NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS) 20040161559: Small Satellites and the DARPA/Air Force Falcon Program

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by  NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

IAC-CIAA.4.11.5
SMALL SATELLITES AND THE DARPNAIR FORCE FALCON PROGRAM
David J. Weeks
Technical Assistant, Exploration and Development Office
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama
[email protected]
Steven H. Walker
Program Manager, FALCON Program
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Arlington, Virginia
walker @darDa.mil
Robert L. Sackheim
Assistant Director and Chief Engineer for Propulsion
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama
bobsackheim @ nasa.gov
ABSTRACT
The FALCON ((Force Application and Launch from CONUS) program is a
technology demonstration effort with three major components: a Small Launch
Vehicle (SLV), a Common Aero Vehicle (CAV), and a Hypersonic Cruise
Vehicle (HCV). Sponsored by DARPA and executed jointly by the United States
Air Force and DARPA with NASA participation, the objectives are to develop
and demonstrate technologies that will enable both near-term and far-term
capability to execute time-critical, global reach missions. The focus of this paper
is on the SLV as it relates to small satellites and the implications of lower cost to
orbit for small satellites. The target recurring cost for placing 1000 pounds
payloads into a circular reference orbit of 28.5 degrees at 100 nautical miles is
$5,000,000 per launch. This includes range costs but not the payload or payload
integration costs. In addition to the nominal 1000 pounds to LEO, FALCON is
seeking delivery of a range of orbital payloads from 220 pounds to 2200 pounds
to the reference orbit. Once placed on ‘alert’ status, the SLV must be capable of
launch within 24 hours.
FULL TEXT
INTRODUCTION payload into low earth orbit (LEO), or
release a suborbital common aero
In 2003, the Defense Advanced vehicle (CAV). Twenty-four proposals
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) were submitted by industry in response.
announced a new joint program with the In December of that year, nine contracts
United States Air Force called Force were initiated for six month studies to
Application and Launch from CONUS Air Launch LLC, Andrews Space,
(FALCON). The program goal is to Exquadnun, KT Engineering, Lockheed
develop and validate, in-flight, the Martin, Microcosm, Orbital Science,
technologies that will demonstrate Schafer, and SpaceX.
affordable and responsive spacelift as
well as enable the capability to promptly In May of 2004, DARPA released a
execute time-critical global reach solicitation for Phase 2 SLV activities to
missions. The program seeks a common include detailed vehicle design,
set of technologies that can be evolved development, test, and flight. A full and
to provide circa 2010 responsive global open competition was conducted with
reach capability from the continental proposals received by the nine Task 1
United States while enabling future contractors plus several other aerospace
development of a reusable Hypersonic firms. Phase 2 is currently still in source
Cruise Vehicle (HCV) circa 2025. selection with multiple contractor
These technologies will be advanced in awards likely in September 2004. The
their technology readiness levels to Phase 2 period of performance is 35
flight readiness and then integrated into months, culminating in a demonstration
a system design and flown in a series of spacelift flight.
flight tests. 1
SPACELIFT REQUIREMENTS
While the global reach capability
focuses on the Common Aero Vehicle The SLV must be able to launch a small
(CAV) and the HCV, a low-cost satellite or other payload weighing
responsive Small Launch Vehicle (SLV) approximately 1,000 pounds to a
is needed to launch and carry the CAV Reference Orbit which is defined as a
to the proper release conditions as well circular, 100 nautical miles altitude, due
as to provide responsive spacelift. The east, launched from 28.5 degrees north
CAV will be an unpowered yet latitude. A program desire is to
maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicle. demonstrate flexibility in placing
This paper will focus on the SLV and payloads ranging from 220 pounds to
specifically the spacelift mission for 2,200 pounds into the same Reference
small satellites. Orbit. An orbital insertion accuracy of
plus/minus 13.5 nautical miles must be
A Phase I solicitation for concept achieved. Each launch should have a
designs was released in May of 2003 for recurring cost of no more than five
a small launch vehicle that could insert a million dollars (US in CY03$),
2
including range costs but excluding the ranged from two staged vehicles with
costs of the payload and payload less than 75 feet height to well over 100
integration. The cost basis for the feet and 1 million pounds GLOW (gross
recurring cost objective is twenty lift off weight). Design emphases
launches per year for ten years. Ideally, included innovative practices for
the vehicle used for spacelift could also lowering manufacturing and vehicle
be used with few modifications for CAV assembly costs, incorporating new
launches. technology to solve classic vehicle cost
and reliability issues, and using existing
PHASE 1 RESULTS hardware in new ways. A number of
concepts also included streamlined
The Phase I concepts involved an range operations, encapsulated payloads
assortment of air launch and ground and/or vehicle scalability for larger
launch systems with solid, liquid, and payloads in the future.
