptions that were made during the initial design and development of a
platform. This information can affect many aspects of ownership including the validity of any previous
safetyanalyses.Insomecases,anewfailuremodemaybepostulated,foundtobeasignificantthreat,and
appropriate mitigation techniques developed and deployed to reduce the newly discovered threat to an
acceptable level. Where necessary, laboratory evaluation may be needed to acquire data to evaluate new
risks, solutions, and advance a technical way forward. The development of mitigation techniques to
preventun-commanded firing of the Space Shuttle’s primaryRCSjetsisanexampleofsuchaprocess.
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This report presents the results of arc track testing conducted to determine if such a transfer of power to
un-energized wires is possible and/or likely during anarcingevent,andtoevaluate anarrayof protection
schemes that maysignificantlyreduce the possibilityof such a transfer. The results of these experiments
may be useful for determining the level of protection necessary to guard against spurious voltage and
currentbeingappliedtosafetycriticalcircuits.
It was not the purpose of these experiments to determine the probability of the initiation of an arc track
event ― only if an initiation did occur could it cause the undesired event: an inadvertent thruster firing.
TheprimarywireinsulationusedintheOrbiterisaromatic polyimide, orKapton®, aconstructionknown
to arc track under certain conditions [3]. Previous Boeing testing has shown that arc tracks can initiate in
aromaticpolyimideinsulated28voltsdirectcurrent(VDC)powercircuitsusingmorerealistictechniques
suchaschafingwithanaluminumblade(simulatingthecornerofan avionicsboxorlipofawiretray),or
vibration of an aluminum plate against a wire bundle [4]. Therefore, an arc initiation technique was
chosenthatprovidedareliableandconsistenttechniqueofstartingthearcandnotarealisticsimulationof
a scenario on the vehicle. Once an arc is initiated, the current, power and propagation characteristics of
the arc depend on the power source, wire gauge and insulation type, circuit protection and series
resistance rather than type of initiation. The initiation method employed for these tests was applying an
oilandgraphitemixturetotheendsofapoweredtwistedpairwire.
Theflightconfigurationoftheheatercircuits,thefuel/oxider(orox)wire,andtheRCSjetsolenoidwere
modeledinthetestconfigurationsothatthebehaviorofthesecomponentsduringanarcingeventcould
bestudied.Todetermineifcoilactivationwouldoccurwithvariousprotectionwireschemes,145tests
wereconductedusingvariousfuel/oxwirealternatives(shieldedandunshielded)and/ordifferent
combinationsofpolytetrafuloroethylene(PTFE),Mystik®tapeandconvolutedwrapstoprevent
unwantedcoilactivation.
Testresultswereevaluatedalongwithotherpertinentdataandinformationtodevelopamitigation
strategyforaninadvertentRCSfiring. TheSSPevaluatedcivilianaircraftwiringfailurestosearchfor
agingtrendsinassessingthewire-shorthazard. Appendix2appliesWeibullstatisticalmethodstothe
samedatawithasimilarpurpose.
Experimental Detail
TestSpecimenConfigurationandExperimentalSetup
Twenty-nine different configurations were tested,with five tests per configurationfor a total of 145tests.
All test configurations consisted of heater wires and a set of fuel/ox wires. Heater circuits were made of
twisted pairs and fuel/ox wires were either two twisted pairs, one twisted quad, or two shielded twisted
pairs,as shownin Figure 1. In all tests,the heater circuits and fuel/oxbundles were bundledtogether and
an arc was initiated in the heater wire bundle. The arc was allowed to propagate down the length of the
bundleanddamagetothefuel/oxbundlewasassessed.
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Figure1.Fuel/OxWireOptions
Within the set of 145 tests, there were subtle differences in the bundle configurations depending on the
number of heater circuits, the type of fuel/ox wire, and the materials used to assemble and protect the
bundle.Theseconfigurationsweregroupedintofourdistincttypes,displayedinFigure2.Theapplication
of the protection scheme changed both the size and weight for the fuel/ox bundles. Each protection
scheme had a unique impact on the size and weight of the wire bundle. The range of possible
configurationsisshowninFigure3.
Thetypeoffuel/oxwire,protectionschemes,andcircuitprotectionforeachgroupoffivetestsare
summarizedinTable1.EachprotectionschemewasappliedaccordingtoBoeingOrbiterwireharness
assemblyandinstallationspecificationsML0303-0013DandML0303-0014N. Adescriptionofthe
twelvedifferentprotectionschemesevaluatedisprovidedinAppendix1.
