Motivational Internalism (Oxford Moral Theory) PDF
Preview Motivational Internalism (Oxford Moral Theory)
Motivational Internalism OXFORD MORAL THEORY Series Editor David Copp, University of California, Davis Drawing Morals Essays in Ethical Theory Thomas Hurka Commonsense Consequentialism Wherein Morality Meets Rationality Douglas W. Portmore Against Absolute Goodness Richard Kraut The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty Pekka Väyrynen In Praise of Desire Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder Confusion of Tongues A Theory of Normative Language Stephen Finlay The Virtues of Happiness A Theory of the Good Life Paul Bloomfield Having It Both Ways Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics Edited by Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge Motivational Internalism Edited by Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson, and Fredrik Björklund Motivational Internalism EDITED BY GUNNAR BJÖRNSSON, CAJ STRANDBERG, RAGNAR FRANCÉN OLINDER, JOHN ERIKSSON and FREDRIK BJÖRKLUND Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 © Oxford University Press 2015 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Motivational internalism / edited by Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson, and Fredrik Björklund. pages cm. — (Oxford moral theory) Includes index. ISBN 978–0–19–936795–5 (hardcover : alk. paper) eISBN 978–0–19–026675–2 1. Ethics. 2. Moral motivation. I. Björnsson, Gunnar, editor. BJ45.M68 2014 170′.42—dc23 2014018542 Contents Preface Contributors 1. Motivational Internalism: Contemporary Debates GUNNAR BJÖRNSSON, CAJ STRANDBERG, RAGNAR FRANCÉN OLINDER, JOHN ERIKSSON, AND FREDRIK BJÖRKLUND Part I EVIDENCE FOR AND AGAINST MOTIVATIONAL INTERNALISM 2. Evaluative Judgements, Judgements about Reasons, and Motivations MICHAEL SMITH 3. Motivational Externalism: Formulation, Methodology, Rationality, and Indifference NICK ZANGWILL 4. An Empirical Case for Motivational Internalism JESSE PRINZ 5. Unconditional Motivational Internalism and Hume’s Lesson DANIEL EGGERS 6. What’s Required for Motivation by Principle? JEANETTE KENNETT Part II THE RELEVANCE OF MOTIVATIONAL INTERNALISM 7. Internalism: Cui Bono? MICHAEL RIDGE 8. Pure Expressivism and Motivational Internalism TEEMU TOPPINEN 9. Can Reasons Fundamentalism Answer the Normative Question? JAMIE DREIER 10. Naturalistic Moral Realism and Motivational Internalism: From Negative to Positive JON TRESAN Part III BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM 11. Detecting Value with Motivational Responses SIGRÚN SVAVARSDÓTTIR 12. Intuition and Belief in Moral Motivation ANTTI KAUPPINEN 13. Tempered Internalism and the Participatory Stance KATE MANNE 14. Two Functions of Moral Language: Rethinking the Amoralist JOHN MUMM Index Preface This volume collects 13 original essays and an introductory chapter on moral judgment motivational internalism (or just “internalism”), the thesis that there is an intrinsic or necessary connection between moral judgment and moral motivation. Internalism is an important thesis in a number of metaethical debates. It is best known for its role in arguments against moral cognitivism that build on the Humean thesis that beliefs cannot be intrinsically motivational, but is widely taken to have significant implications also for the viability of moral absolutism, moral realism, and moral rationalism. Being a constraint on theories of moral motivation and moral judgment, it is also directly relevant to core issues in moral psychology. But while versions of internalism are very often invoked as a central explicandum for metaethical theories, they are also explicitly rejected by a number of important theorists, often on the basis of putative counterexamples. Obviously, this poses difficulties for metaethical theories with internalist implications, in particular forms of non- cognitivism or rationalism. In spite of its central position in metaethics and moral psychology and its highly controversial status, internalism has not received the kind of focused attention directed at other metaethical issues, such as moral realism, moral intuitionism, moral relativism, moral particularism, or moral naturalism. As far as we can tell, no monograph by a leading philosopher has been published on the topic in the last 30 years or so, nor any collection of essays. During the same period, views about the connection between moral judgment and moral motivation have developed and multiplied, adding a number of interesting options, significant complications, and methodological developments. These theoretical additions are there to be found but are scattered in papers and chapters, and though there have been several highly interesting exchanges, many of these are largely disconnected from one another, drawing little from wider developments. This volume is meant to help people appreciate the state of the art of research on internalism, see connections between various aspects of the debate, and deepen the discussion of a number of central aspects. The introductory chapter provides a structured 1 overview of the debate with a focus on the last two decades or so. Its ambition is not only to canvass the variety of positions in the field, but also to distinguish several important threads and trends in recent developments. Early versions of the 13 chapters of original research were presented at a conference on motivational internalism at the University of Gothenburg in 2012. They include contributions from some of the most important participants in current metaethical debates involving issues of internalism: Michael Smith, Sigrún Svavarsdóttir, Jesse Prinz, Jon Tresan, Jamie Dreier, Nick Zangwill, Jeanette Kennett, and Michael Ridge; the other contributors, Antti Kauppinen, Kate Manne, Teemu Toppinen, Daniel Eggers, and John Mumm, were selected on the basis of papers presented at the conference. The contributions divide into three groups. The first group focuses on what evidence there is for or against various versions of internalism; the second focuses on the relevance of versions of internalism for wider metaethical issues; the third contains contributions that in different ways seek to accommodate both internalist and externalist aspects of moral practice. Our planning for this volume has benefited from advice from Jamie Dreier and from discussion with numerous participants at several workshops and the final conference organized as part of the Moral Motivation: Evidence and Relevance project at the University of Gothenburg, including Folke Tersman, Jimmy Lenman, Shaun Nichols, and the contributors to this volume. Two anonymous reviewers for Oxford University Press provided helpful suggestions for the introductory chapter. Work on the volume has been funded by the Swedish Research Council (grant number 2009–1517). Gunnar Björnsson Umeå Fredrik Björklund Lund Caj Strandberg Gothenburg John Eriksson Gothenburg Ragnar Francén Olinder Gothenburg December 2013 1 The chapter is a revised and expanded version of Fredrik Björklund, Gunnar Björnsson, John Eriksson, Ragnar Francén Olinder, and Caj Strandberg, “Recent Work on Motivational Internalism,” Analysis 72 (2012): 124–137.
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