hybrid propulsion systems. Liquid
propulsion systems included pressure- PHASE I1 BEGINNINGS AND
fed and pump-fed systems. Air launch SCHEDULE
enables mission flexibility with respect
to the typical launch ranges, but is
limited in evolutionary growth potential.
Ground launch must deal with weather
conditions and azimuth limitations
imposed by the launch site location.
Fig. 2: FALCON PROGRAM
’
SCHEDULE
Fig. 1: REPRESENTATIVE PHASE I
CONCEPTS
Figure 2 above shows the program
Each conceptual design had associated schedule, indicating that the SLV space
trade studies in balancing affordable cost lift demonstration launch will be
objectives with sufficient vehicle conducted no later than FY07. It is
performance and operational conceivable that a SLV will also be used
responsiveness. Contractors were urged for the CAV demonstration launch
to interact directly with various launch around the end of FY06. The SLV task
ranges in the United States to understand is referred to as Task 1 while the
range requirements and to drive down CAV/HCV task is called out as Task 2.
range costs for future launch vehicles. Multiple contractor teams will be carried
The driver for each design was the low from contract award though Preliminary
recurring cost per launch goal of five Design Review (PDR) before down
million dollars or less. Vehicle concepts
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selection occurs to carry one or two including the contracting officer’s
teams to flight demonstration. technical representative (COTR) for
each SLV contract.. An outer ring of
FALCON PROGRAM APPROACH specialists will be called upon as needed
for turbomachinery, cost analysis and
The FALCON Program team is led by performance, separation systems,
Dr. Steven Walker as the program structures, specific range issues, etc.
manager in the Tactical Technology
Office at DARPA. His deputy is Major CURRENT PLIGHT OF SPACE
John Anttonen of the U.S. Air Force TRANSPORTATION AND
Space and Missile Center. The chief SATELLITE IIWUSTRIES
engineer is Jess Sponable of the Air
Force Research Laboratory in Dayton, The global satellite launch rate has
Ohio. The SLV technical team is led by remained fairly constant for the last
David Weeks at the National couple of decades with the exception of
Aeronautics and Space Administration’s the late 1990s when the communication
Marshall Space Flight Center satellite constellations were launched.
(NASAMSFC). NASA is a partner to Typically, with the exception of the
DARPA and the Air Force on the constellation campaign, the launch rate
FALCON program and is supplying has averaged about 100 plus/minus 20
personnel, funding, and in-kind launches per year. The U.S. portion
i
contributions. over this period has averaged 40
plus/minus 20 launches per year. The
The approach taken by the FALCON situation is not expected to change
team is to emphasize product (hardware) significantly in the foreseeable future
d eve1o pmen t over pro ce ss and even with new NASA exploration goals.