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Configuration1:1PowerCircuit Configuration1:3PowerCircuits
Fuel/OxWires:TwistedQuad
Fuel/OxWires:TwistedQuad
NoProtectiveOverwrap NoProtectiveOverwrap
OX OX OX
28VDC 28VDC
COIL COIL RTN
Lacing GND FUEL OX GND FUEL FUEL GND
Cord RTN COIL RTN RTN COIL RTN RTN
Lacing
FUEL
Cord 28VDC GND 28VDC
RTN
RTN
Configuration2:3PowerCircuits
Fuel/OxWires:2ShieldedTwistedPair OX OX
NoProtectiveOverWrap Lacing COIL RTN Shield
Cord
FUEL FUEL
COIL RTN
28VDC
GND GND
28VDC
RTN RTN
28VDC GND
RTN
Configuration3:3PowerCircuits
Fuel/OxWires:2ShieldedTwistedPair OX OX
1or2LayersofProtectiveOverwrap COIL RTN Shield
Lacing
Cord
FUEL FUEL
COIL RTN
28VDC
GND GND
28VDC
RTN RTN
1or2Layers
ofProtective
28VDC GND Overwrap
RTN
Configuration4:3PowerCircuits
Fuel/OxWires:2Twistedpair
Lacing OX OX
1or2LayersofProtectiveOverwrap
Cord COIL RTN
FUEL FUEL
COIL RTN
28VDC
GND GND
28VDC
RTN RTN
1or2Layers
ofProtective
28VDC GND Overwrap
RTN
Figure2. Cross-sectionofProtectionSchemesandHeaterWireCircuits
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Shielded 1Layer 1Layer 1Layer 2Layers 2Layers 2Layers
TwistedPair PTFEWrap Mystik Convolute PTFEWrap Mystik Convolute
NoProtection (3wraps)
Figure3.CompositePhotoofVariousProtectionConfigurations
Table1.TestConfigurationsEvaluated
ProtectionSchemes
Circuit
Harness #Heater
Test# Fuel/OxWire Protection
Config# Circuits 1stLayer 2ndLayer
(fuserating)
(Bottom) (Top)
N2641-5 1 1 TwistQuad NA NA 15A
N2646-10 1 3 TwistQuad NA NA 15A
N26411-15 2 3 2Sh/Tw/Pair NA NA 15A
N26416-20 3 3 2Sh/Tw/Pair PTFEWrap None 15A
N26421-25 3 3 2Sh/Tw/Pair Mystik None 15A
N26426-30 3 3 2Sh/Tw/Pair Convolute None 15A
N26431-35 3 3 2Sh/Tw/Pair PTFEWrap PTFEWrap 15A
N26436-40 3 3 2Sh/Tw/Pair PTFEWrap Mystik 15A
N26441-45 3 3 2Sh/Tw/Pair PTFEWrap Convolute 15A
N26446-50 3 3 2Sh/Tw/Pair Mystik PTFEWrap 15A
N26451-55 3 3 2Sh/Tw/Pair Mystik Mystik 15A
N26456-60 3 3 2Sh/Tw/Pair Mystik Convolute 15A
N26461-65 3 3 2Sh/Tw/Pair Convolute PTFEWrap 15A
N26466-70 3 3 2Sh/Tw/Pair Convolute Mystik 15A
N26471-75 3 3 2Sh/Tw/Pair Convolute Convolute 15A
N26476-80 4 3 2Tw/Pair PTFEWrap None 15A
N26481-85 4 3 2Tw/Pair Mystik None 15A
N26486-90 4 3 2Tw/Pair Convolute None 15A
N26491-95 4 3 2Tw/Pair PTFEWrap PTFEWrap 15A
N26496-100 4 3 2Tw/Pair PTFEWrap Mystik 15A
N264101-105 4 3 2Tw/Pair PTFEWrap Convolute 15A
N264106-110 4 3 2Tw/Pair Mystik PTFEWrap 15A
N264111-115 4 3 2Tw/Pair Mystik Mystik 15A
N264116-120 4 3 2Tw/Pair Mystik Convolute 15A
N264121-125 4 3 2Tw/Pair Convolute PTFEWrap 15A
N264126-130 4 3 2Tw/Pair Convolute Mystik 15A
N264131-135 4 3 2Tw/Pair Convolute Convolute 15A
N264136-140 1 1 TwistQuad NA NA 10A
N264141-145 1 3 TwistQuad NA NA 10A
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Eachofthefourharnessconfigurations,displayedinFigures4athrough4d,requiredaslightlydifferent
experimentalsetup.Differentialvoltageprobesandcurrentshuntsareincludedatappropriatelocationsin
thecircuitstocaptureusefulinformationduringthearcingevent(Figures4athrough4d).Datawere
collectedonaNicoletVisionDataloggerat1kilosample(KS)/sec.