-pap-er work, to work in small government
management teams, to employ early The United States has lost significant
communications (no surprises), commercial launch share in the global
appropriate division of labor, and market in recent years. The U.S. launch
remembering that integrity is everything. market has remained even barely viable
The SLV Government technical team due to U.S. Government payloads.
will have approximately eight core
members consisting of personnel from Available U.S. small launch vehicles
the Air Force Research Laboratory at have been limited and expensive. The
Kirtland Air Force Base (AFB) and U.S. Government is by far the primary
Edwards AFB, NASA (Wallops Flight customer but finds itself only able to
Facility and MSFC), The Aerospace afford a limited number of launches per
Corporation, and at Centra Technology year. Flying as a secondary payload or
(a System Engineering and Technical ‘ridesharing’ is often unsatisfactory,
-
Assistance SETA support contractor resulting in many payloads going into
for DARPA). Personnel on the core storage instead of going to orbit.
team represent specialties in project
management, propulsion systems, Microgravity research has long used
vehicle integration, range support, sounding rockets to obtain up to 20
avionics, concepts of operations, and minutes of low-g environment. The next
user support from the Air Force Space logical step is using small launch
Command headquarters as well as vehicles for days or weeks of
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microgravity but the launch vehicle cost
has been too high.
Fig. 5: SMALL SATELLITE SHARE
OF ALL SATELLITES GLOBALLY
Fig. 3: SMALL SATELLITES SHARE
OF ALL SATELLITES GLOBALLY
Figure 3 indicates from 1984-2002 that
small satellites internationally comprise
21 percent of the satellite market when
the communication satellite
constellations of the 1990s (Orbcomm,
Iridium, Globalstar) are removed.
Fig. 6: U.S. SHARE OF GLOBAL
Figure 4 shows that the U.S. share of the
SMALL SATELLITE MARKET
worldwide satellite market is 26 percent.
Figure 5 reveals that the U.S. has only a
While the global satellite market has
29 percent share of the worldwide small
satellite market. Within the US., Figure shrunk over the past decade or two, the
US. has suffered an even greater decline
6 discloses that within the U.S., small
during this period. Low cost small
satellites contribute only 7 percent of
launch vehicles could greatly propel the
national satellites.
number of small satellite launches in the
US. and abroad.
IMPLICATIONS OF LOW COST
SMALL LAUNCH VEHICLES
Small satellite missions have several
major components that drive mission
cost including the following:
satellite design, development and test
launch vehicle
Fig. 4: U.S. SHARE OF GLOBAL
SATELLITE MARKET
launch range and telemetry
. ,
mission assurance being barely tolerated by the primary
payload entities.
satellite integration with launch vehicle
If the flyaway launch cost can be
on-orbit checkout of satellite reduced to the $5,000,000 to
$10,000,000 range including range,
on-orbit operations of satellite payload integration and mission
assurance costs, new possibilities arise.
satellite disposal Instead of designing the small satellite
for a five to ten year life on-orbit, it may
For small satellites, the cost of the be affordable to design the satellite for a
launch vehicle is a primary driver. Cost three-year life. This in turn drives lower
of access to space has been a major radiation hardening requirements, allows
barrier for many potential space more frequent technology updating, and
applications, historically at encourages greater automated on-orbit
approximately $10,000 per pound of operations (including on-orbit checkout)
payload. For small satellite missions, a to further drive down mission cost.
more appropriate metric is perhaps cost
per mission rather than cost per pound.
Though small satellites (for purposes of NASA Small Sat Mission Costs I
!
this paper, small satellites are considered
to be less than 500 kilograms) often cost
less than $5,000,000 to design, develop,
and test - a ride to orbit for $5,000,000
has been non-existent.
There are several major issues involving
Fig. 7: NASA SMALL SATELLITE
small satellite launches today, including:
MISSION BREAKDOWN
Though small satellites are often in the
Figure 7 assumes a $10,000,000 small
$500,000 - $10,000,000 cost range, the
satellite of 500 kilograms (1 100 pounds)
launch vehicle flyaway costs are usually
on a NASA Pegasus with a vehicle
above the $20,000,000-$30,000,000
flyaway cost of $30,000,000, a cost of
range. This makes insuring the satellite
$2,000,000 for payload integration,
difficult as well as justifying the satellite
$2,000,000 for range and
launch. Thus many small satellites are
telemetryhracking, a maximum of
never launched and many more are
$1,000,000 for on-orbit checkout over
never carried beyond the conceptual
30 to 90 days, and up to $5,000,000 for
level because the designers realize that
on-orbit operations for up to five years
the economics are not justifiable.