Oil/Graphite
Mixture
Voltage
PowerOn 15AmpFuse 25'of20awg Measurement
CurrentShunt twistedpair HeaterWire Fuel/Ox
Valves
28VDC Bundle Accelerometers
VMoelatasugerement VMoelatasugerement Coils
Fuel/OxWire CurrentShunt
CurrentShunt
CurrentShunt
Ch
Amp
Ch
Amp
Figure4a.HarnessConfiguration1:1HeaterCircuit,Fuel/Ox=UnshieldedTwistedQuad
Harness configuration 1 (Figure 4a) was the simplest configuration, with only one heater circuit. This
configuration was used in Tests 1 through 5 with unprotected twisted quad for the fuel/ox wires. This
setupcorrespondstotheconfigurationthatexistsinsomelocationsontheOrbiter.
Fuel/Ox:1TwistedQuad
Oil/Graphite
15Amp 25'of20AWG Mixture
Fuses(3) Ch2 TwistedPair Bundle
Ch3
Ch1 Ch4 Ch10 Ch11 Fuel/Ox
Valves
Ch15 Ch12 Ch13
Accelerometers
Ch16 s
Ch7 oil
Ch5 C
Ch6
Ch8 Charge
Amp
Ch9 CAhmaprge
Figure4b.HarnessConfiguration1:3HeaterCircuits,Fuel/Ox=UnshieldedTwistedQuad
Harness configuration 1 with three heater circuits (Figure 4b) was used in Tests 5 through 10 for the
unprotected twisted quad. This series of tests represents the configuration that presently exists in some
locations on the Orbiter. Tests performed in this group determined whether the present Orbiter
configuration would allow enough voltage and current to be transferred to the fuel/ox wires to cause coil
activation.
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Fuel/Ox:2ShieldedTwistedPairs
Oil/Graphite
15Amp 25'of20AWG Mixture
Fuses(3) Ch2 TwistedPair Bundle
Ch3
Ch4 Ch10 Ch11
Ch1 Fuel/Ox
Valves
Ch15 Ch12 Ch13
Accelerometers
Ch16 s
Ch7 oil
Ch5 C
Fuel/OxProtection
Ch14
Ch6
Ch8 CAhmaprge
Ch9 Charge
Amp
Figure4c. HarnessConfigurations2and3:3HeaterCircuits,Fuel/Ox=ShieldedTwistedPair
Harness configurations 2 and 3, with three heater circuits (Figure 4c), were used in Tests 11 through 75.
This series of tests used two twisted shielded pairs for the fuel/ox wires, and included five tests for each
of the protection schemes identified in Table 2. Note that the purple box highlights the fuel/ox wires. It
should berecognizedthat eachtwistedshieldedpairhad itsownmetalshieldandthat oneshielddoes not
protectbothtwistedpairsoffuel/oxwire(seeFigures1and2).
Configuration4
Fuel/Ox:2TwistedPairs
Oil/Graphite
Mixture
15Amp
Fuses(3) Ch2 Ch3 Bundle
Ch4 Ch10 Ch11
Ch1
Ch15 Ch12 Ch13
Ch16
Ch5 Ch7 Coils
Ch6
Fuel/OxProtection
Ch8 Ch
Amp
Ch9 CAhmp
Figure4d. HarnessConfiguration4:3HeaterCircuits,Fuel/Ox=2UnshieldedTwistedPairs
Harness configuration4(Figure 4d) wasusedinTests76through145.This configuration was essentially
the same as configurations 2 and 3, with unshielded twisted pairs replacing the shielded twisted pairs for
thefuel/oxwires. Thistestseriesincludedfivespecimensforeachoftheprotectionschemesidentifiedin
Table1.