including satellite disposal. Launch
vehicle costs include mission assurance
‘Ridesharing’ or ‘piggybacking’ as a
activities as well as other reporting
secondary payload is less expensive but
required by the Government. The
the small satellite is relegated to steerage
launch vehicle cost of $30,000,000
class, flying when the primary payload
represents 60% of the mission cost and
wants to fly, where the primmy payload
is the primary cost driver.
wants to fly, and often putting up with
The Delta I1 is a larger launch vehicle The Titan I11 recurring cost of launch vehicle
carrying larger payloads even to hardware as shown in Figure 10 is well above
geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO) 60 percent (82 percent) and the Titan IV
and beyond. The cost breakdown for a recurring cost breakdown in Figure 11 indicates
Delta 7925 is comparable to that for a the hardware costing 59 percent for each flight.
small satellite mission as shown in
Figure 8 below:
-
Titan III Recurring Cost
17.5 5%
Fig. 10: Titan In Recurring Cost Breakdown
4
Fig. 8: Recurring Cost of Delta 7925 Launch
‘ Titan IV - Recurring Cost
Vehicle
Total Cost
The Atlas-Centaur recurring cost as shown
below in Figure 9 also indicates hardware cost
of greater than 60 percent (66 percent).
-
Total Cost
8%
21u
Fig. 11: Titan IV Recurring Cost
Breakdown
Overall, one observes that roughly 60 to 80
percent of the launch vehicle cost is in the
vehicle hardware for an expendable launch
vehicle (ELV). If the launch is commercial, the
hardware portion is closer to 60 percent while
L..
government launches move the hardware closer
to 80 percent of the total cost. Hardware cost
remains the top candidate for significant overall
Fig. 9: Recurring Cost of Atlas-Centaur
‘ cost reduction.
Launch Vehicle
7
. ..
DRIVING DOWN LAUNCH VEHICLE Commonality leads to common building block
COSTS (modular) approaches as well as to increased
production rates. Greater non-aerospace
Launch costs have several elements: launch commercial products and processes are being
vehicle, launch vehicle processing including utilized. Sometimes these parts are heavier but
payload integration, launch operations including cost one to two orders of magnitude less. Cost
range, tracking, and telemetry, is prized above performance (design margins
are traded against greater performance and low
Launch vehicles in their early design often weight). This may translate to heavier but more
appear headed toward low cost but eventually robust vehicles that have much lower recurring
the flyaway cost may rise to as much as costs. Design margins traded against redundant
$30,000,000 or more. One lesson learned from systems reduce complexity and cost and
the United States Air Force EELV program was potentially increase reliability. In some designs
that having launch vehicle competition could expensive pump-fed propulsion systems and/or
drive down cost by 25 percent. The Pegasus high performance upper stages can be avoided.
began as an $8,000,000 DARPA launch vehicle The Former Soviet Union countries have long
but today routinely costs approximately demonstrated lower cost, less redundant launch
$30,000,000 to launch. There are several vehicles that are produced via assembly line and
reasons for this but until now, lack of designed to ship and launch with automated
competition has been a significant reason in the launch pad operations. The first stage of a
free market for launching small satellites. smaller launch vehicle might be the second
stage of the next larger sized vehicle.
There is also credence to the argument that Recoverable first stages that are reusable might
neither the government nor industry has been be more economical than expendable first
strongly motivated to develop a low-cost small stages. Air launches can have low recurring
launch vehicle. Industry realizes far greater costs if the launch vehicles fit into ejectable
profits on larger launch vehicles and the canisters inside the aircraft without requiring
government by and large has been more any aircraft modifications.
comfortable dealing with larger launch vehicles.
Affordable small launch vehicles constitute a
great target opportunity for demonstrating lower APPLICABILITY TO LARGER LAUNCH
recurring costs for launch vehicles. They are VEHICLES
less expensive than larger vehicles, have
potentially more users allowing far greater Figure 12 below portrays what can occur as a
numbers of small satellites to be flown, provide result of lowering the cost of small launch
affordable technology demonstrations for vehicles. If the recurring cost of a small launch
universities, have the potential to change the vehicle capable of carrying 1,000 pounds
small satellite mission life cycle cost by payload to low earth orbit (LEO), more small
changing the paradigm, have the potential to satellites may be developed and launched.
influence lower recurring costs for larger launch Universities might go together to launch four or
vehicles and provide a mechanism for hands on more payloads to LEO on a SLV costing
training for engineers and engineering students. $5,000,000 to $7,000,000 per launch. An
affordable ride exists for various segments of
So how can the small launch vehicles be made the Government, academia, the amateur radio
more affordable? In addition to introducing community (OSCAR), and other civil space,
serious competition in the field, commonality which may drive the SLV launch and
and simplicity of systems is being emphasized. production rate. Now the lower cost for access
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to space encourages even greater small satellite SUMMARY
development. Small satellites can then be made
as “throwaways” for a two to three year life on With the exception of the constellation
orbit allowing for more frequent technology communications satellites in the late
updating and pushing automated on-orbit 199Os, the worldwide annual launch rate
checkout and operations even further. Ranges has been stagnant. Unless one is
begin to compete for the higher volume of SLV flexible enough to deal with rideshare
launches and certify the use of space-based issues, launch vehicles are currently too
assets (GPS, next generation communication expensive for small satellites. As the
satellites) for range safety (GPS/INS with launch market increases, the mission
autonomous flight termination system) and costs will decrease.
telemetry/tracking. The greater volume allows
for steeper discounting of SLV costs. As more A new paradigm is needed to stimulate
small satellites are launched, the SLV cost the production of small satellites, which
decreases somewhat further. Using the can have a significant impact on the
approaches and lessons learned from the small overall global satellite market. The high
satellite space lift vehicles, a new spiral is cost of space access drives total satellite
developed for the 10,000-pound payload space mission cost, inhibits development of
lift vehicle. Some of these approaches are aerospace initiatives, prevents many
conducive to heavy lift launch vehicles in the innovative small low-cost satellites from
40-50 metric ton payload class, which could being developed, stifles growth in the
support exploration missions to the lunar and aerospace industry, and reduces
Martian surfaces. Eventually, one can even opportunities for engineering jobs and
lower the cost of all launch vehicles, including hands on experience.
reusable launch vehicles (RLVs), by applying
the modular building block approaches used in The proposed solution is a new low-cost
expendable launch vehicles (ELVs). All the small launch vehicle that utilizes a
while, the aerospace economy is stimulated, higher modular rack and stack approach
resulting in new jobs and greatly desirable and can be scaled to mid- and even
hands-on experience for its workforce. heavy-lift vehicle development. A new
small satellite launcher can serve as a
Compound Benefits of Stimulating the Small technology test bed to retire technology
Sat/Low Cost SLV Market risks for larger launchers and can
stimulate development and qualification
of new technologies for space.
The FALCON program offers an
excellent opportunity to develop such a
paradigm-changing small satellite
launch vehicle. NASA has opted to
partner with DARPA and the U.S. Air
Force to help make space access more
affordable.
Fig. 12: Benefit Cycle from Lowering Small
Launch Vehicle Cost
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. DARPA, FALCON (Force
Application and Launch from
CONUS) Technology
Demonstration Program Fact Sheet.
November 2003.
2. FALCON, Phase 11, Task 1 Program
Solicitation 04-05, DARPA TTO.
httD:l/www.darpa. rn i I/bm lttto May 7,
2004.
3. “Small Satellites Home Page”,
Surrey Space Center.
hm: ’/\wm.smalIsateIIites.orp February
2004.
4. Sackheim, Robert L., David J.
Weeks, J0hn.R. London. “The
Future for Small Low Cost Launch
Vehicles” presentation. December
18,2003.