Heatercircuitswererepresentedinthetestconfigurations,buttheactualheaterswerenot.OntheOrbiter,
theheaterswitchingislocatedinthefuel/oxvalveassembly.Therefore,evenwhentheheatersareoff,the
heaterwiresareenergizeduptotheswitchatthevalve.Inthisseriesofteststheheatersweresimulatedin
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the “off” position (open circuit). If the heaters had been included in the test circuit the heaters would have
been in parallel with the arc. There would have been little effect on the arc except that the additional
heatercurrentwouldcausethecircuitprotectiontotripearlierlimitingthedamage.
The 25 feet of 20 American Wire Gage (AWG) (Figures 4a through 4d) wire was used to simulate an
event that may occur away from the power bus ― this represents the configuration on the Orbiter. The
resistanceofthe25feetofwire(~0.25ohmsinboththefeederandreturn)limitsthepowerinthearc,but
also slows the speed that the arc travels and increases the time before the circuit protection (fuse) opens.
The later two of these factors tend to increase the collateral damage caused by the arc. While the
additional resistance of the 25 feet of wire tends to stabilize the arc, too much resistance (wire) inhibits
thearc.
Research into fuel/ox circuits indicated that the aft thrusters are protected, such that “a steady state load
current of 15 amperes (amp) shall cause the fusible link to open” (Rockwell Procurement Specification
MC477-0263, paragraph 3.4.5). Therefore, the 15 amp fuse was conservative since at this value, the
current would not cause the fuse to open. However, without more detailed information, the more
conservative protection was used. The forward reaction jet driver (RJD) uses smaller fuses. Therefore,
additionaltestsusingharnessconfiguration1specimenswereperformedusing10 ampfusesasprotection
fortheheatercircuits.
TestProcedure
After all preliminary checks were performed, the heater circuits were energized and the oil/graphite
mixture was used to initiate the arc. The arc was allowed to propagate the length of the sample. The arc
event tripped the circuit protection, self–extinguished the arc, or stopped when it reached the end of the
sample. After the power was turned off, the specimen was removed from the testing chamber and all test
information was recorded. A visual inspection of the sample gave preliminary indications of the
effectivenessoftheprotectionscheme.Foreachsample,wetdielectricvoltagewithstand(DVW)testwas
used to determine if the insulation of the fuel/ox wires was actually compromised. Figure 5 is a still shot
(capturedfromvideo)ofTestN264-008inprogress.
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Figure5. TestN264-008InProgress
Theopeningofthefuel/oxvalvewasdetectedinthreeways:
1. Audibleclickingsoundofvalvesolenoids.
2. Accelerometermeasurements.
3. Coil voltage and current measurements indicating that the coil was at or above the operational
threshold.
Damagetothespecimenandfuel/oxwirewasdeterminedinthefollowingways:
1. Coilvoltageandcurrentmeasurements(includingshieldcurrentmeasurements).
2. Fuel/oxwiredamage(visualandwetDVWtest).
3. Breachofprotectionlayers(visualexamination).
Results
Table 2 summarizes test results with identical harness configuration, protection scheme, and circuit
protectiongroupedtogether.
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Table2.TestResultsSummaryGroupedbyExperimentalConditions
ProtectionSchemes Circuit AudibleClick, MaxCoil Damageto BreachofAll
Harness #Heater Accelero-
Test# Fuel/OxWire Protection Valve Volt/Current Fuel/Ox Protection
Config# Circuits 1stLayer 2ndLayer meterActivity
(fuserating) Opened Reading Wires Layers
(Bottom) (Top)
N2641-5 1 1 TwistQuad NA NA 15A 5/5 Yes 24V/2.1A Yes NA
N2646-10 1 3 TwistQuad NA NA 15A 4/5 Yes 23V/2.0A Yes NA
N264136-140 1 1 TwistQuad NA NA 10A 2/5 Yes 24.8V/2.1A Yes NA
N264141-145 1 3 TwistQuad NA NA 10A 0/5 No 3.5V/0.1A Yes NA
N26411-15 2 3 2Sh/Tw/Pair NA NA 15A 0/5 No 2.2V/0.2A Yes NA
N26416-20 3 3 2Sh/Tw/Pair PTFEWrap None 15A 0/5 No <1V Slight 4/5
N26421-25 3 3 2Sh/Tw/Pair Mystik None 15A 0/5 No <1V Slight* 2/5*
N26426-30 3 3 2Sh/Tw/Pair Convolute None 15A 0/5 No <1V No 2/5
N26431-35 3 3 2Sh/Tw/Pair PTFEWrap PTFEWrap 15A 0/5 No <1V No 0/5
N26436-40 3 3 2Sh/Tw/Pair PTFEWrap Mystik 15A 0/5 No <1V No 0/5
N26441-45 3 3 2Sh/Tw/Pair PTFEWrap Convolute 15A 0/5 No <1V No 0/5
N26446-50 3 3 2Sh/Tw/Pair Mystik PTFEWrap 15A 0/5 No <1V No 1/5
N26451-55 3 3 2Sh/Tw/Pair Mystik Mystik 15A 0/5 No <1V No 0/5
N26456-60 3 3 2Sh/Tw/Pair Mystik Convolute 15A 0/5 No <1V No 0/5
N26461-65 3 3 2Sh/Tw/Pair Convolute PTFEWrap 15A 0/5 No <1V No 0/5
N26466-70 3 3 2Sh/Tw/Pair Convolute Mystik 15A 0/5 No <1V No 0/5
N26471-75 3 3 2Sh/Tw/Pair Convolute Convolute 15A 0/5 No <1V No 0/5
N26476-80 4 3 2Tw/Pair PTFEWrap None 15A 0/5 No <1V Yes 4/5
N26481-85 4 3 2Tw/Pair Mystik None 15A 0/5 No <1V Slight 3/5
N26486-90 4 3 2Tw/Pair Convolute None 15A 0/5 No <1V No 1/5
N26491-95 4 3 2Tw/Pair PTFEWrap PTFEWrap 15A 0/5 No <1V No 0/5
N26496-100 4 3 2Tw/Pair PTFEWrap Mystik 15A 0/5 No <1V No 1/5
N264101-105 4 3 2Tw/Pair PTFEWrap Convolute 15A 0/5 No <1V No 0/5
N264106-110 4 3 2Tw/Pair Mystik PTFEWrap 15A 0/5** No** <1V** No 0/5
N264111-115 4 3 2Tw/Pair Mystik Mystik 15A 0/5 No <1V No 0/5
N264116-120 4 3 2Tw/Pair Mystik Convolute 15A 0/5 No <1V No 0/5
N264121-125 4 3 2Tw/Pair Convolute PTFEWrap 15A 0/5 No <1V No 0/5
N264126-130 4 3 2Tw/Pair Convolute Mystik 15A 0/5 No <1V No 0/5
N264131-135 4 3 2Tw/Pair Convolute Convolute 15A 0/5 No <1V No 0/5
* Specimen N264 – 021 had only 1 wrap of Mystik Tape instead of 3 called for in ML 0303-0014. This shield for this specimen failed the
DVWwheretheshieldfortheother4specimeninthisconfigurationdidnot.
** Specimen N264 – 106: movement of sample during arc caused Fuel/Ox valve clip lead to touch the heater terminal block and the
valveopened.Howeverthiswasnotduetoarcingdamageorpowertransferredbythearc.Note:Theprotectionlayerswerenotfully
breached.
Thebackgroundcoloroftherowssignifiesthepossibilityofanarctrackeventcausingthefuel/oxvalve
toopenorcauseddamagetothefuel/oxwireaccordingtothefollowing:
• Red: It is likely that the fuel/ox valve would open due to an arc track event. This would
notbeanunexpectedeventshouldanarctrackoccur.
• Yellow: It is unlikely that the fuel/ox valve would open due to an arc track event;
however,significantdamagetothefuel/oxwirescouldbeexpected.
• Green:Itisveryunlikelythatthe fuel/oxvalvewouldopenduetoanarctrackevent.Itis
alsounlikelythatsignificantdamagetothefuel/oxwirescouldbeexpected.
Theresultscolumnsprovidethefollowinginformation:
Audible Click,Valve Opened: Whenthe fuel/ox valve openedandclosed, a clickingsoundcouldeasily
be heard. This column records the number of tests in each group of 5 in which the valve opening/closing
washeard.
Accelerometer Activity: The accelerometers, placed on the valve solenoids, were used to “listen” for
valvemovement.Theaccelerometerrecordsifmovementwasdetectedforanytestinthegroupof5.
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